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A Comparative Study of Central Bank Regulation and Financial 
Stability: Lessons for the People’s Republic of China 
 
Author: Miao HAN 
 
The global financial crisis (GFC) has been defined as the worst crisis since the 1930s 
Great Depression, affecting the worldwide financial and economic landscape and 
requiring profound legal reforms. The GFC has challenged the capacity of central 
banks to deal with financial risk. This thesis thus aims to explore the relationship 
between central bank regulation and financial stability. China has attracted particular 
attention by its quick responses and apparent speedy recovery; as a consequence, the 
strengths and weaknesses of its central bank should be critically assessed. 
  
The research question of this thesis looks at how the GFC has challenged the role 
played by state central banks in maintaining financial stability. It is answered 
through a comparative study. In principle, rules and laws affect a central bank in the 
context of their two-tier relationships—with Government and with the Market. This 
relationship is also affected by central banks in response to financial crises. Four 
major central banks are selected for comparison in this thesis; these are the Federal 
Reserve System of the US (US Fed), the Bank of England (BOE), the Bank of Japan 
(BOJ) and the People’s Bank of China (PBC). Their respective legal frameworks 
have been shaped by whether they are market-oriented or government-controlled. 
But such a stark distinction has been challenged in view of the different styles of 
central bank crisis management that occurred during the GFC.   
  
The case studies presented here suggest that a convergence has co-existed with some 
divergence during the development of central banks. The legal frameworks of these 
four central banks were very similar before the GFC, but they actually operated with 
varying levels of independence. With similar policy responses during the GFC, they 
have performed very differently and faced different tasks. This thesis seeks to 
identify some central explanatory variable for this behaviour, addressing the 
mismatch of similar risk management solutions and different outcomes. This 
iv 
 
comparative study argues that in spite of integration and globalization, the focus of 
central banks on risk management and financial stability has actually shown 
significant differences in approach.  
  
This thesis has also undertaken a systematic study of China’s central bank. Overall, 
limited independence has seriously constrained the PBC’s functions, making other 
reform measures relatively superficial as solutions to various risk management 
problems. The GFC has further exposed its inherent shortcoming. After comparing 
the PBC with other three central banks, this thesis concludes that domestic 
vulnerabilities, rather than external shocks, continue to affect the PBC’s orientation; 
this requires an improved balance between political power and market principles. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Research Question and Background 
 
Sweden’s Riksbank, the first central bank in the world, was established in 1668 and 
most countries, either developed or developing, have since established their own 
state central banks.
1
 The inception of central banks was often linked with certain 
delegated tasks from their governments, but their role in stabilising financial markets 
was still far from clear. This conundrum – how central banks contribute to financial 
stability – has been spotlighted again because of the far-reaching effects brought 
about by the global financial crisis (GFC). In this context, the main research question 
of this thesis will examine how the GFC has challenged the role played by central 
banks in maintaining financial stability; this will be answered through a case study of 
four leading central banks with different orientations propositioned. It will argue that 
the GFC has challenged them to strike an improved balance between government 
and the market, among others.  
 
In theory, there are a number of explanations concerning how central banks deal with 
financial crises, and some central banks were expressly established for the very 
purpose to do so.
2
 Even so, it is still a matter of debate as to how their role in 
maintaining financial stability has been defined. This problem has in part been 
attributed to conceptual confusion, and also to an unclear relationship between 
monetary stability and financial stability. 
 
The definition of “financial stability” has itself evolved over time, but without 
achieving much consensus. For example, financial stability has been defined as the 
                                                          
1
 According to the Central Bank Hub listed by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), central 
banks from 168 countries and areas (including the European Central Bank, Hong Kong SAR and 
Macau SAR) have registered <www.bis.org/cbanks.htm>. 
2
 Historical review will be given in Chapter Two. As argued in one case study, the Bank of Japan was 
set up to deal with domestic financial manias.  
2 
 
ability of the financial system to facilitate and enhance economic processes, manage 
risks and absorb shocks; it is also seen as a continuum, changeable over time, and 
consistent with multiple combinations of financial elements.
3
 At the very least, 
financial stability precludes crises, though not necessarily change per se; and thus, 
financial stability could roughly be regarded as the period without such crises. Three 
main approaches may be taken to conceptualising financial crisis: the monetarist, the 
asymmetric information perspective and the financial instability hypothesis.
4
 For 
example, cyclical excess could disturb market participants: a financial crisis is a 
disruption to financial markets where adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
become more intensive, and the financial sector fails to channel efficiently the most 
productive investment opportunities.
5
 To the monetarists, errors from monetary 
policy lead to instability in the financial system, or produce far-reaching negative 
influences by causing minor disruptions;
6
 this approach has linked central banks 
more directly to financial stability. Recently, different theories have been employed 
to understand financial crises, including game theory and asymmetric information.
7
 
Overall, it is difficult to define a “financial crisis”, but it is very evident that financial 
markets have previously developed with crises, which can be prompted by different 
causes, and also take varying forms.
8
 Alternatively, if a positive correlation can be 
established between monetary and financial stability, it is then not hard to determine 
the role played by a central bank in maintaining financial stability. However, such a 
link has not yet been proved with convincing evidence, especially with continuing 
controversy about the synergy or trade-offs between monetary and financial 
stability.
9
  
                                                          
3
 Garry J. Schinasi, Safeguarding Financial Stability, Theory and Practice (Washington DC: IMF 
2006). 
4
 Andrew Crockett, ‘The Theory and Practice of Financial Stability’ (1996) De Economist 144 (4): 
531–568. 
5
 Frederic S. Mishkin, ‘Anatomy of a Financial Crisis’ NBER Working Paper Series, No 3934, 1991 
<www.ppge.ufrgs.br/Giacomo/arquivos/esp207/mishkin-1992.pdf>.  
6
 Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States 1867–1960 (1st Ed., 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1971). 
7
 Similar to the definition of financial stability, arguments continue about what causes financial crises. 
Refer to, e.g., Roger W. Ferguson, ‘Should Financial Stability Be an Explicit Central bank Objective?’ 
in Piero C. Ugolini, Andrea Schaechter and Mark R. Stone (eds.), Challenges to Central Banking 
form Globalized Financial Systems (Washington DC: IMF 2003). 
8
 Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Z. Aliber, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial 
Crises (6
th
 Ed, London: Palgrave Macmillan 2011). 
9
 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, ‘Central Banks and Financial Stability: Exploring a Land in Between’ 
2
nd
 ECB Central Banking Conference “The Transformation of the European Financial System”, 
Policy Panel Introductory Paper, Frankfurt am Main, October 24&25, 2002 
<www.ecb.europa.eu/events/pdf/conferences/tps.pdf>.  
3 
 
It can be challenging to posit a clear-cut link between central banks and financial 
stability, but the GFC has clarified leading issues. This crisis arose from the 
subprime mortgage risk attacking the US housing market in 2007, and caused global 
financial upheavals from 2008 onward.
10
 While many factors triggered and/or 
intensified this crisis,
11
 central banks have in succession been criticised for providing 
excessive liquidity for years running up to the GFC, and also for their inability to 
maintain systemic stability.
12
 Moreover, major central banks have lately launched 
unprecedented monetary expansion, having themselves moved to the centre of crisis 
management. It is thus argued that central banks have assumed particular 
responsibility for dealing with financial stability: “The overall framework [of 
financial stability] does not appear to have been fully conducive to achieving its 
objectives, often leaving ill-defined the responsibilities and tools of central banks in 
their pursuit of financial stability.”13  
 
Central banks are judged to be both problematic in the building up to the GFC yet 
still required to provide solutions for it. With recent radical changes, they have been 
challenged to develop better mechanisms for achieving financial stability: 
“Following the on-going financial crisis, Central Banks are now probably on the 
verge of a further, fourth, epoch, though the achievement of a new consensus on 
their appropriate behaviour and operations may well be as messy and 
confused…Indeed the financial stability authority would then, de facto, become the 
true Central Bank.”14 
 
All these issues have provided a focus for this thesis of how the GFC has challenged 
central bank regulation
15
 to maintain financial stability.  
                                                          
10
 The GFC, including causes and its globalisation, will be analysed in Chapter Three. 
11
 For an overall introduction, see, Robert J. Shiller, The Subprime Solution: How Today’s Global 
Financial Crisis Happened, and What to Do about It (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2008). 
12
 General responses from central banks will be introduced in Chapter Three, and the performances of 
the selected four central banks will be discussed in the case studies. But for a general review, refer to, 
John B. Taylor, ‘The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went 
Wrong’ NBER Working Paper 14631, 2009 <www.nber.org/papers/w14631.pdf>. 
13
 Erlend Walter Nier, ‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from 
the Crisis’ IMF Working Paper WP/09/70, 2009 
<www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp0970.pdf>.  
14
 C.A.E. Goodhart, ‘The Changing Role of Central Banks’ BIS Working Papers No 326, 2010 
<www.bis.org/events/conf100624/goodhartpaper.pdf>. 
15
 “Central bank regulation” will be defined in Chapter Two. Here we can understand this concept as 
policy responses from central banks to deal with financial crises. 
4 
 
1.2 Contribution to the Literature 
 
To understand how the GFC has challenged the capacity of central banks to deal 
with financial crises, two groups of central banks with different basic assumptions 
will be examined to derive and test the key propositions of this thesis.  
 
In spite of other theoretical and statistical studies which focus more upon the 
economic effects of central banking, this thesis will employ a more basic theory to 
identify key legal considerations relevant to central bank regulation aiming at 
achieving financial stability. Central banks became involved in stabilising financial 
markets as paper currency replaced metallic currencies. By means of the money 
supply, their engagement has since been further enhanced. The need to maintain 
currency value necessitated some agency to establish and maintain public confidence 
and, at the same time, deposit takers began to participate in the wider monetary cycle. 
So, after being established as an important intermediary between the banking system 
and the wider economy, the central bank has gradually developed its core value: 
serving as the government’s banker, and meanwhile as the bankers’ bank.16 Starting 
from this core orientation, a central bank is principally located in a two-tier 
relationship – with both government and the market. The theoretical and legal 
framework used here will revolve around such two tiers, and four individual case 
studies will illustrate how the GFC has specifically challenged them. 
 
While central bank regulation can be examined from different dimensions, there are 
some reasons for approaching it from a legal perspective. In general, rulemaking and 
law reform have developed to modify how financial crises can be dealt with.
17
 Since 
the beginning of the 20
th
 century, it became more common to formalise the position 
of central banks, especially their relationship with the finance ministries, by writing 
these expectations into statutes.
18
 As central banks have gradually improved their 
                                                          
16
 C.A.E. Goodhart, The Central Bank and the Financial System (Dordrecht: Macmillan 1995) 205–
215. 
17
 Ioannis Glinavos, ‘Regulation and the Role of Law in Economic Crisis’ (2010) European Business 
Law Review 21(4) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1425782>. 
18
 Before that, such lawful formalisation was impeded due to the lack of what was possible in both 
theory and practice. It was whereas argued that formalisation by statutes was beneficial: legal 
compulsion could define the position of a central bank in a more rigid manner without placing it 
under the direction of the finance ministries or as a pure government institution. Miroslav A. Kriz, 
‘Central Banks and the State Today’ (1948) The American Economic Review 38(4): 565-580. 
5 
 
major functions, statutes have often described monetary stability as their primary 
objective, and have also mandated that they support wider economic development. 
Furthermore, attitudes to financial regulation have continued to evolve across 
different financial crises. As the market-oriented reform spread from the 1970s, the 
role played by governments in financial markets became constrained to regulation 
and supervision after a period of continuous deregulation. However, flawed 
regulation and supervision also helped trigger the GFC. As a result, major statutory 
reforms sought to enhance systemic resilience; at the same time, the relocation of 
central banks as systemic regulators has invariably been written into statutes.
19
 
Examples of this include the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act) in the US, and the Financial Services Act 2012 in 
the UK. In sum, statutes have redefined how central banks can act in an effort to 
achieve system-wide stability, while the GFC has prompted significant legal changes. 
This thesis will focus upon how laws and rules govern central bank regulation with 
regard to systemic stability. In principle, legal frameworks are argued to be based 
upon the two-tier relationship, resulting in certain key legal provisions; central banks 
have dealt with financial crises by employing policy instruments under their 
respective legal authority.
20
 It is clear that central bank crisis management is affected 
by each specific two-tier relationship, and this delineates which challenges 
individual central banks most.  
 
The main research question addressed here will test the key propositions with 
reference to four leading central banks. Central banks were first set up in developed 
countries, including the Bank of England (BOE) in 1694, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) in 
1883 and the Federal Reserve System of the US (US Fed) in 1913. After World War 
II, new central banks were established in other (often semi-colonial) countries, 
including China. However, only limited written materials are available to classify 
them. In this thesis, four central banks will be examined from their respective two-
tier relationships, categorised according to their market or government orientation. 
What is more, it will pay particular attention to China’s central bank. As China was 
one of the first major countries to have recovered from the spill-over effects of the 
                                                          
19
 Supra 17. 
20
 Alan S. Blinder, Central Banking in Theory and Practice (2
nd
 Ed, Massachusetts: MIT Press 1999) 
25–51. 
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GFC, it might be assumed that the policy responses from the PBC and beyond were 
particularly effective. However, this thesis will show that the GFC challenged the 
PBC to such an extent that explicit government intervention might threaten China’s 
further market-oriented reform. 
 
In essence, this thesis will seek to contribute to the relevant literature from the 
following three perspectives:  
(i) theoretical and legal frameworks used will be based upon the core value of 
a central bank being both the government’s banker and the bankers’ bank. 
The two-tier relationship is thus essential in defining a central bank. 
Propositions will be tested and key legal provisions examined in regard to 
these two tiers; 
(ii) case studies will revolve around the propositions assumed to be relevant 
to the four central banks, not only testing their market or government 
orientation, but also clarifying how the GFC has prompted each to change; 
and 
(iii) as there is lack of systemic research into China’s central bank, this thesis 
will probe the PBC’s distinctive character and role, and duly compare it. 
 
 
1.3 Key Propositions 
 
To begin with, it is necessary to set out the key concepts before the specific 
propositions are examined. The concepts of “state” and “government” might have 
different meanings and also have been used interchangeably in different academic 
studies. In international law, there is a close relation between “government” and 
“statehood”. The best known formulation of the basic criteria for “statehood” is laid 
down in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States: “The State 
as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a 
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to 
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enter into relations with other States.”21 It has further been argued that “government” 
or “effective government” is the basis for the other central criterion of independence 
for both internal and external affairs.
22
 At the very least, “state” is different from 
“government”: an effective government is one prerequisite for statehood; and the 
main – and for most purposes the only – organ by which the state acts in 
international relations is its central government. In any event, international law 
distinguishes between changes of State personality and changes of the government of 
the State.
23
 In this thesis, “government” will be used in contrast to “market”, in 
distinguishing between the two groups of central banks. 
 
The GFC has brought many different issues into the spotlight. Inter alia, the rule of 
the prevailing neo-liberalism ideology has been questioned: ‘the onset of the global 
financial crisis in 2008 has been widely interpreted as a fundamental challenge to, if 
not crisis of, neoliberal governance’.24 Between the 1970s and 1990s, neo-liberal 
market-oriented reform became widespread in the US, UK, Japan and beyond.
25
 In 
principle, classic neo-liberalisation incorporates privatisation, minimal regulation, 
depoliticisation, and liberalisation.
26
 Market principles have been expected to enable 
economic units to maintain a temporary imbalance between incomes and 
expenditures, adjust the types of claims with diversifying assets and liquidity, and 
achieve a sound payment system making a wider range of transactions feasible. Such 
a market economy cannot be effective without certain pre-conditions, including open 
financial markets, information closure, no anticipation of bailouts, and proper set 
response mechanisms.
27
Furthermore, since market-oriented institutions claim 
positive association with economic development, market disciplines are also 
                                                          
21
 Article 33, Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Montevideo, 26 December 1933. 
22
 See Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) 2001: Arts 
4–7 for the normal situation of responsibility for acts of State organs or agencies and Arts 8–11 for 
exceptional cases.  
23
 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2
nd
 Ed, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
2006) 31–33, 55–61. 
24
 Jamie Peck, Nik Theodore and Neil Brenner, ‘Postneoliberalism and its Malcontents’ (2009) 
Antipode 41(S1): 94–116. 
25
 Financial liberalisation in the US, UK, Japan and China will be introduced respectively in the case 
studies later.  
26
 William L. Megginson and George M. Netter, ‘From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical 
Studies on Privatization’ (2001) Journal of Economic Literature 39(2): 321-389. 
27
 Timothy D. Lane, ‘Market Discipline’ (1993) IMF Staff Paper 40 (1): 
<www.jstor.org/stable/3867377>.  
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employed to reform those institutions, including central banks.
28
 In addition, during 
the market-oriented reform, government has been challenged to balance its welfare 
role and market making role.
29
 However, neo-liberalism did not develop evenly,
30
 
and differs across the West and the East.
31
 For example, a tight nexus of government, 
financial markets (mainly banks) and firms achieved Japan’s industrialisation and 
economic modernisation, while China has explicitly defined its government as the 
maker of the markets as early as the beginning of its economic reform.  
 
As regards the financial sector, since the end of the Bretton Woods System, the fixed 
exchange rates were gradually liberalised, and intervention from government has 
been reduced to necessary regulation.
32
 In consequence, market discipline is a force, 
whose effectiveness – or, frequently, the alleged ineffectiveness – pervades financial 
policy, while it does not exclude government intervention especially as regards 
regulation and supervision.
33
 In this context, effective market orientation of central 
banking is an outcome of monetary policy which succeeds in keeping overall prices 
low, as well as a sound and stable financial system, which operates at positive 
market rates of interest across the whole range of financial intermediations.
34
 
Market-oriented central banks are generally responsible for stable prices by 
undertaking a programme of actions, including interest rate policies, open market 
operations (OMOs), quantitative controls, and so forth.
35
 They have continued to 
make credit and capital allocation more feasible by conducting due regulation and 
                                                          
28
 Jakob De Haan, Susanna Lundstrom and Jan-Egbert Sturm, ‘Market-Oriented Institutions and 
Policies and Economic Growth: A Critical Survey’ (2006) Journal of Economic Survey 20(2): 157-
191. 
29
 Alberta M. Sbragia, ‘Governance, the State, and the Market: What Is Going On?’ (2000) 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 13(2): 243-250.  
30
 Supra 24. 
31
 For a detailed analysis, see, Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of 
Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990). 
32
 Donato Mascinadaro and Marc Quintyn, ‘Helping Hand or Grabbing Hand? Politicians, 
Supervision Regime, Financial Structure and Market Review’ (2008) Northern American Journal of 
Economics and Finance 19(2): 153-173. 
33
 Supra 27. 
34
 With market disciplines, central banking should reflect the real relationship between the demand for 
real cash balances and the level of economic activities, as well as the opportunity cost of keeping such 
balances rather than increasing an alternative asset for an appropriate rate of return. Vicenete B. 
Valdepenas, ‘Market Oriented Central Banking’ (1994) Philippine Review of Economics 31(2): 104-
136. 
35
 Claudio E.V. Borio, ‘The Implementation of Monetary Policy in Industrial Countries: A Survey’ 
BIS Economic Papers, No 47, 1997 <http://bis.hasbeenforeclosed.com/publ/econ47.pdf>.  
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supervision, and also control payment and settlement systems oversight.
36
 However, 
financial liberalisation by no means guarantees against financial crises, and may 
even enhance fragility.
37
 Financial liberalisation and innovation have removed the 
territorial correspondence between financial markets and central banks’ jurisdiction, 
whilst also blurring the traditional distinctions between banks and non-bank financial 
institutions; this further challenges central banks pursuit of financial stability.
38
 
 
Based on this separation of “market” and “government”, this thesis assumes different 
orientations of four selected central banks. In theory, central banks are generally in 
charge of monetary policy and financial regulation to some extent; from their 
respective two-tier relationships, they are argued to be either market-oriented or 
government-controlled. Both the US Fed and the BOE were primarily market-
oriented, while the former was a consolidated regulator within a rigid legal 
framework, and the latter transferred major financial regulatory duties to an 
independent outside agency in the late 1990s. They both have represented the 
diffusion of market-oriented reforms, whereas the BOJ has seemingly followed 
another direction. Due to long-term subordination to its finance ministry, it was still 
under government control after financial liberalisation, and its oversight was limited 
to selected but direct micro monitoring duties. China did not launch economic 
reform until 1978, aiming for a shift from a highly centralised planning economy to 
reliance upon market disciplines. As far as the PBC is concerned, it remains 
government-owned and combines with other responsible agencies to control directly 
China’s partially-liberalised financial markets. Before the GFC changed their 
respective two-tier relationships, propositions about these central banks can thus be 
summarised in Table 1.1: 
 
 
                                                          
36
 Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa and Fabrizio Saccomanni, ‘Managing a Market-Led Global Financial 
System’ in Peter B. Kenen (ed.), Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years After Bretton Woods 
(Washington: IMF: World Bank Group 1994) 235–268. 
37
 Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache, ‘Financial Liberalization and Financial Fragility’ 
World Bank Publications, No 1917, 1998 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/84797-
1251813753820/6415739-1251813951236/demirguc.pdf>.  
38
 A.H. Golembe and J.J. Mingo, ‘Can Supervision and Regulation Ensure Financial Stability?’ at 
FRB San Francisco Conference “The Search for Financial Stability: The Past Fifty Years”, California, 
1985. 
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Table 1.1: Propositions about Central Banks in this Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, the market or government orientation is the principal indicator for 
distinguishing between these central banks. The four case studies will test the 
propositions illustrated in this table, and also identify further differences.  
 
 
1.4 Research Method 
 
This research has combined logical, explanatory, empirical, hermeneutic, exploratory 
and evaluative information.
39
 Once analysed by employing appropriate 
methodologies, the propositions can be tested and the main research question duly 
answered. In essence, this research is an interdisciplinary comparative study of four 
selected countries. 
                                                          
39
 Mark Van Hoecke, Methodologies of Legal Research, What Kind of Method for What Kind of 
Discipline? (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2011). 
 Proposition 1 
The US Fed was predominantly a market-oriented or laissez faire 
central bank; it was also a consolidated financial regulator based 
upon rigid legislation.   
 
 Proposition 2 
The BOE was predominantly a market-oriented or laissez faire 
central bank; it had limited prudential regulation role in the 
tripartite model (involving the BOE, the FSA and HM Treasury). 
 
 Proposition 3 
The BOJ was a government-guided central bank, and a regulator 
that relied upon moral suasion with limited functions; 
 
 Proposition 4 
The PBC was a government-owned politically-dominated central 
bank, and a proactive regulator as part of China’s financial 
regulatory regime. 
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1.4.1 Interdisciplinary Topic 
 
The study of central banks is inevitably interdisciplinary, drawing upon insights 
from a variety of intellectual traditions, such as economics, finance, mathematics, 
management, law, social science, etc. Among all interdisciplinary approaches to 
legal research, there is an increasingly close link between law and economics.
40
 Such 
interdisciplinary legal - economic research is 
“… concerned with the relationship between the economy of a particular place at a 
given time and the law that controls and guides economic endeavours. We would 
analyse, therefore, the particular forms of organization of the means of production 
and distribution in relation to the legal arrangements that control, confine, and give 
form to the economic activity.”41  
 
According to this criteria, “immediate research in the general area of” central bank 
law “may well be concerned with the relationship between the law and the 
maximization of satisfactions that flow from” central banking.  
 
This thesis will approach the capacity of the selected central banks to deal with 
financial crises from a legal perspective. However, it is argued that many legal issues 
could not be properly understood through reliance upon legal doctrine alone.
42
 For 
example, the relationship between a central bank and the government, “central bank 
independence” in legal provision, is similarly written into statutes, but not actually 
decided by law alone. As will be evident in the following case studies, it can vary 
due to a combination of different factors, including the different development stages 
of domestic markets, financial resources available for central banking, and positions 
                                                          
40
 Erika Arban, ‘Interdisciplinary Approaches to Legal Research: Law and Economics and Critical 
Legal Studies from a North American Perspective’   
<www.amministrazioneincammino.luiss.it/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/E.Arban_giur-cost2.pdf>. 
Law-related interdisciplinary research has a long history. See, George L. Priest, ‘The Growth of 
Interdisciplinary Research and the Industrial Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to 
Judge Edwards’ Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, Faculty Scholarship Series No 1-1-
1993, 1993 
<http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1622&context=fss_papers>. 
41
 Marshall Harris, ‘Legal-Economic Interdisciplinary Research’ 10 Journal of Legal Education 1957-
1968: 452-474. 
42
 Robert Cryer, Tamara Hervey, Bal Sokhi-Bulley and Alexandra Bohm, Research Methodologies in 
EU and International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2011). For historical development of legal 
scholarship, refer to, Richard A. Posner, ‘The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship’ (1981) The Yale 
Law Journal 90(5): 1113–1130. 
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of other governments engaged in setting and implementing monetary policy, 
designing other economic policy objectives, appointing key members, etc. Therefore, 
this thesis will examine de jure legal provisions regarding central bank regulation by 
taking into account de facto circumstance. 
 
1.4.2 Literature Review 
 
This thesis makes its analysis in terms of rule-based legal frameworks, and thus, 
relies upon a library-based research. It reviews the literature regarding the historical 
development of central banks, the statutes governing them, and their policy 
responses and prompted changes during the GFC. Data is collected from diverse 
sources, including books, journals, magazines, newspapers, conference papers, 
reports from international organisations, and websites of both Western and Chinese 
origins. It is not a simple presentation of such materials; rather, it will integrate 
different arguments systematically and develop more critical assessments of their 
meanings and value.  
 
1.4.3 Empirical Study 
 
Empirical evidence dominates economics-related studies. Central banks themselves 
publish data and statistics regarding monetary policy and beyond. As a thesis in law, 
this study will not focus upon data per se, but employ them to gain first-hand 
insights into the policy responses from, and performances of, the four central banks 
throughout the duration of the GFC. Empirical study will incorporate: (i) economic 
and financial inputs, such as GDP, employment, and CPI rates; and (ii) indicators for 
monetary policy, including the money base, interest rates, and the non-performing 
loans rates.  
 
It should be noted that the reliability of data from Chinese authorities has been 
criticised. It is argued that due to strict censorship, official information can be open 
to manipulation. Limited official publications are available in English, while Chinese 
language allows considerable flexibility when interpreting politically sensitive topics. 
To balance this, this thesis will cover both inside and outside information about 
China, such as that from multiple-national organisations, and public and private 
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think tanks. For example, country reports from the BIS, IMF and World Bank will be 
used to analyse China-relevant issues, while views from the specialist institutions 
and research centres will be employed to assess the reliability of Chinese official 
statements. 
 
1.4.4 Country-Selected Comparison 
 
These case studies are country-specific.
43
 Countries earmarked for further detailed 
analysis of their central banks include China, Japan, the UK and the US, particularly 
for determining comparative convergence and divergence. 
 
Particular attention will be given to the PBC, and its historical development, legal 
framework and policy responses to the GFC are all examined. This thesis will also 
review central bank regulation from the other three countries. For some time before 
the GFC, both the US and the UK had pursued finance-led growth, while financial 
fragility intensified.
44
 The US has been the centre of market disturbances during the 
GFC, whilst its losses and policy responses are equally striking. So is the case of the 
UK. Both the US Fed and the BOE are selected to represent broadly what might 
broadly be described as an Anglo-American Style of central banking, orientated 
towards key market principles. China’s economic reform claims to introduce market 
principles, and thus, the market-oriented US Fed and BOE have important reference 
value for the PBC. The BOJ is of particular interest in that its own earlier economic 
bubble produced what has been described as its ‘lost decade’, especially after 
unprecedented monetary expansion has increased wider economic uncertainty after 
the GFC (which Paul Krugman has referred to “Nipponization”). Both the BOJ and 
the PBC are categorised as government-controlled central banks, which operate 
closely under their governments’ guides, and propositions about them are framed in 
that light. Therefore, in this thesis, central banks from four countries are selected 
according to their differing propositions.  
                                                          
43
 For a general introduction to this research method, see, Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, 
Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2007) 69–132. 
44
 Robert Boyer, ‘The Global Financial Crisis in Historical Perspective: An Economic Analysis 
Combining Minsky, Hayek, Fisher, Keynes and the Regulation Approach’ (2013) Accounting, 
Economics and Law 3(3): 93-139. 
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1.5 Thesis Structure 
 
In testing our propositions, we need to consider the issues that can most effectively 
be compared from the four different central banks and the major comparative study 
can be presented accordingly. A legally directed framework has been developed 
from an analysis of the two-tier relationship governing central banks so that 
significant differences and similarities can be identified from any comparisons made.  
 
Part I will introduce the theoretical framework for this thesis. Chapter Two, 
acknowledging that central banks serve as both the government’s banker and the 
bankers’ bank, makes their two-tier relationship explicit, with major legal provisions 
specified. In addition, the central bank is granted crisis management solutions by law, 
and will adjust its pre-existing two-tier relationship when dealing with financial 
instability. Chapter Three will explain how the GFC challenged central banks 
generally.  
 
Part II covers four case studies. Individual central banks – US Fed, BOE, BOJ and 
PBC – will be examined to test our key propositions about their market or 
government orientation. Historical evidence suggests that central banks have 
continued to serve as government’s banker and the bankers’ bank, and reforms have 
revolved around the two-tier relationship. As far as rule-based legal frameworks are 
concerned, in spite of similar provisions, particular two-tier relationships can still 
take plural forms in these countries. Their proposed orientations will be individually 
examined according to their respective legal frameworks, and compared with the 
changes following the GFC, illustrating how this crisis has challenged each of them. 
Both the US Fed and the BOE renewed direct rescues to the markets in cooperation 
with their governments, whilst the GFC has raised intense criticism regarding due 
regulation and supervision. The BOJ was required to deal with domestic economic 
crisis before the GFC’s spill-over effects, and explored further monetary expansion 
under increased government intervention. It is thus known as “a central bank in 
crises”. In China’s case, the PBC officially assisted its quick resilience, which is 
whereas attributed to strong government intervention; and also, its long-term 
negative implications added uncertainty to the future of China’s market-oriented 
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reform. In brief, the commitments of these four central banks to their prevailing 
orientations have been changed by the GFC to varying degrees. 
 
This thesis will consider China’s central bank (PBC) in two chapters: reform in 
Chapter Seven and crisis management in Chapter Eight. In Chapters Four, Five and 
Six, relevant legal provisions will be highlighted by the case studies of US Fed, BOE, 
and BOJ, making it possible to compare the legal framework of the PBC after 
reforms.  
 
Part III will make the major comparative analysis following the presented case 
studies. Chapter Nine will seek to chart key findings, displaying the pattern of 
observed convergence and divergence. Tables will compare these four central banks 
in terms of their overarching legal frameworks, crisis management solutions, and 
prompted reforms during the GFC. Since this thesis adopts a legal approach, detailed 
comparisons will be made in relation to different legal orders in all four countries. 
After summarising the main findings, Chapter Nine concludes that even as their legal 
frameworks became increasingly similar prior to the GFC, these four central banks 
still have actually operated from different two-tier relationships. Drawing upon a 
second comparison, it will demonstrate that central banks have already applied 
certain similar policy instruments, but these do not guarantee similar outcomes. It is 
evident that the GFC has challenged these central banks differently, and changed key 
distinctions between market-oriented and government-controlled central banks. In 
addition to putting central bank regulation under critical pressure, the GFC has also 
amended the prevailing government–market nexus. This will be further illustrated 
with evidences from both the West and the East. In spite of all the changes prompted 
by the GFC, central banks’ core value as the government’s banker and the bankers’ 
bank has remained untouched. Therefore, this thesis finds that the GFC has changed 
the two-tier relationships governing central banks so as to strike an improved balance 
between government and the market.  
 
Chapter Ten will finally conclude how the main research question has been answered 
through a comparative case study of these selected countries. During the testing of 
our key propositions, the significance of this research will be emphasised. Both 
limitations of this study and avenues for further research are also identified.  
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This thesis consists of ten chapters, and its structure can be illustrated by the 
following map (Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1 Thesis Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Chapter One 
Part I Theoretical Framework 
Chapter Two 
Two-tier Relationship, legal framework and conceptual underpinnings 
Chapter Three 
GFC challenge for central bank regulation and review of policy responses 
 
Part II Case Studies 
Chapter Four  
Proposition 1 – the US Fed and the GFC 
Chapter Five 
 Proposition 2 – the BOE and the GFC 
Chapter Six 
 Proposition 3 – the BOJ and the GFC 
Chapters Seven & Eight 
 Proposition 4 – the PBC reform and the GFC experience 
 
Part III Comparison Analysis 
Chapter Nine 
 Convergence and divergence coexist from the pre-existing legal 
frameworks to policy responses to the GFC.  
 GFC challenged their respective two-tier relationships, whilst the key 
distinctions between market-oriented and government-controlled central 
banks have changed.  
 GFC also changed the government–market nexus, and differing 
significances have been attached to the selected central banks. 
 GFC has brought other concerns into the international arena. 
 PBC can be re-visited in a comparative context, pointing out the major 
constraints upon its role and functions.  
 
Conclusion 
Chapter Ten 
Significance, limits and further research avenues 
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1.6 Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, the GFC challenge will be examined from a legal perspective of central 
bank regulation, illustrating how central banks have managed to focus upon systemic 
financial stability. This chapter has explained some key issues before moving on to 
test our propositions relating to the market or government orientation assumed to the 
selected central banks.  
 
The following chapter will first present the two-tier relationship, which decides how 
a central bank serves as the government’s banker and the bankers’ bank. As follows, 
it will suggest what the two-tier relationship meant for the prevailing legal 
framework and how the GFC challenged such two tiers. Individual case studies will 
focus upon the key propositions about the selected central banks. China’s central 
bank will be given a systemic study with the emphasis upon its government 
orientation, and then, a critical assessment can be made in a comparative context. 
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Part I THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical Framework: 
Identifying Central Banks’ Two-Tier Relationship 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
During their long developmental history, central banks have made important changes, 
but their definition as both government’s banker and bankers’ bank is rarely 
questioned.
1
 As explained by the BOE:  
‘The Bank’s roles and functions have evolved and changed over its three-hundred 
year history. Since its foundation, it has been the Government’s banker and, since 
the late 18
th
 century, it has been banker to the banking system more generally—the 
bankers’ bank’.2  
 
It could therefore be argued that a central bank is positioned in a two-tier relationship: 
with government and with the market respectively (as illustrated in Figure 2.1). This 
imposes the following particular duties for the central bank:
3
 
     As Government’s Banker:  
                                          
     As Bankers’ Bank: 
 Banknotes issuance; 
 Deposits; 
 Financial advice; 
 Financial services related to 
issuance and settlement of 
Government securities and bonds; 
 Gold and foreign reserves; 
 Treasury management. 
 Deposits from and loans to banks 
and other financial institutions; 
 Monetary policy instruments; 
 Payment and settlement systems; 
 Lender of last resort (LOLR); 
 Financial regulation and 
supervision. 
 
                                                          
1
 The newly-released publication of Functions and Operations of the Bank of Japan indicates that a 
central bank may not play the role of the government’s banker from a global perspective, but no 
further evidence is supplied.  
2
 <www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Pages/default.aspx>. 
3
 Central banks are not necessarily engaged in all such functions. For example, gold and foreign 
reserves were transferred from the BOE to HM Treasury in 1931 once the UK left the gold standard. 
HM Treasury, Management of the Official Reserves 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/236352/management_of_the
_official_reserves_2013_14.pdf>. 
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Figure 2.1: The Two-Tier Relationship Governing a Central Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 displays the position of a central bank relative to its government and the 
market. This two-tier relationship is the key to understand how a central bank 
operates as government’s banker and bankers’ bank.  
 
As clarified in Chapter One, this thesis will examine central bank regulation toward 
maintaining financial stability, when this was lately challenged by the GFC. 
Accordingly, this chapter will introduce and analyse the rules-based legal framework 
governing central banks before detailing further case studies. It will proceed as 
follows. A short historical review will be first provided: according to its origin, the 
central bank was initially established by government in order to control inflation, 
then gradually to regulate and supervise the banking sector. Although historical 
evidence demonstrates that the central bank was responsible for financial risk 
management, there is still a lack of consensus regarding its exact role in maintaining 
financial stability. In the second part of this chapter, rules and laws are argued to 
regulate a central bank according to its two-tier relationship, resulting in certain 
common key legal elements. Related propositions will be analysed through their 
legal framework, linked directly into the two-tier relationship. In the event of 
financial upheavals, central banks work with both their governments and the markets 
together, thereby adjusting their two-tier relationships; and their propositions 
advanced here will reflect this. Furthermore, this chapter will point out that, with 
Tier 2: Relationship between  
Central Bank and Market 
 
Tier 1: Relationship between 
Central Bank and Government 
Government’s 
Banker 
Central 
Bank 
Bankers’ 
Bank 
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more frequent cross-border financial crises, central banks have pursued increasing 
regional and international financial cooperation. This chapter will then conclude with 
an overall framework, which connects its detailed propositions regarding the two-tier 
relationship, the legal framework and crisis management.  
 
 
2.2 A Review of the Central Bank: Origin, History and Role in 
Maintaining Financial Stability 
 
The history of central banks is much shorter than that of the financial markets, so 
they did not emerge until financial activities had already developed to a certain stage. 
They have managed to change in response to dynamic market conditions, including 
repeated financial crises. Even so, it is still difficult to define their role in 
maintaining financial stability. 
 
 
2.2.1 Origin: Why Establish a Central Bank? 
 
The central bank is generally established by government. Its origin could be traced 
from both perspectives: why government sets up the central bank, and why the 
financial market needs it. 
 
Although many central banks were established to support government’s financing of 
war, or during domestic political unrest, they have gradually been prohibited from 
financing government deficits directly. However, they do not cease to exist once 
those conflicts faded; rather they are regulated by statutes and granted the status of 
being bankers to governments. The reason why governments were tolerant towards 
the rise of central banks lies mainly in their policies about the maintenance of 
currency value.
4
 Facing increasing price levels, governments can favour monetary 
expansion by increasing money supply without taking inflationary costs into account. 
Governments’ incentives can be explained by their responsibilities for employment, 
                                                          
4
 Forrest Capie, Charles Goodhart, Stanley Fischer and Norbert Schnadt, The Future of Central 
Banking: The Tercentenary Symposium of the Bank of England (CUP 1994) 1-9. 
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tax revenue, payments balance, and financial stability.
5
 Accordingly, without perfect 
information, governments cannot pre-commit to placing inflation under control by 
considerable low costs. The theory of rent-extraction holds that political powers 
benefit by creating unanticipated inflation in the short term, but obtain more 
payments by shifting those actions to private sector services. In consequence, 
independent central banks are viewed to reliably pre-commit to controlling inflations 
and then stabilize money.
6
 So, due to the role in controlling inflation, politicians 
allow central banks to stay in the financial market, and their primary objective is 
therefore to achieve monetary stability. 
 
Financial crises can also trigger incentives to establish central banks. For example, 
both Sveriges Riksbank and the BOJ were once expected to deal with chaotic 
situations of their domestic monetary markets. As will be explained later, facilities 
such as the LOLR have been granted to central banks as crisis management related 
solutions. However, it has also been argued that in the US, banking crises increased 
following the establishment of the US Fed.
7
 Traditionally, banks were taken as 
distinguished from other financial institutions, as they provided transactions and 
accounting services, as well as their own portfolio management.
8
 Moreover, central 
banks could operate to regulate and supervise the banking industry due to their 
uncompetitive role; this mainly derives from their being known as the clearing 
houses of the financial sector.
 9
 However, the expansion of financial conglomerates 
and professional monitoring has brought about new challenges. For example, more 
non-banking financial institutions have engaged in deposit takings, and banks have 
expanded their other services and financial products. As a result, it is argued that, 
with the development of financial markets, characteristics of banks’ uncertain “true” 
assets values and fixed nominal value deposits make them especially vulnerable to 
runs and systemic risks; this is the dominant concern for regulation and supervision 
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undertaken by the central bank.
10
 Furthermore, it is argued that government may 
cause extra vulnerabilities by imposing deposit insurance upon the banking industry. 
From this point of view, banks should only be regulated prudentially to reduce such 
externalities, and the central bank is established to monitor those vulnerabilities 
only.
11
 Lack of consensus, therefore, make it hard to conclude why banks need a 
central bank to deal with financial crises, and research studies explore different 
reasons why the banking industry should be rigorously regulated and supervised, as 
conventionally undertaken by central banks.  
 
So, in order to control inflation, governments set up central banks, which also 
controlled regulation and supervision over the banking industry. Such a position 
poses dual-tasks for them: to achieve monetary stability delegated from governments 
and stability in the banking sector as well.  
 
 
2.2.2 Historical Development of Central Banks 
 
In the early 19
th
 century, central banks were widely engaged in financing 
governments, and meanwhile assisted banks with problems. As of their own rights 
and privileges, they were allowed to issue banknotes and earn seiniorage, as well as 
being protected from competition. Later, their main functions took shape, including 
rediscount and loan facilities. By the late 19
th
 century, the central bank developed the 
dual position of both government’s banker and bankers’ bank, causing the 
transformation of the bank of issue to the central bank in the modern sense.
12
  
 
When it came to the 20
th
 century, more central banks were established, and have 
since experienced important reforms and changes.
13
 Up to the 1950s, central banks 
had been challenged by World War I, the 1930s Great Depression and World War II. 
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In general, governments intensified their controls of central banks, and monetary 
expansion was aimed at supporting fiscal stimulus. Afterwards, it became common 
to formalize the relationship between the government and the central bank by writing 
it into the statues.
14
 In the Bretton Woods era, central banks gradually combined 
direct monetary policy instruments, including window guidance and guidelines or 
instructions over bank loans, and indirect ones, such as ratios policy and Open 
Market Operations (OMOs)
15
. Lending to governments was more strictly limited, 
while they still accommodated fiscal policy by trading government papers in the 
secondary markets.
16
 Government rigorously controlled the financial sector until the 
1970s, when marketization became ascendant,17 but banking crises returned. They 
were thought to be mainly caused by fluctuating exchange rates and inflation, 
requiring more direct intervention from governments and central banks. Inflation 
raised increasing concern associated with the oil crises, requiring further 
commitment of central banks to stabilizing prices.
18
 Financial liberalization through 
deregulation has promoted prudential regulation from the late 1960s, and then gave 
birth to more diverse models of regulation, changing duly the roles played by central 
banks. Latterly, central banks were formally granted independence and delegated 
authority over monetary policies in order to achieve better monetary stability. At the 
same time, the financial sector had developed along with more frequent crises.19 The 
Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) changed the development of financial markets with its 
evident transboundary characteristics. It highlighted the requirement for better cross-
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border cooperation, and thus, regulation and supervision needed to address financial 
stability in a more global context.
 20
 
 
This short historical summary of central banks makes some features more evident: 
1. Central banks used to support government financing, especially during World 
Wars, before they had gradually gained independence, adjusting their 
relationships with governments. 
2. Central banks have often reformed and changed their own operations and 
mechanisms, including monetary policy instruments and crisis management 
solutions. 
3. Financial crises have generally triggered intensive incentives from 
governments and their central banks to intervene in financial markets more 
directly, while governments increased control of their own central banks.  
 
In brief, central banks have developed around their changed two-tier relationships. 
With increasing independence, they have moved away from strict banking regulation 
and supervision, and their two-tier relationship has been changed by financial crises, 
enhancing interaction between government, central bank, and the banking sector. 
 
 
2.2.3 The Role of Central Banks in Maintaining Financial Stability 
 
Until now, this section has illustrated that central banks were initially established by 
their governments to control inflation, while the banking industry was arguably 
under stricter control. However, their exact role in maintaining financial stability is 
still hard to define: it is argued that they have a better understanding of systemic 
risks when conducting monetary policy, but the relationship between monetary and 
financial stabilities remains in question.  
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Introduction Chapter has pointed out that the definition of financial stability still 
evolves without much consensus. Inter alia, it is widely accepted that systemic risk is 
a critical threat to financial stability;
21
 this has been emphasized during the GFC. 
Systemic risk can be analysed in terms of origins, transmission channels, outcomes, 
prevention and resolution. First, risks which are possible to extend negative effects 
beyond any individual institution are viewed as contagion; and thus, the degree of 
probability to which a certain risk will exert systemic aftermath determines the 
nature of risk.
22
 Such a hypothesis consists of a risk allocation with domino effects.
23
 
Contagion effects are at the core of systemic risks, having different forms of 
externalities. In the banking sector, systemic crisis is further complicated by hidden 
risk exposure, incentive problems, and coordination problems; this is a main 
justification for regulation.
24
 Due to the interbank market, banks are particularly 
prone to contagion or systemic risks, which can trigger problems in a few entities 
which soon spread to others and then to the whole industry in a comparatively short 
time, causing excessive losses.
25
 Moreover, transmission mechanisms are important 
to understand systemic risk in interdependent banking networks: the strong linkage 
will increase the chance of a systemic risk, while the weak linkage will reduce its 
likelihood.
26
 However, the systemic testing of transmission channels is still missing: 
the uncertainty between triggers and channels make it difficult, if not impossible, to 
predict triggers and their approaches to systemic risks.
27
 As regards consequences, 
systemic risks would cause different losses to various financial sectors, and specific 
conditions vary from country to country.
28
 Finally, to deal with systemic risk, both 
private and public solutions are viewed as inevitable.
29
 There are three types of 
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public resolution techniques: preventative solutions focus upon reducing the risks 
before they undermine banks, such as monitoring their management, capital, 
solvency, liquidity standards, and large exposure limits, while protective skills, 
named “rescue packages” in practice, target the most affected parts within financial 
markets; prudential regulation, which is widely employed, is between these two 
machineries: 
“Traditionally, it [prudential regulation] has consisted of a mixture of monitoring 
individual transactions (ensuring, for instance, that adequate collateral was put up), 
regulations concerning self-dealing, capital requirements, and entry restrictions. In 
some countries, restrictions were placed on lending in particular areas: many East 
Asian countries, for example, used to have restrictions on real estate lending. Finally, 
many countries imposed interest-rate restrictions. Concerns about bank runs also led 
many countries to provide deposit insurance and to establish central banks to serve 
as lenders of last resort.”30 
 
Without exception, the central bank is defined as the sole monetary authority in 
charge of monetary stability, which can be understood as stability in the price level, 
e.g., the absence of inflation or deflation. However, there are continued debates 
about the synergy or trade-off effect between monetary and financial stability. For 
example, high interest rates may control inflations but violate banks’ balance 
sheets.
31
 According to one study about the integral roles of individual banks under 
financial distress, a contraction in monetary policy will increase the average 
probability of their distress.
32
 Some financial instability is believed to derive from 
activities of monetary authorities, such as central banks or IMF.
33
 By contrast, it is 
argued that maintaining financial stability was always part of the central bank’s 
genetic code.
34
 According to one survey, which incorporated a set of variables from 
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79 countries between 1970 and 1999, the choice of the central bank’s objectives 
significantly affected the probability of a banking crisis except among transition 
countries.
35
 Recently, it has further been estimated that a narrow-down objective of 
central banks in maintaining financial stability could reduce the likelihood of 
systemic risks.
36
 Overall, disagreements continue, debating about the exact link 
between monetary and financial stability, creating further uncertainty about the role 
played by central banks in reducing systemic risks. 
 
Central banks nevertheless have their own incentives and advantages to achieve 
financial stability.
37
 To begin with, monetary policy would be under serious 
challenge without financial stability, and central banks pursue financial institutions 
with stable liquidity conditions. It is argued that banks are more vulnerable to 
contagion or systemic risk due to interdependent contracts in the payment system, 
the interbank market and the derivatives market; and hence, the authority owning 
liquidity is required to offer due financial aid.
38
 Since the central bank is responsible 
for liquidity provision, it is qualified to deal with systemic risk caused by the 
liquidity condition of financial institutions and/or of the market as a whole.
 39
 The 
central bank can fulfil this duty through the following specific instruments:
40
 
 
1. Central bank is the only provider of immediate liquidity by legal means 
mainly through its LOLR facility; 
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2. Central bank is the only legal provider to smooth the functioning of the 
payment system, which is closely linked with systemic risks. 
 
Moreover, as the leading monetary authority, the central bank can affect the wider 
economy through monetary policy. It is able to design and carry out a top-down 
analysis of systemic outcomes of a certain monetary policy, rather than individual 
institutions; this is regarded as its advantage to predict and prevent systemic risk. A 
banking crisis can be understood as a situation, where actual or potential bank runs 
or failures induce banks to suspend the internal convertibility of their liabilities or 
which compel the government to extend assistance on a large scale. And monetary 
policy can be designed accordingly.
41
 More broadly, since a healthy financial system 
is important for economic development, the incentive of the central bank could be 
attached to its other statutory objectives, e.g., supporting economic development. 
What is more, an interacted relationship between price and financial stability will 
resolve the potential conflicts of interests, and thus, close coordination and 
information exchange, as well as the advisory role of the central bank, are necessary 
for successful banking regulation and supervision.
42
 Recently, through the interbank 
and wholesale markets, the engagement of the central bank in stabilizing the markets 
has become more preventive with the intention to reduce the moral hazard problem 
posed when exercising its LOLR facility.
43
 
 
From the theoretical perspective, financial stability may be hard to define, but it tops 
the public policy agenda.
44
 At least, the central bank has its own incentives and 
advantages when dealing with systemic risk in terms of monetary policy conduct, 
liquidity support and macroeconomic goals.
45
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2.2.4 Summary  
 
Referring to its origin, the central bank was created by taking into account demands 
from both government and the banking sector: being government’s banker, it was 
delegated responsibilities for monetary stability; being bankers’ bank, it offered 
regulation, supervision and liquidity support. However, there is little evidence that 
financial stability has been enhanced by central bank control over monetary stability. 
Even so, the central bank has distinct incentives in regulation and supervision, which 
is further enhanced by the inherent instability of the financial system; in the event of 
financial crises, the central bank is challenged to restore financial stability by using 
its instruments available. As indicated by historical evidence, the prevailing two-tier 
relationship is changed by a financial crisis: by sacrificing some independence, the 
central bank moved closer to government; by managing the markets, it increased 
direct control.  
 
 
2.3 Legal Framework of Central Banks 
 
Through the 20
th
 century, central banks began to be regulated by either constitutional 
or specific laws. They were granted with legal rights and obligations, which are 
ultimately political choices, expressing society’s preferences. 46  This thesis will 
approach the comparative analysis through a rules-based legal framework, and the 
following section will introduce typical legal provisions before testing our key 
propositions in the subsequent case studies. From the perspective of the two-tier 
relationship, attention will be given to features more directly linked with the 
relationship of a central bank with government and with the market respectively. 
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2.3.1 Ownership and Legal Status 
 
There are three kinds of legal status granted to central banks: private entity, 
government-owned corporation, and government institution.
47
 Moreover, legal status 
itself changes: for example, both the BOE and BOJ were nationalised due to World 
War II. Many newly-established post-war central banks are owned by their states, 
including China. Nowadays, most central banks operate as public agencies.  
 
 
2.3.2 Central Bank Objectives 
 
Once central banks were gradually prohibited from directly financing government 
deficits, their objectives changed.
48
 Government delegated monetary policy to 
central banks, giving them the sole responsible authority for achieving price 
stability.
49
 They used to engage in different economic activities, resulting in other 
objectives, but potential conflict of interests might cause trades-off effects when they 
pursue goals other than monetary stability. As a result, during the last two decades, 
responsibilities were divided: independent central banks were exclusively 
responsible for monetary stability, while fiscal or political powers pursued 
employment and/or economic growth.
50
 Until recently, it has been argued that 
inflation targeting would help central banks make further commitment to monetary 
stability. More central banks have therefore embraced price stability or keeping 
inflation under control among their objectives, as mandated by statute.
51
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2.3.3 Organizational Structure 
 
Controlling monetary policy, central banks are first and foremost policy making 
institutions.
52
 But their specific organizational structures have become more 
diverse.
53
 Developments include the trend towards “flatter” management structures, 
replacing the strict political hierarchy, and more horizontal management of core 
activities, resulting in functional reorganization.
54
 Latterly, major central banks have 
created separate divisions responsible for designing and implementing monetary 
policies.
55
 
 
 
2.3.4 Monetary Policy Instruments 
 
Monetary policy is exclusive to a central bank for monetary stability purposes only, 
and should be designed in line with its statutory goals.
56
 For the convenience of 
further analysis, monetary policy instruments are here categorised into conventional 
and unconventional monetary policy (UMP). As central banks have historically 
shifted from regulatory instruments to market mechanisms, conventional policy 
instruments have developed from direct tools to indirect means.
57
 By definition, 
directive instruments control the amount of money and credit quantitatively or 
qualitatively within the banking system, such as monetary targeting.
58
 Some direct 
tools are still employed to enable them to manage the markets, especially in 
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transition and emerging countries. By contrast, indirect requirements cover mainly 
reserve requirements in both means of cash and liquid assets from financial 
institutions holding with central banks, such as reserve ratios and minimum 
reserves.
59
 Since they take responsibility for the payment and settlement system, 
banks can borrow either from the interbank market, or from the central bank. In 
consequence, the central bank can affect borrowing by changing relevant rates.
60
 A 
new development about indirect monetary policy is that OMOs have become widely 
used, which involve government securities in the money supply between banks and 
the central bank.
61
 Among all those policy instruments mandated for central banks, 
there has not yet to be convincing evidence about any specific tools to dominate 
inflation control, although some surveys indicate that fixed exchange rates in 
developing countries would help reduce the probability of banking crises.
62
  
 
Since the BOJ has employed unusual tools to deal with recession following the burst 
of the bubble from the late 1980s onwards, unconventional policy instruments have 
come into the spotlight, and have also been widely employed during the GFC. By 
definition, the UMP elevates liquidity management, from being passive in meeting 
the requirements of interest rates policies during “normal” times, to an active role for 
influencing broader financial conditions.
63
 As a crisis management tool, it could be 
employed in the LOLR programmes targeting systemic risks, and also as an 
independent monetary policy to maintain financial stability.
64
 They will change the 
central bank’s balance sheet, and thus, can be defined as “balance sheet policies”.65 
 
                                                          
59
 Reserve requirements are defined, by the US Fed, as “the amount of funds that a depository 
institution must hold in reserve against specific deposit liabilities” 
<www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm>. 
60
 CPSS-IOSCO, ‘Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures’ BIS, Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems & Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, April 2012 <www.bis.org/publ/cpss101.htm>. 
61
 <www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed32.html>. 
62
 There are some studies following the AFC 1997. E.g., see, Barry Eichengreen and Ricardo 
Hausmann, ‘Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility’ IMF NBER Working Paper No 7418, November 
1999 <www.nber.org/papers/w7418.pdf>.  
63
 Caruana Jaime, ‘Unconventional Monetary Policies in Time of Crisis’ BIS, SUERF Annual Lecture, 
Brussels, November 16, 2009 <www.bis.org/speeches/sp091118.htm>. 
64
 Leonardo Gambacorta, Boris Hofmann and Gert Peersman, ‘The Effectiveness of Unconventional 
Monetary Policies at the Zero Lower Bound: A Cross-Country Analysis’ BIS Working Paper No 384, 
2012 <www.bis.org/publ/work384.pdf>. 
65
 Claudio Borio and Piti Disyatat, ‘Unconventional Monetary Policies: an Appraisal’ BIS Working 
Paper No 292, 2009 <www.bis.org/publ/work292.pdf>. 
35 
 
Monetary policy instruments can only work properly in certain circumstances, and 
market discipline is an important base. Due to different transmission channels, 
different outcomes might be achieved by applying these instruments.
66
  
 
 
2.3.5 Regulation and Supervision 
 
As explained, banks have traditionally been under more rigorous supervision and 
regulation, aiming ultimately at maintaining “a safe and sound system”. The official 
reasons for regulation could be classified: (1) systemic risk; (2) prevention of fraud, 
monetary-laundering, and terrorism; (3) consumption protection and deposit 
insurance; and (4) competition policy.
67
  
 
In spite of mixed usages, regulation and supervision should be distinguished. As 
regards rule-making, banking regulation is defined as the establishment of rules, 
including acts of the legislator, and statutory instruments or rules from competent 
authorities, such as the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the central bank and other 
regulatory agencies.
68
 Meanwhile, rules from private or self-regulatory agencies and 
at the international level would all affect the domestic financial market. In banking 
and financial services, regulations are mainly prudential rules affecting accesses to 
the market and risks to the system.
69
 As for supervision, it broadly refers to the 
process of monitoring and enforcement, covering the whole range of banking 
activities: market entry, supervision stricto sensu, sanctioning or imposition of 
supervised entities, and internal/external crisis management. In sum, regulation is the 
prerequisite to due supervision, which rather focuses upon the degree to which banks 
abide by rules and regulations. Most supervisors are granted regulatory powers. For 
example, licensing is a key issue in banks’ market entry, including conditions for 
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license, the list of activities, and special arrangements for foreign entities, which 
should all be clearly listed in set rules.
70
 
 
From a historical perspective, financial regulation and supervision was not a natural 
role for a central bank, especially in the free-banking era. Self-regulation has since 
shifted toward government intervention, combining both private and public 
solutions.
71
 From the 1970s, with marketization, government intervention was 
constrained to necessary regulation in the financial sector. Prudential supervision 
began to be applied to most advanced economies, introducing elements and 
techniques as regards monitoring the safety and soundness of banks, among others.
72
 
This was generally embraced by central banks. First, as fixed by laws and rules, 
capital adequacy is directly linked to the health of banking assets, and lending 
restrictions are targeted at the excessive risk exposures caused by loans to a single 
borrower or subsidiaries.
73
 The clarified requirements for capital adequacy have been 
adopted in the international arena, especially after the Basle Accord came into 
effect.
74
 Second, information disclosure became emphasizing, and various 
measurements and instruments have duly been employed, such as reports, ratings, 
on-site examinations, in-house surveillance, consultations and external auditions.
75
 
Third, sanctioning is equal to penalties to non-compliance with the law or other type 
of wrongdoing: with different emphases, “institutional sanctions” affect the 
institution, while “personal sanctions” directly target management. 76  In practice, 
banks in most countries are less subject to general corporate bankruptcy procedures, 
but to particular arrangements with an emphasis upon depositors’ protection and 
potential contagion risk.  
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Also, with neo-liberalization, central banks’ regulatory and supervisory role has been 
challenged by financial conglomerates, along with other requirements for 
professional supervision and regulation.
77
 It is argued that potential conflicts of 
interests might be triggered when dealing with more than one objective by a single 
authority; this is the major reason to separate regulation and supervision 
responsibilities from the central bank.
78
 Monetary stability is often the primary stated 
goal for the central bank, which is the sole mandatory monetary authority conducting 
the top-down monetary policy.
79
 But if in charge of financial regulation and 
supervision, the central bank would possibly endeavour to control inflation by 
implementing over-constraints or over risk-exposure upon banks.
80
 What is more, 
compromise would cause damage to its reputation, affecting thus monetary 
stability.
81
 As a result, in certain jurisdictions, the task of financial regulation and 
supervision is entrusted to a separate body outside the central bank.
82
  As such, 
regulation and supervision can be undertaken by the central bank, an independent 
mega-regulator, or several sector-based organizations.
83
 
 
Even so, it is not possible to totally isolate the central bank from banking regulation 
and supervision. To begin with, it has its own incentives. It controls liquidity, as well 
as the payment and settlement system. The liquidity condition of both financial 
institutions and the market could possibly affect its balance sheet, requiring it to deal 
with market upheavals caused by liquidity shortage.
84
 Meanwhile, failures in 
supervision and regulation can give rise to reputational risks for monetary policy, 
whilst confidential bank supervisory information will help the central bank assess 
macroeconomic variables, requiring consideration of any complementarity between 
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monetary policy and financial supervision.
85
 In terms of their capacity, central banks 
generally possess rule-making power and have detailed understanding of the 
financial markets. Monetary policy instruments, such as monetary policy target, 
short-term interest rates, money market operations, and standing facilities, are 
primarily used to achieve price stability; and the other four—payment systems 
stability, public and private comments, emergency liquidity support and crisis 
coordination – facilitate maintaining financial stability. At the very least, even 
without explicit legal provisions, instruments can facilitate them to conduct 
prudential regulation and supervision.
86
 Therefore, central banks have both 
incentives and capabilities regarding financial regulation and supervision, while 
safeguarding systemic stability will be adversely affected by removing such powers. 
 
 
2.3.6 Central Bank Independence 
 
The central bank is located in a two-tier relationship, but being government’s banker 
is not equal to its dependence upon government. Debates continue about the 
definition of central bank independence, especially about how to make it reconcile 
with its organizational structure.
87
 One of the most widely-used concepts is to free 
central banks to formulate and conduct monetary policies without government 
intervention.
88
 In a narrow definition of independence, opposing “control”,89  the 
central bank is independent of political instructions when carrying out its 
responsibilities.
90
 
 
From a legal perspective, independence refers to powers entrusted to a central bank 
by legislation. The formal formulation should be contained in a constitution, in a law 
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or in a contract, forming an organic safeguard by statutes.
91
 According to legal 
provisions, central bank independence incorporates independence in terms of goals, 
instruments, budget and operation.
92
  Generally, the central bank rarely bears goal 
independence, but has been legally granted operational independence with the 
explicit monetary objective of price stability. In addition, the incentive of an 
independent central bank, as well as the integrity and professionalism of central 
bankers, should be embedded into countries’ statutes to guarantee a proper internal 
structure, including clear declaration of independence, selection and responsibilities 
of its staff, fiscal and budgetary support, and due regulatory powers.
93
 
 
Historically, central bank independence fluctuated, being particularly affected by 
inflation rates.
94
 There is some historical evidence.
95
 In the 19
th
 century, laissez faire 
and the gold standard fostered considerable independence, later stifled by World War 
I. The following inflation triggered the return of independence, but after the 1930s 
Great Depression, reform revolved around further constraining it, enhanced by the 
government’s rising fiscal policies. As argued, such extraordinary events as wars and 
financial upheavals trigger greater government control over its economic bodies, 
including the central bank, for political powers have noticeable advantages if 
required to expand revenues quickly and efficiently.
96
 Gradually, it was accepted that 
inflationary prospects encourage more independent monetary authority, whilst 
extraordinary events provoke governments’ intensive involvement; government 
intervention and central bank independence can be counter-balance.
97
   
 
However, what constitute adequate independence is still unclear, and controversy has 
continued with respect to the relationship between central bank independence and 
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monetary stability or even financial stability.
98
 In particular, following the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods System, research in this area did not bring noticeable 
consensus.
99
 In the legal opinion, an autonomous central bank was proved to benefit 
monetary stability and low inflation,
100
 but without much systemic effect upon real 
economic growth.
101
 Later, it was established that other factors also affected central 
bank independence.
102
 For example, de jure autonomy was more closely related to 
independence in developed countries than in less-developed countries, where de 
facto circumstance has further effects upon monetary policy making. Among less 
developed countries, political vulnerability has a more pronounced influence upon 
inflation and its variability, while greater independence could hinder macroeconomic 
performance, especially after major political transitions.
103
 From this point of view, 
legal variables, such as the appointment of the central bank’s board and budgetary 
policy-making, have limited effects upon inflation or macroeconomic variables.
104
 It 
is thus argued that central bank independence is only enhanced by some specific de 
facto circumstances in certain countries.
105
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Recently, central bank independence has been promoted by enhancing accountability 
and transparency.
106
 Accountability requires the central bank to explain and justify 
its policies or actions, and to account for any failures of not achieving its stated goals. 
In spite of autonomy, the central bank should be accountable to another authority, 
even though few statutes make explicit provisions for such accountability.
107
 To 
understand the concept of accountability, four factors should be emphasised: the 
accountable (a holder of power), the accountee (subject of responsibility), the 
content of obligations and the criteria of assessment.
108
 Here accountability can be 
defined from both institutional and empirical approaches.
109
 Institutional articulation 
enables the central bank to remain accountable to executive, legislative and judicial 
bodies. Independence does not attempt to diminish the political hierarchy, especially 
between it and the finance ministry; for example, the former should provide 
necessary advice, reports, and information to the latter. Central bank independence is 
guaranteed by statute, which is directly related to parliamentary legislative decisions, 
and thus, the central bank is subject to parliamentary accountability.
110
 In addition, it 
is under legal control. For example, the US and the EU
111
 have set up rules to govern 
functions of the Court of Auditors in ensuring transparency of central banks’ 
activities. The institutional structure of a central bank could help improve 
accountability: the decision-making authority reflects its institutional capabilities and 
statutory constraints, linking accordingly with the political framework that 
determines its autonomy and powers.
112
 For example, it is argued that representatives 
of the board should be appointed from various economic, social, and legal 
backgrounds, to increase public acceptance.
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As another indicator, transparency is important in informing the wider public of 
information formulated and conducted by the central bank so as to gain support for 
maintaining its autonomy.
113
 In principle, both disclosure and performance 
accountabilities are essential to assess the efficiency and transparency of an 
independent institution in a market economy.
114
 Information disclosure is to ensure 
transparency when the central bank executes monetary policies, and the examples 
include the minutes of FOMC meetings
115
 and improved information disclosure from 
the BOE.
116
 The performance of a central bank can be assessed by whether it has 
achieved its statutory monetary goal(s), including budget, expense, income, facilities 
and efficiency ratios, and thereby, its governing body should be held responsible for 
relevant failures.
117
 Accordingly, clear monetary policy instruments clarified by law 
should enhance the performance of a central bank, and a single goal could facilitate 
controlling it; it is thus argued that accountability through transparency will result in 
lower inflationary prospects with reduced variables.
118
 
 
Overall, any central bank can only possess limited independence. As explained, its 
origin suggests that it derives from political compromise, and appointments are made 
by a higher political authority to head its organisation.
119
 Furthermore, its goal is 
mostly constrained to price stability, which has been widely enshrined in central 
bank law. Under this prerequisite, due independence should favour its pre-
commitment to statutory responsibilities.  
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2.3.7 Summary  
 
Altogether, the above legal items typically govern a central bank from its two-tier 
relationship, placing down its legal framework as in the following Figure 2.2: 
Figure 2.2: Legal Framework of Central Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated here, there are several common legal elements, which typically exist in 
legal frameworks governing central banks. Among them, central bank independence 
is the most convincing explanation of its relationship with the government. Other 
factors, especially ownership and organizational structures, will define its position 
with the fulfilment of its statutory objectives from the outset. How central banks deal 
with the financial sector is reflected by how they exercise their monetary instruments 
and responsibilities for regulation and supervision. Overall, the legal framework 
defines how a central bank works as government’s banker and bankers’ bank. 
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As stated, financial stability precludes crises, and central banks are required to 
manage crises under due legal authority. The outcome of crisis management could be 
judged from the perspective of their statutory objectives (performance 
accountability). More generally, they work closely both with their governments and 
the markets so as to restore financial stability, thereby challenging the balance of 
their previous two-tier relationships.  
 
 
2.4.1 Crisis Management Solutions 
 
Since the banking sector is innately instable, ex post mechanisms are essential for a 
central bank to deal with problems facing commercial banks and other financial 
institutions. From a legal perspective, as bankers’ bank, it is in charge of serving 
banks according to its own capacity, mainly the LOLR facility, as well as deposit 
insurance scheme and bankruptcy proceedings, which are designed for financial 
stability purpose.  
 
2.4.1.1 LOLR 
 
The LOLR has a long development history, and recently, this facility has been 
granted to the central bank:
120
 
 
 
 
 “…the Bank of England, by the effect of a long history, holds the ultimate cash 
reserve of the country; whatever cash the country has to pay comes out of that 
reserve, and therefore the Bank of England has to pay it. And it is as the Bankers’ 
Bank that the Bank of England has to pay it, for it is by being so that it becomes the 
keeper of the financial cash reserve.”121  
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The LOLR is first an instrument of monetary policy, and thereby, troubled 
institutions could access credit at the discount rate. But this should be distinguished 
from monetary policy instruments for price stability: it is to protect banks from runs 
and failures, rather than control inflation.
122
 Secondly, the LOLR is also a banking 
supervision technique used to bring banks out of financial distress.
123
 A failing bank 
might trigger contagion risks with excessive losses, and hence, providing further 
liquidity for survival reduces the potential systemic risk.
124
  
 
In principle, the LOLR is available to temporarily illiquid but still solvent banks, 
triggering the initial problem concerning the differences between illiquidity and 
insolvency.
125
 An economically insolvent bank mostly refers to a bank’s liability 
exceeding its assets, which only causes losses to shareholders.
126
 With financial aid, 
it is not necessarily legally insolvent; in particular, the development of the interbank 
market has facilitated borrowing between banks. If a bank cannot access credit in 
this market, it would then be difficult to assess whether it is illiquid or insolvent. 
Alternatively, lack of liquidity can lead to liabilities exceeding the market value of 
assets, and might even quickly escalate into insolvency through a “fire-sale”.127 It is 
thus difficult to differentiate illiquidity from insolvency. Modern central banks 
mostly offer liquidity to insolvent institutions rather than illiquid ones, as determined 
by the potential of contagion risks.
128
 How any failure from lack of liquidity would 
adversely affect the economy should also be taken into account. To sum up, both the 
liquidity position of banks and the potential consequence upon the system should be 
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analysed prior to proceeding with the LOLR.
129
 The principles a central bank should 
follow here include, in addition to distinguishing insolvent institutions from the 
illiquid ones, lending being preannounced and offered freely, but at a penalty rate 
and with good collateral.
130
 Such lending is short-term by nature but, to meet 
practical liquidity requirements of falling banks, short-term financial assistance 
might not be sufficient to resolve their problems.
131
   
 
Clear legal provisions are viewed as effective in minimizing the misuse of the LOLR 
facility: under prudential consideration, legal provisions should incorporate 
availability of this facility, procedures, requirements, and especially terms. Basically, 
the LOLR was conducted through the OMOs, but it is still rare for central bank laws 
to explicitly formulate this arrangement, apart from US legislation. The US Fed Act 
describes the periods, penalty rate, and collateral for discount window lending, 
covering general principles regulating the LOLR.
132
 Originally, the US mandated the 
LOLR facility with discount window arrangements under Sections10 (a) and 10 (b) 
of the Federal Reserve Act, and it was specifically governed by Regulation A. 
Basically, this facility was limited to emergent circumstances where borrowers 
cannot obtain credit from other sources. In 1980, the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act expanded the application from depository 
institutions by modifying the nature of financial institutions.
133
 The Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 1991 made further changes to the LOLR: 
the “Limitations on Advances” section makes it clear that emergent loans are only 
available short-term for illiquid but solvent financial institutions; additionally, it 
explicitly addresses that the LOLR is a discretionary role, but not a mandatory 
one.
134
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Concerning moral hazard, there have been proposals for changing the LOLR.
135
 
There are arguments over the recipient of emergent financial aid from the central 
bank: individual institutions or the market as a whole.
136
 Recently, some new-rising 
issues might affect the further reform. One is that, due to financial conglomerates, 
the central bank might be required for financial assistance in such depository 
institutions as universal banks, but their illiquid problems are actually caused by 
business activities in securities markets. It has thus extended the safety net beyond 
depositors’ protection. 137  Another issue is that the US Fed has offered similar 
financial help to Japanese banks operating in New York in certain conditions.
138
  
 
2.4.1.2 Deposit Insurance 
 
Most industrialized countries have designed deposit insurance programmes,
139
 and 
this part will focus upon some legal aspects.
140
 While certain programmes are spelt 
out in rules, others are implicit. Explicit ones,
141
 such as the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the USA
142
 and the EC Directive on Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes
143
, are formulated by law with regard to structure and operation. 
As a general rule, insured depositors are paid only after the bank is closed, 
preventing bank runs and reducing losses to taxpayers. But the implicit insurance 
protection covers all depositors, other creditors, shareholders and even managers. 
Since implicit insurance protection can be exercised while the bank is still operating, 
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it could possibly trigger moral hazard problems.
144
 By comparison,
145
  a clear legal 
provision will not only protect certain depositors, but also reduce moral hazard 
risk.
146
 When compared with the LOLR, which is contingent, deposit insurance is 
non-contingent: the LOLR will be applied with discretion by a central bank, while 
explicit deposit insurance is mandatory to protect depositors regulated by legislation. 
 
2.4.1.3 Market-Exit Arrangements 
 
Exit arrangements for insolvent financial institutions are necessary to prevent risk 
contagion from failing organisations spreading further afield, and also facilitate 
liquidity mobility.
147
 The first issue is that, when it comes to banks’ insolvency, 
specific procedures are varying from country to country:
148
 the US is typical in 
dealing with banks’ bankruptcy through the special arrangement of taking into 
account depositors’ protection and potential systemic risk from any failing 
institutions, but before the GFC, the UK favoured the same rules for banks’ failure as 
those were used in dealing with the failures of other companies. In certain countries, 
for example, Mainland China, none of the banks’ bankruptcy has materialised.149 
Secondly, as argued, due to difficulties with differing illiquidity from insolvency, the 
definition of “bank bankruptcy” is controversial. A technically insolvent bank might 
be rescued by the LOLR, rather than legal cessation of business. In practice, 
responsible authorities prefer to rehabilitate, reorganise, or restructure banks, 
including both private solutions, such as purchases and mergers, and state aid, for 
example, bailouts from authorities in charge.
150
 The public solution involves 
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changing the balance between taxpayers and the troubled bank, for from the 
economic perspective, “a well-designed and properly announced bailout policy can 
indeed reduce rather than worsen moral hazard in banking by increasing the value at 
stake at the time of risk-taking decisions”.151 
 
 
2.4.2 Moral Hazard 
 
Moral hazard could be understood as meaning “if you cushion the consequence of 
any bad behaviour, then you encourage that bad behaviour”.152 As far as the financial 
sector is concerned, in particular, safety nets such as the LOLR and deposit 
insurance will trigger irresponsible, careless, or less conservative, investments or 
other financial activities, and thereby, increasing the threat of moral hazard, as well 
as more losses to the taxpayers. It is argued that the arrangements above, which are 
designed to achieve financial stability, could work instead as incentives for 
participants in the financial market to take more risks, and incur further financial 
instability.
153
  
 
However, it does not mean that all safety nets should be removed to eliminate 
negative implications associated with moral hazard. Adverse effects caused by moral 
hazard should be compared with the losses potentially caused by failing institutions 
without those rescue packages: when a bankruptcy could possibly trigger contagion 
risk, the whole market should be rescued as the priority even with the threat of moral 
hazard; if otherwise, moral hazard should be taken into account, for it would trigger 
wider-ranging systemic instability or even crisis.
154
 As a consequence, the key issue 
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concerning moral hazard here is a cost-benefit analysis, which central banks should 
consider while dealing with financial crises.
155
  
 
 
2.4.3 Changed Two-Tier Relationship in Financial Crises 
 
These three facilities arise amid financial crises, which is why they are regarded as 
“crisis management solutions”. Historical evidence has pointed out that facing 
financial instability, central banks work more closely with their governments, and 
managed the financial market more directly. This can be further confined by 
analysing the changed two-tier relationship caused by employing the above facilities 
of crisis management.  
 
As conducted under the untraditional monetary policy, a central bank might change 
its own balance sheet to modify market liquidity directly by exercising asset 
purchases programmes, while also intervening into individual financial institutions 
through liquidity aid or bailouts. From this point of view, the central bank moves 
closer to the market. At the same time, central bank independence is weakened by 
intensified government intervention, and monetary policy accommodates fiscal 
solutions. For example, the central bank is required to inject liquidity to troubled 
financial institutions under the LOLR facility, which will be placed under review 
from the finance ministry which generally controls public funds. In terms of deposit 
insurance, some programmes are implicitly offered by government, rather than the 
central bank. Furthermore, in countries with separated financial regulation and 
supervision, other responsible agents are involved in dealing with financial 
upheavals, such as the tripartite arrangement of the BOE, FSA and HM Treasury in 
the UK.  
 
As a result, during financial crises, the central bank still operates as both 
government’s banker and bankers’ bank to achieve the statutory objectives of 
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stability, but selected crisis management solutions would require closer collaboration 
among all the three parties in practice.  
 
 
2.5 Central Bank Regulation toward Financial Stability 
 
Up till this point, this chapter has analysed legal frameworks governing central banks, 
as well as crisis management solutions granted by law. In essence, there is little 
doubt about the primary goal for central banks in monetary stability, while debates 
about their role in financial stability continue. Even so, they have incentives and 
capacities to deal with financial crises. Under due legal authority, central bank 
regulation relating to financial stability will operate as follows:  
(i) Monetary policy instrument is primary aimed at monetary stability;  
(ii)Emergent lending under the LOLR facility enables to support financial 
institutions and the markets; and  
(iii) Prudential regulation should maintain systemic stability.  
 
The theory part has argued that financial stability can roughly be viewed as 
transcending disruptive financial crises. Central banks might operate different policy 
instruments during financial crises and at other times, but their tasks are similarly 
related to financial stability; this could be summarised as in Figure 2.3: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: The Role of Central Banks in Maintaining Financial Stability 
 
 
 
Monetary Policy Instruments 
Central Bank 
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The figure above displays how a central bank can be linked with financial stability. 
Central banks are primarily responsible for monetary stability, which should be 
achieved by conducting direct/indirect monetary policy instruments. They could 
adjust monetary policy instruments and conduct LOLR facilities to deal with 
systemic risk. During this course, central banks generally accommodate policy 
responses from other government bodies, sacrificing some independence, and 
meanwhile, intervene into financial markets and even business operations of 
individual financial institutions in a more direct manner. As a result, their original 
two-tier relationships are changed due to their selected crisis management solutions. 
 
 
2.6 When National Central Banks Encounter Supranational 
Financial Crisis 
 
As demonstrated by theoretical, historical and legal evidence above, the central bank 
operates within domestic legal governance. With financial and economic 
globalization, financial crises have become cross-border. In this context, an 
international financial crisis calls for cross-border solutions, including adoption of 
best practice, due actions taken by multinational organisations (MNOs) and 
cooperation among central banks.  
 
 
2.6.1 Financial Liberalisation and Globalisation 
 
After World War II, globalisation of the world economy in trade, production and 
finance has grown. From a geographic perspective, globalisation is the multiplicity 
of linkages and interconnections between states and societies, requiring 
intensification at the levels of interaction, inter-connectedness and interdependence; 
Monetary Stability Financial Crisis 
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by nature, globalisation is production and distribution of products and/or services of 
homogeneous types and quality on a world-wide basis with the disappearance of 
former trade barriers and state regulation.
156
 As a result, globalisation alters the 
world economic landscape, including liberalisation of trade and capital markets, 
internationalisation of cooperation production and distribution strategies and 
technological changes.
157
 The definition of globalisation can be simply divided into 
scope, which is the intensification at the levels of interaction, and intensity, focusing 
more upon interaction and interdependence.
158
  
 
Financial globalisation refers to the emergence of integrated capital markets from the 
wider world. Especially since the 1970s, extensive financial liberalisation had 
expanded among advanced countries, increasing autonomy and mobility of financial 
capital, while government intervention changed through market-oriented reform.
159
 
Financial globalisation, in principle, has brought more capital, improved financial 
infrastructure, extended markets,
160
 and especially, higher economic growth rates for 
developing countries when integrating well into the cross-border financial 
markets.
161
 However, financial globalisation is also associated with risks, especially 
spreading further threat of contagion.
162
 For example, extended capital markets have 
arguably intensified domestic economic volatility, which can also challenge 
democracy either directly or indirectly.
163
  
 
From a worldwide perspective, ongoing economic integration and globalisation of 
capital accumulation is a matter of national economy integrating around regional 
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gravitational poles and facilitating closer cooperation and deeper integration after 
removing trade barriers. Financial globalisation has not yet been fully achieved due 
to various obstacles; for example, it is argued that a central coordinating and 
regulatory institution, along with a single currency, is necessary for next-step 
integration.
164
  
 
 
2.6.2 Solutions for International Financial Crises 
 
Financial globalisation is closely associated with risks, therefore requiring 
international cooperation from regulators, supervisors and beyond.
165
 Policy 
responses are made from individual countries, whilst cooperation at both regional 
and international levels has been intensified.
 166
 
 
To begin with, international norms and standards have been designed and applied to 
advance financial development through best practice.
167
 The Basel Accord is most 
important in relation to prudential regulation of financial institutions.
168
 In principle, 
it has gradually developed to comprise three pillars of minimum capital adequacy, 
supervisory review process and market discipline, and it aimed to strengthen the 
soundness and stability of the international banking system by exercising higher 
capital ratios.
169
 Recently, the Basel III proposals have emerged as a response to the 
GFC.
170
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MNOs have widely been engaged in promoting international cooperation. Inter alia, 
due to the absence of a global central bank, national central banks are required to 
cooperate when dealing with cross-border financial crises.
171
 Cooperation can be 
exercised in various formats,
172
 and the BIS has played an important role with 
emphasis upon improving decision making.
173
 It has developed “to serve central 
banks in their pursuit of monetary and financial stability, to foster international 
cooperation in those areas and to act as a bank for central banks”.174 Central bank 
cooperation is aimed to achieve and maintain monetary and financial stability, but it 
is particularly prone to government intervention, international relationships and 
market conditions.
175
 Historically, rigid government control made central bank 
cooperation gradually recede during the first half of the 20
th
 century.
176
 With the 
market-oriented reform, international banking and capital mobility have sharply 
expanded, and banking crises made a comeback along with deregulation, requiring 
further central bank cooperation.
177
 The GFC has also highlighted this issue, as 
explained in the following case studies. 
 
As globalisation has brought cross-border financial crises, influencing factors 
become more complex, affecting not only the choices of central banks, but also the 
outcomes of their policy responses: certain joint solutions are expected, and spill-
over effects affect more than just one country.  
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2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced the definition of central bank regulation with theoretical 
and conceptual underpinnings. The core value of a central bank is to serve as 
government’s banker and bankers’ bank; from this can a two-tier relationship be 
developed. Laws and rules are enacted to govern a central bank from different 
aspects of this two-tier relationship.  
 
There is little doubt that central banks are considered responsible for monetary 
stability, but their role in maintaining financial stability is not yet clearly defined. 
Rather than conceptualising financial stability, this chapter has argued that central 
banks operate between government and markets for systemic stability purpose. They 
might operate different policy instruments during financial crises and at other times, 
but their tasks are similarly linked to financial stability. Financial crises triggered 
such crisis management solutions as adjusted monetary policy instruments and the 
LOLR facilities. Consequently, the previous two-tier relationships under their legal 
frameworks are changed: reduced central bank independence can weaken their 
market-oriented principles, while they will also work as stricter regulators and 
supervisors, better able to deal with market upheavals. Accordingly, their market or 
government proposition, assumed under their “old” legal frameworks, will be 
challenged to reflect these changes. 
 
In principle, this chapter has laid out the logic of the arguments in this thesis, as in 
figure 2.4:  
 
 
Figure 2.4: Logic of the Argument of this Thesis 
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As illustrated above, the two-tier relationship develops from the core value of a 
central bank. The legal framework, which governs a central bank from such two tiers, 
will be used to test our key propositions regarding the market or government 
orientation. However, central bank regulation in financial crises is achieved by 
reduced central bank independence, but enhanced intervention into the markets, 
causing changes to its original two-tier relationship under legal authority. 
Accordingly, the propositions introduced in Chapter One will be tested by analysing 
the rules-based legal frameworks, which were whereas changed due to central bank 
crisis management as a result of the GFC. By comparison, it can be established how 
the GFC has challenged the selected central banks to manage to change for an 
increasing focus upon financial stability.  
 
In Chapter Three, the challenge posed by the GFC will be outlined, and empirically 
elaborated in the following case studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Crisis Management 
Solutions 
Change Challenge 
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Chapter Three 
The Global Financial Crisis: The Challenge for Central Banks 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has established that central banks have important roles to play 
in maintaining financial stability, and statutes have stipulated facilities which enable 
them to fulfil their purposes and functions of ensuring monetary stability and 
managing financial crisis. Their regulation is therefore closely linked with the 
actuality and/or threat of financial crisis: central banks combine monetary policy 
instruments and crisis management solutions to deal with market instability. The 
GFC has highlighted leading issues relevant to central bank regulation among others. 
This thesis will discuss how the GFC has challenged the market or government 
orientation propositioned to the selected central banks, beginning with the following 
outline of the GFC itself and policy responses to it.  
 
Central banks have lately been blamed for both causing and not ably responding to 
the GFC with particular respect to their financial stability agenda and objectives. 
Since 2007, they have globally conducted massive policy responses, which will now 
be reviewed; meanwhile, they have been targeted for profound reforms, moving 
towards financial stability. As a result of, and compiling data about, my key research 
questions, this chapter will explore whether, and if so, how central banks have 
managed to change in order to work towards and achieve financial stability. 
 
 
3.2 Global Financial Crisis: Causes and Impacts 
 
The GFC has been defined as the worst crisis since the 1930s Great Depression, 
affecting most developing and developed countries. It derived from the subprime 
mortgage crisis in the US housing market, and quickly escalated into a global 
59 
 
financial catastrophe. 
 
 
3.2.1 The US Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
 
From the mid-1990s up to 2005, the global economy had steadily expanded, with 
advanced economies dominated by low interest and inflation but stable GDP 
growth.
1
 With increasing investment and demand from those countries, as well as 
improved domestic conditions, emerging markets and developing countries had 
pursued further economic development.
2
 Responding to low real interest rates, they 
had increased their holdings of US assets, further enlarging global imbalance.
3
 When 
the high technology boom burst, the US Fed instituted easy monetary policy by 
reducing interest rates from 6.5% in 2001 to 1.0% in 2003, aiming to avoid deeper 
output contractions.
4
 As a result, liquidity increased under monetary expansion, and 
the wider world economy enjoyed low inflation,
5
 leading to reduced risk premia, 
higher leveraged financial markets, and further financial innovations.
6
  
 
In this context, American property prices boomed after 2001 but, as interest rates 
were raised worldwide, a failure to make repayments in the housing market brought 
about a “credit crunch” in early 2006.7 When property prices declined and subprime 
mortgage defaults increased in 2007, foreclosures further escalated the housing 
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bubble burst, causing huge losses in securitised mortgage and the banking sector.
8
  
After New Century Financial filed for bankruptcy protection and halved its 
workforce in April 2007, the collapse in the subprime market undermined bank 
balance sheets.
9
 From September 2007, major banks had announced losses in their 
subprime related investments; in particular, the month of September 2008 saw 
successive financial panics. For example, on the 15
th
, Lehman Brothers filed for 
bankruptcy protection, while Merrill Lynch was taken over by the Bank of America; 
on the 17
th
, HBOS was taken over by Lloyds TSB; on the 25
th
, Washington Mutual 
closed and was sold to JP Morgan Chase; on the 29
th
, Bradford & Bingley was 
nationalised; and on 30
th
, Dexia became the biggest European bank to be bailed 
out.
10
 The bank-offered rate (BOR) reached record highs, which itself increased 
anxiety among banks.
11
 Liquidity squeeze halted record-high US stock prices, and 
from there bear-market contagion spread across international markets.
12
 Overall, 
banks, corporate bonds, hedge funds, insurance companies and pension funds all 
suffered individually varying but comparatively dramatic losses.
13
  
 
Since real estate markets were linked with other important economic sectors, 
including construction and service businesses, weakness in housing had critically 
negative effects upon national economies,
14
 further encumbered by the squeeze of 
the capital market.
15
 The US economy was likely to have contracted from December 
2007, as predicted by the National Bureau of Economic Research, and contraction 
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accelerated following Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 2008.16 By the 
end of 2008, after the Euro Zone officially slipped into recession,
17
 the fourth quarter 
UK GDP was revealed to have fallen by 1.5% against the previous three months.
18
 
Developing countries duly encountered related contagion via different channels, such 
as financial integration and trade links.
19
 For example, the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, 
India and China), which have chiefly thrived from a combination of exporting, FDIs 
and commodity price rises, suffered badly from sharply reduced exports and capital 
outflows from advanced markets.
20
 In consequence, once triggered by the US 
subprime mortgage market, the crisis spread wider and deeper than was originally 
anticipated.  
 
 
3.2.2 The Creation of Causes 
 
The spread of the US subprime housing crisis reflected a financial panic borne upon 
widespread contagion.
21
 Its persistency and seriousness are partly attributed to new 
financial developments in the context of excess liquidity deriving from previous 
growth.
22
 There are continuing debates about what caused the GFC.
23 
To begin with, 
global imbalance had already increased, especially due to US deficits and high 
savings rates among Asian countries.
24
 In terms of financial markets, a new financial 
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structure, incorporating highly-leveraged financial institutions, securitised credit, 
interacting investments, rating agencies, and so forth, had emerged.
25
 By 
comparison, regulatory and supervisory changes were lacking,
26
 while developments 
in internal risk assessment
27
 and fair value accounting standards
28
 were thought 
insufficient to minimise or eliminate full-blown crises.  
 
Once Fannie Mae was established under the Roosevelt Administration in 1938, the 
US housing sector massively changed.
29
 From the mid-1970s, with faster housing 
finance development, private investment banks have moved into mortgage financing, 
and then mortgage securitisation. The business model of housing mortgage shifted 
from “buy and hold” to “trade” on securitised products: rather than holding 
mortgages on their own balance sheets, lenders made initial loans, and then pooled 
them with other mortgages, named as mortgage-backed securities (MBSs). 
Investment banks and broker-dealers were traditionally prohibited from participating 
in the origination and securitisation of mortgages, but this segmentation was broken 
by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999: commercial banks engaged in investment 
business, and investment banks entered into the mortgage-related business.
30
 As a 
result, the mortgage market and the banking sector have become more closely 
connected, and increasingly interdependent.
 31
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In terms of banks, they were initially built upon borrowing short and lending long, 
and they thus assumed most of the risks. However, banks have developed an 
originate-and-distribute model: they initiate assets and then sell them to the 
investment market; risks, along with assets, are thereby transferred to other 
investors.
32
 As a result, modern banks pursue would-be innovations not only in 
lending but also in invested products with higher risks and returns; and investment 
business has gated the development of riskier products. As the Basel Accord 
required certain capital adequacy ratios, banks preferred to have short-term debt, 
rather than expensive equity, in order to collect funding.
33
 As a result, both 
securitisations and structured products have increased.
34
 The simple banking model 
is thus succeeded by a shadow banking pyramid with complex transactions, making 
it possible for banks to transfer risks within the long and complicated selling-buying 
investment chain, which can entice banks to supply reckless loans. During this 
course, banks’ obligations have been changed; for example, within the extended 
chain, risks to borrower quality have reduced, while gaps in information disclosure 
have grown.
35
 Under an increasingly close connection between banking and 
mortgage activities, where borrowers defaulted, banks would repossess property; but 
in a declining market, they frequently failed to recover fully.  
 
If there were only problems with subprime mortgages alone, the scope of the 
problem could be clearly defined.
36
 However, supposed financial innovations such as 
securitisation and structured products, including Collateralized Debt Obligations 
(CDOs) and Credit Default Swaps (CDSs),
37
 added another dimension to the crisis.
38
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Under the “originate-and-distribute” model, securitising and structuring is a complex 
process of pooling, packaging, selling and reselling, which is fulfilled by banks 
through special purpose vehicles (SPVs).
39
 SPVs have the following features: (1) 
they are established to participate in investment activities by creating new asset-
backed securities (ABSs), which are conferred on them by parent banks; and (2) they 
are at the arm’s length but not under the direct control of the banks that create them. 
The SPVs would sell structured financial products with different risk ratings for 
different tranches. All such structured financial derivatives share one particular 
characteristic in common: they are off-balance-sheet, and hence, their investment 
activities will not bankrupt their parent banks. Ironically, however, when the 
interbank market weakens, parent banks pay for any loss caused by their investment 
activities, and thus, banks still make risky products.
40
 Also, many purchasers – 
Conduits and structured investment vehicles (SIVs) – are the original sellers of those 
securitised products.
41
 Those products are further sold to various end-investors; and 
insurance companies offer CDSs to participate in the investment market.
42
 This new 
model can be displayed in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 The Originate-and-Distribute Model of Banking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated, new participants, along with more complex financial instruments, get 
introduced to the financial markets, and in this shadow system, investors become 
increasingly removed from the underlying assets both physically and financially.
43
 
Prior to the GFC, it was believed that not only has such a long chain with the banks’ 
leadership improved efficiency, but also distributed risks across market sectors and 
internationally that used to solely reply upon individual banks.
44
 The capability to 
distribute contagion is thus similarly accelerated: the greater integration of capital 
markets has meant that, if a major problem arose, it is more likely to have wider and 
indeed potentially damaging consequences.
45
 The subprime mortgage crisis has first 
caused losses on securitised mortgage products and absorbed market liquidity, which 
quickly spread elsewhere. From the perspective of its transmissions, both financial 
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and non-financial channels have amplified instability and panics.
46
 For example, due 
to further financial integration, the UK and Europe were quickly impacted after the 
US contraction (although Japan did not display severe economic recession until the 
end of 2008, as explained later). In consequence, since late 2008, economic 
conditions have deteriorated in most advanced economies, and world output reduced 
continuously; for example, the IMF once predicted that global economic growth 
would be 0.5% in 2009, the lowest since World War II, but it was found to shrink by 
0.6%.
47
 Emerging markets such as the BRICs have slowed economic growth, but 
remained more resilient between 2010 and 2011.
48
 Meanwhile, sovereign debt crisis 
deepened across Europe, and the risk shocks caused by the asset crisis were greater 
among advanced markets.
49 
 
 
3.3 The GFC Challenges for Central Banks: Key Research Question 
 
The GFC has produced important negative impacts. For example, among the Wall 
Street top five investment banks, both Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
converted to commercial banking charters, while others no longer exist.
50
 However, 
as indicated by historical evidence, both rigid and lessened financial regulation and 
supervision regimes have been questioned by financial crises.
51
 During the last two 
decades, unprecedented financial prosperity amplified regulatory arbitrage, resulting 
in deregulation and also legal gaps in several key aspects. So, strengthened 
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regulation has become appealing due to the evident mismatch between the new 
financial architecture and the flawed regulatory system.
52
 As regards central banks, 
they have intensely been criticized for excessive liquidity in the Great Moderate era, 
as well as fatal failures to prevent systemic instability, and their changes are seen as 
part of the solution.  
 
 
3.3.1 Global Monetary and Fiscal Policy Responses: A Review 
 
To deal with the GFC, fiscal stimulus and monetary expansion have been combined. 
Due to its cross-border characteristics, cooperation has been reinforced, especially 
following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
53
   
 
Fiscal stimulus packages were generally conducted more intensively than monetary 
rescue efforts.
54
 As early as 2008, aggressive fiscal measures, including tax reduction 
and spending expansion, were introduced to boost domestic demand and spur better 
economic performance, although actual spending rates varied from country to 
country.
55
  
 
Central banks have widely injected capital directly into financial markets and 
rescued certain individual financial institutions.
56
 In spite of different pre-crisis 
interest rates, their official rates were reduced to the near-zero levels in the US, UK, 
and Japan from 2009. With speedy deterioration of the crisis, further qualitative and 
quantitative measures were undertaken, including extended LOLR facilities, 
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expanded asset purchase programmes, and more direct aid for particular market 
sectors and institutions. Due to these crisis management solutions, central banks’ 
objectives have generally shifted from targeting inflation toward restoring financial 
stability and supporting economic activities.  
 
In terms of regional collaboration, the EU has its own sovereign debt crisis, and both 
fiscal and monetary stimuli have brought intense controversy and criticism.
57
 For 
Asian countries, in spite of lesser impact, regional cooperation has been further 
strengthened;
58
 for example, China has actively promoted bilateral local currency 
swap schemes and sought to reform the Chiang Mai Initiative.
59
 More broadly, the 
G7 and G20 summits represent new developments in international cooperation, 
where a wider range of agreements have been reached covering regulation and 
supervision over hedge funds, bonuses, rating agencies, capital requirements for 
banks, securitisation, tax havens, accounting rules, and so forth.
60
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It is difficult to make an overall judgement about the exact effectiveness of those 
responses, for exposures to risks, as well as losses, vary from country to country.
61
 
More specific analyses will be given in the individual case study chapters.  
 
 
3.3.2 Overarching Central Bank Reforms 
 
As the traditional banking sector has gradually been replaced, central banks have 
themselves also developed. They have embraced the following features: (1) after 
being delegated monetary policy for price stability, independence has been written 
into their statutes together with enhanced accountability and transparency; (2) a fixed 
toolbox of monetary policy instruments has been granted to achieve their statutory 
goals; and (3) prudential regulation has prevailed, but relevant responsibilities have 
shifted from some central banks, including the BOE. In the years running up to the 
GFC, accommodative monetary policy, as well as light-touch prudential regulation, 
has induced certain banks to take greater funding and credit risks within a shadow 
system increasingly characterised by complicated securitisation and high-level 
leverage ratios during financial conglomeration. Therefore, with central banks’ focus 
upon monetary policy, and financial markets upon liberalisation, a mismatch has 
already emerged. 
 
With the GFC, central banks have combined conventional and unconventional 
monetary policy instruments, so interest rates have been reduced to, and maintained 
at, near-zero levels among most advanced countries, while expanded liquidity 
supports have been offered with exceptional arrangements, but selected policy 
instruments and their outcomes vary. Overall, central banks have intended to restore 
financial stability by modifying their monetary policies, and also been required to 
resolve wider economic problems that have exposed. However, monetary policies 
have their own limits and structural problems, especially, cannot be resolved by 
                                                          
61
 E.g., see, Barry Eichengreen, ‘The Financial Crisis and Global Policy Reforms’ for FRB San 
Francisco’s Conference on Asia and the Financial Crisis, California, October 2009 
<www.frbsf.org/economic-research/conferences/aepc/2009/09_Eichengreen.pdf>. 
Anthony Payne, ‘How Many Gs are there in “Global Governance” after the Crisis? The Perspective of 
the ‘Marginal Majority’ of the World’s States’ (2010) International Affairs 86(3): 729-740; Jomo 
Kwame Sundaram, Reforming the International Financial System for Development (Columbia 
University Press 2010). 
70 
 
these alone; moreover, overburdened central banks might risk their own credibility 
and independence.
62
  
 
As suggested by the history of central banks, their role and functions changed with 
financial crises. For example, following the 1930s Great Depression, the US central 
bank failed to rebuild the gold standard; and, after the 1970s’ crises, central banks 
endeavoured to achieve monetary stability associated with the triumph of market 
economy. Similarly, it is argued that central banks could have reached another 
crossroad in the aftermath of the GFC.
63
 In principle, they are required to improve 
crisis management solutions, thus rebuilding stability and regaining economic 
development. The main avenues for reform include the following three aspects: 
1. Objectives: central banks should retain their primary objective of price 
stability, but emphasize financial stability. 
 
Without exception, price stability has been the primary goal for central banks’ 
exercise of monetary policy. However, specific targets for inflations have not 
necessarily been adopted, with debates about them becoming more complicated 
once the GFC shifted attention to financial stability.
64
 
 
Certain developments have occurred, including an enhanced role in maintaining 
financial stability for the UK central bank and the establishment of new councils 
managing systemic risks in the US, but other uncertainties still exist. In Japan, 
price stability has brought a mixed outcome of lower inflation but greater 
financial imbalance. Since it is estimated that the most serious imbalance 
destabilising macro economy has emerged from the financial sector, ex ante 
measures to restrain the accumulation of a financial imbalance take priority.
65
 In 
financial crisis, monetary easing is employed to liquidate the financial sector and 
restore market confidence, which might create potential inflation; but tight 
                                                          
62
 BIS, ‘82nd Annual Report: 1 April 2011-31 March 2012’ (June 24, 2012) 2-3, 34-49 
<www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2012e.pdf>. 
63
 C.A.E. Goodhart, ‘The Changing Role of Central Banks’ BIS Working Paper, No 326, November 
2010 <www.bis.org/publ/work326.pdf>. 
64
 Olivier Blanchard, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia and Paolo Mauro, ‘Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy’ 
(2010) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, supplement 42(S6): 199-215. 
65
 Masaaki Shirakawa, ‘Central Banking: Before, During and After the Crisis’ (2013) International 
Journal of Central Banking 9(S1): 373-387. 
71 
 
monetary policy, while able to counter inflation, would likely accentuate 
financial distress. Conflicts thus intensify when the central bank is in charge of 
both monetary and financial stability, and it is necessary to inform this 
relationship with further evidence.
66
 
 
2. Financial regulation and supervision: reform should focus upon the 
introduction and implementation of macro-prudential policies.  
 
While such policies are not new, a macro-prudential dimension reinforces 
existing approaches for systemic stability.
67
 Aiming at ensuring financial 
stability by mitigating the build-up of systemic risks, this is understood to limit 
the costs to the economy from financial distress.
68
 So macro-prudential policies 
are directly linked with governing the conjunctural and structural financial 
system, rather than individual institutions only.
69
 Specific tools include capital 
requirements and buffers, forward-looking loss provisioning, liquidity ratios, 
prudent collateral valuation, and suchlike.
70
 Central banks have their own 
incentives and advantages when coping with systemic risks, making them central 
to strengthening macro-prudential policies.
71
 
 
Debates about how to arrange financial regulation and supervision have 
continued since the pre-crisis period, especially after the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) was established in the UK as a mega regulator in the late 1990s. 
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countercyclical capital buffer, Basel III is a macro-prudential regulatory policy; refer to, Luis I. 
Jacome and Erlend W. Nier,  ‘Macroprudential Policy: Protecting the Whole’ IMF Finance and 
Development <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/macropru.htm>. 
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In the aftermath of the GFC, standards of “good supervision” have been revisited. 
Overall, it is argued that supervisors’ approaches to financial stability, including 
indicators, the ability and the will to act, could affect the outcomes.
72
 
 
3. Conduct: central banks should make their operational framework more 
flexible and yet reduce moral hazard, while still maintaining their own 
independence. 
 
As will be analysed, the four selected central banks were slow to respond to 
changed financial conditions, and were also inflexible in selecting crisis 
management solutions. Therefore, it is argued that more flexible frameworks for 
central bank operations would make them more resilient.
73
 Some unconventional 
monetary policy may still be required even after economic recovery has occurred. 
Specific facilities should also be re-assessed; for example, in terms of the LOLR, 
possible reforms might include more recipients, more explicit legal provisions, 
stricter regulation about collateral, and expanded coverage.
74
 Furthermore, 
international cooperation should move further to mitigate systemic financial 
instability, rather than harmonising individual capital and regulatory 
requirements alone.
75
  
 
In general, central banks have often worked more closely with their governments 
to deal with financial crises; this renewed argument as to whether and how much 
central bank independence still matters.
76
 At the same time, central banks have 
particular effects upon financial market participants.  
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 Jose Viñals, Jonathan Fiechter, Aditya Narain, Jennifer Elliott, Ian Tower, Pierluigi Bologna and 
Michael Hus, ‘The Making of Good Supervision: Learning to Say “No”’ IMF Staff Position Note, 
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 This is not a new issue either; refer to, Jakob de Haan, Donato Masciandaro and Marc Quintyn, 
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How to restore financial stability has been critically questioned by the GFC, and 
central bank reforms start with the relocation of their role in mitigating systemic 
risks. This is the challenge posed by the GFC and should be tackled by central banks.  
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
The GFC has caused profound changes to financial markets and beyond. This 
chapter has summarised the performances and reforms of central banks, especially 
regarding their role in maintaining financial stability. Principally, major monetary 
policy responses, both domestic and cross-border, have explained the increasing 
requirement for central banks to stabilise financial markets and then contribute to 
economic growth, while profound reforms have been conducted to improve facilities 
and mechanisms for financial crisis. From those points of view, the GFC has 
challenged the capacity of central banks to deal with financial crises, and 
accordingly, the main research question for this thesis is first to discover whether, 
and then explore exactly how, central banks might have managed to change in order 
to restore financial stability.  
 
As will be shown in the following chapters, individual case studies will revolve 
around their respective propositions about how changing two-tier relationships were 
impacted by/upon leading central banks during the GFC.  It will argue that this crisis 
has brought central banks closer to the broader policies of their governments, and 
also to financial markets. Therefore, the changed two-tier relationship has typically 
been characterised by reduced central bank independence and more direct control 
over the markets; each case study will prove this.  
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Part II: CASE STUDIES 
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Chapter Four 
US Federal Reserve System and the Global Financial Crisis
1
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As clarified in Chapter One, the proposition of a central bank can be approached 
from its legal framework, which deals with its two-tier relationship; these all have 
later been challenged by the GFC. This chapter will demonstrate that the US Fed was 
a market-oriented central bank with consolidated prudential regulation until the GFC 
changed its commitment to market principles.    
 
The GFC originated from the US subprime mortgage crisis, and the US Fed has 
since changed monetary policy responses to deal with the resulting recession. Also, 
the US attracts significant attention from China. This chapter will thus provide a 
leading case study for further comparison. With these goals in mind, this chapter 
proceeds as follows. First, the US Fed had gradually developed its functions as the 
LOLR, and also indirect policy instruments to affect financial markets. Its legal 
framework assumed it to be a market-oriented central bank and consolidated 
regulator. Throughout the GFC, the US Fed has become a target for public criticism 
about sacrificing independence, directly intervening in the financial markets, and 
neglecting systemic financial stability. In response to these problems, subsequent 
legal reforms sought to reaffirm it as a market-oriented central bank and macro-
prudential regulator. Accordingly, under the pressure from the GFC, the US Fed has 
changed its two-tier relationship, and then its proposition. This chapter will conclude 
with a comparative summary regarding the way in which the GFC has challenged the 
approach of the US Fed toward financial stability. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 This chapter is updated until mid-July 2013. 
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4.2 Overriding Legal Framework of the US Fed before the GFC 
 
This section will first focus upon the ruling legal framework of the US Fed before 
the GFC. It was arguably born of financial panics, and had been challenged by 
recurring financial crises. It was intended to work as the LOLR with financial 
regulation and supervision modified accordingly. However, it was founded with the 
express purpose of being independent, and its relationship with Government 
developed following limited statutory changes. These characteristics constitute the 
distinct two-tier relationship governing the US Fed; the legal framework assumed its 
independence within Government and emergent lending to markets.  
 
 
4.2.1 Establishment of the US Fed 
 
American banks were initially built up in the colonies, following the model of the 
BOE. Between 1835 and 1856, the “free banking” model brought flourishing 
financial activities under an increasing number of laws and rules, especially in New 
York.
2
 After the National Banking Act 1863, a dual system of state-registered and 
nation-registered banks came into being with certain rudimentary central banking 
functions.
3
 This Act required national supervision by the newly established 
Comptroller of the Currency (COC), covering capital and reserve requirements, 
interbank payment and holdings of gold.
4
 New York gradually developed to be the 
central reserve city, and clearing houses also emerged.
5
  Clearing houses, which 
initially dealt with increasing cheque transactions, began to issue their own loan 
                                                          
2
 The New York law was viewed contributed to successful banking and the wider economy growth in 
the US. See, Hugh Rockoff, ‘The Free Banking Era: A Reexamination’ (1974) Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 6(2): 141-167. 
3
 William Graham Summer, A History of Banking in all the Leading Nations (The Journal of 
Commerce and Commercial Bulletin, 2
nd
 Edition, vol 1, 1971). 
4
 Paul Peretz and Jean Reith Schroedel, ‘Financial Regulation in the United States: Lessons from 
History’ (2009) Public Administration Review 69(4): 603-612. 
5
 Jon R. Moen and Ellis W. Tallman, ‘New York and the Politics of Central Banks, 1781 to the 
Federal Reserve Act’ FRB Atlanta, Working Paper 2003-42, 2003 
<www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/wp0342.pdf>. 
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certificates, similar to the LOLR lending and a public role in money creation, and 
selected regulatory duties.
6
  
 
Reluctance to develop central banking delayed the establishment of the US Fed until 
just before World War I.
7
 In 1907, a run on the Knickerbockers Trust Company 
caused suspended payments to depositors, triggering intensive debates over uneven 
regulation among financial institutions, working as a catalyst for the creation of a 
central bank.
8
 Responding directly to this crisis, the Aldrich Vreeland Act was 
enacted in 1908 with provisions of note-issues in an emergency,
9
 and a National 
Monetary Commission was established to explore long-term solutions to related 
banking and financial problems, as well as temporary mechanisms to offer emergent 
lending, moving further towards central banking.
10
 From an international perspective, 
pre-war upheavals also accelerated the need for domestic market stability controlled 
by central banks.
11
 
 
The Federal Reserve Bill was passed in December 1913, and twelve regional Federal 
Reserve Banks (FRBs) were established in 1914, with the Federal Reserve Board 
(Board) in Washington DC. This Act did not explicitly express its responsibilities in 
the event of a financial crisis, but rather instructed it to “furnish an elastic currency, 
to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to establish a more effective 
supervision of banking”.12 It provided loans to accommodate fluctuations in currency 
demand under the discount window mechanism; the principal function for FRBs was 
                                                          
6
 Gary Gorton, ‘Private Clearinghouses and the Origins of Central Banking’ FRB Philadelphia, 
Business Review, 1984 <www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/publications/business-
review/1984/brjf84gg.pdf>. 
7
 Alexander Hamilton proposed to establish the Bank of the United States at the end of the 18
th
 
century, aiming to ensure currency circulation with advantages accruing to government, banks, and 
the wider public. See, supra 3, 22-62. 
8
 Ellis W. Tallman and Jon R. Moen,’ Lessons from the Panic of 1907’ FRB Atlanta, Economic 
Review, May/June 1990 <http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/meltzer/talles90.pdf>.  
9
 J. Laurence Laughlin, ‘The Aldrich-Vreeland Act’ (1908) Journal of Political Economy 16(8): 489-
513. 
10
 William G. Dewald, ‘The National Monetary Commission: A Look Back’ (1972) Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking  l4(4): 930-956. 
11
 J. Lawrence Broz, The International Origins of the Federal Reserve System (NY: Cornell 
University Press 1997).  
12
 <www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/history_article.html> Robert L. Owen, Chairman of the 
Committee on Banking and Currency, US Senate, said “it is the duty of the United States to provide a 
means by which the periodic panics which shake the American Republic and do it enormous injury 
shall be stopped”. Robert L. Owen, ‘The Federal Reserve Act: Its Origin and Principles’ (November 
15, 1918) <http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/docs/publications/books/fra_owen_1919.pdf>. 
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to rediscount to their member banks in case of liquidity shortage.
13
 There were no 
provisions about lending to Government, but during its first decade, it supported war 
finance by keeping interest rates low but bond prices high. Inflation rose in 1917, but 
due to pressure from the Treasury, the US Fed could not raise interest rates until 
1919, causing recession in 1921.
14
  
 
The dual-chartering banking system continued. Types of commercial banks were 
divided according to which government body chartered them, and whether or not 
they were members of the Federal Reserve System. National banks were chartered 
by the federal government through the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) in the Treasury, which were members by law. State banks were chartered by 
state governments, which could join voluntarily when meeting specified criteria.
15
 
The relationships between the Board, FRBs, and commercial banks can be 
summarised as follows. Each FRB was owned by member banks in the region, and 
member banks held deposits with FRB in their respective regional divisions. FRBs 
were thus owned by commercial banks, but under the supervision of the Board, 
which consisted of Secretary of the Treasury, OCC and five members appointed by 
the President, who was also responsible for selecting the governor and vice governor. 
As a result, the US Fed was considered a private agency operating in the public 
interest under Government supervision.
16
  
 
In dealing with financial panics, the US Fed took over the management of the 
financial system from the private sector. The 1913 Act placed down the principle 
mechanism of discount window, whereby the US Fed served as the LOLR. The legal 
description explicitly highlighted its independence from the banking sector rather 
than Government.
17
 It was argued to be a decentralised central bank which balanced 
                                                          
13
 Sections 26, 30, 32, 35, 36, 41, and 49, Federal Reserve Act 1913. 
14
 Charles R. Whittlesey, ‘The Banking System and War Finance’ NBER Financial Research Program 
“Our Economy in War”, Occasional Paper 8, 1943 <www.nber.org/chapters/c9925.pdf>.  
15
 Comptroller of the Currency Administrator of National Banks, National Banks and The Dual 
Banking System (OCC, 2003). 
16
 <www.let.rug.nl/usa/essays/general/a-brief-history-of-central-banking/federal-reserve-act-
(1913).php>. 
17
 James Forder, ‘“Independence” and the Founding of the Federal Reserve’ (2003) Scottish Journal 
of Political Economy 50(3): 297-310. 
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the competing interests of private banks and populist sentiment. Even the word 
“central bank” had been conspicuously absent from the legislation.18 
 
 
4.2.2. The US Fed in the 1930s Great Depression 
 
The US Fed commenced business during World War I; in 1923, its Board set up the 
Open Market Investment Committee, and promulgated principles for OMOs. The US 
stock market crashed in October 1929, and by mid-1930, the economy went into 
deep depression.
19
 The US Fed misjudged the stock market boom by tightening 
monetary policy partly triggered financial recession,
20
 whilst having failed to fulfil 
its task as the LOLR as described under the 1913 Act.  
 
Only a limited short-term monetary expansion was undertaken through OMOs by the 
spring of 1932.
21
 There are several reasons explaining its inactivity. To begin with, 
membership did not equally apply to commercial banks, so the dual banking system 
led to the lack of nationwide branch banking and constrained the wider liquid money 
market.
22
 In this context, region-based FRBs had often competed rather than 
cooperated when injecting liquidity into banks in their respective jurisdictions since 
1929.
23
 From a legal perspective, the 1913 Act limited the conduct of the LOLR in 
the event of a banking crisis: the LOLR could only be made to member banks, with 
most non-member banks excluded;
24
 the US Fed could only rediscount real bills 
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 <www.federalreserveeducation.org/about-the-fed/history/>  
19
 There are many studies into its causes, crisis management solutions, and lessons in general and for 
the US Fed particularly. For an overall study of monetary policy responses, refer to, Milton Friedman 
and Anna Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 2008).  
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 Frederic S. Mishkin and Eugene N. White, ‘U.S. Stock Market Crashes and Their Aftermath: 
Implications for Monetary Policy’ NBER Working Paper No 8992, 2002 
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21
 Gerald Epstein and Thomas Ferguson, ‘Monetary Policy, Loan Liquidation, and Industrial Conflict: 
The Federal Reserve and the Open Market Operations of 1932’ (1984) Journal of Economic History 
44(4): 957-983. 
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 Supra 19, 362-390. 
23
 Mark A. Carlson, Kris Michener and Gary Richardson, ‘Arresting Banking Panics: Federal Reserve 
Liquidity Provision and the Forgotten Panic of 1929’ (2011) Journal of Political Economy 119(5): 
889-924. 
24
 By December 1929, only 35% of commercial banks were members; non-member banks, saving 
institutions, trust companies and other financial institutions were excluded from the discount window 
“except by permission of the Federal Reserve Board”. This could be conducted via member banks 
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such as “notes, drafts, and bills of exchange arising out of actual commercial 
transactions” with a term to maturity of “up to 90 days”. FRBs controlled discount 
windows for the member banks they regulated, but the Board did not fully clarify 
discount rates and conduct for FRBs. Meanwhile, FRBs had to maintain minimum 
gold reserves equal to 40% of their outstanding notes and 35% of their deposit 
liabilities; as a result, the gold standard reduced the space for monetary easing.
25
 The 
functions of the US Fed as the LOLR were weakened by insufficient legal 
provisioning, a decentralised federal system, and international factors linking its 
commitment under the gold standard.
26
   
 
Responding to the 1930s Great Depression, the New Deal enacted a series of 
programmes, including reforms relating to the LOLR facilities.
27
 The first Glass-
Steagall Act was introduced in 1932, adding Section 13(3) to the 1913 Act as a 
provision of the Emergent Relief and Construction Act. The US Fed was authorised 
“in unusual and exigent circumstances … to discount for any individual, partnership, 
or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange of the kinds and maturities made 
eligible for discount for member banks”. The newly-added Section 13(13) allowed 
borrowing against the obligations of the US government and its agencies. In 1934, 
Congress added Section 13(b), permitting working capital advances for up to five 
years to established industrial and commercial businesses. The Banking Act 1935 
made further changes: it removed the requirement of “exceptional and exigent 
circumstance” for loans under Section 10(b), and also that of loans under Section 
13(3) secured by both collateral eligible for discount by member banks and the 
endorsement of the borrower or a third-party surety; and those credit programmes 
were permanently added to the Federal Reserve Act. Accordingly, Congress 
removed some constraints upon the LOLR by changing the 1913 Act, and thereby, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
working as agents and only with the exception of approval from the Board. See, Howard H. Hackley, 
Lending Functions of the Federal Reserve Banks: A History (US Fed, Washington DC 1973) 117-125. 
25
 There are lasting debates about whether the LOLR of the US Fed was constrained by the gold 
standard. See, supra 19. 
26
 Mark A. Carlson and David C Wheelock, ‘The Lender of Last Resort: Lessons from the Fed’s First 
100 Years’ FRB St. Louis, Working Paper Series 2012-056B, 2013 
<http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-056.pdf>. 
27
 For the review of statutory changes, see, supra 24, 127-145. 
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enhanced discretion of the US Fed to offer credit supports against an extended range 
of collaterals to more recipients in the context of a financial crisis.
28
  
 
Moreover, under the Glass-Steagall Act 1932, the Board eased reserve requirements 
over FRBs, extending to include government securities as collateral for note issues. 
In March 1933, the Emergency Banking Act further suspended the gold standard: the 
US Fed was allowed to issue an unlimited amount of currency backed only by 
government securities without gold reserve requirement.
29
 Later, under the Gold 
Reserve Act 1934, Congress nationalised the gold reserve of the US Fed by 
establishing the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF), leaving the Treasury controlling 
gold and exchange transactions both home and abroad.
30
   
 
The landscape of the US financial sector, including the oversight regime, had 
fundamentally been different due to those legal reforms. First, the Glass-Steagall Act 
1933 separated commercial and investment banking, aiming to resolve conflicts of 
interests to protect depositors by limiting banks’ engagement in the securities 
business.
31
 The Board strengthened its regulatory power: it was instructed to set 
maximum limits on interest rates which commercial banks could pay on time 
deposits (Regulation Q), adjust reserve requirements of member banks, and regulate 
margin requirements for the purchase and holding of registered securities. This Act 
also required bank holding companies (BHCs) to be examined by the US Fed, and 
the Board could gather information on affiliates of member banks, especially the 
voting permit requirement under Regulation P.
32
 The FDIC was set up to deal with 
banking panics in the absence of an effective LOLR; this was expanded and made 
permanent by the Banking Act 1935.
33
 Under this, Congress amended the Federal 
Reserve Act to provide, by statute, the FOMC with central control over OMOs and 
                                                          
28
 The US Fed only made few loans under Sections 13(3) and 13(13) until 1940. In contrast, Section 
13(b) was employed more extensively, and repealed in 1958 under the Small Business Investment 
Company Act. For details, see, David Fettig, ‘Lender of More than Last Resort’ FRB Minneapolis, 
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 Supra 19, 462-482. 
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31
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32
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 Supra 19, 434-442. 
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its principles,
34
 whilst improving central bank independence by removing the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the COC from the Board.
35
 At the same time, the 
Board strengthened its controls over the FRBs: all members on the Board joined the 
FOMC, while the Board was authorised to influence FRBs’ discount rates.36  
 
The 1930s reform improved financial regulation and supervision by strengthening 
the US Fed, introducing deposit insurance, and establishing more individual 
responsible agencies based upon the dual-chartering system.
37
 Both it and the OCC 
were federal regulators, whilst the FDIC underwrote deposit insurance for those 
regulated at the federal level, as well as many state-regulated banks. The financial 
sector also changed: Regulation Q set limits upon interest rates, commercial banking 
was separated from investment business, interstate branching continued to be 
prohibited, and the chartering regime limited free risk taking. In consequence, the 
1930s Great Depression left a highly regulated and controlled financial system, 
where the US Fed governed interest rates, reserve requirements, and discount rates.    
 
 
4.2.3 Legal Framework before the GFC 
 
The legal framework is defined by the Federal Reserve Act, along with subsequent 
laws.
38
 The US Fed comprises the Board, twelve regional FRBs, and the FOMC. The 
following part will explain major legal elements.  
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 For a legislative review, especially of its relevance to the Federal Reserve Act, refer to, US Fed, 
‘Alternative Instruments for Open Market and Discount Window Operations’ Study Group on 
Alternative Instruments for System Operations, December 2002 
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Conference “the First 100 Years of the Federal Reserve System: The Policy Record, Lessons Learned, 
and Prospects for the Future”, July 10, 2013 
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 Supra 4. 
38
 The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions (9
th
 edn, US Fed 2005). 
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Objectives  
After World War II, the Employment Act 1946 reordered economic policy-making, 
building up the legislative framework for the federal government to pursue the full 
objectives of production, employment, consumption, investment and finances. Under 
this constitution, the US Fed acted under a mandate with Government: it was 
expected to foster “conditions under which there will be afforded useful employment 
opportunities … for those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote 
maximum employment, production, and purchasing power”. 39   In the Federal 
Reserve Reform Act 1977, this was clarified to “promote effectively the goals of 
maximum employment, stable price, and moderate long-term interest rates”.40  In 
1978, the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act was enacted, requiring it to 
“promote full employment … and reasonable price stability”. Accordingly, the 
objectives of the US Fed were defined to embrace both employment and price 
stability.
41
  
 
By law, the US Fed should enable maximum employment, maintain stable prices and 
moderate long-term interest rates.
42
 It acquired multiple objectives without explicit 
inflation targeting.
43
 In practice, under the leadership of Chairman Greenspan, the 
dual mandate above had been strengthened since the late 1980s.
44
  
 
Independence  
The Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord 1951 defined the department management and 
monetary policies necessary to ensure the successful financing of Government’s 
                                                          
39
 Arthur F. Burns, ‘Some Reflections on the Employment Act’ (1962) Political Science Quarterly 
77(4): 481-504. 
40
 Section 2A, Federal Reserve Reform Act 1977. 
41
 Emmanuel Apel, Central Banking System Compared: The ECB, the Pre-Euro Bundesbank and the 
Federal Reserve System (London: Routledge 2003) 32. 
42
 For historical evolution, see, ‘The Goal of U.S. Monetary Policy’ FRB San Francisco, Economic 
Letter No 99-04, January 29, 1999 <www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-
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43
 Willem Thorbecke, ‘A Dual Mandate for the Federal Reserve: the Pursuit of Price Stability and Full 
Employment’ (2002) Eastern Economic Journal 28(2): 255-268. 
44
 Alan S. Blinder and Ricardo Reis, ‘Understanding the Greenspan Standard’ for FRB Kansas City 
Symposium, August 25-27, 2005 <www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2005/pdf/Blinder-
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requirements and minimise monetisation of public debts.
45
 An independent 
government securities market was established, but the US Fed was still responsible 
for assuring the success of Treasury debt sales.
46
 The FOMC took over monetary 
policy decision-making after abolishing the Executive Committee in 1955. In 1962, 
the US Fed was authorised to deal with foreign exchange operations on its own 
account.
47
 Afterwards, few statutory changes were made to govern its independence, 
but in practice, its interaction with government had changed between the 1970s and 
1980s.
48
 From 1975, Congress started regular consultations with it about plans for 
monetary and credit aggregates,
49
 while required by the Full Employment and 
Balanced Growth Act, the Chairman began to report monetary policy goals and 
objectives to Congress twice annually from 1978.  
 
It was held that the US Fed had “independence within the government”: it does not 
have to be ratified by the President or any other executive branches of government, 
but remain subject to Congress.
50
 It also gained income primarily from interest on 
government securities under OMOs, as well as from foreign currency transactions, 
fees and other interests, but it handed the rest of its earnings, excluding expenses, to 
the Treasury.
51
 Therefore, without relying upon the congressional budget, the US 
Fed had considerable budgetary independence.  
 
Clearly, central bank independence is never absolute, and the US Fed faced both 
formal and informal restrictions.
52
 To begin with, it is an agent of Congress, required 
to support employment. Moreover, Government’s authority derived from personnel 
                                                          
45
 Robert L. Hetzel and Ralph F. Leach, ‘The Treasury-Fed Accord: A New Narrative Account’ (2001) 
FRB Richmond Economic Quarterly 87(1): 33-55. 
46
 Robert L. Hetzel and Ralph F. Leach, ‘After the Accord: Reminiscences on the Birth of the Modern 
Fed’ (2001) FRB Richmond Economic Quarterly 87(1): 57-64. 
47
 For the influence of foreign exchange operations upon central bank independence and monetary 
policy, see, Marvin Goodfriend and J. Alfred Broaddus, ‘Foreign Exchange Operations and the 
Federal Reserve’ (1996) FRB Richmond Economic Quarterly 82(1): 1-19. 
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 Supra 17. 
49
 House Concurrent Resolution 133 of 1975. 
50
 Section 2B, Appearances Before and Reports to the Congress, Federal Reserve Act. 
51
 <www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12799.htm>. 
52
 Informal restrictions can arise from budgetary authority, the relationship between President and the 
US Fed, its location at the political centre of Washington DC, etc. Refer to, Allan H. Meltzer, History 
of the Federal Reserve: Vol. 2, Book 1, 1951-1969 (London: University of Chicago Press 2009) 1-40. 
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appointments to it.
53
 The constitution of the Board dated back to the Banking Act 
1935, including the Chairman and Vice Chairmen appointed by the President and 
confirmed by Senate; the Chairman regularly testifies before congressional 
committees and meets with the President and the Treasury Secretary. The Board has 
continual contacts with other policy makers, such as the President’s Council of 
Economic Advisers, and regularly reports to the House and Senate committees, 
while Congress supervises those monetary policies set by the Board. Furthermore, 
Congress charters and oversees FRBs, which operate a nationwide payments system, 
and also work as bankers for the Treasury. In order to promote accountability, both 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
54
 and a public accountant audit the 
Board.
55
 Congress prescribed only two areas outside the GAO review: monetary 
policy deliberations, decisions, and action; and transactions involving foreign central 
banks, governments and international financial organisations.
56
 Additionally, the US 
Fed has been required to improve its communication and transparency. For example, 
from 1994, the FOMC began to release its statement with further details after the 
monetary policy meeting.
57
  
 
With “independence within the government” as described by statute, the US Fed’s 
actual independence leaves open where the limits of the government authority 
ultimately lie.  
 
Organisational Structure
58
 
The Board is primarily required to formulate monetary policy with sole 
responsibility for changes in reserve requirements and discount rates initiated by a 
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FRB. It also conducts analyses of domestic and international financial and economic 
development, national payment system, and consumer credit protection. FRBs’ 
Board constitutes nine directors elected from outside with 3 classes representing the 
public interests of different groups.
59
 They have more direct relationships with the 
financial markets: they hold reserves as deposits from commercial banks, and 
manage onsite bank examinations. The relationship between the Board and FRBs is 
two-fold: the former had a broad oversight responsibility over the operations of the 
FRBs, and the latter must submit their annual budgets for approval from the Board.  
 
The FOMC is the dominant body for monetary policy making.
60
 It determines its 
own organisation by statute, and governs OMOs. Its 12 members include the 7 Board 
members plus 5 Presidents from FRBs. Since 1981, eight regularly scheduled 
meetings have been held every five to eight weeks for each year, where the 
committee reviews prevailing economic and financial conditions.
61
 The FOMC is the 
agent which carries responsibility for monetary policy instruments, aimed at meeting 
the US Fed’s long-term goals of price stability and economic growth.62   
 
Monetary Policy 
The US Fed had gradually changed its monetary policy from direct tools to indirect 
means.  
 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the conduct of bank credit generally served as the primary 
intermediate objective for monetary policy, and the FOMC initially targeted free 
reserves and then federal funds rates.
63
 Later, the US Fed faced a dilemma of the 
trade-off between suppressing inflation and maintaining employment after holding 
Treasury bond prices stable, which was exacerbated in the 1970s.
64
 With further 
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inflation threats during the oil crises, it shifted towards targeting money growth.
65
 In 
October 1979, the FOMC strengthened its commitment to control monetary 
aggregates by adopting a non-borrowed reserves operating target, while 
deemphasizing the federal funds rates as its leading operating target.
66
 However, it 
missed all such targets between 1979 and 1982. As monetary aggregates failed to 
relate inflation with nominal GDP, it was criticised for misleading conduct of money 
policy. In this context, Chairman Alan Greenspan testified in Congress in 1993 that 
it would no longer use any monetary targets to guide monetary policy.
67
 In brief, the 
US Fed adjusted its conduct of monetary policy responding to changed 
macroeconomic conditions, especially regarding inflation.
68
  
 
Under legal authority, the US Fed had such official monetary policy instruments as 
OMOs, reserve requirements, contractual clearing balances and discount window 
lending.
69
 These were employed to control federal funds rates, influencing the 
demand and supply of the trade balance held by depository institutions. Both OMOs 
and discount window loans could be employed to change the aggregate supply of the 
monetary base, adjusting not only the aggregate quantities of money and credit but 
also interest rates.
70
 In spite of legal authority, it is argued that, in the 1990s, 
monetary policy under former Chairman Greenspan was made and implemented with 
particular discretion, being flexible and adaptable to changed conditions.
71
 In 2003, 
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the US Fed set rates at the discount window operations above the Funds rates, and 
loans to banks were priced through interest rates.
72
 
 
LOLR Facilities     
The US Fed gradually developed its LOLR associated with occasional financial 
panics.
73
  
 
By law, it could offer financial aid through discount window and OMOs, as well as 
an emergency discount window under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.
74
 
Legislation provided some flexibility, allowing it to consider extending its statutory 
authority in prescribed circumstances. The US Fed was governed to rediscount 
commercial paper with member banks but not directly with the public; that is, only 
commercial paper could be discounted with member banks, and then rediscounted.
75
 
Section 13(3) required non-depository institutions to pledge the same “near 
substitute for cash” quality of collateral eligible for discount window, including 
certain US Treasury obligations and “notes, drafts, and bills of exchange issued or 
drawn for agricultural, industrial, or commercial purposes” with a maturity of up to 
90 days.
76
 When lending to depository institutions, known as the LOLR facility, 
Section 10(b) stimulated its broadest authority to extend loans as long as they were 
collateralised. As previously observed, this facility was extended to individuals, 
partnership and corporations (IPCs) during the 1930s Great Depression under 
Section 13(3). In principle, lending to IPCs could only be made in unusual and 
exigent circumstances, and only when IPCs were not able to secure sufficient credit 
accommodations from other banking institutions. In terms of asset purchases and 
sales, the US Fed could employ OMOs to inject reserves and smooth market 
dislocations. According to Section 14, it could purchase the debt of US state and 
local governments, and US financial service institutions, as well as private-sector 
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debt in the case of unusual and exigent circumstance. In practice, it had narrowed 
down the scope of securities.
77
 In 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement (FDICI) Act was released, restricting bailouts by instructing regulators 
to close failing firms,
78
 whilst deleting the strict restricts on eligible collaterals, 
expanding the US Fed’s safe net. 
 
Table 4.1 summarises financial aid offered by the US Fed under its legal authority:  
Table 4.1: Monetary Policy Actions Authorised under Federal Reserve Act 
 
Facilities 
 
Usual Conditions 
 
Unusual and Exigent 
Circumstances 
 Provisions Requirements Provisions Requirements 
 
 
Lending 
Activities 
 
Section 
10(b), 
13(2), (3), 
(4), (6), (8), 
(13)  and 
13(a) 
 
Lending to 
depository 
institutions; 
Certain types of 
collateral; 
Limited risk added to 
the US Fed’s balance 
sheet 
 
Sections 
13(3) and 
(13) 
 
 
Lending to non-
depository 
institutions; 
Certain types of 
collateral; 
More risk added to 
the US Fed’s 
balance sheet 
 
Asset 
Purchases 
 
Section 14 
 
Domestic OMOs 
only in securities 
issued or guaranteed 
by US Treasury or 
federal agencies 
 
Section 
13(3) 
 
Extending to 
certain types of 
private-sector debt  
 
 
 
As illustrated in Table 4.1, various legal provisions had defined what kind of 
financial aid could be offered in both usual and unusual circumstances. It could only 
extend its safety net over more recipients with a wider range of collaterals as long as 
a certain conditions were met. When purchasing private-sector debt, the US Fed 
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affected credit allocation across the economy,
79
 and also risked its own balance sheet 
by affecting liquidity directly.
80
  
 
Financial Regulation and Supervision 
During the US financial history, the multi-agency pattern of supervision and 
regulation was based upon the dual-chartering banking system; different market 
sectors were regulated by individual agencies.
81
 The US Fed had gradually 
developed its financial oversight duties, while liberalizing the highly regulated 
financial system left by the 1930s Great Depression.
82
  
 
In 1956, the Bank Holding Company Act was enacted, granting the Board the 
authority to require the registration of companies controlling two or more banks.
83
 In 
1980, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control (DIDMC) Act 
marked the commencement of financial modernisation, allowing interest payment to 
transaction accounts and also removing interest rate ceilings.
84
 Meanwhile, the US 
Fed began to set reserve requirements for all eligible institutions to provide checking 
account services, extending its regulatory coverage.
85
 By the late 1990s, the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act 1999 (GLB) brought important changes. With increasing demands 
from large financial constitutions for branch banking in states and interest payment 
on deposits, the GLB finally ended the separation between commercial and 
investment banks, allowing commercial banks, investment banks and insurance 
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companies to enter into each other’s lines of business.86 It laid the foundation for the 
US Fed to become the “umbrella regulator” over the new financial holding 
companies (FHCs), and it began to oversee such companies as were traditionally 
regulated by the SEC and state regulators.  As a result, it regulated an increasing 
number of financial institutions as a consolidated supervisor.
87
  
 
In terms of approaches, safety and soundness was the core value for US banking 
regulation, supervision and enforcement, while its principles were purposefully left 
to evolve in accordance with changed market situations.
88
 With the market-oriented 
liberalization since the late 1970s, a risk-based approach was introduced after the 
“savings and loans” debacle,89 linking the likelihood of risks posed by a financial 
institution or market sector with its particular scope of business.
90
 The Board 
gradually formalised its requirement for capital adequacy, which was based upon 
risk-focused prudential supervision,
91
 and the Basel Accord I was introduced in 
1989.
92
 Under the GLB 1999, the US Fed was granted broad discretion to oversee 
the safety and soundness of the parent FHCs, rather than intervening into individual 
banking, investment and insurance businesses.
93
 Its umbrella supervision focused on 
reporting requirements, examination, capital oversight, enforcement powers, and 
sharing information with other primary or functional regulators; only after the GLB 
1999 had the US Fed expanded the above oversight to functionally regulated 
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subsidiaries.
94
 It introduced and emphasised risk-based supervision; and risk 
management, from both the internal and external aspects, had been strengthened.
95
 
 
By law, the Board had a wide-range responsibility over state-chartered member 
banks, BHCs, foreign activities of member banks, activities of foreign banks in the 
US, and Edge Act and agreement corporations.
96
 After the GLB 1999, the US Fed 
was the leading prudential regulator, while the SEC and the State Insurance 
Commissioner, as well as other state or federal regulators, were functional regulators 
overseeing different market sectors. Emphasizing risk-focused approaches to the 
core value of safety and soundness, such regulation architecture was argued to have 
strengths of sheer size, specialism and flexibility.
97
 Therefore, the US Fed controlled 
monetary instruments exclusively, but shared financial oversight with other 
government agents, together forming a consolidated regulation regime with 
regulatory laxness.
98
  
 
The legal framework of the US Fed could be described in Figure 4.1: 
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Figure 4.1: The Federal Reserve System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the US Fed operated chiefly in four areas, including 
monetary policy, supervision and regulation, financial stability and certain financial 
services. As Government’s banker, legislation defined the US Fed’s operational 
independence, and also explicitly set the limits of the government’s authority; as 
bankers’ bank, it could affect financial markets through monetary policy instruments, 
financial aid and prudential regulation. The FRBs have more direct contracts with 
the financial sector. 
 
 
4.2.4 Summary 
 
The US Fed, established as a private entity to operate in the public interest, was first 
and foremost set in place to govern the LOLR amid financial panics, but continuous 
legal reforms had brought other major changes as summarised in Table 4.2: 
 
With Financial Sector 
Reserve requirements, discount rates, economic 
and financial analyses, national payment 
systems, administering consumer credit 
protection, regulation and supervision 
With Government 
 Congress charters and supervises FRBs, which 
work as banks for the Treasury 
With Financial Sector  
Deposits holdings, regulation and supervision 
With Government  
Personnel appointments via President and 
Senate, subject to Congress 
FRBs 
Federal 
Reserve 
System 
Board  
Supervision 
Budget 
Approval 
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Table 4.2: Major Changes around US Fed’s Two-Tier Relationship 
before GFC 
 
Circumstances 
Legislation 
Monetary Policy 
Operation 
Central Bank 
Independence 
Relationship with 
Financial Markets 
 
1930s Great 
Depression 
 
 
 
US Fed’s 
misjudgement about 
stock market boom 
helped trigger financial 
recession 
 
Government 
nationalised US 
Fed’s gold reserves; 
US Fed was 
required to support 
government’s 
general economic 
strategy 
 
US Fed neglected 
LOLR facilities; 
Limited monetary 
stimulation through 
delayed OMOs and 
interest rates cuts 
 
New Deal Reform 
 
Glass-Steagall Acts 
1932 and 1933; 
Emergency 
Banking Act 1933; 
Gold Reserve Act 
1934; 
Banking Act 1935 
 
 
 
 
 
US Fed governed 
OMOs; 
FDIC was introduced; 
FOMC was set up but  
Treasury’s decisions 
dominated gold 
policies and interest 
rates; 
Centralising the power 
of the Board over 
FRBs 
 
 
Independence was 
strengthened by 
removing Treasury 
Secretary and the 
OCC from Board 
 
 
Commercial banks 
were prohibited 
from investment 
activities with few 
exceptions; 
individual agencies 
were responsible for 
segmented financial 
markets; 
US Fed examined 
BHCs; 
Regulation Q set 
ceilings on interest 
rates 
Employment Act 
1946 
 A mandate between 
Government and 
US Fed  
 
 
Treasury-Federal 
Reserve Accord 
1951 
 
FOMC resumed 
decision-making 
authority over interest 
rates 
 
US Fed began to 
raise independence 
 
 
US’s engagement in 
political conflicts 
and military wars  
1960s 
 
Inflation/Deflation 
1970s-1980s 
 
Full Employment 
and Balanced 
Growth Act 1978 
 
FOMC adjusted 
monetary policy 
conduct with changed 
macroeconomic 
conditions, especially 
regarding inflation 
 
Congress began 
regular 
consultations with 
US Fed; 
US Fed to promote 
full employment 
and price stability; 
Chairman reported 
to Congress 
regularly 
 
Congress gradually 
removed 
prohibitions over 
markets since the 
1930s; 
US Fed extended 
regulatory and 
supervisory regime  
 
DIDMC Act 1980 
 
Financial 
Modernisation 
  
US Fed extended 
reserve 
95 
 
requirements; 
Interest rate ceilings 
were abolished; 
Risk-based 
prudential 
regulation 
developed  
 
FDICI Act 1991 
   
US Fed explicitly 
conducted the 
LOLR facility under 
the clear legal 
authority 
 
GLB Act 1999 
 
 
  
Breaking separation 
between commercial 
and investment 
banking; 
Board improved and 
expended umbrella 
supervision 
 
 
According to the information summarised in Table 4.2, the 1930s Great Depression 
brought about legal reforms with far-reaching effects. The US Fed improved 
emergent lending facilities, and operated as part of the sector-based regulation 
regime. Afterwards, it had changed with dynamic developments of monetary policy 
and theory, in line with its relationship with Government.
99
 
 
After the 1951 Accord, there were few statutory changes relating to central bank 
independence, and the US Fed was legally prescribed to be accountable to Congress 
only, operational independence being ensured by budgetary autonomy and 
transparency. The FOMC was exclusively in charge of interest rate decisions, whilst 
the US Fed had OMOs, reserve requirements, and contractual lending facilities to 
affect indirectly the supply of and demand from financial markets. It was also 
granted responsibilities in the event of financial instability, including emergent 
lending and asset purchases, which were more direct management targeting specific 
financial sectors or institutions. Regarding regulation and supervision, it fulfilled 
umbrella supervision as one consolidated supervisor by mainly focusing upon the 
LOLR and deposit insurance under the FDICIA, as well as capital adequacy under 
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the Basel Accord. Accordingly, as Government’s banker, the US Fed had clarified its 
objective to support employment maximum, but with budgetary and operational 
independence; as bankers’ bank, its conduct of indirect monetary policy instruments, 
functions of LOLR facilities and prudential regulation all developed. It can thus be 
concluded that the US Fed was a market-oriented central bank with consolidated 
prudential regulation.  
 
This system was considered to have operated relatively effectively. For example, for 
a decade up to the GFC, the US Fed maintained low interest and inflation rates, 
contributing to the longest peacetime economic expansion in the US history. 
Following the stock exchange crash in 1987 and the terrorist attack in 2001, it 
augmented emergent lending through discount window and OMOs, whilst clarifying 
its duty as the nation’s central bank to meet liquidity requirements and support the 
economic system.
100
 
 
 
4.3 GFC Impact upon the US Fed 
 
Since the GFC was triggered by the US subprime housing market crisis, the US Fed 
has attracted considerable attention. According to the Federal Reserve Act, it 
governs monetary policy, pursues financial stability mainly by the facility of the 
LOLR, supervises member banks and BHCs, and ensures an orderly payment and 
settlement system. Corresponding instruments thus include interest rate policies, 
OMOs, discount windows and reserve requirements. In the event of financial crises, 
it would first employ the above instruments to implement due monetary policy, 
achieving “the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-
term interest rates”; however, as market conditions worsen, innovative measures 
have been sought.
101
 The following part will introduce crisis management solutions 
selected by the US Fed and other responsible agencies, focusing upon the changes 
brought by the GFC for further comparison. 
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4.3.1 Crisis Management Solutions  
 
The course of the GFC can be divided into two stages by the collapse of Lehman 
brothers in September 2008, and policy responses from the US Fed have changed 
accordingly.
102
 The rescue package can be examined from the following five 
perspectives. 
 
(1) Interest Rate Reductions 
Since September 2007, when liquidity squeeze emerged from a wider market,
103
 the 
FOMC cut both target federal funds rates and primary lending rates to 0%-0.25% on 
December 16, 2008 (as displayed in Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3: Federal Funds Effective Rates between End 1999 and May 2013 
 
 
Data sources: US Fed  
<www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/current/>  
 
 
Moreover, under the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act 2006
104
 and the 
Emergency Economic Stabilisation Act 2008
105
, the US Fed began to pay interests 
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on excess reserves, introducing a floor under the federal funds rate, with the discount 
rate as a ceiling above the funds rate; the target for federal funds rate would be 
between the ceiling and the floor.
106
 It is thus argued that without statutory 
formalisation, the US Fed has operated under a corridor system of interest rates.
107
  
These changes are agued to enable it to meet its longer-term target of federal funds 
rates, given that more UMPs had changed its own balance sheet,
108
 and that 
monetary policy conduct had differed when interest rates maintained at the near-zero 
level.
109
 
 
(2) Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy 
 
Latterly, the US Fed had renewed financial aid to financial institutions and the 
markets. The following table lists these facilities. 
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<http://webhouse.unimc.it/economia/repo/quaderni/QDief64-2011.pdf> ); Hess Chung, Jean-Philippe 
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Fed’s Asset Purchases’ FRBSF Economic Letter, No 2011-03, 2011 <www.frbsf.org/economic-
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Table 4.4: US Fed’s Selected Facilities and Programmes between August 2007 
and Mid-2013
110
 
 
FACILITY 
 
AIM & FUNCTIONS 
 
 
August 2007 
Discount 
Window
111
  
 
Banks were allowed to exchange their holdings of Treasury securities 
for cash to manage their liquidity constraints, but additional 
borrowing was quite limited
112
 
 
December 2007 
Term Auction 
Facility (TAF)
113
  
 
 
 
Combining OMOs with discount window lending:
114
 sound institutions 
were allowed to directly borrow longer-term (extended from 28 days to 
84 days) loans from US Fed as long as collateralised; 
Auctions were conducted anonymously, helping channel loans into 
banks which needed it most, without undermining the price of their 
securities 
 
March 2008 
Term Securities 
Lending Facilities 
(TSLF)
 115
   
 
Primary Dealer 
Credit Facility 
(PDCF)
 
 
 
 
Primary dealers were allowed to swap secured or collateralised 
funding for Treasury securities
116
 
 
 
Primary dealers – investment banks and brokers – were allowed to 
borrow overnight loans directly from US Fed with a relatively wide 
range of securities accepted as collateral
117
 
 
May 2008 
Asset purchase of 
Bear Stearns 
 
 
Outside US Fed’s conventional regulatory regime 
                                                          
110
 For a summary, refer to, Baird Webel and Marc Labonte, ‘Government Interventions in Response 
to Financial Turmoil’ CRS Report for Congress, R41073, 2010 
<http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41073.pdf>. 
111
 Office website: <www.frbdiscountwindow.org/>. 
112
 This facility was conventionally used to support failing financial institutions rather than healthy 
ones; see, James A. Clouse, ‘Recent Developments in Discount Window Policy’ 80 Federal Reserve 
Bulletin 1994: 956-977. 
113
 Olivier Armantier, Sandra Krieger and James McAndrews, ‘The Federal Reserve’s Term Auction 
Facility’ (2008) FRBNY Current Issues in Economics and Finance 14(5): 1-11. The final TAF auction 
was operated on March 8, 2010. 
114
 Such an auction facility was already under consideration in 2001, when the US Fed ran out of 
federal government securities; for the initial design, refer to, Board, ‘Federal Reserve System Study 
Group on Alternative Instruments for System Operations’ (December 2002) 
<www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/surveys/soma/alt_instrmnts.pdf>. 
115
 Michael J. Fleming, Warren B. Hrung and Frank M. Keane, ‘The Term Securities Lending Facility: 
Origin, Design and Effects’ (2009) FRBNY Current Issues in Economics and Finance 15(2): 1-11. 
The TSLF peaked at $ 260 billion on October 1, 2008, and no more transactions from August 2009. It 
was closed on February 1, 2010. 
116
 For many years, primary dealers had been allowed to swap Treasuries of different maturities or 
attributes with the US Fed on an overnight basis through the System Open Market Account Securities 
Lending Programme. Michael J. Fleming, Warren B. Hrung and Frank M. Keane, ‘Repo Market 
Effects of the Term Securities Lending Facility’ FRBNY Staff Reports No 426, 2010 
<www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr426.pdf>. 
117
 Press Release, ‘Federal Reserve Announces Establishment of Primary Dealer Credit Facility’ 
FRBNY <www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/news/markets/2008/rp080316.html> accessed on March 16, 
2008. It was closed on February 1, 2010. 
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September and 
October 2008 
Special loans to 
American 
Insurance Group 
(AIG) 
 
Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper 
Money Market 
Mutual Liquidity 
Facility (AMLF)  
 
Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility 
(CPFF) 
 
Money Market 
Investor Funding 
Facility (MMIFF) 
 
 
 
Outside US Fed’s conventional regulatory regime 
 
 
 
 
High-quality asset-backed commercial papers (ABCPs) were taken as 
collateral when depository institutions and BHCs borrowed from US 
Fed
118
 
 
 
 
SPV combining with AMLF: to borrow from US Fed to purchase all 
types of 3-month, highly rated US commercial paper from issuers;
119
 
 
US Fed to purchase non-financial commercial paper from non-
financial firms, as well as uncollateralised debt; 
FRBNY provided senior secured funding to a series of SPVs to 
facilitate an industry-supported private-sector initiative to finance the 
purchase of eligible assets from eligible investors
120
 
 
November 2008 
Purchases of 
longer-maturities 
securities  
 
 
 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into conservatorship; 
US Fed purchased MBSs issued by government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs) through OMOs,
121
 including both above and 
Federal Home Loan Banks
122
  
US Fed extended to buy agency debt and agency-insured mortgage-
backed securities
123
 
 
2009 
Quantitative 
Easing (QE)
124
 
 
 
Continuing to inject liquidity by buying long-term MBSs and 
Treasury securities until March 2010 
 
April 2010 
Term Deposit 
Facility (TDF)
125
 
 
 
All institutions eligible to receive earnings on their balances held with 
FRBs were allowed to claim term deposits
126
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 It was closed on February 1, 2010. 
119
 Official website: <www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/cpff.htm> accessed on February 5, 
2010. It was closed on February 1, 2010. 
120
 Press Release, <www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/20081021a.htm> accessed on October 21, 
2008; and <www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mmiff.htm> accessed on February 5, 2010. 
121
 Intensive debates emerge about GSEs purchases; see, Christopher L. Peterson, ‘Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and the Home Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis’ 10 Loyola Journal of Public Interest Law 
(2008-2009): 149-170.  
122
 Janet L. Yellen, ‘The Federal Reserve’s Asset Purchase Program’ at the Brimmer Policy Forum, 
Allied Social Science Associations Annual Meeting, Colorado, January 8, 2011 
<www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20110108a.htm>. 
123
As verified by the Federal Reserve Act, the US Fed was allowed to buy securities issued or 
guaranteed by the US Treasury of US agencies. 
124
 There are misleading uses of this term, triggering some debates. Janet L. Yellen, ‘US Monetary 
Policy Objectives in the Short and Long Run’ Presented to the Andrew Brimmer Policy Forum, 
IBEFA/ASSA Meeting, January 4, 2009 <www.frbsf.org/our-district/press/presidents-
speeches/yellen-speeches/2009/january/yellen-us-monetary-policy-objectives/0104b.pdf>. 
125
 Official website: <www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/tdf.htm> accessed on April 26, 2013. 
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November 2010 
QE2 
 
Another purchase of $600 billion longer-term Treasury securities by 
mid-2011
127
 
 
September 2011 
Maturity 
Extension 
Programme 
 
Operation Twist: $667 billion purchase of long-term Treasury 
securities was conducted with an equivalent sale of short-term 
Treasury securities, without much effect upon its balance sheet
128
 
 
September 2012 
QE3 
 
 
 
Monthly, US Fed purchased MBSs at a pace of $40 billion and 
continued longer-term Treasury securities at a pace of $45 billion 
with extended maturities, which will continue until the labour market 
has improved with price stability
129
 
 
December 2012 
QE4 after QE2  
 
Purchasing MBSs and longer-term Treasuries regularly until expected 
inflation rate at 2.5%, or unemployment rate below 6.5% 
January 2013  
FOMC resumed 
rolling over 
maturing Treasury 
securities at 
auctions 
 
Increasing the public’s cash balance and directly injecting new money 
into the market
130
 
 
March 2013 
 
US Fed clarified to continue QE3 until the labour market gains 
substantial improvement,
131
 expanded normal OMOs, and also raised 
asset purchases with further extended maturities 
 
 
As illustrated in Table 4.4, the US Fed had changed its policy instruments in 
response to changed market conditions. From autumn 2007 to autumn 2008, with 
gathering banking losses, it took over illiquidity or lower quality assets from the 
banking sector, weathering its own balance sheet, but without changing the size of its 
                                                                                                                                                                    
126
 It is viewed as one tool for the US Fed to drain reserves when accommodative monetary policy 
should be withdrawn after economic conditions improved. It announced to conduct 5 small value 
offerings of term deposits under the TDF after approving the basic structure required for those 
offerings. Press Release, <www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20100510b.htm> 
accessed on May 10, 2010; documents can be downloaded from 
<www.frbservices.org/centralbank/term_deposit_facility.html>. 
127
 Press Release, <www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20101103a.htm>, accessed 
on November 3, 2010. 
128
 Press Release, <www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20110921a.htm> accessed on 
September 21, 2011. 
129
 Press Release, <www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120913a.htm> accessed on 
September 13, 2012. 
130
 News Report, <www.forbes.com/sites/jamesdorn/2012/12/27/ben-bernankes-qe4-another-step-
toward-helicopter-money-and-away-from-freedom/> accessed on December 27, 2012. 
131
 Press Release, <www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20130619a.htm> accessed on 
June 19, 2013. 
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own assets. This was named “qualitative easing”. 132  As financial upheavals 
intensified sharply after Lehman Brothers’ crisis, it began to extend maturities, 
enlarge the range of collaterals, and grant more institutions emergent liquidity 
supports, rather than sterilising additional credits by selling its own good assets.
133
 
For example, to support the commercial papers market, the CPFF is the first modern 
standing facility with an ongoing commitment to purchase, as opposed to lending 
against, assets. Its balance sheet increased from $ 905.8 billion in May 2008 to 
$2,312 billion by end-2008,
134
 reaching 3 trillion in 2012. From the end of 2008, 
when interest rates reached the near-zero level, there was little scope for a central 
bank to affect the market by cutting rates, and thus, it began to inject good assets by 
restructuring its own balance sheet.
135
 Up to March 2010, when most ad hoc 
facilities were closed, it purchased $ 1.7 trillion longer-term securities, $300 billion 
of Treasury securities, $175 billion of agency debt and $1.25 trillion of AMBSs, 
while renewing its commitment under extended maturities and expansive collateral. 
Consequently, its selected monetary policy responses have most affected its own 
balance sheet either in composition or in size. 
 
(3) Numerical Inflation Targeting and Commitment to Further Expansion 
 
On January 25, 2012, the US Fed began publishing its forecasts for federal funds rate 
targets, announcing a longer-run goal of a 2% inflation rate:  
‘… Committee judges that inflation at the rate of 2 per cent … is most consistent 
over the longer run with the Federal Reserve’s statutory mandate. Communicating 
this inflation goal clearly to the public …. thereby fostering price stability and 
moderate long-term interest rates and enhancing the Committee’s ability to promote 
maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances. 
                                                          
132
 Philipp Bagus and Markus H. Schiml, ‘New Modes of Monetary Policy: Qualitative Easing by the 
Fed’ iea Economic Affairs, Oxford, June 2009 
<www.philippbagus.com/archivos/NEW%20MODES%20OF%20MONETARY%20policy%20-
%20qualitative%20easing%20by%20the%20fed.pdf>. 
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 Ben S Bernanke, ‘The Crisis and the Policy Responses’ at the Stamp Lecture, LSE, January 13, 
2009 <www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090113a.htm>. 
134
 Ben S. Bernanke, ‘The Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet: An Update’ at the Board Conference on 
Key Development in Monetary Policy, Washing DC, October 8, 2009 
<www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20091008a.htm>.  
135
 Ben S. Bernanke, ‘Liquidity Provision by the Federal Reserve’ at FRB Atlanta Financial Markets 
Conference, May 13, 2008 
<www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080513.htm>. 
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The maximum level of employment is largely determined by nonmonetary factors 
that affect the structure and dynamics of the labour market … it would not be 
appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment; rather, the Committee’s policy 
decisions must be informed by assessments of the maximum level of 
employment. …’136 
 
While maximum employment was reinforced as its goal, the US Fed specified a clear 
inflation target but not a parallel numerical employment goal, bringing renewed 
discussion about whether it should adopt a single mandate of price stability with a 
numerical inflation target.
137
 Without statutory change, at the very least, it has 
moved to embrace the key features of an inflation targeting regime.
138
  
 
From mid-2012, fragile economic growth was restored: inflation remained subdued, 
and the unemployment rate only declined marginally over the period, leaving other 
risks and uncertainty.
139
 In this context, the FOMC announce to maintain its low-
level interest rates and extend highly accommodative monetary policy facilities for a 
considerable time after economic recovery strengthened.
140
 In September 2012, it 
further explicitly announced to keep interest rates at zero per cent until at least 
                                                          
136
 Press Release, <www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125c.htm> accessed on 
January 25, 2012. 
137
 Prior to the GFC, it had been argued that the US Fed had operated an implicit inflation targeting 
since the late 1970s. But it was important to make such commitment to the long-term low inflation 
more explicit. See, Marvin Goodfriend, ‘Inflation Targeting in the United States?’ in Ben S. Bernanke 
and Michael Woodford (eds.), The Inflation-Targeting Debate (University of Chicago Press 2004) 
311-337. 
138
 Marc Labonte, ‘Changing the Federal Reserve’s Mandate: An Economic Analysis’ CRS Report for 
Congress, R41656, 2012 <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41656.pdf>. 
139
 Board, ‘Monetary Policy Report’ 
<www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mpr_20130226_summary.htm> accessed on February 26, 
2013 
140
 Press Release, <www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120913a.htm> accessed on 
September 13, 2012.  
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2015.
141
 Then, in December 2012, the US Fed sought to extend monetary easing 
until a certain inflation or unemployment rate was achieved (QE4):
142
 
‘… the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 
1/4 per cent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the 
federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate 
remains above 6-1/2 per cent, inflation between one and two years ahead is 
projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 per 
cent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well 
anchored … developments. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy 
accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals 
of maximum employment and inflation of 2 per cent.’143 
 
The US Fed finally replaced the data-based guidance for the federal funds rates with 
numerical thresholds linked to unemployment and projected inflation rates, linking 
explicitly monetary policy operations with statutory macroeconomic goals of stable 
prices and maximum employment.
144
 It has since widely employed forward 
commitments, clarifying the continuation of a low-level federal funds rate for an 
extended period, to achieve additional monetary stimulus, as well as improved 
transparency.  
 
(4) Fiscal Stimulus Packages 
 
Fiscal stimulus packages have been gradually enhanced, and the US Fed had 
undertaken some actions to support the Treasury.  
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 Ben Bernanke, ‘Transcript of Chairman Bernanke’s Press Conference’ at Chairman Bernanke’s 
Press Conference, September 13, 2012 
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bond-buying-to-spur-growth.html?pagewanted=2&hp&pagewanted=print&_r=0> accessed on 
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Following the G-7 meeting in 2008, the US announced capital injection equivalent to 
1.9% of the GDP from the Treasury, extension of deposit insurance to all non-
interest-bearing transaction deposits, a programme which allowed banks and BHCs 
to issue FDIC-guaranteed senior debts, and the US Fed’s continued commitment to 
stabilise key financial institutions and market sectors.
145
 Under the Emergency 
Economic Stabilisation Act 2008, the Troubled Asset Relief Plan (TARP) was 
established to inject capital and purchase troubled assets, and the Treasury gained 
broad discretion to administer this programme.
146
 Meanwhile, the Term Asset-
Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) was announced by the joint agreement of 
the US Fed and the Treasury, aiming to encourage the issuance of securities backed 
by privately originated loans to consumers and businesses, and then improve the 
market condition for ABSs.
147
 Both the TARP and the TALF were employed to 
encourage non-mortgage asset backed securities, but under the TALF, the US Fed 
lent to purchase rather than outright purchase, and these securitized products were 
not troubled existing assets. Overall, all such facilities have further deteriorated the 
US Fed’s own balance sheet by introducing longer maturities, more financial 
institutions and a wider range of collaterals.
148
 
 
By 2009, together with the US Fed, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner announced 
a plan, requiring capital injection into GSEs, asset purchases of troubled MBSs, and 
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 Since the OECD Committee on Financial Markets (CFM) meeting in March 2008, the financial 
safety net extended its coverage and functions in the event of bank runs. Refer to, Sebastian Schich, 
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CMBS on June 30, 2010 and other types of loans on March 31, 2010. Details can be found from 
<www.newyorkfed.org/markets/talf_faq.html> accessed on April 1, 2010. 
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 For a summary, refer to, Joseph Gagnon, Mathew Raskin, Julie Remache and Brian Sack, ‘The 
Financial Market Effects of the Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchases’ International Journal 
of Central Banking (March 2011) <www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb11q1a1.pdf>. 
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a $ 1 trillion credit facility.
149
 On February 10, 2009, he and the heads of federal 
banking agencies also unveiled a new strategy, encouraging banks to provide credit 
to households and businesses. On February 13, 2009, Congress approved a new 
economic stimulus package with outstanding policy diversification, covering 
infrastructure, health, education, unemployment assistance and tax cuts (referred to 
as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 2009).
150
  
 
(5) Cross-Border Cooperation 
 
The US Fed has actively participated in cross-border cooperation with other central 
banks under Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act.
151
 As early as December 2007, 
the FOMC began establishing foreign exchange swap lines with the ECB and the 
Swiss National Bank.
152
 After September 2008, the US Fed increased currency 
swaps, and also set up new lines with such as the BOE and BOJ.
153
 Europe’s 
sovereign debt crisis stressed US dollar short-term funding markets in May 2010, 
and thus, the FOMC re-built temporary reciprocal currency arrangements with 
several central banks.
154
  
 
As a central bank, the US Fed can issue currency and bank reserves required to 
finance asset purchases and restore market functioning. This is done in the context of 
increasing cooperation with the Treasury, and also strengthening its links with 
market participants. All these have brought about significant changes to its two-tier 
relationship. 
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accessed on November 30, 2011. 
152
 Press Release, <www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20071212a.htm> accessed on 
December 12, 2007. 
153
 Press Release, <www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080918a.htm> accessed on 
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May 11, 2010. 
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To begin with, the US Fed has worked as a LOLR on a major scale, including ad hoc 
facilities and bailouts of non-depository firms. Accordingly, it has directly affected 
liquidity conditions of both key market sectors and individual financial 
institutions.
155
 During this course, it was criticized for having overly expanded its 
authority by repeatedly citing Section 13(3).
156
 As legally defined, only depository 
institutions were eligible for financial aid against a certain type of collateral, but the 
Act also granted the US Fed flexibility to expand lending facilities and asset 
purchases “in unusual and exigent circumstances”. When interest rates were near 
zero or a significant pay-down of the Treasury debt, it could purchase longer-
maturity Treasury securities, accept other assets than US Treasury securities, 
structure its discount window operations, and make loans directly to IPCs if 
conditions are met; or when the US government has paid off the federal debt 
completely, or to such an extent that lack of depth in the Treasury market has an 
adverse impact on market’s functioning, it could consider conducting OMOs 
purchasing of assets other than Treasury debt.
157
 After 2008, the FOMC had reduced 
interest rates to the near-zero level, constituting the exception to extend financial aid. 
How these policy instruments are classified as unconventional tools can be displayed 
in Table 4.5.  
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156
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Table 4.5: Classification of Facilities and Programmes Established Introduced 
by US Fed during GFC 
Market 
Conditions 
Facility 
Non-
depository 
Institutions 
 
Longer 
Maturities 
 
Extended 
Collateral 
 
Private 
Sector 
 
Treasury 
Securities 
Losses across 
banking sector 
Term 
Discount 
Window 
     
Interest Rate 
Cuttings 
     
Interbank 
market dried 
up 
TAF   
√ 
   
Large 
financial 
institutions 
announced 
their 
subprime-
related losses, 
deteriorating 
market 
conditions 
TSLF √     
PDCF √     
Special 
Loans to 
AIG 
√     
Asset 
Purchases 
from Bear 
Stearns 
 
√ 
    
Lehman 
Brothers 
collapse 
AMLF   √   
CPFF   √   
MMIF    √  
Interest Rate 
at the near-
zero level 
Further asset 
purchases; 
Quantitative 
easing 
   √ √ 
Recovery 
delayed but 
uncertainty 
increased 
TALF    √  
QE2  √   √ 
QE3 and 
QE4 
 √  √ √ 
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As seen from Table 4.5, the US Fed has supported depository institutions with lower 
requirements regarding collaterals and maturities, whilst adding emergent lending 
under Section 13(3) to non-depository institutions.
158
 Overall, it has offered more 
extensive financial aid to a wider range of recipients due to the GFC.  
 
However, as delegated authority may always be retrieved by the state during a crisis, 
the US Fed worked more closely with other government agencies amid the GFC, 
especially with the Treasury. First, it started certain asset purchases as required to 
support the Treasury. For example, in November 2008, it bought large amounts of 
direct obligations and MBSs from GSEs, supplementing similar programmes 
operated by the Treasury.
159
 Moreover, in cooperation with the OCC and FDIC, it 
led stress tests into capital positions of nineteen largest BHCs, and the Treasury 
committed to providing any public capital needed.
160
 What is more, some of the US 
Fed’s financial aid facilities have had evident fiscal implications. It set up Maiden 
Lanes to purchasing assets from Bear Stearns and the AIG, including MBSs and 
CDSs.
161
 Both cases were verified by citing Section 13(3). The FRBNY was required 
to lend to Bear Stearns directly. Since any losses arising from this deal reduced the 
amount transferred by the FRBNY to the Treasury, it is argued that this constituted a 
fiscal solution rather than monetary instrument.
 162
 Similarly in the case of AIG, the 
Treasury purchased $ 40 billion in preferred shares, and the US Fed purchased its 
distressed CDOs and mortgage-backed securities.
163
 Not only did such deals pose 
risks to taxpayers, but also impair central bank independence, which otherwise 
should be preserved.
164
 Meanwhile, cooperation between the US Fed and financial 
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institutions had been strengthened to support specific market sectors with a distinct 
fiscal nature. This encouraged debate about the quasi-fiscal nature of monetary 
policy responses. In principle, fiscal stimulus is potentially more effective for 
dealing with economic recession, but monetary policies have further fiscal 
implications. Therefore, once UMPs were launched, interactions between fiscal and 
monetary policies changed and increasingly interdependent.
165
  
 
Overall, during the GFC, the US Fed had largely extended its lending facilities and 
asset purchases “in unusual and exigent circumstance”, which was achieved under 
the joint efforts with the Treasury. As a result, its two-tier relationship changed, with 
reduced central bank independence but enhanced intervention into financial markets.   
 
 
4.3.2 Reforming the US Financial Regulation and Supervision System 
 
According to the Treasury statement, two particular problems have caused the GFC, 
among others:  
‘…There were systematic failures in the checks and balances in the system, by 
Boards of Directors, by credit rating agencies, and by government regulators. Our 
financial system operated with large gaps in meaningful oversight, and without 
sufficient constraints to limit risk. Even institutions that were overseen by our 
complicated, overlapping system of multiple regulators put themselves in a position 
of extreme vulnerability …’166 
 
To summarise, the US financial oversight system failed to maintain financial 
stability from the systemic perspective, whilst the multi-agency pattern failed to 
oversee systemic risks effectively.
167
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In terms of the US Fed, it was officially in charge of financial stability by 
supervising and regulating financial institutions, operating the national payments 
system, and serving as the LOLR facility. However, it had mainly focused upon 
designing and conducting monetary policy rather than stabilizing the whole financial 
system, but financial stability policy has taken on greater prominence amid the GFC, 
and has been judged equal to monetary policy.
168
 Initially, the US Fed made 
organisational changes to improve its capacity to strengthen prudential regulation 
over the largest, most complex financial firms. In spring 2009, it led the Supervisory 
Capital Assessment Programme (stress test), evaluating comprehensively the largest 
banking organisations.
169
 It created the Large Institution Supervision Coordinating 
Committee (LISCC) as a multidisciplinary body to centralize supervision over these 
firms on a regular, simultaneous and horizontal base.
170
 It also set up the Office of 
Financial Stability Policy and Research (OFS): grouping skilled staff from different 
professional areas,
171
 the OFS should identify and analyse potential risks to financial 
stability and the wider economy, setting the macro-picture for regulation and 
supervision.
172
 
 
The benchmark of legal reforms is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), which came into effect on July 21, 
2010.
173
 This Act is aimed to address perceived gaps and weaknesses exposed during 
the GFC, and focus upon systemic risks by adjusting regulators and introducing 
system-wide regulatory policy.
174
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To begin with, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was established to 
take comprehensive responsibility for identifying and monitoring risks across the 
financial system.
175
 It designated nonbank financial companies for supervision by the 
Board (Board-supervised nonbank financial companies),
176
 and make 
recommendations to enhance prudential standards applicable to such companies, as 
well as large, interconnected BHCs.
177
 It also collects data, reports to Congress, and 
makes recommendations according to regulatory and supervisory matters of systemic 
concern, so it is non-regulatory in nature.
178
 Another new agency – Office of 
Financial Research – now exists within the Treasury, responsible for improving the 
quality of financial data available to such policy makers as the FSOC, as well as the 
public.
179
 The OTS was abolished, and its responsibilities were taken over by the US 
Fed, the OCC and the FDIC. Meanwhile, duties for existing agencies have been 
rearranged. The US Fed began to supervise thrift holding companies, nonbank 
financial firms and certain payment, clearing, and settlement utilities which the 
FSOC designates as systemically important
180
, while also being granted 
responsibilities to supervise all systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs).
181
 It is granted the power to identify additional priorities beyond the core 
areas of regulation and supervision. The US Fed and the FSOC should collaborate to 
reduce systemic risks. The US Fed is one of 10 voting members of the FSOC, and 
the Board has contributed to the FSOC studies mandated by the Act and also to 
rulemakings. Recently, most of them are directed at enhancing bank supervision and 
prudential standards.
182
  
 
Regarding how to regulate and supervise, there were three traditional components: 
safety and soundness, deposit insurance and adequate capital; now the Dodd-Frank 
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Act has added the fourth pillar of systemic risk.
183
 Macro-prudential regulation 
requires more focus upon not only the safety and soundness of individual financial 
entities, but also the linkages among institutions and the overall market conditions.
184
 
The Dodd-Frank Act imposes a macro-prudential mandate on individual responsible 
agencies, including the US Fed.
185
 The Board is required to set out “more stringent” 
prudential standards,
186
 including liquidity requirements, risk management 
requirements, stress tests, limits on concentration and credit exposure, enhanced 
public disclosures, limits on short-term debt, leverage limits, off-balance sheet 
activities, and so forth, for BHCs with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or 
more and Board-supervised nonbank financial companies.
187
 In addition, a “Vice 
Chairman for Supervision” has been designated, responsible for recommending, to 
the Board, the policies regarding regulation and supervision of depository institution 
holding companies and other financial firms supervised by the Board, while 
overseeing such supervision and regulation.
188
 Regarding macro-prudential 
regulation tools, on an annual basis since 2010, the US Fed has conducted the 
Comparative Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR)
 189
 to ensure that large, complex 
BHCs have robust, forward-looking capital planning progress for their risks and 
sufficient capital to continue operation throughout times of financial and economic 
stress.
190
 It also conducts the Dodd-Frank Act stress tests (DFA stress tests).
191
 
Moreover, the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) was established to improve the 
prospects for an orderly liquidation of a systemic financial firm.
192
 Consequently, the 
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US Fed reviews the resolution plans (living wills),
193
 whilst deposit insurance from 
the FDIC comes under the stricter requirements in collaboration with the Treasury.
194
 
In brief, the Dodd-Frank Act has removed many restraints over the Board’s 
regulatory and supervisory responsibilities under the BHCs Act and the GLB Act, 
whilst extending its authority beyond traditional banking sectors with more emphasis 
upon risk management, capital planning and adequacy.  
 
Responding to criticism of the legitimacy of some unprecedented monetary 
expansion, the Dodd-Frank Act modified Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act 
with constraints upon approval authority, recipient’s conditions, eligible collateral, 
and so forth. Emergent lending to IPCs is replaced by financial assistance to a 
“participant in any program of facility with broad-based eligibility”,195 and Treasury 
Secretary has the authority to approve lending programs. In this context, the Board is 
required to consult the Treasury Secretary first, so as to ensure that financial aid is 
provided to maintain market-wide stability, rather than directly supporting individual 
financial institutions.
196
 Meanwhile, the Act has required FRBs to reform their 
governance structures to effectively represent the public under the audit of the GAO. 
What is more, in the 112
th
 Congress, finally, H.R. 459 on July 25, 2012 eliminated 
the final restriction that GAO cannot evaluate economic merits of policy decision 
from the US Fed.
197
 Overall, the GAO has increased its audit power over emergent 
lending under Section 13(3), OMOs, and discount window, as well as FRBs’ 
governance.
198
 Additionally, the US Fed has improved transparency through further 
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publications: besides a weekly summary of its own balance sheet, it has published 
more detailed monthly reports updating its unconventional liquidity injections.
199
 In 
particular, as from December 2010, it began to release individual lending records 
under discount window and also for emergent lending, including borrowers’ 
identities; this is the first time in its history to release borrowers’ own identities.200 
As a result, when conducting emergent lending and asset purchases as crisis 
management solutions, the US Fed has come under reinforced oversight from the 
Treasury, as well as the GAO. 
 
Internationally, the US Fed has started implementing the Basel III.
201
 By July 2013, 
it, together with the COC and FDIC, has finalised implementation requirements for 
US banking firms to increase capital adequacy, improve the quality of regulatory 
capital, and also strengthen their risk-weight framework.
202
 
 
During the GFC, the US Fed recognised how it had underestimated its role in 
regulation and supervision as regards maintaining financial stability. The release of 
the Dodd-Frank Act intended to fill in gaps and resolve problems exposed by 
emphasising the clear division of responsible agencies and macro-prudential 
regulation.
203
 The US Fed has its role clarified to deal with systemic risks, including 
both structural vulnerabilities and cyclical systemic risks.
204
 It has thereby been 
required to give special attention to placing SIFIs under a new consolidated oversight 
framework, while monitoring routinely such indicators as measures of leverage, 
maturity mismatch and regular stress tests. By contrast, Section 13(3) has been 
modified to restrict emergent lending from the US Fed with enhanced requirements 
for oversight, transparency and information disclosure. In particular, direct 
interventions into financial markets and individual institutions have been strictly 
constrained. In that regard, the Dodd-Frank Act has strengthened the official 
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authority from Government in relation to crisis management for systemic stability, 
while the US Fed has been reformed to balance its role as monetary authority and 
systemic regulator. The new regulation and supervision regime can be displayed in 
Figure 4.2: 
Figure 4.2: Financial Regulation and Supervision Regime under Dodd-Frank 
Act 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, the US Fed has enhanced macro-prudential regulation over more 
individual financial institutions, but its emergent lending under Section 13(3) has 
been constrained. At the same time, the Treasury has strengthened its influence upon 
the US Fed in both aspects.  
 
 
4.3.3 Summary 
 
Unlike hesitant responses during the 1930s Great Depression, the US Fed has 
utilised unprecedented monetary expansion during the GFC. It has moved closer to 
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both Government and financial markets through major asset purchases and direct 
bailouts. In comparison, financial regulation and supervision were not considered to 
be as critical as monetary policy before the GFC exposed critical gap in financial 
stability. Therefore, the Dodd-Frank Act, as a comprehensive reform of the US 
oversight regime, has changed the role played by the US Fed in maintaining financial 
stability. 
 
 
4.4 How has the GFC Challenged the US Fed? 
 
Prior to the GFC, the US Fed was defined by law as a market-oriented central bank 
with consolidated micro-prudential regulation. During the GFC, with increased 
cooperation between the US Fed and Government, financial markets have received 
more direct support; the two-tier relationship is thus characterised by reduced central 
bank independence and more direct intervention into financial markets. In 2010, the 
Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, and inter alia, it has endeavoured to rearrange the 
triangular relationship of Government, US Fed and financial markets. This entire 
process can be depicted in Figure 4.3: 
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Figure 4.3: Changed Two-Tier Relationships of the US Fed 
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As illustrated here, Government had once directly controlled the US Fed, exerting 
further controls over the markets. By law, the US Fed was granted certain crisis 
management solutions, including indirect monetary policy instruments and LOLR 
facilities. However, such legal tools and facilities gave way to more direct 
intervention into markets through asset purchases and bailouts of financial 
institutions during the GFC. Such a tight nexus did not change until the legal reform 
under the Dodd-Frank Act brought a new triangular interaction. In terms of the two-
tier relationship governing the US Fed, Government has more indirect controls of it, 
and the Treasury has strengthened its authority over crisis management; by 
emphasising macro-prudential regulation but limiting direct liquidity support, the US 
Fed has re-positioned itself as a systemic regulator. To say the least, therefore, 
statutory changes are aimed to protect the US Fed from being directly controlled by 
Government and also from directly administering financial markets.  
 
Dodd-Frank Act 2010 is still at the preliminary stage of implementation,
205
 so that it 
may be too early to draw many consolidated conclusions.
206
 But the US Fed has 
experienced significant changes relating to its legal framework, as compared in 
Table 4.6: 
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Table 4.6: Legal Framework of the US Fed—Changes During the GFC 
 
Legal Framework 
 
 
Prior to GFC 
 
Under Dodd-Frank Act 
 
Objectives 
 
To maximum employment, 
maintain stable prices, and 
moderate long-term interest rates 
 
Clarified to link monetary 
policy with employment; 
2% target for inflation rate  
 
Independence 
 
Independence within Government 
 
Independence within 
Government 
 
Enhanced oversight, 
accountability and 
transparency;  
GAO strengthens audits 
 
Governance 
 
Board of Governors plus FRBs 
 
Board: a new Vice Chairman 
for Supervision; 
FRBs Presidents: new 
election mechanisms 
 
Monetary Policy 
 
OMOs, reserve requirements, 
contractual clearing balances, 
discount window lending 
 
Limits on emergent lending 
under Section 13(3), 
especially increasing 
oversight from Treasury 
 
Regulation & 
Supervision 
 Objectives 
 
 
 Approaches 
 
 
 
Safety and soundness, deposit 
insurance and adequate capital 
 
Consolidated micro-prudential 
regulation and undermined 
functions in stabilising financial 
system 
 
 
 
Plus systemic risks 
 
 
Macro-prudential 
regulation over more 
financial institutions and 
focuses upon systemic 
stability 
  
 
According to Table 4.6, the major changes brought by the Dodd-Frank Act to the US 
Fed can be summarised as: (i) clarified target for inflation rate and goal for financial 
stability; (ii) constrained financial aid under enhanced government oversight; (iii) 
macro-prudential regulatory policy; and (iv) improved transparency and credibility.  
 
In particular, the Dodd-Frank Act has left central bank independence intact, but 
strengthened requirements from oversight, accountability and transparency. The 
Treasury, along with the GAO, has been brought to govern the US Fed in regard to 
121 
 
emergent lending. Furthermore, by introducing numerical inflation rate targeting, the 
US Fed clarified its commitment to projected inflation and a set unemployment rate, 
linking monetary policy further explicitly with statutory macroeconomic goals.
207
 
The Dodd-Frank Act has strictly limited direct bailouts of individual financial 
institutions, but extended the US Fed’s macro-prudential regulatory duties. At its 
core, statutory changes promote macro-prudential regulation over direct control, 
while enabling Government to deal better with financial crises. This Act has 
therefore endeavoured to maintain the market orientation of the US Fed, whilst 
balancing its functions as monetary authority and systemic prudential regulator. 
 
After major changes, the American economy has not yet fully recovered from 
recession: neither inflation rate target nor maximum employment goal has been met, 
though a highly controlled financial system is not likely to make resurgence as 
following the 1930s Great Depression. The FOMC has clarified to continue its zero 
bound on interest rates, much of monetary expansion is still in operation, and the exit 
of UMPs has been a particular concern, especially with prevailing quantitative easing 
policies in the international arena.
208
 At the firm level, financial markets differ from 
before the GFC, with more changes underway.
209
 If economic recovery halted, it 
would not be clear whether and how the US Fed would put more efforts to spur 
growth. To summarise, regulatory restructuring is aimed at balancing the 
independence of the US Fed in monetary policy with systemic stability regulation, 
but prolonged crisis management has questioned its exact market orientation.  
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
   
This chapter has supplied evidence to demonstrate that the US Fed was a market-
oriented central bank with consolidated prudential regulation, while also detailing 
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changes that have resulted from the GFC. First, the previous legal framework 
defined it as independent within Government, whilst governing indirect monetary 
policy, LOLR facilities and some prudential regulation. However, selected crisis 
management solutions during the GFC has placed distinct burdens upon the US 
Fed’s market-oriented approach; it was linked to financial markets through 
innovative emergent lending facilities, and was also linked to the Treasury via a joint 
commitment to restore financial stability. Furthermore, the GFC triggered profound 
statutory reforms in the US. In particular, the Dodd-Frank Act has enhanced 
Government’s indirect control over crisis management, and also modified the US 
Fed as a prudential regulator responsible for systemic stability. The US Fed’s 
position as a market-oriented central bank has been challenged by the GFC to bring 
it closer to the broader policies of the Treasury, whilst legal reforms prioritized to 
balance its role in both monetary and financial stability. Overall, this chapter has 
provided support for the proposition in this thesis how the US Fed as a market-
oriented regulator has been questioned by the GFC.  
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Chapter Five 
Bank of England and the Global Financial Crisis
1
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Similar to the US Fed, the Bank of England (BOE), under its legal framework, was 
required to be a market-oriented central bank and lender of last resort in the event of 
financial crises; prudential financial regulation was distributed between it and 
another independent agency. But its two-tier relationship has been challenged by 
crisis management during the GFC. This chapter will thus explain how its market-
oriented commitment has been changed accordingly. 
 
With these goals in mind, this chapter will proceed as follows. Before the GFC, the 
ruling legal framework assumed that the BOE was a market-oriented central bank 
with operational independence, and along with the old Financial Services Authority 
(FSA), it conducted prudential regulation and supervision over financial markets. 
During the GFC, the BOE has changed its operating framework to implement 
unconventional monetary policy (UMP), while HM Treasury has enhanced its power 
to assist individual financial institutions and stabilise the whole market. Moreover, 
after the old tripartite model failed, significant changes have been introduced by the 
UK Government to reform financial regulation and supervision. In particular, under 
the Financial Services Act 2012, the BOE became responsible for systemic stability, 
the FSA was split into a twin-peak model controlling prudential regulation, and 
Government, especially HM Treasury, positioned to lead the UK financial oversight 
regime. Accordingly, under pressure from the GFC, the BOE has changed its two-
tier relationship, and hence its orientation. This chapter concludes with a 
comparative summary regarding the way in which the GFC has challenged the BOE 
to maintain financial stability. 
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5.2 Overriding Legal Framework of the BOE before the GFC 
 
This section will focus upon the ruling legal framework of the BOE before the GFC, 
arguing that it was a market-oriented central bank, and its regulatory and supervisory 
duties had undergone important changes. Currently, it consists of the following parts 
as displayed in Table 5.1:
2
  
Table 5.1: The Constitution of the BOE
3
 
 
 The Bank of England Act 1694 (BOE Act 1694) 
 The Charter of the Bank of England 1694 (1694 Charter) 
 The Bank Charter Act 1844 (BOE Act 1844) 
 The Bank of England Act 1946 (BOE Act 1946) 
 The Charter of the Bank of England 1998 (1998 Charter) 
 The Bank of England Act 1998 (BOE Act 1998) 
 The Banking Act 2009  
 Financial Services Act 2012 
 Orders (No 1120, 1129, 1130, 1270 and 1344) 
 
 
5.2.1 The BOE Development as a Central Bank 
 
The first Bank of England Act was enacted in 1694, establishing it to raise money for 
the war with Louis XVI.
4
 By legal status, it was a joint stock corporation invested 
with a legal personality. It was prohibited from engaging in general trade, but 
authorised to deal in bills of exchange, and then in the equivalent of promissory 
notes, gold coins, bullion and silver. It was entrusted by law with a monopoly 
position: competing banks were not allowed, and it assumed informal control of 
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banks.
5
 According to the 1694 Charter, capital stock was allocated to the BOE, and 
the Governor and Company determined its internal organization.  
 
In the 19
th
 century, the growth of trade and industry promoted private banks, and the 
BOE gradually developed its main functions as a note issuer, central bank, and 
settlement venue.
6
 In spite of an unclear origin,
7
 the BOE Act 1844 separated the 
issue department from the banking department,
8
 but it could only issue fiduciary 
notes after consultation with HM Treasury.
9
 Its supervisory role derived from its 
functions as the LOLR, and it began to regulate powerful joint stock banks by 
controlling interest rates from the late 1800s
10
 and margins maintenance in World 
War I.
11
 It held both accounts of the daily balance and of the daily global balance, 
which demonstrated its role as the settlement venue.  
 
After World War II, the BOE was nationalized by the new Labour Government 
through the BOE Act 1946.
12
 Its stock was transferred to Treasury solicitors, 
becoming a government institution subordinate to HM Treasury.
13
 Even so, the BOE 
was granted the power to make requests or recommendations to banks, and issue 
directions under HM Treasury, which whereas could give it directions only after 
consulting with its governor.
14
 Moreover, a person could not assume office as a 
minister of state or as a civil servant and meanwhile a BOE officer.
15
 This Act did 
                                                          
5
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6
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7
 It is argued that the BOE had begun to issue notes since the BOE Act 1696; refer to, Bank of 
England v. Anderson (1837) 3 Bing. NC 589, 653. Until the 19
th
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Currency and Bank Notes Act 1925. 
8
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 Responding to bank failures, the Joint Stock Bank Act was enacted in May 1826, ending the BOE’s 
monopoly on joint-state status. The Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 was the first banking code in 
England, regulating joint stock banks. Later, the Joint Stock Banking Companies Act 1857 allowed 
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1800 (Princeton University Press 2010) 169-196. 
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 H.S. Sayers, The Bank of England 1891–1944 (Cambridge 1976). 
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 R.F. Harrod, ‘Consequences of Nationalizing the Bank of England’ (1946) The Political Quarterly 
17(3): 214-227. 
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 House of Commons Treasury Committee, Accountability of the Bank of England (Twenty-first 
Report of Session 2010-12). 
14
 BOE Act 1946, (9 and 10 Geo. 6 c. 27, February 14, 1946) 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/legislation/1946act.pdf>. 
15
 The Economist (February 16, 1946). 
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not provide a clear definition of “bank” for supervision purposes, so deposit takers 
were under regulation and supervision at different levels, with some still self-
regulated.
16
 
 
Since the 1950s, the BOE had further improved its monetary operations.
17
 Between 
1971 and 1973, it introduced Competition and Credit Control, enabling deposit 
banks to participate in a wider range of business and also relaxing capital 
requirements.
18
 It administered foreign exchange rates until 1979, reaching the peak 
of its influence over the banking sector.
19
 It introduced supplementary special 
deposits (corset) until June 1980, placing a quantitative control on banks’ balance 
sheets by penalising the institutions whose monetary liabilities grew faster than the 
prescribed rate.
20
 After suspending this corset, with the spread of market-oriented 
reform, it gradually reduced direct controls of lending and increased OMOs to 
control the growth of broad money.  
 
However, financial crises exposed the shortcomings of the BOE in dealing with 
market panics. In 1972, the declining property market and the international exposure 
led to adverse contagion among clearing banks in the UK, but its experience from 
previous crises limited its ability to rebuild market confidence. As a result, in 1973, 
26 clearing banks were supported by a “lifeboat” arrangement from the BOE, 
forming an early LOLR facility.
21
 Its progress in formalising financial regulation and 
supervision was slow. Between 1973 and 1975, the Secondary Banking Crisis 
informed it of the necessity to better oversee the whole banking sector.
22
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 “Competition and Credit Control” was extracted from a lecture by the Chief Cashier of the BOE on 
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<www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/qb/1971/qb71q4477481.pdf>. 
19
 In 1947, HM Treasury and the BOE granted a list of “authorized banks” with the right to deal in 
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20
 A.W. Mullineux, International Banking and Financial Systems: A Comparison (Springer 1987) 28. 
21
 David Cobham, ‘Monetary Policy’ in Michael J. Artis and David P. Cobham (eds.), Labour’s 
Economic Policies 1974–1979 (Manchester University Press 1991) 38–55. 
22
 Joseph Jude Norton, Devising International Bank Supervisory Standards (Graham & 
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Internationally, after the UK joined the European Commission (EC) in 1973, EC 
Directives in banking regulation and supervision exerted significant impact upon UK 
banking law. In 1979, the First EC Banking Directive required member countries, 
including the UK, to establish a prior authorisation procedure for credit institutions. 
An inter-banking market was promoted by the Second EC Directive.
23
 Under internal 
and external factors, therefore, the Banking Act 1979 was approved, setting the 
foundations for the BOE to regulate and supervise all UK banks. The requirements 
for a deposit-taking business were described in detail for the first time, as was 
diplomatic recognition of deposit takers under the EC Directives;
24
 and a deposit 
insurance scheme was also introduced.
25
 However, in the domestic market, financial 
institutions were still divided into two categories: those with the title of “bank” 
included the BOE, recognised banks, licensed deposit takers, and institutions as 
listed in Schedule 1 of the 1979 Act; and those non-bank institutions, which were 
under a more relaxed control determined by the BOE,
26
 were prohibited from 
engaging in banking business but allowed to take deposits from the public.
27
 In 
addition, an administrative rulemaking framework was designed for it to issue 
directions for regulatory purposes, leading further toward prudential supervision. 
Until then, the BOE still preferred informal, non-legalistic and flexible supervision, 
and specific criteria for prudential supervision were thus absent from this Act.
28
  
 
The collapse of Johnson Matthey Bank (JMB) in 1984 triggered further debates 
about differentiated supervision between banks and other licensed deposit takers, and 
the Banking Act 1987 was enacted to formalize the BOE’s role in financial 
oversight.
29
 It was defined “generally to supervise the institutions authorised by it in 
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 I. Morrison, P. Tillet and J. Welch, The Banking Act 1979 (London, 1979); F.R. Ryder, The 
Banking Act 1979 (London 1979). 
28
 C.A.E. Goodhart, ‘Financial Supervision from a Historical Perspective: Was the Development of 
Such Supervision Designed, or Largely Accidental?’ in David G. Mayes and Geoffrey Edward Wood 
(eds.), The Structure of Financial Regulation (Warwick: Taylor & Francis 2008) 43–64. 
29
 This Act can be downloaded from 
<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1985/jul/26/johnson-matthey-bankers >. For further, 
refer to, M. Blair, R. Cranston, C. Ryan and M. Taylor, The Bank of England Act 1987 (London 1998). 
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the exercise of those powers”, terminating the previous two-tier banking system.30 A 
new BOE Board of Banking Supervision was appointed, including the governor, 
deputy governor, executive director and six independent members.
31
 Moreover, more 
instruments were granted to execute the supervisory role: for example, the BOE 
could require detailed information in an individual case, and also revise the minimal 
criteria as it saw fit.
32
 It was required to report its own activities annually to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, and independent members above were appointed 
jointly by HM Treasury and the governor. As a result, the BOE was by law 
accountable to Government.
33
  
 
In brief, as Government’s banker, the BOE was nationalised in 1946, and thereafter, 
few statutory changes were made in regard to its relationship with Government. It 
managed government’s cash position and issued sterling market debt, including 
Treasury bills and gilt-edged stocks. As bankers’ bank, the BOE had gradually 
reduced its direct monetary controls, while formalizing its prudential regulation.  
 
 
5.2.2 The BOE Legal Framework before the GFC 
 
The Labour Government brought important changes in 1997.
34
 Reforms relating to 
the BOE sought to separate monetary policy, debt management and financial 
regulation, thereby changing its two-tier relationship. It is thus argued that the 
establishments of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) and an integrate regulator 
were the most marked changes in the history of the BOE since World War II.
35
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5.2.2.1 The BOE Act 1998 
 
This Act was enacted in 1998 after a series of transition arrangements.
36
 Key legal 
provisions include: 
 
Objectives  
The BOE was formally described “to maintain price stability, and subject to this, to 
support the Government’s economic policy, including its objectives for growth and 
employment”. As the monetary authority, it should primarily achieve the inflation 
targeting, and also support general economic development.
37
 The BOE thus had 
multiple goals.
38
  
 
Independence  
The BOE Act 1946 enabled HM Treasury to give the BOE directions relating to 
policy-making about interest rates after consultation with Governor; this power was 
reserved only “if they are satisfied that the directions are required by the public 
interest and by extreme economic circumstances”. 39  The BOE handed over its 
responsibility as Government’s debt manager to the Debt Management Office (DMO) 
within HM Treasury, marking the formal separation of debt management from 
monetary policy.
40
 Therefore, it was further distanced from Government, gaining 
operational independence with respect to monetary policy.
41
  
 
                                                          
36
 Gordon Brown, A letter to the Governor of the Bank of England 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Documents/pdf/chancellorletter970506.pdf> accessed 
on May 6, 1997. 
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 Mervyn King, ‘The MPC Two Years On’ at the Queen’s University, Belfast, May 17, 1999 
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38
 Peter Rodgers, ‘The Bank of England Act’ BOE Quarterly Bulletin, May 1998 
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39
 Bank of England Bill: Memorandum by Her Majesty’s Treasury 
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January 30, 1998. 
40
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41
 It is argued that the BOE’s performance in keeping inflation under control had ensured 
contributions to its independence. Refer to, Stephen Nickell, ‘The Assessment: the Economic Record 
of the Labour Government since 1997’ (2002) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 18(2): 107-119. 
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To strengthen independence, Government set up the MPC as an internal committee 
of the BOE to specialize in formulating and implementing monetary policy,
 42
 
aiming to fulfil its responsibility in controlling inflation.
43
 In September 1992, the 
UK was forced to leave the European Monetary System following speculative 
attacks on the pound, and the BOE replaced the exchange rate anchor with a clear 
inflation rate for price stability. Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the inflation 
target between 1% and 4%, and the BOE committed to this, producing regular 
quarterly inflation reports. After its establishment, the MPC was directed by statute 
to aim for this, and thus could only operate to meet such numerical inflation 
targeting on a quasi-independence way.
44
 Moreover, a representative from HM 
Treasury attended the MPC discussion of policy issues without vote rights. Through 
this representative, the MPC was confirmed to be acting consistently with fiscal 
policy development and other government’s macro-economic policies, whilst the 
Chancellor was fully informed of MPC discussion.
45
 The MPC was accountable to 
the BOE Court through its monthly reports, and also explained its actions regularly 
to parliamentary committees, especially the Treasury Select Committee (TSC).
46
 It 
was exclusively responsible for interest rate policies, raising the BOE’s 
independence in policy making; however, HM Treasury still maintained its strong 
presence by setting inflation targets, sending representative to MPC meetings, and 
enhancing accountability. 
 
Organisational Structure
47
  
The BOE Court set up to formally focus upon operational affairs of the BOE, 
including the Governor, two Deputy Governors, and sixteen Non-Executive 
Directors. A sub-committee was formed by the Non-Executive Directors, whose 
tasks included the review of the MPC procedures.  
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Functions  
The Court of Directors formally determined the BOE’s key functions in line with its 
objectives, including setting monetary policy, and overseeing market operations and 
financial stability.
48
 By division, the MPC controlled interest rate policies, and the 
Financial Stability Division within the BOE was responsible for overall systemic 
stability.
49
 Moreover, all building societies in the UK were required to place interest-
free deposits with the BOE, and thus, the tiered financial institutions had further 
come under uniformed and standardised oversight.
50
  
 
The BOE had gradually developed the Sterling Monetary Framework (SMF) to 
achieve inflation targeting, whilst reducing disruption to the payment and settlement 
system to maintain financial stability.
51
 The SMF was evolutionary: in March 1997, 
the BOE extended OMOs of gilt repo, relaxed requirements for counterparties to be 
separately capitalised and added funds provision late in the day;
52
 and it listed the 
eligible collateral, pattern of operations rounds and functional criteria for 
counterparties from 2002.
53
 After 2006, it paid interests on reserve balances held by 
banks and building societies, which chose their own reserve targets over the period 
of the MPC’s monthly meetings (maintenance period). 54  On any given day, 
participants were allowed to vary their reserve positions, and adjust their interest 
rates within the corridor, where the lending rate was above, and the deposit rate was 
below the policy rate.
55
 Therefore, the SMF incorporated the following three main 
elements:
56
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 Reserves-averaging schemes: banks and building societies joined voluntarily, 
and chose to hold target balances with the BOE on average over maintenance 
periods;  
 Standing facilities: including deposits and lending, aiming to allow banks to 
borrow from, and deposit with, the BOE in unlimited amounts at specific interest 
rates;  
 OMOs: short-term repos57 at the official Bank Rate, long-term repos at the 
market rates determined in variable-rate tenders, and outright purchases of high-
quality bonds. They were intended to provide liquidity insurance to the banking 
sector by balancing their own prudent risk management and the BOE’s balance 
sheet.  
 
In the SMF, the BOE controlled the amount of money in line with statutory 
objectives, whilst operating the LOLR facilities to provide temporary, short-term 
liquidity assistance to the financial sector; and financial institutions could employ the 
SMF to manage their own sterling liquidity positions.
58
  
 
Overall, after the MPC was granted operational independence to set interest rates, the 
BOE officially focused upon being a monetary authority. As Government’s banker, 
it traded government securities in the SMF; as bankers’ bank, it offered, on a 
voluntary basis, guidance on interest rates and liquidity insurance to participants.  
 
5.2.2.2 The FSA and the FSMA 2000 
 
As the market-oriented reform developed, financial conglomerates broke down 
boundaries between banking, securities and insurance from the 1980s.
59
 On October 
25, 1986, London’s “Big Bang” was launched, sought to end the division between 
brokers and jobbers, abolish constraints upon capital flows, attract more foreign 
                                                          
57
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investors, re-structure the gift market, promote fair competition, etc., raising London 
as an international financial centre.
60
 The largest banks became universal and global 
by combining securities transactions, derivative trading, fund management and 
insurance business in the cross-border capital markets.
61
 It was thus argued that all 
the activities of separate regulators and supervisors should be brought under an 
integrated body to oversee the financial market as a whole.
62
 At the same time, 
financial crises continued, especially after the collapse of Barings in 1995 triggered 
intense criticism about the BOE’s supervision.63 As a result, the FSA was established 
on October 28, 1997 to centralize prudential regulation.
64
 It at first oversaw the 
reforms conducted under the BOE Act 1998, and then the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) came into full force, giving the FSA a statutory 
position and powers as a mega regulator.
65
  
 
By legal status, the FSA was a limited company financed by levies on the sector, but 
accountable to Treasury ministers and Parliament.
66
 It had improved principle-based 
prudential regulation,
67
 and at the core, without authorisation under Section 19 of 
FSMA 2000, it was a criminal offence to conduct identified types of financial 
business listed in Regulated Activities Order 2001. To assess “impact and 
probability” of risks and sensitivities of a regulated body consistent with its business 
activities, the FSA was equipped with various mathematical models,
68
 and regulated 
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bodies were classified according to risks.
69
 Being responsible for regulation and 
supervision at the firm level, the FSA developed its duties from the dialogue with 
financial markets, which might have caused conflict of interests over the integrity of 
business and prudential regulatory requirements.
70
 Meanwhile, regulated bodies were 
still allowed to set their own standards, and the FSA was expected to oversee and 
promote self-regulation by improving accountability and transparency. This 
“flexibility” was criticised as being overly uncertain, causing other potential 
conflicts and continuous controversy.
71
In addition, the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme (FSCS) was created to replace the old deposit insurance 
scheme, aiming to protect customers against risks from service providers’ going into 
insolvency or being unable to meet due obligations.
72
  
 
More importantly, the FSMA 2000 stipulated the division of responsibilities and 
cooperation mechanisms between HM Treasury, BOE and FSA, setting up a 
tripartite financial regulation and supervision model: 
“The Bank contributes to the maintenance of the stability of the financial system as a 
whole…ensuring the stability of the monetary system as part of its monetary policy 
functions…overseeing financial system infrastructure systemically significant to the 
UK, in particular payments systems whether based in the UK or abroad … 
undertaking, in exceptional circumstances, official financial operations… in order to 
limit the risk of problems in or affecting particular institutions spreading to other 
parts of the financial system. 
The FSA… is responsible for the authorisation and prudential supervision of banks, 
building societies, investment firms, insurance companies and brokers, credit unions 
and friendly societies; the supervision of financial markets, securities listings and of 
clearing and settlement systems; the conduct of operations in response to problem 
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cases affecting firms, markets and clearing and settlements systems within its 
responsibilities…. 
The Treasury is responsible for the overall institutional structure of financial 
regulation and the legislation which governs it, including the negotiation of EC 
directives; informing, and accounting to Parliament for the management of serious 
problems in the financial system and any measures used to resolve them….”73 
 
Accordingly, the UK tripartite model can be displayed in Figure 5.1: 
Figure 5.1: UK Tripartite Model of Financial Regulation and Supervision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the tripartite model indicated how the three parties were 
involved in dealing with financial crises. The FSA oversaw individual financial 
institutions and specific market sectors through principles-based prudence and risk-
based assessments; the BOE pursued monetary policy, the LOLR, and the broad 
oversight of the financial system as a whole; and HM Treasury controlled public 
funds, as well as the overall institutional structure which governed the tripartite 
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model.
74
 Within this model, both the BOE and FSA were accountable to HM 
Treasury. 
 
 
5.2.3 Summary 
 
The BOE was one of the oldest central banks in the world, and major changes around 
its two-tier relationship can be summarised in the following Table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2: Major Changes around the BOE’s Two-Tier Relationship before the 
GFC 
 
Governing 
Legislation 
 
Conditions 
 
Independence 
 
Relationship with the 
Market 
 
1694 Act 
& Charter  
 
War with France 
 
BOE established as a joint 
stock corporation 
 
BOE had monopoly  
 
 
1844 
Charter 
 
Main functions of 
central banking 
 
BOE issued fiduciary 
notes with HM Treasury 
 
BOE regulated interest rate 
and margins maintenance  
 
BOE Act 
1946 
 
Labour 
Government took 
office after World 
War II 
 
BOE was nationalised, 
subordinate to HM 
Treasury; 
Limited independence in 
monetary policy 
 
Dual-track supervision for 
deposit takers, but self-
regulation was espoused 
 
Banking 
Act 1979 
 
Banking industry 
developed; 
BOE shifted 
toward indirect 
policy instruments;  
Crises unveiled 
gaps in regulation 
and supervision;  
UK legislation was 
affected by EC 
Directives  
 
BOE managed 
government’s cash 
position and issued 
sterling market debt 
 
 
Defining and setting 
requirements for deposit-
taking business;  
Deposit insurance scheme; 
Diplomatic recognition 
under EC directives; 
Prudential regulation 
without specific criteria  
 
 
Banking 
Act 1987 
 
JMB crisis 
triggered further 
debates about 
differentiated 
supervision 
between banks and 
other licensed 
deposit takers 
 
BOE was required to 
report activities to the 
Chancellor of the 
Exchequer annually;  
HM Treasury controlled 
personnel appointment 
 
Supervising all institutions 
authorised by it with more 
tools, ending the two-tier 
system; 
Board of Banking 
Supervision Division was 
set up 
 
BOE Act 
1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FSMA 
2000 
 
Financial 
conglomerates 
further developed; 
“Big Bang” 
liberalized financial 
markets, and raised 
London as an 
international 
financial centre 
 
Goal dependence: price 
stability and economic 
development;  
Operational 
independence: MPC 
controlled interest rate 
policies, but HM Treasury 
maintained certain 
influence 
 
HM Treasury led the 
tripartite model by 
controlling public funds 
and institutional structure 
 
BOE controlled the LOLR 
and systemic stability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FSA conducted risk-and 
principle-based prudential 
regulation with great 
flexibility 
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As illustrated in Table 5.2, the post-war nationalization changed the BOE from being 
a private joint-stock company to subjecting to HM Treasury. Afterwards, few 
statutory changes occurred to adjust its relationship with Government, while it had 
slowly changed its attitudes toward financial regulation and supervision. The BOE 
Act 1998 constituted a turning point in its development. On one hand, operational 
independence was written into statute, and the establishment of the MPC 
consolidated its decision-making authority as regards monetary policy. The BOE 
controlled the amount of money required to meet inflation targets via indirect tools 
under the SMF, including reserve accounts, standing facilities and OMOs. On the 
other hand, the FSA was set up to take over prudential regulation from the BOE. The 
package of prudential regulation included capital adequacy requirements under the 
Basel Accord, the LOLR facility from the BOE, prior authorisation and risk-
weighted assessment from the FSA, as well as the deposit insurance scheme. The 
tripartite model defined how HM Treasury, BOE and FSA dealt with regulation and 
financial crises.  
 
Laws and rules enabled the BOE to employ indirect monetary policy tools, the 
LOLR facilities and certain prudential regulatory policy as crisis management 
solutions. Therefore, it was a market-oriented central bank with operational 
independence under its legal framework, whilst was responsible for systemic 
stability within the tripartite model. Its successor, the FSA, was a risk-and-
principles-based prudential regulator. However, since the MPC was accountable to 
the TSC, and the FSA to HM Treasury, HM Treasury continued to influence 
monetary policy, financial regulation and crisis management solutions. 
 
 
5.3 The GFC Impact upon the BOE 
 
Until early 2007, inflation had not moved by more than 1% away from its target for 
over ten years, the BOE increased Bank Rates to 5.75% on July 5, 2007 (as 
illustrated in Table 5.3), and output had grown up every quarter since the second half 
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of 1992.
75
 However, the UK was a victim to the GFC: following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, the British mortgage market fell to almost a three-year low,
76
 and 
the UK went into economic recession from the end of 2008.
77
 In this context, the 
BOE renewed policy innovations, whilst the tripartite model was criticized after 
nationalizing Northern Rock, and then targeted for profound reforms. The following 
part will introduce crisis management solutions selected by the BOE and other 
responsible agencies, focusing upon changes brought by the GFC for further 
comparison. 
Table 5.3: BOE Bank Rates between May 1992 and July 2007 
  
Data source: BOE 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/mfsd/iadb/Repo.asp?Travel=NIxIRx>. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
75
 For economic growth contributed by the BOE’s monetary policy, refer to, Treasury Committee 
Inquiry into the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England: Ten Years on – The Bank of 
England’s Submission regarding the Economic Context (Submitted to the House of Commons 
Treasury Committee, February 19, 2007) <www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/overview.htm>. 
76
 Stanley McGreal, Greg Lloyd, Martin Haran, Jim Berry and Alastair Adair, ‘The Global Financial 
Crisis: Impact on Property Markets in the UK and Ireland’ Report by the University of Ulster Real 
Estate Initiative Research Team, March 2009 <http://news.ulster.ac.uk/podcasts/ReiGlobalCrisis.pdf>. 
77
 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7846266.stm> accessed on January 23, 2009. 
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5.3.1 Crisis Management Solutions 
 
As a market-oriented central bank similar to the US Fed, the BOE has combined 
conventional and unconventional monetary policy instruments to deal with market 
upheavals. Major responses can be analysed from the following five perspectives. 
 
(1) Bank Rate Reductions 
 
By August 2007, economic problems had become evident in the UK. However, the 
BOE did not change Bank Rates until the end of 2007 in fear of moral hazard: 
liquidity injection would offer extra incentives for banks to take more risks.
78
 Finally, 
the Bank Rate was reduced to 0.5% in March 2009 (as illustrated in Table 5.4).  
 
Table 5.4: BOE Bank Rates between July 2007 and March 2013 
 
Data source: BOE 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/mfsd/iadb/Repo.asp?Travel=NIxIRx>. 
 
 
(2) Conventional and Unconventional Monetary Policy 
 
The BOE had first conducted its statutory monetary policy instruments to deal with 
liquidity shortage, but as market upheavals worsened, untraditional tools were 
underway. These can be summarised in Table 5.5: 
                                                          
78
 George Walker, ‘Sub-prime Loans, Inter-bank Markets, Financial Support’ (2008) Company 
Lawyer 29(1): 22–25. 
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Table 5.5: BOE’s Monetary Policy Responses during the GFC 
TIME FACILITY 
 
Autumn 2007 – 
Autumn 2008 
 
Extended OMOs with greater size, greater frequency and wider ranges of 
collateral
79
 
 
December 2007 
 
Increasing three-month-maturity repo operations;  
Certain AMBSs and covered bonds were accepted as collateral
80
 
 
April 2008 
 
Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS): banks and building societies to swap 
high-quality but temporarily illiquid securities for UK Treasury bills;
81
 
Funded by Government via UK Treasury bills without much direct effect 
on BOE’s balance sheet82 
 
October 2008 
 
Discount Window Facility (DWF): permanent facility to swap assets; 
Banks and building societies could borrow gilts against a wide range of 
potentially less liquid eligible collateral at varying fees to upgrade 
collateral; 
BOE had discretion to lend cash rather than gilts when necessary
83
 
 
March 2009 
 
Quantitative easing: asset purchases
84
 
 
June 2010 
 
Indexed long-term repos: first permanent repo facility to supply liquidity 
insurance against different types of collateral
85
 
 
December 2012 
 
Extended Collateral Term Repo Facility (ECTR): BOE could operate 
against a wider range of collateral than under the above repo in a crisis 
 
 
According to Table 5.5, the BOE initially combined interest rate cuts with extended 
OMOs to deal with credit crunch, but enhanced financial aid from September 2008. 
When the Bank Rate maintained at 0.5% since March 2009, quantitative easing had 
                                                          
79
 The BOE released the narrow OMO collateral set on July 1, 2011, and the wider OMO collateral set 
on October 2, 2012.  
80
 BOE, ‘Long-Term Repo Operations: Market Notice’ 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/money/documentation/statement071214.pdf> 
accessed on December 18, 2007. 
81
 Official website: <www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/sls/default.aspx>. It is officially 
closed on 30 January 2012. Also, see, Paul Tucker, ‘Financial System and Monetary Policy: 
Implementation’ at the Bank of Japan 2009 International Conference, Tokyo, May 27–28, 2009 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2009/speech390.pdf>. 
82
 <www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2008/029.htm>. 
83
 BOE, ‘Extending Eligible Collateral in the Discount Window Facility and Information 
Transparency for Asset-Backed Securitisations: A Consultative Paper’ (March 2010) 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/money/publications/condocmar10.pdf>. 
84
 Official website: <www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/qe/default.aspx>. 
85
 Official website: <www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/money/ltomo/default.aspx>. 
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been executed through sizeable asset purchases.
86
 Quantitative easing sought to 
boost money supply directly through liquidity injection, and also bring the level of 
nominal demand consistent with inflation targets for the medium term.
87
 Overall, the 
MPC had authorised asset purchases of £375 billion up to July 2012, most of which 
were UK Government debt or gilts.
88
 By conducting large-scale asset purchases, the 
BOE worked as the LOLR to the whole market, thereby changing the composition of 
its own balance sheet (as illustrated in Table 5.6).
89
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
86
 James Benford, Stuart Berry, Kalin Nikolov and Chris Young, ‘Quantitative Easing’ BOE 
Quarterly Bulletin, Q 2, 2009 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/qb090201.pdf>. 
87
 Joyce Michael, Ana Lasaosa, Ibrahim Stevens and Tong Matthew, ‘The Financial Market Impact of 
Quantitative Easing’ BOE Working Paper No 393, 2010 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2010/wp393.pdf>. 
88
 BOE, ‘Quantitative Easing Explained’ 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/pages/qe/default.aspx>. 
89
 Paul Fisher, ‘The Bank of England’s Balance Sheet: Monetary Policy and Liquidity Provision 
During the Financial Crisis’ at the Professional Pensions Show, London, November 19, 2009 
<http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/capitalisback/CountryData/UK/VariousOfficialSeries/BalanceSheetBoE
/Fisher09.pdf>. 
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Table 5.6: BOE Balance Sheet between November 2006 and October 2011
90
  
(In GBP Billion) 
 
DATE 
 
Total Assets/Liabilities 
 
Assets/Liabilities in 
Issue Department 
 
Assets/Liabilities in 
Banking Department 
Nov 08, 2006 80,110 38,700 41,457 
Jul 11, 2007 79,980 39,932 40,097 
Dec 24, 2007 102,241 45,022 102,241 
Mar 05, 2008 105,954 41,334 70,497 
Sep 17, 2008 118,031 42,618 75,442 
Oct 01, 2008 186,592 42,882 143,784 
Oct 15, 2008 276,747 43,304 260,810 
Mar 04, 2009 167,018 44,980 147,635 
April 08, 
2009 
214,054 46,613 198,452 
April 07, 
2010 
251,670 51,809 226,036 
Oct 26, 2011 256,207 - - 
 
Data source: BOE  
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/bankstats/2011.htm>. 
 
 
After the BOE utilized its own balance sheet to conduct quantitative easing, the 
implementation of monetary policy was challenged to serve a dual goal of keeping 
short-term market interest rates in line with Bank Rates, and also undertaking 
various asset purchases.
 91
 Accordingly, the BOE changed its operations in the SMF. 
The Operational Standing Facilities (OSFs) replaced its standing facilities, serving 
two goals: (i) to assist monetary policy in the normal market conditions by 
preventing the market rates moving too far from Bank Rates, and (ii) to enable 
                                                          
90
 The APF was withdrawn by the BOE on November 15, 2011. 
91
 Bill Winters, ‘Review of the Bank of England’s Framework for Providing Liquidity to the Banking 
System’ Presented to the BOE Court (October 2012) 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2012/cr2winters.pdf>. 
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participating banks to manage unexpected (fictional) payment shocks.
92
 Both deposit 
and lending facilities are designed for participating institutions to place unsecured 
deposits with, or borrow via, overnight repo transaction against high-quality, highly-
liquid collateral, directly from the BOE. The deposit rate was set at zero since March 
2009 with the lending rate at 25bp above Bank Rate.
93
 Moreover, the BOE 
suspended the corridor interest rate system: rather than voluntary targets and reserves 
averaging, it operated a “floor system”, so that all reserves balances were 
remunerated at Bank Rates.
94
 In addition, short-term OMOs were suspended. The 
supply of reserves was therefore determined by the level of reserves injected via 
asset purchases, long-term OMOs and other money flows.
95
 How the BOE had 
changed its operations in the SMF due to the GFC can be compared in Table 5.7: 
Table 5.7: Changed Facilities for the BOE’s Operation in the SMF 
 
Before the GFC 
 
During the GFC 
Reserves-averaging Schemes 
 A corridor of interest 
rates 
Reserves-averaging Schemes Suspended 
 A floor system to remunerate all 
reserve balances at Bank Rates 
 
Standing Facilities 
 
Replaced by OSFs 
 
 
OMOs 
 
 
Short-term OMOs Suspended 
 
 
 Permanent Facilities: DWF, 
Indexed Long-Term Repo 
Operations and ECTR 
 ad hoc facilities: Quantitative 
easing 
 
Data Source: BOE  
 
                                                          
92
 Official website: <www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/money/osf/default.aspx> 
93
 BOE, ‘The Framework for the Bank of England’s Operations in the Sterling Money Markets’ 
(Updated, June 2012) 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/money/publications/redbookjune2012.pdf>.  
94
 To control inflation prospects, the BOE exercised one-week bills in its own name to drain liquidity 
excess from the markets. ‘Bank of England Market Notice: Sterling Monetary Framework; Asset 
Purchase’ <www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/marketnotice090305.pdf> accessed on 
March 5, 2009. 
95
 BOE Market Notice, <www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/marketnotice090806smf.pdf> 
accessed on August 6, 2009. 
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As illustrated by Table 5.7, both permanent and temporary aid facilities were added 
to the SMF, while certain traditional tools were changed.
96
 In principle, the 
introduction of the floor system and the increase in reserves triggered banks’ need to 
transact with the BOE rather than the money market, and the decline in unsecured 
money market activity heightened sensitivity to credit risk. While these changes 
intended to assist the effective implementation of monetary policy, given that 
quantitative easing was exercised at the near-zero Bank Rate,
97
 the BOE had also 
enhanced its direct management over financial institutions through asset purchases 
and interest rate controls.
98
 
 
(3) MPC’s New Remit 
 
Further significant changes occurred in March 2013. According to Government’s 
Budget, the BOE was required to undertake more monetary activism to spark 
economic recovery, provided that inflation remained under control.
 99
 The MPC has 
been required by HM Treasury to prioritise growth, but also permitted to depart from 
its inflation targeting in certain circumstances.
100
 The new remit is as follows: 
“The remit recognises that inflation will on occasion depart from its target as a result 
of shocks and disturbances. Attempts to keep inflation at the target in these 
circumstances may cause undesirable volatility in output. This reflects the short-
term trade-offs that must be made between inflation and output variability in setting 
monetary policy … 
                                                          
96
 BOE, ‘The Framework for the Bank of England’s Operations in the Sterling Money Markets’ 
(Updated, June 2013) 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/money/publications/redbookjune2013.pdf>.  
97
 Christopher Jackson and Mathew Sim, ‘Recent Developments in the Sterling Overnight Money 
Market’ BOE Quarterly Bulletin, Q3 2013 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2013/qb130304.pdf>.  
98
 Roger Clews, ‘The Bank’s Money Market Framework’ BOE Quarterly Bulletin, Q 4, 2010 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/qb100404.pdf>. 
The latest summary of its operations under the SMF is available at 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/sterlingoperations/summaryops130307.pdf>.  
99
 Claire Jones, ‘Budget 2013: Changes to BoE Remit Expand Options for Activism’ (Financial Times) 
<www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2697b1ca-9169-11e2-b4c9-00144feabdc0.html> accessed March 2013. 
100
 Samuel Brittan, ‘Budget 2013: It’s the Monetary Policy that Matters’ (Financial Times) 
<www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e10ebba0-917a-11e2-b839-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Qw5dkcTw> accessed 
on March 20, 2013. 
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… Monetary activism has a vital role to play in the Government’s economic strategy 
as the Government delivers on its commitment to fiscal consolidation…”101 
 
Moreover, the BOE explicitly announced that its expansionary monetary policy 
would hold until the inflation target was met; this was described as forward 
guidance.
102
 Such forward guidance is linked directly with the unemployment rate as 
taken into account when the MPC decides monetary policy: 
“… the Monetary Policy Committee has provided some explicit guidance regarding 
the future conduct of monetary policy. The MPC intends at a minimum to maintain 
the present highly simulative stance of monetary policy until economic slack has 
been substantially reduced, provided this does not entail material risks to price 
stability or financial stability. In particular, the MPC intends not to raise Bank Rate 
from its current level of 0.5% at least until the Labour Force Survey headline 
measure of the unemployment rate has fallen to a threshold of 7% ... if it judges that 
additional monetary stimulus is warranted …”103 
 
It has been argued that the BOE had relied more upon Bank Rates to control inflation 
than upon falling output, exposing its limitations in meeting the dual objectives.
104
 
According to this new remit, the single mandate of inflation targeting has been 
replaced by a further clarified dual mandate which now included government’s 
employment goal. This would correct the BOE’s over-emphasis on inflation targets; 
however, without statutory changes, Government has accordingly brought the BOE 
closer to its objective for economic development, thereby affecting its independence.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
101
 HM Treasury, ‘Remit for the Monetary Policy Committee’ 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Documents/pdf/chancellorletter130320r.pdf> accessed 
on March 20, 2013. 
102
 BOE, News Release, <www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/forwardguidance.aspx> 
accessed on August 7, 2013. Analysis about forward guidance was included in its latest inflation 
report, refer to, BOE, ‘Monetary Policy Trade-offs and Forward Guidance’ (MPC, August 2013) 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/inflationreport/2013/ir13augforwardguidance.p
df>.  
103
 BOE, News Release, <www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2013/096.aspx>. 
104
 Colin Thain, ‘A Very Peculiar British Crisis?: Institutions, Ideas and Policy Responses to the 
Credit Crunch’ 4 British Politics 2009: 434–449. 
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(4) Joint Actions with HM Treasury 
 
During the GFC, HM Treasury directly assisted individual financial institutions with 
liquidity supports. As early as October 8, 2008, the Darling Plan was announced,
105
 
and HM Treasury introduced the Asset Protection Scheme (APS) to recapitalise the 
banking sector by purchasing preference shares.
106
  
 
The BOE made some joint efforts with HM Treasury. In January 2009, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer authorised the BOE to set up an Asset Purchase Facility 
(APF).
107
 After being indemnified, the BOE bought high-quality assets financed 
through Treasury bills and the DMO’s cash management operations, via its 
subsidiary – the Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility Fund under the remit of 
the Chancellor.
108
 The APF gradually incorporated the commercial paper facility, 
corporate bond purchases, secured commercial paper facility, gilt lending and 
corporate bond sales.
109
 Meanwhile, the MPC could also use the APF for monetary 
policy purposes: the BOE purchased assets mainly from non-bank institutions with 
banks as intermediaries, so non-bank institutions could get their accounts credited by 
selling asset purchases, and banks could get payment to create reserves by working 
as intermediaries.
110
 
 
On July 13, 2012, to incentivise bank lending, the BOE and HM Treasury jointly 
launched the Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS).
111
 Banks and building societies 
could borrow a certain amount of Treasury Bills in exchange for eligible collateral at 
a pre-set fee according to the lending growth in the market. 
 
                                                          
105
 Nicholas H. Dimsdale, ‘The Financial Crisis of 2007–9 and the British Experience’ (2009) 
Oxonomics 4(1): 1-9. 
106
 <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/apa_aps.htm>. 
107
 Official website: <www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/qe/facility.htm>. At the initial stage, 
Treasury bills were used to purchase private-sector debt, and since March 2009, purchases have been 
financed by central bank reserves. The latest result of the APF is available at 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/apf/results.aspx>. 
108
 Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility Fund Limited, Annual Report 2012/13 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/markets/apf/boeapfannualreport1307.pdf>.  
109
 Official website: <www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/apf/default.aspx>. 
110
 Bank of England Annual Report 2013 (Presented to Parliament by the Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury by Command of Her Majesty) 14 
<www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/annualreport/2013/2013report.pdf>. 
111
 Official website: <www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/FLS/default.aspx>. 
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(5) Cross-Border Cooperation 
 
The BOE introduced the US dollar repo operations on September 18, 2008,
112
 swap 
line agreements with the ECB in December 2010,
113
 the FX intervention in the Yen 
market in March 2011,
114
 and the GBP/RMB swap line agreements with the PBC in 
June 2013.
115
 Additionally, the BOE began to apply the Basel III as a more truly 
global minimum standard for bank liquidity, to be put imposed in January 2015 but 
would be phased in over four more years up to 2019.
116
 
 
In a nutshell, during the GFC, the BOE’s policy responses mainly included Bank 
Rate reductions, asset purchases and changed operations under the SMF, resulting in 
more direct market intervention. However, HM Treasury increased its control over 
the BOE, especially through the MPC’s new remit since 2013. Accordingly, its two-
tier relationship changed: as Government’s banker, it was brought to the wider 
policies of HM Treasury; as bankers’ bank, it strengthened the implementation of 
monetary policy through direct market intervention. What is more, some ad hoc 
facilities of the BOE were set up under enhanced cooperation with HM Treasury, 
whilst most of its holdings were gilts or government debt; this raised the power of 
HM Treasury to affect the financial market as a whole.  
 
 
5.3.2 Northern Rock Crisis: Failure of the Tripartite Model? 
 
Ever since the 1970s, the UK mortgage market had continuously expanded, 
attracting more participants to compete with banks.
117
 Mortgage assessment 
procedures had become more standardised, along with the development of the 
                                                          
112
 Official website: <www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/other/dollarrepo/default.aspx>. 
113
 BOE, News Release, <www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2011/078.aspx> 
accessed on August 25, 2011. 
114
 News Report, <www.theguardian.com/business/blog/2011/mar/18/yen-currency-intervention-
bank-of-england-holdings> accessed on March 18, 2011. 
115
 BOE, News Releases, <www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2013/082.aspx> 
accessed on June 22, 2013. 
116
 Banking Standards (Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, a joint committee of the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords, Written Evidence, December 19, 2012) The FPC is in 
charge of its implementation. The arrangement can be downloaded from 
<www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/basel3_phase_in_arrangements.pdf>. 
117
 Kathleen Scanlon and Christine Whitehead, ‘The UK Mortgage Market: Responding to Volatility’ 
(2011) Journal of Housing and the Built Environment 26(3): 277–293. 
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wholesale market, as well as the ever-changing ranges and mixes of securitised 
financial products. In this context, the sub-and-near-prime lending had speedily 
increased.
118
 Since 2004, the FSA began to supervise the mortgage market.
119
 In 
September 2007, Northern Rock, the UK’s fifth largest mortgage lender and 
previously viewed as the most cost effective mortgage lender, saw the biggest run 
since the mid-19
th
 century. This section will use its failure to examine the limits of 
the UK’s tripartite model.  
 
Northern Rock had relatively limited retail business, but relied upon the interbank 
market to finance the holding of mortgages. Its business was extended by 
securitising mortgages and selling them on; when the market for securitised products 
dried up, it turned to the wholesale market for funding.
120
 Northern Rock was 
considered to be a typical “originate-and-distribute” bank, which financed long-term 
mortgages by short-term funding. When the US subprime crisis spilled over, its 
inability arose from stressful conditions in the wholesale market, eventually leading 
to its insolvency.
121
  
 
On September 13, 2007, the BOE announced financial aid for Northern Rock, which 
was expected to guarantee its business operations but then actually triggered bank 
runs on September 14 and 17.
122
 Hereupon the BOE announced that deposits were 
guaranteed against all the losses incurring to Northern Rock, and further extended on 
September 19.
123
 In October, additional facilities were made available, aiming to 
maintain its strategies until February 2008, when a private buyer might take over its 
                                                          
118
 Mark Stephens, Janet Ford, Peter Spencer, Alison Wallace, Steve Wilcox and Peter Williams, 
‘Housing Market Recessions and Sustainable Home-Ownership’ 
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ownership/> accessed on October 31, 2008. 
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and Bank Rescues’ Journal of Banking Regulation 2009 (10): 321-334. 
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 The timeline of the Northern Rock crisis is available at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7007076.stm>. 
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business.
124
 After it failed to find a proper buyer, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
announced to place Northern Rock into public ownership temporarily for a period 
commencing upon February 17, 2008.
125
 The whole procedure how the tripartite 
model dealt with Northern Rock crisis can be summarised in Figure 5.2:  
Figure 5.2: Nationalisation of Northern Rock under the Tripartite Model  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: HM Treasury 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 5.2, the FSA, as the regulator at the firm level, assured that 
Northern Rock was still solvent based upon its own risk assessment, while the BOE 
provided emergency funding, and then made additional financial aid available for a 
longer maturity on a wider range of collateral. However, only HM Treasury had the 
power to make the political decision to use public money, and thus, since Northern 
Rock’s problems emerged, HM Treasury gradually extended the FSCS to include 
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both depositors and institutions.
126
 After nationalization, Northern Rock received the 
arm-length regulation from HM Treasury, as Government acquired its shares.
127
  
 
While the particular business model of Northern Rock made it vulnerable to external 
shocks in the capital and mortgage markets,
128
 its nationalisation exposed the 
malfunction of the tripartite model as financial supervisor and regulator.
129
 Under the 
FSMA 2000, as explained, the BOE and FSA shared duties for systemic stability; the 
MoU arranged how they and HM Treasury should deal with financial crises.
130
 In 
principle, the BOE focused upon systemic stability with the LOLR facility; the FSA 
monitored individual market participants at both pre and post crisis periods; and HM 
Treasury worked as the intermediary between Parliament and markets, but unable to 
intervene into the activities of the BOE and FSA. The shortcoming of this 
interwoven network was reflected in the difficulty of clarifying WHICH should take 
WHAT duty in a financial crisis.  
 
Regarding Northern Rock, HM Treasury Committee’s detailed the respective failures 
of the tripartite bodies.
131
 To begin with, the FSA was guilty of systemic failure in its 
regulation approach.
132
 Prior to the GFC, it conducted a survey into the UK sub-
prime mortgage market under the cooperation of the BOE and HM Treasury, 
addressing that, in spite of weaknesses, no major concerns bore the possibility of 
systemic failures.
133
 It also failed to supervise Northern Rock properly: the FSA 
made mistakes in appointing personnel members and requiring it to undertake stress-
                                                          
126
 Dalvinder Singh and John Raymond LaBrosse, ‘Northern Rock, Depositors and Deposit Insurance 
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127
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management, refer to, Roman Tomasic, ‘Corporate Rescue, Governance and Risk Taking in Northern 
Rock’ (2008) Company Lawyer 29 (10 & 11): 297–303, 330–337. 
129
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November 26, 2008. 
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testing, and also wrongly allowed it to weaken its balance sheet as a waiver 
programme under the Basel Accord II out of concerns regarding liquidity 
problems.
134
 In terms of the BOE, it was prevented from undertaking efficient 
systemic regulation by various obstacles, including legislative constraints and 
insufficient deposit insurance. For example, as early as April 2007, it had identified 
the increasing wholesale funding of banks as a potential risk if markets became less 
liquid, but few ex ante solutions had been conducted to reduce risk exposures.
135
 It 
was also widely criticised for its insistence against capital injection for fear of moral 
hazard, as well as slow responses, whilst selected solutions lacked flexibility in 
accepting a sufficiently wide range of collateral.
136
 Moreover, it failed to hold high-
level discussions with Northern Rock about financial aid before September 10, 2007. 
When implementing its rescue package, it was blamed for inadequate preparation for 
support facility, deposit guarantee, and following announcements. In brief, the BOE 
was held responsible for slow responses both in general and particularly regarding 
Northern Rock.
137
 At the very least, therefore, the tripartite model had already failed 
to work properly in the period leading to the deterioration of financial conditions, 
rather than just in the case of Northern Rock alone.
138
  
 
After nationalising Northern Rock, Government subsequently applied similar rules 
to several financial institutions. In November 2008, UK Financial Investments 
(UKFI) was established as a Companies Act Company with HM Treasury as its sole 
shareholder. UKFI is responsible for managing Government’s shareholdings in The 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, Lloyds Banking Group and UK Asset Resolution 
Ltd (Bradford and Bingley, and Northern Rock Asset Management).
139
 
Consequently, these institutions were under the arm-length regulation of HM 
Treasury through the UKFI, whose Board is accountable to the Chancellor of the 
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Exchequer and then to Parliament.
140
 HM Treasury has therefore further enhanced its 
direct control of individual financial institutions. 
 
 
5.3.3 Reforming the UK Financial Regulation and Supervision Regime 
 
The GFC, including the Northern Rock crisis, brought an urgent requirement to 
improve the UK financial regulation and supervision regime, bolstering a new round 
of reforms.  
 
At first, the existing model was improved toward a more intrusive regulatory regime. 
The FSA abandoned its stand as “not an enforcement led regulator”,141 launching the 
Supervisory Enhancement Programme (SEP) to strengthen “intensive 
supervision”.142 Particularly, in March 2009, the Turner Review pointed out that the 
FSA regulation and supervision should have been more intrusive and systemic.
143
 
From a legislative perspective, the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 came into 
force on February 21, 2008 to deal with Northern Rock’s nationalization, and 
afterwards, more nationalisation and Treasury transfer orders were exercised to 
protect depositors’ rights while dealing with failing banks.144 It was revealed by the 
Banking Act 2009 on February 21, 2009.
145
 Under this Act, the BOE was given a 
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statutory objective for contributing to “the maintenance of financial stability”,146 and 
the Financial Stability Committee (FSC) was established.
147
 This Act changed 
significantly the bankruptcy law in the UK by setting a statutory toolkit for resolving 
failing banks and building societies.
148
 Special Resolution Regime (SRR) was 
introduced as bank insolvency legislation used when a bank or part of a bank’s 
business “has encountered, or is likely to encounter, financial difficulties”.149 The 
Act conferred responsibility on the FSA to intervene and then apply a special regime 
before a bank reached the point of insolvency.
150
 Special Resolution Unit (SRU) was 
established within the BOE to “plan for and implement resolutions of failing UK 
banks and building societies under the SRR”.151 Three resolution tools were granted 
by law: private sector purchase, bridge bank and temporary public ownership.
152
 HM 
Treasury could decide whether to put a bank into temporary public ownership. 
Between 2007 and 2009, briefly, the FSA sought to strengthen intensive supervision, 
whilst the tripartite model focused upon formalising the legal framework to deal with 
failing banks.
153
 
 
The newly-established Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition introduced further 
regulatory reforms. It announced that, to correct fundamental problems exposed by 
the GFC, the FSA would be abolished,
154
 with the BOE at the centre of banking 
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regulation and supervision.
155
 It was widely agreed that insufficient attention was 
paid to the cumulated systemic risks in the financial sector, which was one major 
inherent weakness of the tripartite model. Specific limits could be summarised as:
156
 
 BOE: granted the statutory objective of maintaining financial stability, but 
still lacked facilities and tools to deliver financial stability; 
 
 FSA: with specific tools for financial stability, focused upon individual firms 
due to its wide range of duties; 
 
 A significant regulatory “underlap” existed in the oversight regime, with no 
authorities having the remit to tackle this linkage between firm-level and 
systemic stability. 
 
Being a landmark, the BOE transferred prudential regulation to the FSA in 1998, and 
had since focused upon monetary policy. As exposed during the GFC, however, 
central banks should re-examine “the intimate relationship between macro-prudential 
regulation, micro-prudential regulation and supervision, and the provision of 
liquidity insurance to banks”, rebuilding their role in overall financial stability.157 To 
strengthen their involvement in maintaining financial stability, responsible bodies 
should be reformed with different approaches to regulation. In consequence, UK 
government amended existing legislation – mainly the BOE Act 1998 and the FSMA 
2000
158
 – to give effect to the reform; and the Financial Services Act was enacted in 
2012.
159
 
 
New responsible agencies are established after the old ones were reformed or 
abolished. The Financial Policy Committee (FPC), set up as a Committee of the 
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BOE Court, controls primarily macro-prudential supervision over the entire financial 
system, filling thus the key gap of the tripartite model.
160
 Responsibility for 
prudential regulation was transferred to the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), 
added as a subsidiary to the BOE, monitoring deposit takers, insurers and some 
investment firms.
161
 The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) controls customer 
protection and the regulation of business conduct.
162
 From this point of view, 
prudential and conduct of business regulations, formerly undertaken by the FSA, 
were shared by the twin-peak model of the PRA and FCA:
163
 the former provides 
dedicated resources to supervise individual institutions, while the latter focuses more 
upon thematic work than firm-specific supervision;
164
 and they both seek more 
forward-looking, proactive and judgement-based supervision.
165
 These three newly-
established regulators first and foremost emphasize various facets of financial 
stability.  
 
It is further argued that prudential regulation should be re-oriented toward risk across 
the system as a whole. Gaps have emerged between macroeconomic policy and 
regulation of individual financial institutions, contributing to the build-up of leverage 
and liquidity mismatch in the markets; macro-prudential policy is identified to fill 
these gaps.
166
 Accordingly, it should address resources of systemic risk, increase the 
resilience of the financial system, and moderate exuberance over the supply of credit 
to the wider economy.
167
 The BOE has identified three groups of macro-prudential 
regulatory tools:
 168
 
(i) Those that affect the balance sheet of financial institutions, including 
maximum leverage ratios, countercyclical capital and liquidity buffers, time-
varying provisioning practices and distribution restrictions;  
                                                          
160
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(ii) Those that affect the terms and conditions of financial transactions, 
including the ability to restrict the quantity of lending at high ratios of loan to 
value or of loan to income; and  
(iii) Market structure tools, for example, the authority can adjust risk weights 
on intra-financial system activities to limit excessive exposures building up 
between financial institutions.  
 
The FPC is defined as the macro-prudential regulator, having two primary tools: 
recommendations and directions.
169
 It has the power to make recommendations to 
regulators, to HM Treasury, within the BOE and to other relevant bodies. It also has 
the direction-making power over the PRA and FCA, but strictly limited to using 
macro-prudential tools set out by HM Treasury in secondary legislation.
170
  
 
In addition, clarified division of responsibilities and effective cooperation are viewed 
equally important and should be further strengthened.
171
 Under the new regime, in 
the event of financial crises, the BOE has the primary operational responsibility for 
crisis management, including identifying potential crises, developing contingency 
plans, and implementing emergent solutions when necessary, while the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer is solely responsible for all decisions involving public funds or 
liabilities.
172
 To advance effective collaboration,
173
 cross-membership is widely 
applied among the MPC, FPC, PRA and FCA;
174
 and the MoU between the PRA and 
FCA has specified their cooperation in some areas and coordination in others, 
thereby maintaining the functions of the twin-peak model.
175
 Transparency has also 
been enhanced: Financial Stability Report is now published twice a year under the 
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guidance of the interim FPC,
176
 the FPC publishes the records within six weeks after 
the quarterly meetings,
177
 and the PRA releases leading issues with regard to micro-
prudential regulation.
178
 
 
The UK’s new financial regulation and supervision system aims at maintaining 
systemic stability, bringing about both new institutions and different approaches to 
monitoring. It can be displayed in the following figure: 
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Figure 5.3: New UK Financial Regulation and Supervision System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: HM Treasury and Bank of England 
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According to Figure 5.3, this new regime is expected to correct the shortcomings 
exposed by the GFC, and thus, addresses macro-prudential regulation, clear division 
of responsibilities, effective communication and cooperation, and improved 
transparency. Within the BOE, the FPC employs macro-prudential regulation to deal 
with system-relevant risks; being a subsidiary of the BOE, the PRA undertakes 
prudential regulation at the firm level; and the BOE also controls the SRU. Therefore, 
by embracing monetary policy, macro-and micro-prudential regulations, and failing 
bank resolutions, the BOE is now central to financial oversight after abolishing the 
tripartite model. 
 
Due to these changes, the BOE’s two-tier relationship has been modified. It has 
moved closer toward Government, especially HM Treasury. Both the FPC and MPC 
are given balanced statutory objectives of financial stability/monetary stability, and 
also supporting the wider economy, enhancing their goal dependence upon 
Government’s macroeconomic strategies. Moreover, the MoU has set out the 
requirement for the BOE Governor to inform HM Treasury of any financial cases 
involving public funds;
179
 also, HM Treasury is given by the statute the power of 
directions over the BOE in certain circumstances, along with statutory investigatory 
powers.
180
 HM Treasury can recommend the FPC to help shape its pursuit of 
financial stability, as well as other influencing factors to be taken into account.
181
 In 
addition, a Treasury representative is a non-voting member of the FPC, as well as of 
the MPC, while the PRA Board is accountable to Parliament, appearing regularly 
before the TSC.
182
 In principle, HM Treasury enhances its control over the BOE 
group to affect markets in the event of financial crises. 
 
On the other hand, new tools and facilities with the system-wide focus have been 
designed for the BOE to manage financial markets more directly. Within it, the FPC 
achieves macro-prudential regulation by identifying, monitoring and taking action to 
remove or reduce systemic risks.
183
 As the PRA regulates deposit takers, insurers 
and some complex investment firms, the BOE has extended its coverage to these 
                                                          
179
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institutions. It also regulates some post-trade financial market infrastructures, 
including recognised payment systems,
184
 and central counterparties and securities 
settlement systems, to help ensure their resilience.
185
 It continues to control failing 
banks’ resolutions by applying the SRR, absorbing thus tailored treatment to 
individual financial institutions. Overall, the BOE, with the coordination of the FCA, 
has embraced macro- and micro-prudential regulations together, enhancing its effects 
upon financial markets. 
 
In terms of regulatory and supervisory reforms, as Government’s banker, the BOE 
sacrificed some independence but under further HM Treasury’s leadership; as 
bankers’ bank, it extended its authority, as well as more direct intervention at the 
firm level.  
 
 
5.3.4 Summary  
 
To deal with the GFC, the BOE enhanced its intervention into the markets through 
asset purchases and interest rates controls, while the tripartite model was replaced by 
a new regime. Inter alia, the Financial Services Act 2012 brought the BOE to the 
centre of the UK financial oversight regime by splitting the FSA into a twin-peak 
model. HM Treasury had considerably raised its power by: (i) stabilizing financial 
markets by offering liquidity supports; (ii) nationalizing individual financial 
institutions; and (iii) leading the regulation regime. In a word, Government, through 
HM Treasury, has increasingly controlled financial markets, especially via the 
central bank group. 
 
 
5.4 How has the GFC Challenged the BOE? 
 
Prior to the GFC, the BOE was defined by law as a market-oriented central bank 
with operational independence and indirect monetary policy instruments, while the 
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FSA conducted risk-based micro-prudential regulation. However, not only has the 
GFC triggered more direct financial aid from the BOE, but also questioned the 
tripartite model. From the legal perspective, both the Banking Act 2009 and the 
Financial Services Act 2012 modified the operations of the BOE; relevant changes 
can be summarised in Table 5.8: 
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Table 5.8: Legal Framework of the BOE – Changes by the GFC 
 
Legal 
Framework 
 
 
Prior to the GFC 
 
During the GFC 
 
Objectives 
 
To maintain price stability, and 
subject to this, support 
Government’s economic policy, 
including its objectives for growth 
and employment 
 
Plus contribute to the maintenance of 
financial stability 
 
Independence 
 
 
Operational independence 
 
Operational independence with further 
transparency 
 
Organisation 
 
MPC controlled  interest rate 
policy with a non-voting 
representative from HM Treasury 
and accountable to TSC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Within BOE: 
 FPC with a HM Treasury 
representative 
 SUR  
 
BOE’s Subsidiary: PRA accountable to TSC 
 
Monetary Policy 
 Price stability 
 
 
 
 
 Monetary 
Operations 
 
 
Numerical inflation targeting pre-
set by HM Treasury 
 
 
 
SMF: OMOs, reserve accounts, 
Standing facilities, and a corridor 
system of interest rates 
 
 
New remit allowing flexibility in meeting 
the 2% target; 
Explicit forward guidance linking monetary 
policy directly with employment conditions 
 
Interest rates: corridor → a floor system; 
OSFs replaced standing facilities; 
Short-term OMOs suspended; 
DWF as a permanent facility for assets 
swap; 
Indexed Long-Term Repos; 
Collateral Term Repos; 
ad hoc facilities: Quantitative Easing 
 
Regulation and 
Supervision 
 Agencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 Approaches 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BOE sought systemic stability 
but without specific tools 
 
FSA was mega-regulator  
 
 
Risk-and-principle-based 
prudential regulation of 
individual institutions and 
specific financial sectors 
 
 
 
 
 
BOE at the centre of financial oversight, 
embracing monetary stability and 
financial stability 
FSA was replaced by a twin-peak model 
 
 
FPC: macro-prudential regulation over 
the entire financial market;  
PRA: judgement-led prudential 
regulation at the firm’s level; 
FCA: business conduct regulation and 
consumer protection; 
SUR: failing bank resolutions 
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As compared in Table 5.8, legal changes concentrated on improving the capacity of 
the BOE to deal with financial crises. As a monetary authority, its previous legal 
framework had identified certain indirect monetary policy tools to operate in the 
SMF but, with major asset purchases, it has controlled financial markets more 
directly. Moreover, the BOE has moved more closely to serve Government’s goals 
under its new remit, whilst nationalising financial institutions actually raised the 
authority of HM Treasury. As the systemic regulator, the BOE is argued to have 
achieved a phoenix-like re-emergence, being the centre of maintaining financial 
stability, but HM Treasury has actually led this new regime. To sum up, due to the 
GFC, the BOE has changed its duties as both monetary authority and systemic 
regulator.  
 
The two-tier relationship governing the BOE is different from that before the GFC: 
as Government’s banker, the BOE is increasingly controlled by HM Treasury; and as 
bankers’ bank, it influences financial markets more directly. Therefore, even though 
legal reforms leave pre-existing central bank independence relatively intact, the 
triangular relationship has been adjusted toward an enhanced Government control 
over financial markets via the BOE group; central bank independence was weakened 
without statutory reforms. Against this backdrop, the GFC has challenged the market 
orientation of the BOE by modifying its functions regarding monetary policy, 
macro-and micro- prudential regulation.  
 
Until mid-2013, it was still hard to conclude that the BOE had fulfilled its goals of 
monetary and financial stability: inflation continued to elevate above targets and 
prospects, and the Court, with risk and uncertainty, still endeavoured to sustain 
systemic stability.
186
 The BOE also maintained its comparatively intensified control 
over financial markets: the SMF has been adjusted to accommodate an increasing 
number of UMPs, Bank Rates were kept at 0.5%, and asset purchases were £375 
billion in total. At the firm level, nationalised financial institutions remained under 
public ownership, and the agenda for selling them back to the private sector was far 
                                                          
186
 BOE, Annual Report 2013 (Presented to Parliament by the Chief Secretary to the Treasury by 
Command of Her Majesty) 26-33. 
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from clear.
187
 What is more, the interdependence among monetary policy, macro-
prudential policy and banking stability is problematic,
188
 challenging the BOE to 
balance monetary and financial stability.
189
 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the BOE used to be a market-oriented central 
bank with limited prudential regulatory policy, and then examined changes that have 
resulted from the GFC. The previous legal framework defined operational 
independence for the BOE controlling indirect monetary policy, systemic stability 
and the LOLR facility, but major financial oversight responsibilities were transferred 
to the FSA. However, selected crisis management solutions during the GFC have 
changed the BOE’s two-tier relationship: as Government’s banker, it has been placed 
under further control of HM Treasury to support overall economic development; as 
bankers’ bank, its indirect monetary tools gave way to more direct means of asset 
purchases and interest rate controls. In terms of legal changes, according to the 
Banking Act 2009 and the Financial Services Act 2012, while the BOE controlled 
major financial oversight, HM Treasury’s influence on financial markets had further 
increased by assisting individual financial institutions and leading the new regulation 
system. The BOE’s proposition as a market-oriented central bank has therefore been 
challenged by the GFC to bring it closer to the broader policies of HM Treasury with 
more fundamental changes regarding the reallocation of financial regulation and 
supervision. Overall, this chapter has provided support for the proposition in this 
thesis that the BOE, as a market-oriented central bank with limited regulatory duties, 
has been systemically challenged by the GFC. 
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188
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Chapter Six 
Bank of Japan and the Global Financial Crisis
1
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
As the first central bank outside the Europe, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) was 
established in 1882, and then politically controlled for over a century. Therefore, 
unlike the market-orientated US Fed and BOE, the BOJ is assumed to be a 
government-guided central bank conducting limited financial regulation and 
supervision.  
 
To prove the above proposition, this chapter will proceed as follows. The BOJ had 
experienced limited statutory changes before the GFC. In particular, legal reforms in 
the 1990s brought constrained central bank independence while, under a new 
regulation regime, the BOJ only conducted limited micro-prudential regulation and 
LOLR facilities. This chapter will focus upon crisis management solutions selected 
by the BOJ: it was first challenged to deal with the NPLs and bank failures during 
the domestic crisis period, and then by the GFC to overcome lasting deflation and 
economic stagnation. Lately, it, following further government intervention, has 
enhanced its liquidity support and oversight at the firm level. This chapter will 
conclude with a comparative summary, analysing how its government-guided nature 
has been challenged by the GFC.  
 
 
6.2 Overriding Legal Framework of the BOJ before the GFC 
 
Historically, there were few legal reforms in relation to the BOJ. This section will 
argue that it was a government-guided central bank with limited micro monitoring 
duties.  
                                                          
1
 This chapter is updated until October 2013. 
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6.2.1 Establishment of the BOJ 
 
The establishment of the BOJ was directly triggered by Japan’s domestic market 
instability since the mid-19
th
 century,
2
  and benefited from its open economy policy 
to the western influence.
3
 However, its establishment is generally viewed as being 
achieved under the power of Count Masayoshi Matsukata, arguing that a central 
bank would facilitate Government to stabilize markets.
4
 After the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) initiated preparations, his views were accepted in June 1882, 
releasing the Bank of Japan Act by Law No. 32 (BOJ Act 1882).
5
  
 
The BOJ was built up on the model of Banque National De Belgique (BNB),
6
 being 
a joint-stock company with renewable licence. The state was a major shareholder, 
and private shareholders were to be approved by the MOF. The MOF also controlled 
personnel appointments, branch opening, and operational management. The Bank 
Committee was set up within the Treasury to control monetary policy. To support 
Government, the BOJ offered sizeable short-term loans, increased interest rates and 
issued notes beyond ordinary limits.
7
 Moreover, it helped to build up the unified 
domestic monetary system through redemption schemes of silver and national bank 
notes;
8
 and under the Convertible Bank Note Act 1884,
9
 this function was conducted 
under the supervision of the MOF and Treasury.
10
 The BOJ managed the banking 
sector directly through rediscounting facilities and direct advances with illiquid 
securities as collaterals; both discount rates and bill discount window were initiated 
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on a comparative base.
11
 It had special rediscounting facilities with the Yokohama 
Specie Bank, transferred to the Branch of Osaka in 1889.
12
 When a banking crisis 
occurred in 1891, the BOJ responded by exercising implicit deposit insurance, 
offering emergent loans to contracted industries (similar to the LOLR facility), 
enabling the development of payments and inter-regional transfer systems, as well as 
establishing its own branches.
13
  
 
Since the beginning, the BOJ had close relationships with Government, especially 
the MOF, and with markets as well. In spite of objections to its privilege of higher 
benefits, it, by combining monetary policy instruments and preliminary crisis 
management, had evident effects: as Government’s banker, it supplied war loans, 
and also helped stabilise the monetary system; as bankers’ bank, it directed the 
industry by offering commercial loans to contracted institutions, and also integrated 
domestic financial markets.
14
  
 
 
6.2.2 Bank of Japan Act 1942 
 
During World War II, Japan’s production and reallocation was centralized to meet 
emergent military requirements.
15
 In the financial sector, bank loans for investment 
were rationed from September 1937, a compulsory lending scheme was introduced 
in March 1939 and, lending and securities exceeding certain amounts needed 
Government approval. After December 1940, Japan’s economy was further 
centralised under the Memorandum of Establishing a New Economic System.
16
 
Financial regulation was reinforced: under Government’s initiative, dividends were 
constrained, limiting fund-raising from the capital market, but loans were 
                                                          
11
 These direct policy instruments lasted until the 1980s. See, Bernard Laurens, ‘Refinance 
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encouraged from banks, especially from long-term credit banks. As a result, a 
comparatively small group of commercial banks began to dominate domestic capital 
allocation, providing the basis for Japan’s banking-oriented indirect financing.17 
 
In order to strengthen the state’s control over the economy, the Bank of Japan Act 
1942 (BOJ Act 1942) was modelled on the Reichsbank Act 1939.
18
 The Wartime 
Financing Bank was established to support further wartime loans.
19
 The BOJ was 
required to “adjust currency, regulate financing and develop the credit system, 
conforming to policies of the state to ensure appropriate application of the state’s 
total economic power”. It could only set discount rates and reserve requirements 
with the consent from the MOF and Prime Minister (PM).
20
 The governor, replacing 
the director, undertook absolute responsibility for decision-making, and was fully 
accountable to Government. In principle, the BOJ was administered by the MOF to 
operate exclusively to accomplish the purposes of the state. 
 
During American occupation era,
21
 limited changes occurred regarding the BOJ. 
Under the Finance Law 1947, it was legally prohibited from underwriting 
government bonds unless authorized by the Diet to refinance maturing debts under 
specific circumstances.
22
 The Policy Board was reformed in 1949 to protect the BOJ 
from government intervention. However, in effect, it followed recommendations 
made by the BOJ staff, or as an executive board of directors representing several 
departments within the BOJ.
23
 Therefore, delegating monetary policy duties to the 
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Policy Board did not enhance central bank independence, and conflicts caused by 
other unchanged legal provisions underlined the BOJ’s political subordination.24  
 
 
6.2.3 Legal Framework  
 
From the 1950s, Japan quickly recovered and gained further growth, but new 
political, economic, technological and international forces had since challenged its 
financial sector.
25
 In 1975, the MOF launched financial liberalisation to promote fair 
competition and consolidate market principles.
26
 Japan was ranked as the second 
largest economy and largest creditor nation in 1985, but this was followed by a cycle 
of economic bubble and burst (referred to as Japan’s “lost-decade”).27 In spite of all 
the profound changes, as wartime legislation, the BOJ Act 1942 was not replaced by 
a new legislation until 1998, though the BOJ had been criticised for its misleading 
and delayed monetary policies.
28
 
  
From the legal perspective, a strong MOF with its subordinated central bank enabled 
Japan’s development, while also impeding substantial statutory changes. By the 
1990s, intensified economic and political instability made profound reforms 
possible.
29
 Therefore, a “Big-Bang” reform sought to reshape the financial system to 
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develop free markets, fair trade and international standards;
30
 transparency was 
viewed as crucial for achieving this goal.
31
 Legislative and administrative reforms 
focused upon reconstituting market forces, moral hazard and transparency.
32
 In a 
nutshell, the MOF was restructured, bringing forward a new BOJ and a new financial 
regulation regime.
33
  
 
6.2.3.1 The BOJ Act 1998  
  
The goal of the BOJ reform was clarified in the draft submitted to the Diet: central 
bank independence should be ensured by enhancing transparency, achieved by both 
deregulation and introducing international standards;
34
 accountability and reporting 
responsibility should be both well documented and made public.
35
 The formal policy 
deliberations were made by the Central Bank Study Group, a private advisory agent 
established by PM Hashimoto Ryutaro.
36
 Their findings were presented to an 
internal council of the MOF, while the full text was drafted by the MOF.
37
 The BOJ 
reform was thereby propelled by politicians and the MOF, especially, led the legal 
reform.  
 
The new legislation was aimed to separate the BOJ from the MOF, whereby it could 
pursue its statutory responsibilities without direct political interventions. Main legal 
elements include: 
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Objectives  
The BOJ was responsible for price stability, whereby sound economic development 
was enhanced, while maintaining an orderly payment and settlement system.  
 
Organisational Structure  
Traditionally, the MOF retirees entered the top rank of the BOJ. In 1998, when 
Hayami Masaru was appointed Governor by the Hashimoto Cabinet, the BOJ 
governorship became the first breakthrough, but the MOF still controlled personnel 
appointments.
38
  
 
The Policy Board resumed its formal power, being the BOJ’s highest decision-
making body, and formulated monetary policy at Monetary Policy Meetings 
(MPMs).
39
 It also controlled reforms affecting the BOJ’s organisation, code of 
conduct for executives and staff, as well as the repos market.
40
 The Board was 
extended to have nine members, including the governor and two deputy governors, 
along with six deliberative members selected by the Cabinet with the consent of both 
Diet Houses.
41
 Non-voting representatives from the MOF and Economic Planning 
Agency still attended the MPMs to express views and even request a delayed policy 
decision, but could be rejected by the Board. The BOJ executives included the Policy 
Board members, up to three auditors, up to six executive directors and an unspecified 
number of advisers. Auditors were appointed by the Cabinet, but both advisers and 
executive directors were appointed by the MOF on the recommendation of the Policy 
Board.
42
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40
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Major Functions  
The BOJ was granted the final power in deciding the amount of bank notes, rather 
than being approved by the Cabinet for the ordinary amount and by the MOF for 
excess as under the 1942 legislation. But technique issues, including the format of 
coins and notes, still belong to the Cabinet and MOF.
43
 Authorised by law, the BOJ 
served Government by receiving and paying government bonds and cash, and also 
trading Japanese government bonds (JGBs).
44
 The BOJ and MOF formulated and 
conducted exchanges through their own accounts respectively.
45
 In terms of 
monetary policy instruments, the BOJ had long relied upon window guidance to 
guarantee bank lending from major financial institutions.
46
 But with financial 
liberalization, it shifted to interest rates as the transmission channel to execute 
monetary policy.
47
 In 1982, it officially announced to abandon direct credit controls 
through window guidance.
48
 During the bubble and burst cycle, it mainly relied upon 
interest rate policies to affect markets.
 49
  
 
The BOJ undertook on-site examinations and off-site monitoring to gauge risks and 
business conditions of individual financial institutions by collecting and analysing 
micro information.
50
 Therefore, it still possessed the power to investigate directly at 
the firm level. Moreover, it was responsible for designing contingency plans for 
emergencies, including the extension of loans under special in-advance contracts to 
those institutions with stated current accounts, and reporting it to the PM and MOF.
51
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The BOJ decided whether a financial institution was eligible based on these criteria: 
i) the institution should play a major role in funds or securities settlement or as an 
intermediary in money markets; ii) it should ensure the appropriateness of its 
businesses and management structure, and of its operational framework; and iii) it 
should conclude an on-site examination contract with the BOJ.
52
 By law, its LOLR 
facilities included:
53
   
(1) Complementary lending offering extensions of loans against collateral;  
(2) Extensions of temporary uncollateralised loans in case of unexpected 
shortage of funds for payment problems, and to smooth settlement of funds 
among financial institutions;   
(3) Extensions of special loans to maintain financial stability in cooperation 
with Government.  
 
It is worth noting that the PM and MOF could legally request the BOJ to lend in 
much broader circumstances, but the right of refusal was lacking in this Act. 
Therefore, the BOJ shared its LOLR responsibility with the MOF to deal with 
liquidity shortages.  
 
Accountability and Transparency  
Under the BOJ Act 1998, the BOJ was accountable to the Diet: every six months, the 
BOJ reported to the Diet via MOF, the governor appearing before the Diet on 
request.
54
 The BOJ clarified that transparency should be comprehensively practiced, 
including clarification of its role, responsibilities, and objectives, open access for 
formulating and reporting policy decisions, public availability of policy information, 
and accountability and assurances of its integrity.
55
 To advance transparency, it 
joined the IMF’s programme of the Code of Good Practices on Transparency in 
Monetary and Financial Policies in 1999. However, it was still criticised for only 
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pursuing limited transparency when assessing particular political, economic, 
procedural, policy, and operational factors.
56
  
 
Independence  
As explained, central bank independence has been closely linked with inflation 
control, but this was not the case with the BOJ.
57
 Historically, it was rarely 
challenged for failed monetary policy in managing inflation. For example, during the 
two oil crises in the 1970s, it placed inflation under control by conducting different 
policy instruments.
58
 Overall, Japan had a successful policy record in controlling 
inflation with the least independent central bank; this is known as “the Japan 
puzzle”.59 Therefore, inflation was not the primary reason to grant the BOJ more 
autonomy.
60
 Instead, it was deemed responsible for the bubble economy and its burst, 
as well as deflation. As argued, the longer deflation lasted, the harder for monetary 
policy to work effectively; consequently, deflation constrained the functions of the 
BOJ.
61
 Furthermore, as political instability exacerbated in the 1990s, the MOF lost 
its preferential position supported by the powerful Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP).
62
 In this context, the BOJ reform became the breakthrough point for changing 
the MOF. Externally, the ECB was established with significant independence, 
influencing Japan’s choice over which path to take to reform.63 Accordingly, the 
BOJ reform arose from both domestic instability and international pressure, which 
contributed to making independence its top priority.  
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Between the 1950s and 1960s, reforms toward greater central bank independence 
proved fruitless, mainly due to the strong opposition from the MOF.
64
 However, 
even under the BOJ Act 1998, it was still in question whether its independence had 
really been improved. Fundamentally, the BOJ could not conduct more functions 
than those prescribed by law, thereby confining its overall authority within this 
legislation.
65
 It was independent in formulating and implementing currency and 
monetary controls, as well as business operations, but with ambiguous wording. In 
practice, its relationship with Government was more complex than what legal 
provisions prescribed. The MOF maintained its authority to an obvious degree by: (i) 
affecting the formality of monetary policy by sending a representative to the Policy 
Board, and selecting advisers and executive members; (ii) monitoring the BOJ’s 
current expenditure budget under a government cabinet order; (iii) working as the 
bridge between the BOJ and the Diet; and (iv) requesting the BOJ to conduct the 
LOLR facility under its own discretion.  
 
Moreover, the BOJ was placed under the increasing power of Government. The Act 
reaffirmed that uncollateralised loans were channelled to Government, and 
government bonds were subscribed or underwritten by the BOJ with different 
categories.
66
 According to Article 4,  
“… [the BOJ] shall always maintain close contact with the government and 
exchange views sufficiently, for monetary policy and price stability is a component 
of overall economic policy, and hence, the monetary management and the basic goal 
of the government’s economic policy should be mutually harmonious …” 
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Accordingly, Government linked the BOJ directly with its own economic strategy.
67
 
In terms of personnel selection, the Cabinet was responsible for appointing the 
governor and vice governors, which should be approved by the Diet, whose right to 
dismiss central bankers under special circumstances remained intact. According to 
Article 65 of Japan’s Constitution, administrative power belonged to the Cabinet led 
by the PM, which was critical for opposition against more BOJ independence.
68
 
Therefore, the implicit logic of the BOJ Act 1998 was the changeover of influencing 
powers: claiming to raise central bank independence, this legislation reinforced the 
subjection of the BOJ to the Diet and Cabinet by weakening the MOF.  
 
After the legal reform, debates continued as regards the BOJ’s real independence. It 
seemed to have a higher level of de facto independence: it had gained a reputation 
for controlling inflation in the 1970s, while the strong MOF had blocked certain 
political pressure. For example, it insisted upon operating OMOs to finance the 
national budget deficit, rather than purchasing public debt directly as required by 
Government; it even tightened monetary policy against pressure for monetary 
expansion from domestic and international markets between 1998 and 1999. This 
was arguably achieved by the astute leadership of Governor Hayami Masaru, the 
BOJ’s ability to turn politicisation of monetary policy to its own advantages, and its 
expertise knowledge base.
69
 However, the BOJ was criticised for “independence 
trap”: it failed to anticipate lasting deflation with prolonged negative effects, but 
appeared comfortable with the prospect of sustained low-level inflation rates since 
the late 1990s.
70
 
 
The BOJ Act 1998 modified the scope of the BOJ’s functions. In principle, it was 
defined as being responsible for monetary policy, government-related transactions, 
various LOLR facilities, and limited but direct micro-regulation into individual 
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financial institutions. However, its transparency and independence were still 
constrained, failing to meet stated reform targets.  
 
6.2.3.2 New Financial Regulation and Supervision System 
 
After World War II, the MOF was the major financial regulator, controlling interest 
rates and capital flows through regulatory and administrative directions. To deal with 
troubled institutions, an official convoy facility operated: the BOJ made liquidity 
available,
71
 and the MOF required stronger institutions to support or merge with 
weaker ones.
72
 Forgiveness and forbearance pervaded between administrative 
authorities and markets, also between banks and their corporation customers; this 
gave rise to difficulties in transparency and financial disclosure.
73
 For long, the 
financial sector, with rigid and direct regulation, was viewed as an instrument of 
industry policy. As Japan’s economic development hit its limits in the late 1970s, 
conflicts emerged, including a bias toward indirect financing, functional 
segmentation, administrative guidance, convoy regulation, and international 
isolation.
74
 Inter alia, the convoy system, involving the MOF, BOJ, business and 
financial institutions, did assist Japan’s post-war economic growth, but also impeded 
necessary reforms.
75
 Later, the bubble-burst cycle caused increasing unemployment 
and business failures, and thus, in private and public sectors, the level of outstanding 
debts made up over 25% of GDP. Japan’s “main bank” system, based upon 
forgiveness and forbearance, channelled credits to weak corporations; and this 
aggravated the NPLs problem facing both banks and non-bank financial 
institutions.
76
 This was further worsened by the strict capital adequacy ratio adopted 
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under the Basel Accord 1988.
77
 In brief, bad loans were the immediate causes of 
many problems in Japan’s banking industry and, with changed market conditions, 
the old convoy system became unsustainable.
78
 
 
In the 1990s, continuous bank failures and recapitalization by the MOF constrained 
financial sector development, and also indicated the limitations of previous 
regulators.
79
 When housing loan corporations (the jusen industry) was announced to 
be insolvent in 1996, the MOF employed the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) 
to make a full government guarantee until March 2001. This new disclosure of 
information indicated the real level of all the problems, which had lastingly been 
manipulated by the authority, and intensive public negative reaction was also 
triggered by the MOF’s solution by employing massive public fund.80  Especially, 
the AFC brought Japan’s economy to the edge of financial panic in November 
1997;
81
 and in particular, problems continued longer in the banking industry with 
extraordinary costs at output, causing a banking crisis until 1998. For example, 
Sanyo Securities filed for protection from creditors on November 3, 1997, triggering 
scandals in the interbank call market, and the unusual procedure exposed inadequate 
government intervention.
82
 The bankruptcy of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank made null 
the “too-big-to-fall” policy of the MOF,83 and Yamaichi failure exerted international 
spillover effects because of its extensive banking business.
84
 In 1998, the Long-Term 
Credit Bank and the Nippon Credit Bank went into temporary nationalisation, which 
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underlined the necessity of dealing with failures of large financial institutions in a 
more orderly and consistent manner.
85
  
 
The objective of regulatory reform was to introduce a mechanism in line with 
international best practice standards, whereby bank failures could be handled better 
with less negative impact upon financial stability.
86
 New rules and regulations were 
released. The Law Concerning Emergency Measures for the Reconstruction of the 
Functions of the Financial System (Financial Reconstruction Law) was enacted to 
deal with a failed bank without necessarily finding a sound receiving bank 
beforehand. The Financial Function Early Restoration Law aimed at restoring 
confidence in the banking sector by arranging capital injections under a new 
framework.
87
  
 
Moreover, responsible agencies were changed. The MOF transferred its regulatory 
and supervisory duty to an outside agency – Financial Supervisory Agency.88 It was 
first supervised by the MOF and then by the Financial Reconstruction Commission 
(FRC), an independent office under the PM, since 1998. Under this arrangement, the 
relationship between the PM and the financial supervisor was strengthened, reducing 
the MOF’s power for dealing with bank failures. 89  In July 2000, the Financial 
Supervisory Agency was re-structured into the Financial Services Agency (FSA), 
and a new mechanism was introduced. Banks were ensured to be viable and 
investment fully recovered by assessing their “original cost accounting standards” 
and “effective capital ratios”, followed by explicit plans to improve profitability.90 
This “management improvement plan” was first submitted to the FRC upon 
receiving capital and made public subsequently. The FRC became responsible for 
NPLs disposals by employing public funds, and Government’s power was restricted 
to converting preferred shares into common stocks over the operations of the 
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weakest institutions up to five years. The FSA regularly checked their actions against 
the plans and could intervene directly into their management. 
 
Japanese banks were required to dispose of their bad loans within 2–3 years by 
following bankruptcy procedures or rehabilitating borrowers.
91
 The Prompt 
Corrective Action was initiated to evaluate and audit their positions, whilst 
supervising them in accordance with set standards. NPLs were assessed more 
transparently through more informative and realistic reports. Capital ratios were 
divided by percentages, and varying capital rations applied to banks according to 
their businesses under the Basel Accord: higher ratios of capital adequacy applied for 
internationally active banks,
92
 while the FSA controlled the reform and 
recapitalisation plan for banks between 4% and 8%.
93
 Accordingly, insolvent banks 
were distinguished from the merely weak: special public control was placed over 
insolvent banks by government-managed bridge banks, while weaker ones could be 
injected with public funding on request. Meanwhile, an explicit insurance 
programme was introduced, and the DIC was reformed.
94
 DIC accounts were divided 
into: (i) Special Account, established under the revised Deposit Insurance Law in 
1998 to nationalise institutions; (ii) Financial Reconstruction Account, to support 
emergent financial aid under the Financial Reconstruction Law; and (iii) Account for 
Early Restoration of Financial Function, to recapitalise a weak bank under the 
Prompt Corrective Action Standards after the DIC approved its business restoration 
plan. Additionally, the Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC) was 
established to purchase loans from both failed and still solvent but weak banks, 
NPLs were charged at market prices or fair value, and securitisation developed to 
further consolidate banks’ capital base.95  
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Within this new regime, the LOLR facilities of the BOJ were diminished, for such 
loans could pose threats and trigger conflicts between the FSA and the BOJ.
96
 The 
BOJ was still responsible for making loans on bills available to the DIC’s Financial 
Crisis Management Account according to the Financial Law on Emergency 
Measures for Stabilizing the Financial Functions, and the Special Account according 
to the Supplementary Provisions of the Deposit Insurance Law, but the Deposit 
Insurance Act stipulated that funds required by failed financial institutions would be 
provided by the DIC rather than the BOJ. In practice, the BOJ also lent temporarily 
to the DIC via bridge financing, but the DIC generally borrowed from private 
channels and also international financial institutions.
97
  
 
After the above reform, the new financial regulation and supervision regime can be 
displayed in Figure 6.1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
96
 Takeo Hoshi and Takatoshi Ito, ‘Financial Regulation in Japan: A Sixth Year Review of the 
Financial Services Agency’ (2004) Journal of Financial Stability 1(2): 229-243. 
97
 Supra 87. 
 183 
 
Figure 6.1: Japan’s New Financial Regulation and Supervision System  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, the key to Japan’s financial regulation and supervision reform was to 
add new facilities and responsible agencies to deal with NPLs and bank failures. The 
MOF was replaced by the FSA controlling financial regulation, while the BOJ only 
offered limited financial aid under its LOLR facilities. 
 
 
6.2.4 Summary 
 
This section has focused upon legislation governing the BOJ. Major changes around 
its two-tier relationship can be summarised in Table 6.1: 
RCC 
Legal Reform 
Financial Reconstruction Law 
Financial Function Early Restoration Law 
A flexible but orderly way, without 
shocking financial stability 
NPLs  
 Bank Failures 
BOJ 
Capital 
Injection 
DIC 
Special Account 
to Nationalise 
Institutions 
Financial 
Reconstruction 
Account 
Account for Early 
Restoration of 
Financial Function 
 FSA 
FRC 
Prime Minister 
Prompt Corrective Action 
Financial Crisis 
Management 
Account 
Capital Conditions Assessment 
Bridge Financing 
Loan 
Purchases 
Loan 
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Table 6.1: Major Changes around BOJ’s Two-Tier Relationship before GFC 
 
Conditions 
 
 
Legislation 
 
Independence 
 
Relationship with 
Market 
 
External 
influence and 
domestic 
instability 
 
BOJ Act 1882 
 
A joint-stock company 
with the state as the 
major shareholder; 
Under the direction of 
the MOF and Treasury 
 
Directly manage the 
industry to integrate 
financial markets 
 
World War 
II  
 
Memorandum of 
Establishing a New 
Economic System 
 
 
BOJ Act 1942   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BOJ was under the 
MOF and operated to 
support the nation’s 
centralised strategy 
 
Rationing measures of 
lending and securities;  
MOF strengthened direct 
control but prioritized 
major banks 
 
 
  
 
American 
Occupation 
 
1947 Finance Law 
 
BOJ underwrote 
government bonds; 
Policy Board was 
controlled by the Diet, 
Cabinet, MOF and 
Treasury 
 
 
 
Economic 
recovery and 
development 
until the 
1970s 
  
BOJ reform for more 
independence failed due 
to the powerful MOF 
 
BOJ controlled inflation 
and conducted window 
guidance to channel 
commercial loans; 
MOF controlled financial 
markets and the convoy 
system  
 
Economic 
dynamics 
1970s and 
1980s 
 
   
BOJ shifted to indirect 
monetary policy; 
banking industry was 
challenged by NPLs and 
bankruptcy; 
Convoy regime failed to 
manage regulation and 
recapitalisation 
 
Big Bang 
Financial 
Reform since 
1996 
 
BOJ Act 1998  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Highlighting 
independence and 
transparency, the BOJ 
reform implied the 
shifted influence from 
the MOF to the Diet 
and Cabinet; 
BOJ was confined to 
control monetary policy  
 
On-site examination, off-
site monitoring and limited 
LOLR facilities 
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Financial 
Reconstruction 
Law,  
Financial Function 
Early Restoration 
Law;  
Prompt Correction 
Action 
 
FSA was supervised 
first by the MOF and 
then by the FRC under 
the PM 
Convoy system was 
replaced by a new system 
to deal with NPLs and 
capital injection 
 
 
 
As illustrated in Table 6.1, the BOJ experienced few legal changes prior to the GFC. 
From the outset, it was established with close relationships with Government and 
financial markets. During World War II, it was brought directly under the MOF, with 
the predominant goal to support government’s wartime needs. In spite of Japan’s 
undergoing changes, the BOJ was governed by such exceptionally long-standing 
wartime legislation until 1998, when it was reformed during Japan’s “Big Bang”.  
 
The BOJ reform sought to improve independence through further transparency. By 
examining its legal framework, the strong presence of the MOF was reduced, but its 
real independence was constrained by the rising power of the Diet and Cabinet. 
Consequently, the stated reform goals miscarried. Meanwhile, the indirect-financing 
pattern, which had assisted Japan’s economic development, produced serious NPLs 
with threats of insolvency from the 1990s. This was first dealt with by the MOF with 
LOLR support from the BOJ under the convoy system, and then by the FSA; the 
BOJ’s role had been further weakened regarding banks’ liquidity and bankruptcy.  
 
Overall, the BOJ was predominantly a monetary authority, while financial regulation 
and supervision shifted from the MOF to the FSA. Its two-tier relationship can be 
summarised as follows: as Government’s banker, the BOJ was under continuous 
government guidance, carrying the responsibility for maintaining monetary stability 
to support the state’s strategy, and managing treasury funds and government 
securities services; as bankers’ bank, it, based upon contractual relationship, 
conducted examining and monitoring at the firm level, as well as emergent lending 
in limited cases. After the reform, the FSA, as the successor of the MOF, continued 
to supervise banks at the firm level. In brief, the BOJ was a government-guided 
central bank, and oversaw financial institutions quite directly. 
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6.3 The GFC Impact upon the BOJ 
 
The new BOJ was challenged to deal with Japan’s domestic crisis and also the GFC; 
therefore, it can be viewed as “a central bank in crisis”. This section will introduce 
and analyse its crisis management solutions before making further comparisons.  
 
 
6.3.1 The BOJ in Japan’s Domestic Crisis 
 
Since the mid-1990s, the relationship between the money stock and economic 
activity had become unstable, and thus, the BOJ adjusted monetary policy to directly 
influence the credit creation behaviour of financial institutions and overall money 
demand.
98
 It continued to reduce interest rates to 0.25% in September 1998 (as 
illustrated in Table 6.2). On February 12, 1999, the Policy Board decided to reduce 
the uncollateralised call rate to virtually zero, named the Zero Interest Rate Policy 
(ZIRP). Due to a false expectation of recovery, it raised the rate to 0.25% in August 
2000, soon threatening economic recession. It re-introduced the ZIRP in March 2001, 
and also announced that it would last until “the inflation rate becomes stably above 
zero”.99 The goal of the ZIRP was further clarified in October 2003 to continue until 
“the CPI inflation rate becomes zero or above for a few months and there is no 
forecast by the Board members of falling back to deflation”.100 
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Table 6.2: Time-Series Setting of BOJ Interest Rates between 1998 and 2006 
 
      Basic discount rate and basic loan rate           
      Call rate, uncollateralized overnight/average  
Data source: BOJ 
<www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/ssi/cgi-bin/famecgi2?cgi=$graphwnd_en>. 
 
With prolonged deflation, neither monetary expansion nor fiscal stimulus can 
effectively help support economic recovery. Hence, the BOJ began experiments by 
introducing unconventional monetary policies (UMPs).
101
 It set up the 
Complementary Lending Facility (CLF) to offer extended loans against a wider 
range of collaterals.
102
 On March 19, 2001, the Policy Board officially announced 
“quantitative easing”.103 It increased the outstanding balance of the current accounts 
to ¥ 35 trillion in 2004, whilst shifting its target of monetary policy operation from 
the uncollateralised overnight call rate to the outstanding balance of the current 
account balances held by financial institutions. So, given that the current account 
balance far exceeded the level of required reserves, the BOJ began to provide 
liquidity directly to financial institutions, triggering their incentives to hold sufficient 
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excess reserves. At the same time, it increased outright monthly purchases of long-
term JGBs from ¥ 0.4 trillion to ¥ 1.2 trillion from March 2001 to November 2002, 
after the low interest rate limited the profits produced by short-term funds. Between 
July 2003 and March 2006, it conducted ABSs purchases under a temporary measure 
to support corporate financing. Overall, the BOJ employed its own current account 
balances to conduct quantitative easing through assets purchases.
104
 
 
To promote NPL disposals, the BOJ completed a comprehensive review in 2002, 
pointing out that bad loans were caused by both the bubble economy and structural 
shortcomings. Thereafter, it encouraged major financial institutions to strengthen 
their own efforts toward more appropriate provisioning, and also expanded the 
secondary market for loan assets to help remove NPLs from their balance sheets.
105
 
In October 2002, the Financial Revitalisation Program was introduced, aiming at 
halving the NPL ratios by the end of March 2005. This goal would be achieved 
through stricter assessment of assets, and the restructuring of both financial and 
industrial sectors.
106
 In 2004, the Financial Function Strengthening Act
107
 created the 
Financial Functions Strengthening Account to inject public funds to prevent further 
NPLs. This account allowed Government to make capital injection prophylactically 
into financial institutions which were solvent but without sufficient capital to 
operate.
108
  
 
By April 2005, the banking crisis was alleviated by a combination of rescue 
measures, including accommodated monetary policy, direct intervention, and fiscal 
stimulus packages.
109
 To protect depositors and ensure confidence, Government 
established the blanket guarantee of deposit in June 1996, and extended until March 
2002. As market conditions smoothed, it was replaced by a limited coverage in 
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2005.
110
 This reform is argued to have advanced the development of market 
disciplines in deposit insurance.
111
 The BOJ also shifted its focus from crisis 
management to supporting private sector initiatives to provide efficient and advanced 
financial services via fair competition, though meanwhile maintaining financial 
stability.
112
 To facilitate this change, it conducted reorganisation: the Financial 
Systems and Bank Examination Department replaced the Financial Systems 
Department and the Bank Examination and Surveillance Department, and the Centre 
for Advanced Financial Technology was set up. In addition, the BOJ began to 
release regularly Financial System Reports to explain its own policy stances after 
evaluating the entire financial system. According to these reports, the soundness of 
individual financial institutions would be regularly examined, and macroeconomic 
imbalance was vitally linked with systemic risk.
113
  
 
Between November 2005 and March 2006, the core CPI inflation turned positive, 
and economic recovery stabilized.
114
 The BOJ returned to the uncollateralised 
overnight call rate for its money market conduct,
115
 and raised it to 0.25% on July 17 
to avoid large swings in prices and other economic activities in the future.
116
 It ended 
the quantitative easing policy, but continued the call rate at the above low level.
117
 In 
2007, the FSA launched a reform toward balancing rule-based and principle-based 
regulation, with improved transparency to promote financial institutions’ 
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international competitiveness.
118
 However, Japan suffered contagion from the GFC 
before this reform was completed.  
 
 
6.3.2 The BOJ amid the GFC 
 
Unlike the US and UK, Japan was not challenged by severe housing collapses or 
banking failures during the GFC.
119
 Instead, its banking sector was comparatively 
stable, for continuous recapitalization had ensured financial soundness rather than 
profitability.
120
 Japanese banks were less innovative with limited direct exposure to 
the US subprime mortgage housing market. Until September 2010, subprime-related 
losses were established at ¥ 1,038 billion, representing less than 2.2% of Japanese 
bank Tier-1 capital, much less than their counterparts in the US and UK.
121
 
 
However, the stock market was alert to the US subprime mortgage crisis, declining 
gradually but sustainably after a record peak in mid-2007. This placed downturn 
pressure upon balance sheets and capital adequacy ratios of commercial banks, 
limiting their willingness to lend, especially from summer 2008.
122
 New loans for 
equipment funds declined by 9% on a year-to-year basis in the third quarter of 2008, 
and reduced more sharply until the year end.
123
 Some exporting and manufacturing 
sectors showed earlier instabilities, and major problems emerged since November 
2008.
124
 For example, exports fell by 12.5% in late 2008, with another 36.8% 
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reduction in the early 2009; real GDP shrank by 12.1% at the end of 2008. In 2008 
and 2009, Japan performed less well than its peers and emerging countries in Asia.
125
 
 
Japan got contagion with a noticeable time lag, but still serious losses occurred; this 
has mainly been attributed to its particular trade and industrial structure.
126
 In the 
Great Moderation era, worldwide economic growth facilitated Japan’s recovery, and 
export contributions to GDP became high; its over-dependence upon exports and 
foreign capital accelerated its vulnerability to external shocks. So declining demand 
from both advanced countries
127
 and regional trade partners
128
 directly reduced GDP 
growth. Moreover, after Japan’s industrial structure was reformed to introduce more 
effective Yen exchange rates, exports were spurred by a declining currency value, 
especially between 2003 and 2007.
129
 As domestic inventory adjustment engendered 
further pressure on exports, downward pressure upon industrial production also 
increased.
130
 Meanwhile, foreign banks largely reduced their investment in the 
interbank market and their holdings of Japanese stocks. As a result, negative outward 
portfolio investments increased from 2007 in absolute terms, inward portfolio 
investment turned negative in 2008/09, and foreign short-term investment reduced; 
all these forced a credit crunch.
131
 Overall, Japan entered into serious economic 
recession from late 2008, mainly due to the collapse of world trade and liquidity 
crunch in international capital markets.
132
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To deal with the GFC, Japan similarly employed fiscal stimulus and monetary 
expansion. The BOJ was first to prevent the exacerbation of this crisis and then 
manage it with selected solutions.
133
 The Governor summarised the key policy 
responses as “ample liquidity provisions, support for credit market functioning, 
macroeconomic stimulus, and injections of public capital and elimination of balance 
sheet uncertainties”.134 Its crisis management solutions could be analysed from the 
following six perspectives. 
 
(1) Interest Rate Reductions: 
 
Under the ZIRP, the BOJ maintained the uncollateralised overnight call rate at 0.5% 
until October 31, 2008, and reduced it to 0.1% in December 2008. To clarify its 
commitment, it announced at the end of 2009 to maintain quantitative easing until 
the country came out of deflation.
135
 By October 2010, the BOJ had made 
continuous cuts to “around 0 to 0.1%” (as illustrated in Table 6.3), and the target was 
set until price stability came into sight without any significant systemic risk.
136
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Table 6.3: Time-series Setting of BOJ Interest Rates between 2006 and Mid-
2013  
            Basic discount rate and basic loan rate   
           Call rates, uncollateralized overnight/average  
 
Data Source: BOJ 
<www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/ssi/cgi-bin/famecgi2?cgi=$graphwnd_en>. 
 
 
(2) Quantitative Easing 
 
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Japanese financial market 
deteriorated sharply, corporate bankruptcies increased and stock prices fell. 
According to the Short-term Economic Survey of Enterprise in Japan (Tankan), more 
firms reported difficulties in accessing credit from financial institutions.
137
 As 
various indicators pointed out, the spillover effects from the GFC to Japan required 
the BOJ to explore more UMPs, as summarised in Table 6.4:
 138
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Table 6.4: Quantitative Easing from the BOJ between 2008 and 2013  
 
Category 
 
 
Programme 
 
Aims and Functions 
 
JGBs 
 
 
Purchases/sales of 
JGBs with repo 
agreements 
 
Extended maturities and wider ranges of 
eligible collaterals 
 
Corporate 
Financing 
Support
139
 
October 2008 
 
 
 
December 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009 
 
 
 
 
Complementary 
Deposit Facility 
(CDF)
140
 
 
A new operation 
utilising corporate debt 
 
Special Funds-
Supplying Operation to 
Facilitate Corporate 
Financing (SFOFCF)
141
  
 
Outright purchases of 
corporate financing 
instruments
142
  
 
 
 
 
Remuneration was paid to excessive reserves, 
lowering real interest rates and securing 
financial stability directly 
 
 
 
 
Providing an unlimited amount of funds 
against the value of corporate debt at loan 
rates equivalent to the target for the 
uncollateralised overnight call rate
143
 
 
Including commercial papers (CPs) and 
short-term corporate bonds against a wider 
range of eligible collaterals
144
 
 
Liquidity Aid to 
Banks 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Purchase of bank-held 
corporate shares
145
  
 
Subordinated loans 
programme
146
 
 
A quantitative easing 
facility of ¥ 10 trillion 
three-month loans
147
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supporting banks subject to international 
capital standards 
 
Influencing directly the volume of loans and 
also lowering interest rates on term 
instruments 
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2010 
 
Loan support 
programme
148
 
 
Fund-Provisioning 
Measures to Support 
Strengthening the 
Foundations for 
Economic Growth 
(FMSSFEG)
149
 
 
Encouraging lending from private financial 
institutions  
 
Supplying long-term funds at a low interest 
rate against certain collateral 
 
Comprehensive 
Quantitative 
Easing (CQE) 
October 2010 
 
 
 
New Asset Purchase 
Programme
150
  
 
 
 
BOJ purchased CPs, corporate bonds, ETFs, 
J-REITs, and longer-maturity JGBs 
 
Great East 
Japan 
Earthquake 
March 2011 
 
Quasi-fiscal support
151
 
 
BOJ injected ¥ 15 trillion into the interbank 
market; Temporary financial support to 
affected areas for public welfare; 
CQE was extended 
 
BOJ New 
Framework 
2013 
 
 
Numerical price 
stability target  
 
Quantitative and 
Qualitative Easing 
(QQE)
152
 
 
 
Linking monetary policy directly with 
economic recovery 
 
BOJ shifted to the money base control as the 
target of monetary framework; 
Regular assets purchases 
 
 
 
According to the information presented by Table 6.5, the BOJ focused upon 
facilitating corporate financing, while supporting the banking sector and export-led 
growth.
153
 It also conducted quasi-fiscal support after Great East Japan earthquake: 
for example, it provided funds to meet the demand from the market sector and ensure 
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financial stability, and amended its provisions to conduct more asset purchases over 
extended periods.
154
 As established empirically, asset purchases under the CQE were 
aimed at stabilizing financial markets while allowing for further monetary easing, 
but their impact on inflation and outputs was limited.
155
 Moreover, by taking over 
credit risks from the private sector as emergency steps, the BOJ directly affected 
resource distribution.
156
 What is more, it changed its own balance sheet to favour 
financial markets. The lasting JGBs purchases changed the composition of its 
balance sheet. Its size to nominal GDP sharply expanded from 2001 to 2006, and 
maintaining almost constant between 2007 and 2009;
157
 however, it expanded further 
after introducing the CQE in October 2010.
158
 According to its commitment under 
the QQE, the size and composition of its balance sheet would induce further burden 
and risk. 
 
(3) BOJ’s New Framework 
 
As early as 2006, the BOJ announced to introduce a new framework for monetary 
policy conduct. It considered examining the inflation rate at 0%-2% over one-to-two 
years, achieving therefore sustainable economic growth under price stability.
159
 Due 
to the GFC, this experiment was formalised. Given that it has continued to be a 
critical challenge for Japan to overcome deflation and regain sustainable growth, in 
February 2012 the BOJ judged that inflation should be in a positive range of 2% or 
lower in the medium to long term, and also set the price stability goal at 1% for the 
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time being.
160
 However, it failed to meet this target, even after a large scale of asset 
purchases.  
 
In December 2012, with change-over of political leaders, Japan’s new government 
announced its ambitious policy framework to overcome lasting deflation and achieve 
sustainable economic growth. It has been named the “Abenomics approach” having 
three arrows: “a 10 trillion yen fiscal stimulus, inflation targeting and structural 
reform”.161 The immediate task was to end lasting deflation, requiring the BOJ to 
introduce and fulfil its numerical inflation rate at 2%; the second was to achieve 
stable long-run GDP growth over the coming decade of 2% in real terms, and 3% in 
current prices; the third was fiscal consolidation.
162
 After taking office, Mr Abe 
continuously threatened to revise the central bank law if the BOJ did not support his 
strategies by more aggressive monetary easing. It was thus challenged to revise its 
mandate, as well as adding steps to provide monetary accommodation decisively.
163
 
 
At the MPM in January 2013, the BOJ announced: 
‘… The newly-introduced “price stability target” is the inflation rate that the Bank 
judges to be consistent with price stability on a sustainable basis ... toward 
strengthening competitiveness and growth potential of Japan’s economy make 
progress. … the Bank sets the “price stability target” at 2 percent in terms of the 
year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI) – a main price 
index …’164 
  
Accordingly, a price stability target was formally introduced by the BOJ, and 
“switching from a ‘goal’ to a ‘target’ reflects an increasing awareness regarding the 
importance of flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy in Japan”. Removing the 
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limits, the BOJ began to purchase certain assets regularly,
165
 and clarified its 
commitment to strengthen cooperation with Government: 
“… The Bank of Japan conducts monetary policy based on the principle that the 
policy shall be aimed at achieving price stability, thereby contributing to the sound 
development of the national economy, and is responsible for maintaining financial 
system stability … 
The Government will, in order to revitalize Japan’s economy, not only flexibly 
manage macroeconomic policy but also formulate measures for strengthening 
competitiveness and growth potential of Japan’s economy, and promote them 
strongly under the leadership of the Headquarters for Japan’s Economic 
Revitalization...” 166  
 
In February 2013, Haruhiko Kuroda was nominated Governor, and then the BOJ 
began more monetary easing.
167
 A comprehensive entailing programme was set up to 
pursue economic recovery, including monetary, fiscal and structural policies.
168
 At 
the MPM in April 2013, the BOJ adopted the money base control as the target of the 
monetary framework and announced to formalise the “Quantitative and Qualitative 
Easing” policy (QQE):  
“In order to (achieve the price stability target) … it [the BOJ] will enter a new phase 
of monetary easing both in terms of quantity and quality … the main operating 
target for money market operations is changed from the uncollateralized overnight 
call rate to the monetary base ... It will double the monetary base and the amounts 
outstanding of JGBs as well as ETFs in two years, and more than double the average 
remaining maturity of JGB purchases … will continue with the quantitative and 
qualitative monetary easing … as long as it is necessary for maintaining that target 
in a stable manner … The quantitative and qualitative monetary easing…will 
underpin the Bank’s commitment, and is expected not only to work through such 
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transmission channels like longer-term interest rates and asset prices but also to 
drastically change the expectations of markets and economic entities …”169 
 
In principle, the QQE would help achieve recovery though both a quantitative 
increase and qualitative changes in the BOJ’s balance sheet. Quantitatively, the BOJ 
increased the monetary base at an annual pace of 60–70 trillion yen; from the 
qualitative perspective, it continued annual purchases of JGBs at ¥ 50 trillion, ETFs 
at ¥ 1 trillion per year, J-REITs at ¥ 30 billion per year; and its purchases of CPs and 
corporate bonds were set to reach 2.2 trillion yen and 3.2 trillion yen respectively by 
the end of 2013.  
 
The Abenomics approach has attracted considerable attention and discussion.
170
 In 
June 2013, the Japan Revitalisation Strategy highlighted Government’s plans to 
achieve economic recovery, while the BOJ was given added requirement to spur 
growth.
171
 To achieve such goals, it has operated a numerical inflation targeting, 
further asset purchases and a new target for monetary operation. The problematic 
longer-term implications cannot be ignored. At the above pace, its money base 
would double to ¥ 270 trillion by the end of 2014, and the increased holding (more 
than double in two years) of longer-term JGBs (up to about seven years) would 
change the size and composition of its balance sheet with extended maturities.
172
 In 
addition, these measures are expected to bring positive results by affecting the 
public’s inflation expectations; this will be achieved, step-by-step, mainly through 
changes in relation to longer-term interest rates and asset prices.
173
 For years, the 
zero bound on interest rates have changed the main transmission channels of 
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monetary policy, bringing thus renewed uncertainty.
174
 In addition, the BOJ is 
required to enhance and improve its dialogues with financial markets participants, 
consolidating its oversight at the firm level.
175
 
 
Until now, it is argued that all these measures have successfully enhanced financial 
soundness of institutions, inflation expectations, economic activity and prices.
176
 But 
it is still not clear whether, with improvements in banking and corporate sectors, 
easing measures will become more effective.
177
 Overall, it would be too early to 
draw decisive conclusions: sector-based reforms bear their respective risks,
178
 and 
the function of Abe’s “three arrows” depends upon the design and implementing of 
all the relevant plans; historically, there is little experience to draw in on how to 
escape from a sustainable deflation.
179
 Recently, to ensure its commitment, the 
Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, monitoring macroeconomic policies, has 
overseen monetary policy, further limiting the BOJ’s independence as a monetary 
authority.
180
 
 
(4) Fiscal Stimulus 
 
Japan’s economic conditions worsened following the failure of Lehman Brothers, 
triggering intense government intervention. “Emergency guarantee” was introduced 
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to help borrowers by easing the criteria for loans guarantee programmes.
181
 In 2009, 
Japan released a fiscal stimulus package worth ¥ 130 billion.
182
 As output further 
deteriorated, a new stimulus package was announced to prevent a double-dip 
recession.
183
 In 2012, Japanese Cabinet approved a further economic stimulus 
package of ¥ 423 billion,
184
 and later, MP Abe began to bolster economy by 
cushioning the impact of an increase in the national sales tax.
185
 These stimulus 
measures were invested into the public arena with direct support to households, and 
public financial institutions were urged to increase their loans to aid private 
corporations.
186
 It is argued that Japan’s fiscal stimulus packages, including changed 
emphases and weights, were particularly affected by repeated party leadership 
changes.
187
 After years, the budget deficit has become a major concern after its 
public debt renewed the records: until the second half of 2010, Japan’s public debt 
took up approximately 200% of GDP.
188
 
 
(5) Financial Regulation and Supervision 
 
Before the GFC, Japan’s financial regulatory and supervisory regime was reformed 
toward an optimal combination of rule-based and principles-based oversight 
                                                          
181
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approaches with improved transparency.
189
 During the GFC, the limited banking 
crisis brought moderate changes rather than massive legal reforms. 
The BOJ identified liquidity risk as the major challenge facing financial institutions, 
and accordingly, suggested four areas to improve for “appropriateness in liquidity 
risk management”. 190  It clarified that proper conduct of liquidity management 
constituted a requirement for financial institutions to accept counterparties for fund 
provisioning such as OMOs and the CLF.
191
 Moreover, in order to exercise macro-
prudential regulation, the BOJ highlighted its initiatives in analysing and assessing 
systemic risks rooted in the entire financial system from both cross-sectional and 
time-series dimensions.
192
 Additionally, top-down bank stress tests were launched by 
the BOJ with details covered by its Financial System Report, whilst the FSA carried 
out bottom-up tests with common assumptions for major banks and insurers.
193
 
Meanwhile, it insisted that its direct access to information about individual financial 
institutions through on-site examinations and off-site monitoring contribute to 
effective macro-prudential regulation.
194
 Since 2008, such monitoring has been 
based upon risk, which was further emphasized in its policy for fiscal 2013.
195
 
Oriented at risk management, the BOJ strengthened its regulation at the firm level. 
 
The FSA was not severally challenged by assisting troubled financial institutions 
during the GFC, but became more concerned about their capital adequacy, which 
was argued to have been learnt from its previous experience between 2001 and 
2006.
196
 When the stock market declined, the FSA announced to loosen capital 
adequacy ratio regulation temporarily, whereby banks could keep their valuation 
                                                          
189
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losses of “other available-for-sale securities” as capital. 197  It then revised the 
definition of NPLs in November 2008: banks were allowed not to classify condition-
changed loans as NPLs under wider exceptions, therefore reducing bad loans but 
increasing capital adequacy ratios. The FSA also introduced emergency facilities to 
encourage loans from financial institutions, including further aid to SMEs.
198
 In 2008, 
the Financial Function Strengthening Act was amended,
199
 allowing financial 
institutions to apply for liquidity supports with extended deadlines under easing 
criteria.
200
 Overall, the FSA’s regulatory responses to the GFC focused upon 
ensuring capital adequacy of financial institutions, and hence, loans could be 
guaranteed under additional supports.
201
  
 
(6) Cross-Border Cooperation: 
 
Japan’s vulnerability to external shocks triggered the BOJ to accelerate some 
proactive currency transactions with other central banks and international 
organisations from late 2007,
202
 addressing the problems derived from international 
short-term funding markets.
203
 Late 2011 saw further coordinated central bank 
actions as the crisis intensified, especially in the Europe.
204
 In particular, large-scale 
swap lines were established with the US Fed,
205
 and the BOJ actively participated in 
strengthening the CMI mechanism in Asia.
206
 Also, Japan promoted broader legal 
and governance reforms,
207
 as well as further discussion and exchange of views.
208
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The Basel III was introduced with final rule published on March 30, 2012 and 
implementation began from March 2013.
209
 
 
 
6.4 How the GFC Challenged the BOJ 
 
Japan had experienced massive economic and political dynamics before the GFC, 
including a bubble-burst cycle. As a central bank in crisis, the BOJ was first 
challenged by NPLs and bank failures, and then by the GFC, especially deflation and 
economic recession; the overall experiences can be displayed in Figure 6.2: 
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2008. 
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As illustrated in Figure 6.2, the big-bang reform brought a new BOJ and a new 
financial regulation regime. To summarise the relevant changes, the BOJ hardly 
raised central bank independence, while the LOLR facilities were limited when 
dealing with NPLs and bank failures. What is more, the BOJ pioneered untraditional 
monetary policy instruments to support the market more directly. The FSA, the 
successor of the MOF, focused upon regulation for capital adequacy at the firm level. 
When it came to the GFC, without sizeable legal reforms, Government reinforced its 
support to financial markets, and also directed the BOJ further explicitly. The BOJ 
per se had renewed its policy instruments to offer liquidity, whilst promoting better 
risk management. At these two periods, crisis management solutions selected by the 
BOJ can be compared in Table 6.5 below:  
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Table 6.5: Monetary Policy Responses from the BOJ: 2001-2006 vs. GFC 
 
 
 
2001–2006 
 
GFC 
 
Pre-
conditions 
 
Lasting deflation and economic 
stagnancy after a bubble-burst 
cycle 
 
Short-lived economic recovery with 
recapitalised banking sector; 
Uncollateralised overnight call rate was 
maintained at 0.5% 
 
Interest Rate 
Reductions 
 
ZIRP was introduced in 2001 
and extended from 2002 with 
clarified objectives, 
commitment and timescale 
 
Virtually zero interest rate policy would 
be kept at 0–0.1% from October 2010; 
BOJ explicitly linked its ZIRP with 
inflation and price stability 
 
Asset 
Purchases 
 
 
CLF; 
Extended maturities of funds-
supplying operations; 
Credit easing by purchasing 
long-term JGBs, ABCPs and 
ABSs; 
Outright purchases of stocks 
from banks’ equity portfolios 
 
BOJ purchased CPs, corporate bonds, 
ETFs, J-REITs, and longer-maturity 
JGBs against a wider range of 
collaterals; 
Various facilities to directly support 
banks and corporate financing, such as 
CDF, SFOFCF, and loan support 
programme; 
Formalised QQE in April 2013 
 
Regulation 
and 
Supervision 
 
Dealing with NPLs and 
bankruptcy through on-site 
examination, off-site 
surveillance and limited LOLR 
facilities 
 
Micro-prudential regulation: monitoring 
liquidity risk at the firm level;  
Macro-prudential regulation: managing 
financial imbalance  
 
Framework of 
Monetary 
Policy 
Conduct 
 
Uncollateralised call rate 
 
BOJ introduced numerical inflation 
targeting and shifted to the money base 
as the target of monetary framework 
 
Cross-border 
Cooperation 
 
N/A 
 
Swap lines with selected major central 
banks; 
Acceptance of selected government 
bonds as collaterals 
 
 
According to Table 6.5, Japan’s government did not launch major legal reforms 
during the GFC; this is partly attributed to the comparatively stability of Japanese 
banks after continuous recapitalisation. But Japan still suffered huge losses, requiring 
the BOJ to pursue more unconventional measures. At these two points, the 
compositions of crisis management solutions selected by the BOJ are similar: these 
included interest rate reductions, clarified commitment and asset purchase 
programmes, but monetary easing was more aggressive during the GFC. From the 
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timing perspective, the BOJ was slow to deal with the bubble economy and its 
aftermath, but it acted proactively during the GFC, especially in cross-border 
cooperation.  
 
As argued, during a financial crisis, a central bank sacrificed part of its independence, 
while increasing its direct controls over financial markets; this is very evident in 
terms of the BOJ. As bankers’ bank, it added emergent loans based upon its contracts 
with banks to ensure liquidity, while intensifying on-site examination and off-site 
monitoring to assist in improving liquidity risk management at the firm level. More 
importantly, the independence of the BOJ, constrained rigorously under the legal 
framework, was further diminished. The continuous outright purchase of long-term 
JGBs required it to maintain government bond prices.
 
With Abenomics, Government 
used the BOJ to serve its own strategy more directly. Under the newly-established 
mandate, the BOJ has conducted the following three changes: (i) it has explicitly 
committed to a numerical price stability target, which is determined by 
Government’s strategy for GDP growth; (ii) reset the monetary base as the operating 
target of monetary policy conduct, linking directly with Government’s overall policy; 
and (iii) has purchased various assets on an unprecedented basis. Due to the GFC, 
overall, the BOJ has gradually re-positioned itself as Government’s engine leading 
the fight against deflation.  
 
Lately, the BOJ has closely supported Government via overall monetary easing, 
while strengthening its management over financial activities and institutions through 
asset purchases and intense micro-prudential regulation. The challenge caused by the 
GFC to the BOJ can therefore be summarised: the BOJ, via supporting lending and 
investment from the private sector toward further economic growth, has continued to 
serve Government’s goal for sustainable recovery; and this has enhanced cooperation 
under the triangular relationship of Government, BOJ, and financial markets 
accordingly. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the BOJ has continued to be a government-
guided central bank, while the GFC has further intensified Government’s direct 
control. The historical development of the BOJ evidenced significant political 
domination, especially the strong MOF continuously affecting monetary policy and 
financial regulation. The BOJ reform brought limited improvement to central bank 
independence and confirmed its limited but comparatively direct contacts with 
financial institutions. The new BOJ has been examined in the context of financial 
crises. During the last 15 years, providing that Government has explored different 
approaches to regain economic growth, the BOJ has introduced and renewed UMPs 
to expand monetary easing, while the banking sector has come under more intensive 
regulation regarding capital adequacy. The GFC has brought more government 
intervention into the BOJ and more direct central bank regulation over financial 
markets. The BOJ’s proposition as a government-guided central bank has thus been 
changed by the GFC by bringing it closer to serving Government’s strategy for 
recovery. This chapter has provided support for the proposition in the thesis that the 
BOJ has strengthened its functions as a government-guided monetary authority amid 
the GFC. 
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Chapter Seven 
From Centrally Planned Economy to Market-Oriented Principles: 
The People’s Bank of China under Change 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The People’s Bank of China (PBC), established on January 1, 1948, is the youngest 
of the four central banks selected here. The key objective of this thesis is to make a 
critical examination of the PBC, and this chapter will review its two-tier relationship 
under change amid China’s market-oriented reform.  
 
The proposition is that the PBC has still been a government-owned central bank 
which, together with specialised regulators, continued to administer China’s 
underdeveloped financial markets. To demonstrate this, this chapter will proceed as 
follows. It will initially outline China’s financial sector before reform with the PBC 
as the mono-bank. It is followed by the overview of the PBC’s reform, but few 
statutory changes occurred. China’s financial regulation and supervision system is 
argued to have borne structural weaknesses from the outset. By comparing relevant 
laws and rules, this chapter will then argue that China’s Party-led economic reform 
embraces selected market principles, which has ensured continued political 
domination, enabling Government to continue direct controls over the PBC and the 
wider economy as well. 
 
 
7.2 The PBC amid Revolution 
 
After founding, China had pursued different approaches towards overall 
development. At this stage, the PBC operated as the mono bank with few changes.  
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7.2.1 The PBC under Soviet Model 
 
China first transplanted a largely Soviet model in a wholesale manner. Such a model 
encouraged rapid industrialisation through a highly and comprehensively centralised 
authority: public ownership was deemed a prerequisite for the true socialist economy, 
and mandatory planning excluded acknowledged market principles.
1
 Ultimate 
decision-making power was politically centralised to the central government, 
representing the Party,
2
 and political agencies directly controlled enterprises.
3
 In the 
financial sector, the central bank was the only bank with monitoring responsibilities, 
and also controlled the central cash, credit and settlement transactions.
4
 Government 
formally employed the central plan to allocate resources to its key sectors based on 
the predetermined development plans.
5
 The budget plan was prioritised to supply the 
normal working capital to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and bank credits were 
mainly used to meet the “temporary” needs.6 On the whole, the financial sector was 
limited to achieve planned targets as the cashier and accountant of the national 
economy.  
 
China’s socialist transformation programme focused upon the establishment of a 
state-owned economic system.
7
 Until 1955, the PBC had transformed all private 
deposit-takers into its own saving agents, with the Bank of China (BOC) being its 
                                                          
1
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 Shulin Lin, ‘The Soviet Socialist Model and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics/Shehui Zhuyi 
de Sulian Moshi yu Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi’ 
<http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49152/9168586.html> accessed on April 21, 2009 [in 
Chinese]. 
3
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Zhuyi Daolu de Tansuo’ in China’s Way and the China Model: 1949–2009/ Zhongguo Daolu yu 
Zhongguo Moshi (Beijing: Social Science Academic Press 2009) ch 2 [in Chinese]. 
4
 Yingyuan Yang, ‘Freeing the Banking Credit from the Soviet Model/Woguo Yinhang Xinyong 
Yaocong Sulian Moshi zhong Jiefang Chulai’ 5 Journal of Finance 1980: 21-24 [in Chinese]. 
5
 Robert F. Miller, ‘Theoretical and Ideological Issues of Reform in the Socialist System: Some 
Yugoslav and Soviet Examples’ (1989) Soviet Studies 41(3): 430-448. 
6
 Zhen Zhu, ‘China’s Fiscal System of State and SOEs for the Last 60 Years: Historical Development 
and Choice in Practice/Xinzhongguo 60 Nian Guojia yu Guoyou Qiye Caizheng Fenpei Moshi: Lishi 
Yanjin yu Xianshi Xuanze’ <www.crifs.org.cn/crifs/html/default/caizhengshihua/_history/3803.html> 
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foreign exchange department and the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) subjected.
8
 
The People’s Construction Bank of China (PCBC) was transformed into a fiscal 
agent under the Minister of Finance (MOF).
9
 The PBC confiscated capitalist-
invested and bureaucrat-monopolised capital to bring both capital and cash 
circulation under the state’s control.10 Fiscal and monetary management then only 
included the state budget, and the cash and credit plans.
11
The MOF consolidated the 
annual revenue and expenditure plan, first designed to finance government 
operations and then invest, especially in the heavy industry.
12
 Money was simply 
categorised into currency and transfer money. Monetary management aimed to 
control cash in circulation and bank credits to support state sectors. Under the credit 
plan, bank branches made loans according to specified credit targets set up by the 
higher level units, which subsequently retained any resulting surplus. The cash plan, 
determined by both the credit plan and state budget, was employed to maintain 
monetary balance between the demand and the supply of consumer goods stipulated 
in the physical plan.
13
 At that stage, the PBC controlled currency issue, money 
supply and interest rates as a central bank, whilst taking deposits and offering short-
term loans as working capital and capital replacement. The entire financial sector can 
be displayed in Figure 7.1: 
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Figure 7.1: China’s 1950s Financial Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accordingly, a highly centralised planning economy led the PBC towards the mono 
bank, and capital allocation relied upon the budget, cash and credit plans.  
 
 
7.2.2. The PBC under Maoist Ideology 
 
Once exposed, the shortcomings of the Soviet Model produced evident structural 
imbalance:
14
 savings were encouraged to support long-term investment in the heavy 
industry, and domestic consumption brought limited economic improvements.
15
 In 
this context, a statement “On the Top 10 Major Relations” released in 1956 indicated 
that the China rethought its socialist revolution.
16
 Few changes occurred with the 
PBC, but Maoist ideology, seeking to reshape China through organization and 
modernization reforms, brought wider effects.
17
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To begin with, the absolute leadership of the Party was strengthened as the vanguard 
of proletarian society, limiting the negative influence from revelatory Populism.
18
 
With overly extensive politicisation, previous laws and rules were widely replaced 
by administrative controls sanctioned through the Party leaders.
19
 Meanwhile, 
“fragmented authorizationism” changed China’s bureaucratic system: 20  under the 
mass-directed organisational model, self-reliant local governments caused 
fragmented communities and compartmentalised resources, as well as super 
localities’ control over economy; the central plan was weakened, but local initiative 
was still limited.
21
 
 
Both politicisation and decentralisation affected the financial sector. Economic 
activities were controlled via specific pre-set targets, personnel appointments and 
vertical management based upon political hierarchy.
22
 Monetary policies were 
administratively controlled by the Central Party Committee and State Council, whilst 
the central credit plan was decentralised with banks required primarily to support 
local development.
23
 As a result, credit expanded to support repeated “adventurist” 
advances, making economic growth only attributed to massive investment.
24
 In terms 
of the PBC, its role was further weakened by streamlining its organisational structure 
and halved its staff. In 1962, to save the nation’s economy, the Central Party 
Committee and State Council released the “Six Provisions for Banks”, centralizing 
banking business and money issuance.
25
 It was followed by the “Note of Changing 
the Position of the PBC in the State Structure”. The PBC was thus subject to the 
State Council, being responsible for cash management and credit supervision.
26
 With 
the Cultural Revolution, China’s economic conditions further destabilized.27  The 
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PBC was targeted for anti-bureaucratism reform and repositioned as the MOF’s 
cashier and accountant, whilst branches were controlled by local governments.
 28
 
 
Maoist ideology sought the absolute Party leadership, while subjecting the economy 
to extensive politicisation.
29
 Under the destroyed central plan, the mono-bank system 
had been budget-based, and the PBC ended up being subject to the MOF with 
dysfunctional monetary policies. 
 
 
7.3 The PBC during Economic Reform 
 
Until the late 1970s, China was an isolated economy with low inflation, small budget 
deficits and minor external imbalance, being dominated by political fragmentation, 
administrative orders, and centrally controlled economic activities.
30
 This part will 
highlight some key features of China’s reform since 1978 before examining the PBC 
in detail.
31
  
 
 
7.3.1 Overview 
 
It is argued that legal development can underpin a well-functioning financial sector, 
which in turn supports better economic performance.
32
 However, the interaction of 
law, finance and economic development can be different in China: its GDP growth, 
attributed mainly to exports and foreign investment, was initially achieved without 
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305-332. 
29
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(1974) The Political Quarterly 45(1): 26-48. 
30
 Gregory C. Chow, ‘China’s Economy: Reform and Perspectives’ 
<www.princeton.edu/~gchow/China.html> accessed on April 15, 1999. 
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 For a timeline of China’s reform, see, Nolan Peter, Transforming China: Globalisation, Transition 
and Development (Anthem Press 2004). For data and statistics, refer to, Gautam Jaggi, Mary Rundle, 
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Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 96–5, 1996  
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sophisticated financial markets or effective legal systems.
33
 This paradox is of 
particular significance to understanding Chinese reformism.
34
 It is claimed to be a 
comprehensive transformation, including both financial liberalization and legal 
reform.
35
 Table 7.1 displays some of its main characteristics: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33
 Wing Thye Woo, ‘The Real Reasons for China’s Growth’ 41 The China Journal 1999: 115-137. 
34
 Martin King Whyte, ‘Paradoxes of China’s Economic Boom’ 35 Annual Review of Sociology 2009: 
371–392.  
35
 Harry Harding, China’s Second Revolution: Reform after Mao (Brookings 1987). 
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Table 7.1: Overview of China’s Reform 
Target & Goal 
To build up “a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics”, including “economy 
system reform” and “opening up to the world”36 
Financial Liberalization 
Targets 
 
 
 
Goal 
 
Reform 
Measures 
Centralized credit plan and pre-specified margins for interest rates setting should 
be removed, allowing the pricing mechanism to operate freely on the market 
base; and direct controls over interest and exchange rates, financial 
intermediation, and credit allocation should be eliminated
37
 
An independent central bank, flexible interest rates, and efficient revenue 
systems
38
 
Financial sector should function as: i) a medium of exchange and a store of 
value, or simply a payment mechanism; ii) the medium to mobilise savings for 
productive investment; iii) smoothing conflicts caused by maturities mismatch; 
and iv) transforming and diversifying evident risks
39
 
Legal Reform 
Targets 
 
 
 
Goal 
 
Reform 
Measures 
Under the Communist regime, the “command-and-control” model placed down 
varying biases, including towards the public ownership and the state sector; this 
is what the legal reform should most target 
 
Socialist legal system 
 
Enacting market-friendly laws, establishing institutions to implement and 
enforce substantive rules,
40
 encouraging the demand from market participants
41
 
 
 
As illustrated in Table 7.1, selected market principles would replace centralized 
planning, resolving the problems inherited from the Soviet Model and Maoism. As 
                                                          
36
 <http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49154/49155/8404298.html> accessed on November 15, 2008. 
37
 Guijun Lin and Ronald M. Schramm, ‘China’s Foreign Exchange Policies Since 1979: A Review of 
Developments and an Assessment’ (2003) China Economic Review 14(3): 246-280. 
38
 Kang Chen, Gary H. Jefferson and Inderjit Singh, ‘Lessons from China’s Economic Reform’ (1992) 
Journal of Comparative Economics 16(2): 201-225. 
39
 Supra 13, 17–19. 
40
 Gerald W. Scully, ‘The Institutional Framework and Economic Development’ (1988) Journal of 
Political Economy 96(3): 652-662. 
41
 Cheryl W. Gray, ‘Reforming Legal Systems in Developing and Transition Countries’ (September 
1997) 13-16 <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1997/09/pdf/gray.pdf>.  
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stipulated, “old” institutions should be reformed, 42  and enterprises should be 
modernized by diversifying ownerships and reforming property rights.
43
  
 
(1) Party Control and State Monopoly 
 
By and large, Government has been relocated as the maker of the market, leading the 
market-oriented reform, and thus, China’s reform was conducted in a top-down 
manner, 44  affecting the choice of a gradualist strategy. 45  Decision-making was 
decentralized, encouraging local governments to remove regulatory obstacles, and 
establish more innovative institutions for local economic growth; this has extended 
political coverage, and also increased differences and splits from the central 
government.46 At the initial stage, it is argued that the presence of a strong central 
government would favour the reform by making gradualism acceptable and 
applicable without excessive costs of instabilities.
47
  
 
Meanwhile, the monopoly of the state was not simply removed, but the state-owned, 
planned economy has been utilized as the base for launching a new non-state, 
market-based sector.
48
 Inter alia, competition, rather than privatization, was 
advocated,
 49
 the non-state sector was encouraged to compete with the SOEs,50 and 
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 Yingyi Qian, ‘The Institutional Foundations of China’s Market Transition’ at Annual Bank 
Conference on Development Economics, World Bank, No 47582, 1999 
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43
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44
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45
 For China’s debates about gradualism or big-bang, see, Yingwang Cao, ‘Chen Yun and Deng 
Xiaoping in the Initial Stage of Reform and Opening Up’ (2010) Contemporary China History 
Studies 17(3): 16-21 [in Chinese].  
46
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Group, The Newsletter about Reforming Economies, 2001 
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47
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(1995) Journal of Economic Issues 29(3): 883-895. 
48
 David M. Kotz, ‘Lessons from Economic Transition in Russia and China’ in Ron Baiman, Heather 
Boushey and Dawn Saunders (eds.), Political Economy and Contemporary Capitalism: Radical 
Perspectives on Economic Theory (Armonk 2000). 
49
 Shaojia Guy Liu and Gala Garino, ‘Privatisation or Competition: A Lesson Learnt from the Chinese 
Enterprise Reform’ (2001) Economics of Planning 34(1-2): 37-51. 
50
 Jeffrey Sachs, Wing Thye Woo, Stanley Fischer and Gordon Hughes, ‘Structural Factors in the 
Economic Reforms of China, Eastern Europe, and the Former Soviet Union’ (1994) Economic Policy 
9(18): 101-145. For a general introduction about China’s underestimated private sector, See, Linda Y. 
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pilot programmes,
51
  as well as second-best arrangements,
52
 were widely used to 
balance planning and market principles, bringing about many dual-track systems.
53
  
 
(2) Internal and External Financial Liberalization 
 
Where financial liberalization is argued to have followed economic growth, finance 
is viewed as an endogenous factor responding to demand requirements in a more 
sophisticated system, and financial intermediation can have positive effects beyond 
government intervention.
54
 As far as China is concerned, however, its average GDP 
growth approached 3% annually, in a context where the mono-bank system came 
under rigorous political control, with Government controlling capital allocation.
55
 
Certain empirical studies thus observe unidirectional causality from economic 
growth to financial development: in China, economic growth encouraged financial 
sector development, accelerating financial liberalisation accordingly.
56
  
 
China’s financial liberalization was not launched until 1984, when sudden inflation 
brought retrenchment, exposing the distorted pricing system.
57
 In a transition 
economy, institutions, instruments and markets all need to be liberalized,
58
 but 
uneven development was applied as a strategy in China. Since the beginning, 
financial institutions have been prioritized before reforming instruments and market 
principles.
59
 From the external perspective, China’s export-oriented economic 
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51
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52
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<http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/39858/wp473.pdf?sequence=3>. 
53
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(1994) Economic Policy 9(19): 99-122. 
54
 Ross Levine, ‘Law, Finance and Economic Growth’ 8 Journal of Financial Intermediation 1999: 
8–35. 
55
 John McMillan and Barry Naughton, ‘How to Reform a Planned Economy: Lessons from China’ 
(1992) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 8(1): 130-143. 
56
 Qi Liang and Jian-Zhou Teng, ‘Financial Development and Economic Growth: Evidence from 
China’ (2006) China Economic Review 4(17): 395-411. 
57
 On Kit Tma, Financial Reform in China (Routledge 1995) 88–100. 
58
 John P. Bonin and Paul Wachtel, ‘Financial Sector Development in Transition Economies: Lessons 
from the First Decade’ (2003) Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments 12(1): 1-66. 
59
 Hassanali Mehran, Marc Quintyn, Tom Nordman and Bernard Laurens, Monetary and Exchange 
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development has increased international trade, financial assistance, and technical 
cooperation.
60
  
 
Even so, the effects of extensive and prolonged government intervention are still 
being experienced even now.
61
 With the securities market still being undermined, the 
indirect-financing system remained dominated by the state sector.
62
 The state has 
first controlled the banking industry through ownership, and used its monopoly to 
lend mostly to itself.
63
 Secondly, decentralisation has attracted incentives from local 
governments to meet pre-set targets for economic development by employing 
financial institutions within their jurisdictions, reinforcing their influence upon 
economic activities. Thirdly, SOEs are still manipulated as privileged with cheaper 
credit guaranteed by Government, increasing potential NPLs to the SOCBs.
64
 But, 
without improved capital allocation, flawed institutions – especially the SOEs – 
cannot accomplish the market-oriented reform.
65
 Reform of financial markets has 
thus been inextricably bound up with the official efforts to reform the SOEs with the 
state retaining ultimate control over them.
66
 What is more, financial repression 
continued with reform. By definition, it refers to a policy regime that creates a wedge 
between actual return rates to financial assets and nominal return rates to the 
investors.
67
 Under the central plan, extraordinarily low levels of interest rates 
boosted profits for the SOCBs and facilitated industrialization.
68
 Where Government 
                                                          
60
 Ramgopal Agarwada, ‘International Cooperation behind National Borders: Country Case Study of 
China’ UN Development Programme, New York, 2005 
<http://web.undp.org/thenewpublicfinance/casestudies/cs_background_note.pdf>. 
61
 Supra 55. 
62
 Linton Katherine Connor, ‘Access to Capital in China: Competitive Conditions for Foreign and 
Domestic Firms’ 1 Journal of International Commerce and Economics 2008: 27-50. 
63
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64
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66
 Charles W. Calomiris, China’s Financial Transition at a Crossroad (NY: Columbia University 
Press 2007). 
67
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68
 Ronald I. McKinnon, The Order of Economic Liberalisation: Financial Control in the Transition to 
a Market Economy (2
nd
 ed., JHU Press 1993) 11–30.  
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also benefited from increasing revenue by controlling commercial lending,
69
 there 
could be resistance to further financial deepening.
70
  
 
In sum, China’s financial sector has developed with strong government 
intervention,
71
 whilst being right intervened with the SOEs reform.  
 
(3) Law in Transition 
 
Generally, economic growth requires a legal order offering stable and predictable 
rights of property and contract. However, in China, the legal framework was weak, 
and even the legitimacy of private property was long questioned. Prior to the reform, 
the substance of political commitment was the key precondition for economic 
growth. It is thus argued that China functioned on the basis of what it has, rather than 
what it lacks.
72
 Even so, economic reform can stimulate the demand for legal reform, 
and generate resources necessary for the supply. From this standpoint, a sound and 
effective legal system was not an incentive for launching market development in 
China, but instead a pre-condition for advancing improvements.
73
 Therefore, a 
socialist legal system was believed to contribute to a nation’s wealth and economic 
growth, and integral to China’s comprehensive transformation.74 
 
As early as 1954, the Party wrote into Constitution that the state power should rest 
exclusively in the hands of a supreme legislature.
75
 After decades’ reform, however, 
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the legal system is still fraught.
76
 The biggest challenge lies in the critical tensions 
between “rule by man” and “rule by law”. China’s reform regime attempts to achieve 
political legitimacy through legal reform,
77
 and the dignity of the Party is thereby 
ensured by reinforcing the relationship between codification and politics.
78
 The 
Constitution explicitly confirms the supreme authority of the Party above all the 
institutions of the state and society, though it requires all organisations, including the 
Party, to abide by the law.
79
 The Party is thus wholly exempted from legal 
constraints,
80
 weakening the benefits brought by legislation, including transparency, 
predictability, and accountability,
81
 whilst unequal treatment between Party members 
and the others undermines public trust.
82
 Consequently, the Party has asserted that 
law is an instrument to execute its own policies.
83
 In addition, legal reform is 
conducted through pre-existing political organs, prioritising the Party’s superior 
position of administrative bureaucracies.
84
 Legislative powers are divided between 
central and local government bodies, reinforcing the overly extensive authority of 
administrative power.
85
 Fundamentally, it is argued that China’s legal reform has 
been constrained by the systemic and ideological limitations of the Party rule;
86
 and 
its major shortcoming is thus constitutional, lying in the “ambiguous relationship 
between the constitutional supremacy of the Communist Party and the authority of 
law”.87  
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The close relationship between legislation and the vocabulary of the Party doctrines 
and policies helps explain the contextual nature of Chinese legislative language.
88
 
Legislation is drafted in approved terms as strictly required by the Party, making it 
difficult to fully understand the legal system without reference to relevant political 
documents, especially unpublished documents from administrative bureaucracies.
89
 
China has been criticised for limited transparency, but the Party continues a strict 
censorship system to prohibit certain issues from being publicly discussed,
90
 making 
context important to recognise what rules and regulations really mean.
91
 
 
China’s financial sector has been particularly vulnerable, for its effectiveness 
depends upon an effective legal system with strong protections for investors, lenders 
and borrowers.
92
 For example, the capital markets have arguably developed without 
a sound legal base, leaving behind problems; the problems trigger the necessity of 
legal reform for further growth.
93
 Therefore, the financial sector has displayed a 
“crash-then-law” character: market developments often precede, rather than follow, 
legal reforms, especially in protecting shareholders’ rights.94 
 
 
7.3.2 The PBC Reform in the 1980s 
 
Before reform, the PBC was the only bank controlled by the MOF with limited 
functions under centralized planning. Required by market economy, it should assume 
independence to make policy decisions, whilst shifting toward indirect conduct of 
monetary policy and regulating the financial markets prudentially. Accordingly, the 
reform started with freeing it from the MOF, and separating central banking 
functions from commercial banking business.  
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The domestic financial market continuously developed, making it possible to change 
the scope of the PBC. In 1979, it announced to recuperate domestic insurance 
businesses. In 1983, People’s Insurance Company of China (PICC) was transformed 
to a bureau-level economic entity under the State Council, with branches supervised 
vertically by head office in Beijing.
95
 The PBC still audited and supervised the PICC, 
but seceded insurance from banking. In terms of banks, the ABC was restored, the 
PCBC was granted independence and, particularly, in 1984, the newly-established 
Industry and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) replaced the PBC to take deposits 
from, and lend loans to, households and industries for commercial purposes. They 
operated strictly according to their specified business jurisdictions as indicated by 
their titles, forming a specialised state-owned banking system.
96
 Moreover, non-
banking financial institutions (NBFIs) and foreign banking institutions gained legal 
approval with pilot programmes in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. Gradually, 
the PBC separated insurance from banking in the operation area, and freed 
specialised banks to provide financial services; the PBC itself began to focus upon 
macroeconomic control by administering interest rates under the central credit 
plan.
97
 
 
The MOF and the PBC operated separately from 1978. In 1982, the PBC issued 
“Notice of the Information of the PBC’s Internal Structure at the Secretaries level”, 
clarifying its own political rank within the central government. “State Council 
Decision Requiring the PBC to Perform the Functions of the Central Bank” was 
released in 1983 (1983 Decision), confirming its legal status as central bank.
98
 This 
Decision promulgated it to be a state authority under the State Council, but did not 
explicitly specify its political hierarchy. Its management board was controlled by the 
State Council, with branches supervised by local governments. The PBC supervised 
specialised banks based upon administrative hierarchy, whilst relying upon the 
centralised credit plan to balance finance budget and lending channels.
99
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With more liberalization after 1984, the Economic Reform Office sought to reform 
the pricing, tax and fiscal system. The “Provisional Regulations of the PBC on 
Banking Management” was released in 1986 (Provisional Regulation 1986).100 The 
financial sector was positioned to support the real economy, generating profound 
effects to China’s growth model.101  Both the PBC and the banking sector were 
required to maintain domestic currency value, and promote social and economic 
efficiency. The State Council still controlled monetary policy making. The MOF was 
not allowed to overdraw from the PBC, which could only operate to meet the 
requirements under long-term economic strategies and priorities for funds allocation 
determined by the MOF.
102
 In terms of its relationship with markets, the PBC 
gradually removed credit quotas and pre-specified margins under the central plan, 
while still administering interest rates by stimulating maximum business loan rates 
and minimum deposit rates. As regulator and supervisor, without clear authority and 
sufficient instruments, the PBC and its branches engaged in managing day-to-day 
operations of specialised banks, policy banks and trust companies, rather than 
implementing its own monetary policies.
103
  
 
Most importantly, Provisional Regulation 1986 settled a dual subordination: the PBC 
was subordinate to the State Council in administrative affairs, whereas financial 
markets were subordinate to the PBC for business purposes.  
 
 
7.3.3 PBC Law 1995 
 
The above Provisional Regulation, formulated by the State Council, was replaced by 
a central bank law from the NPC in 1995, and erenow, further marketization paved 
the way. 
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First, the highly centralized credit control became less effective for dealing with 
China’s dynamic macroeconomic conditions. Increasing conflicts of interest between 
central and local governments rendered certain direct administrative guides 
ineffective for controlling inflation from 1988.
104
 Excessive real estate investment 
and speculation in the equity market raised prices, with signs of an economic bubble 
emerging in 1993.
105
 Since 1992, reduced tariff tax and recovery from the previous 
political tension saw FDIs exceed foreign loans.
106
 Inflation and capital inflows 
therefore distorted the financial sector.
107
 With regards to financial liberalization, the 
PBC approved more diverse ownership structures, including joint-stock state-owned 
commercial banks, shareholding banks backed-up by enterprises, and finance lease 
firms.
108
 Old specialised banks were transformed into SOCBs, offering more 
financial products and services.
109
 Later, they were commercialized and recapitalized 
repeatedly, increasing thus profitability and competitiveness.
110
 At the same time, the 
securities market gradually developed: government securities were issued in 1981, 
followed by other types of bonds and enterprise shares; with deepening SOE reform, 
secondary markets were established in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1988.
111
 To 
smooth conflicts arising from the newly-born capital markets, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was established in 1992, and the PBC thus stopped 
managing securities businesses.
112
 Moreover, policy banks were built up in 1994 to 
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take over duties of policy loans from the PBC, reducing its commitment to market 
liquidity and supporting the state sector.
113
 
 
Reform progresses in other areas also made contributions. Inter alia, the State 
Council released “the Decision on Financial Structure Reforms”, requiring the PBC 
to reform its mechanisms of monetary policy and macroeconomic supervision. It 
then abandoned the profit retention system and set up an independent budget 
management system.
114
 The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) 
changed the dual foreign exchange system into a systemic settlement, and RMB 
became convertible in the current account.
115
 As argued, continued economic reform 
required further legal changes. For example, increasing FDIs had made rules and 
laws governing company and corporate governance more market-oriented.
116
  
 
In response, “Law of the PRC on the PBC” was enacted in 1995 (PBC Law 1995). 
The PBC was defined as a state-owned government institution with capital invested 
and owned by the state; losses were totally compensated by the Treasury.
117
 It began 
to have clearer objectives as a state central bank: to design and implement monetary 
policies, improve macroeconomic management, and supervise financial markets. It 
was argued that many factors would influence the selected legal framework for a 
country’s monetary policy, and the basic logic here was to prevent financial risk and 
support economic development.
118
 The primary objective of monetary policy was 
clarified to maintain domestic currency value.
119
 However, neither inflation control 
nor monetary stability was defined, and currency value had a narrow meaning 
without reference to external stability with the SAFE responsible for foreign 
exchanges.  
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The responsibilities of the PBC were classified. As monetary authority, it made 
monetary policy decisions under the State Council. Direct controls were imposed on 
liquidity mainly through controlling the quantity of monetary supply, and the credit 
plan was still in place. As financial regulator, the PBC administered financial 
institutions and their businesses by market-entry and market-exit arrangements. Its 
direct oversight was further facilitated by having higher political standing than the 
SOCBs with chairmen at the vice-ministerial level. 
 
Under Article 7, the PBC was independent “in fulfilling its duties without 
disruptions from local governments, other administrative authorities or agencies”. 
Nevertheless, it did not possess either political or operational independence. 
Governor and deputy governors were nominated by the Premier of the State Council 
and then decided by the NPC or its Standing Committee, but law did not specify 
candidates’ qualifications, tenure, and dismissal. Being a state-owned government 
body, the PBC was one functional ministry of the State Council. As Government’s 
banker, it was still responsible for loans to policy banks, and the State Council still 
held the power to make it lend to selected NBFIs. In particular, the PBC relied upon 
interest rate policies to administer markets, and thus, the approval and reporting 
system strengthened the authority of the State Council in its daily operation. 
 
This Act filled in the corresponding gap in China’s legal system. It was argued that 
the PBC would become more effective under this formalised legislation.
120
 In 
principle, it was still under the strict control of both the NPC and State Council, 
while being closely attached to, rather than independent of, markets through direct 
intervention. All suggested that the PBC was a government-controlled central bank, 
which directly controlled China’s preliminarily liberalized financial markets.121 
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7.3.4 PBC Law 2003 
 
From the late 1990s, external factors, including the AFC in 1997 and China’s WTO 
accession in 2001, accelerated the domestic reform, especially in relation to financial 
liberalisation and globalisation. In this context, the PBC Law 1995 was amended in 
accordance with “the Decision to Amend the Law of the PRC on the PBC” in 2003 
(PBC Law 2003).  
 
7.3.4.1 The AFC Impact 
 
On July 2, 1997, Thai government abandoned the pegged fixed exchange rate policy, 
and the baht depreciated by 17.1% within one day. This quickly triggered adverse 
changes in stock markets and asset prices, before spreading to its neighbouring East 
Asian countries.
 122
 Disturbances in the financial sector seriously influenced the real 
economy, and caused widespread social insecurity, shifting “Asian Miracles” into 
“Asian Meltdown”.123 
 
In spite of a similarly weak domestic banking system, China did not incur the same 
losses as its neighbours. In early 1998, recession was limited to exports with some 
financial anxiety. Hainan Development Bank
124
 and Guangdong International Trust 
and Investment Corporation
125
 were closed by Government; the NPLs of the “Big 
Four” SOCBs accounted for around 20% of total advances until 1997 but then rose 
sharply; B shares lost nearly 80% of their value in 1998
126
 and capital inflows 
reduced as well.
127
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Certain favourable factors limited China’s losses. Since 1993, economic reforms had 
been advanced with profound changes in tax, fiscal tools, foreign reserves, and 
macroeconomic policies. Up to 1997, problems caused by overheating, including 
credit expansion, had been under control, and the current account surplus boosted 
international trade. 128   Various capital controls were still in place to protect the 
underdeveloped domestic financial market. 129  In particular, after abolishing the 
retention system, the over-appreciation of RMB was reduced by 50% of its official 
rate in 1994.130 Afterwards, partial convertibility in the current account hindered 
international speculators from any short position against RMB.
131
 Moreover, unlike 
free capital flows, Government deliberately favoured certain types of capital inflows 
(FDIs) through policy and legislation bias.
132
 As a result, China’s incomplete 
financial reform initially worked to defend against adverse external effects.
133
 
 
Achievements from previous reforms had informed responses to the AFC.134 When 
data suggested limited losses in 1997, Government introduced a temporary system to 
manage banks, securities companies and insurance companies respectively.
135
 The 
PBC pursued some pro-active policy instruments to cope with external shocks. From 
late 1997 to mid-1998, it reduced interest rates four times, and lowered reserve ratios 
and rediscount rates to encourage commercial lending. It added an extra 20% loan to 
financial institutions in 1998, while having a limited effect on encouraging 
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consumption, and deposit savings were still increasing.
136
 Meanwhile, the PBC 
issued many guidelines and suggestions to strengthen its direct management over 
some key financial sectors, causing certain centralization. When compared, fiscal 
stimulus was more important than monetary expansion. Funds, equivalent to 2.5% of 
GDP, raised by special state bonds, banking credits and local public finance, were 
invested in infrastructure construction, employment creation and prioritised 
industries.
137
 It was argued that fiscal intervention yielded faster results and bigger 
economic returns by better targeting affected areas directly.  
 
While the AFC provoked attention to the steps and sequencing of market 
liberalisation,
138
 China’s market-oriented reform continued. The credit plan was 
replaced with an annual guiding directory from Government, and more foreign 
invested banks were approved to participate in RMB businesses. The PBC required 
the SOCBs to reform their corporate governance, portfolio management and 
information disclosure.
139
 The PBC itself was restructured in 1998: nine regional 
branches replaced thirty-one provincial and municipal branches to promote regional 
economic development and banking efficiency, while reducing political intervention 
from local governments. After China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) was 
set up in 1998 to supervise the insurance sector, the PBC conducted banking 
oversight only.  
 
In essence, the AFC was not a prerequisite for China to proceed with economic 
reform, but contradictory requirements had compelled China, including the PBC, to 
balance between crisis management and further financial liberalisation. 
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7.3.4.2 China’s WTO Commitment 
 
As the largest developing country, China made a lengthy endeavour to become a 
WTO permanent member.
140
 Apart from GDP growth, it was still difficult to 
conclude whether or not its financial sector was ready for such further integration.
141
 
The profitability of financial institutions was difficult to assess, especially with the 
SOCBs burdened by unclear NPLs. Four asset management companies (AMCs) 
were established to handle such loans,
142
 but failed to prevent the new birth from the 
SOEs and China’s structural rebalancing. 143  The presence of foreign banks was 
limited: 191 institutions accounted for less than 3% of assets, 2% of loans, and 
almost 0.1% of deposits.
144
 Additionally, some “window dressing” measures were 
encouraged by Government to meet the WTO requirements. For example, some rules 
and regulations were adopted just before the accession.
145
 Even so, China’s WTO 
accession was generally viewed to act as a lever to force further reform, and also 
lock in marketization progress and make it irrevocable.
146
  
 
China was designated as a nonmarket economy under the WTO for the purposes of 
anti-dumping determinations,
147
 and agreed to detailed concessions.
148
 In the 
financial sector, relevant steps can be summarised in Table 7.2: 
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Table 7.2: China’s Financial Commitments under the WTO  
 
ITEMS 
 
 
COMMITMENTS 
 
Geographic 
Coverage 
 
Foreign Currency Business: foreign financial institutions are permitted 
to provide services in China without any geographic restrictions 
 
RMB Business: restrictions will be removed by increased numbers of 
cities within 5 years after accession 
 
Clients 
 
Foreign Currency Business: foreign financial institutions are permitted 
to provide services in China without restrictions 
 
RMB Business: within 2 years after accession, services to Chinese 
enterprises; within 5 years, services to Chinese clients 
 
Qualified foreign financial institutions can serve clients in any regions 
only if such business is allowed 
 
Licensing 
 
Foreign financial institutions are authorised to establish under prudential 
criteria 
 
Non-prudential measures will be phased out over 5 years 
 
For RMB business, foreign financial institutions should be in operation 
for 3 years in China with a two-consecutive-year profitable file prior to 
application 
 
NBFIs 
 
Motor vehicle financing, advisory, intermediation, financial leasing 
services 
 
 
According to Table 7.2, China should gradually relax controls over financial 
products and services, in line with market principles and further liberalisation.
149
 
Inter alia, fair competition was the principal requirement for financial liberalisation, 
achieved mainly by deregulation and the entry of more foreign financial 
institutions.
150
 It was argued that incoming foreign institutions would bring about 
more sophisticated services, products and skills. Consequently, the traditional 
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monopoly of the SOCBs would be weakened, promoting better capital allocations,
151
 
and facilitating the adjustment of the SOEs-SOCBs relationship.
152
  
 
Under the WTO rules, the PBC would promote financial liberalization, and improve 
its conduct of monetary policy and financial oversight. After 2001, it began to check 
up existing rules and promulgate new regulations.
153
 In particular, it introduced the 
Basel Accord by enacting “the Administrative Regulations of the PRC on the 
Foreign Invested Financial Institutions” (Regulations on FIFIs) in 2001 and “the 
Implementing Rules” in 2002.154 The PBC controlled the establishment of the FIFIs 
and their operations. Among others, WTO rules highlighted the significance of RMB 
convertibility,
155
 whilst requiring the PBC to shift toward prudential supervision with 
enhanced transparency and better information disclosure.
156
  
 
7.3.4.3 Legal Framework under the PBC Law 2003 
 
Statutory reforms occurred amid China’ changed internal and external financial 
conditions. The PBC Law 2003 clarified further its role as Government’s banker and 
bankers’ bank, incorporating the following main elements: 
 
Objectives  
The PBC shall “under the leadership of the State Council, formulate and implement 
monetary policy, prevent and mitigate financial risks, and maintain financial 
stability.”157 It was explicitly required to maintain financial stability without this 
being clearly defined.  
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Organisational Structure  
In order to reduce the conflicts between the PBC and the MOF, leadership 
appointments shifted from the board of directors to a governor-led system.
158
 But 
central bankers holding the same tenure as administrative officials increased the risk 
of political intervention.
159
 The new MPC regulation was promulgated in 2004 but 
with few substantive changes.
160
  
 
Monetary Policy Instruments  
By law, monetary policy instruments included rates policies, monetary supply and 
ratios policies, while the PBC has continued subsidies and loans directly to the 
SOCBs. 
 
Regulation and Supervision  
Since the NPC Standing Committee released “the Decision on the CBRC in 
Performing the Duties of Supervision and Administration Originally Performed by 
the PBC” on April 26, 2003, the PBC Law 2003 distinguished between monetary 
instruments and supervisory duties. The PBC concentrated upon its responsibilities 
as monetary authority,
161
 and its regulatory objective was to promote coordinated 
development by monitoring financial markets. A new facility for examining troubled 
financial institutions was promulgated, after due approval from the State Council.
162
  
 
Independence  
“Operational independence” was announced by law, but the PBC’s actual autonomy 
was still in doubt. Personnel appointments were still under the NPC and State 
Council. The PBC was placed under the rigorous budget control of the State Council 
with net profits turned over to the Treasury, and internal auditing and accounting 
systems supervised by agents within the State Council.
163
 As monetary authority, the 
PBC could only design and implement policy instruments after being approved by 
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the State Council, and report them to the Standing Committee for recording. The 
MPC was still the executive of Government in maintaining currency value. The PBC 
exercised centralised leadership and control over nine branches, with support from 
local governments due to China’s political hierarchy. This created the dilemma of 
being independent of local administrative intervention while relying upon it to 
implement monetary policy and supervisory duties. To sum up, the PBC was still 
under dual subordination to the NPC and State Council, having no operational 
independence in either formulating or implementing monetary policies.  
 
When compared with the PBC Law 1995, the 2003 Act did not touch its ownership 
and legal status, but refined its legal framework with clearer objectives and diverse 
policy instruments. This reflected the requirement from the AFC for a stronger role 
played by central banks in maintaining financial stability,
164
 and also from China’s 
WTO accession to advance liberalization. Overall, as Government’s banker, the PBC 
continued to be under political control; and as bankers’ bank, it maintained some 
management at the firm level. 
 
 
7.4 Financial Regulation and Supervision Regime 
 
China’s financial regulation regime has also developed in response to gradual market 
liberalization, which could be divided into three stages: highly centralised planning 
economy, early economic reform, and contemporary progress.
165
  
 
Prior to marketization, the PBC was the only financial institution under the directly 
administrative leadership of the MOF, and regulation was thus neither needed nor 
sought.
166
 Until the mid-1990s, the PBC had the dual role as monetary authority and 
financial regulator. It controlled both the market and individual institutions through 
direct administration rather than indirect market principles, for the central credit plan 
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was not fully removed.
167
 In consequence, the PBC administered interest rates and 
executed window guidance, while financial institutions were directly burdened by 
constraints over total lending, and sub-ceilings for certain types of commercial loans. 
At the third stage, China gradually developed a more sector-based regulatory model. 
It is argued that China’s WTO entry accelerated financial liberalization, and also 
improved regulation and supervision.
168
 On March10, 2003, “the Decision of the 1st 
Session of the 10
th
 NPC on the Plan of Reforms of the Organizations of the State 
Council” was promulgated, aiming to administratively reorganise China’s 
bureaucracy in line with a more market-oriented economy. According to the 
restructuring plan, China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established, 
taking over banking surveillances from the PBC.  
 
With the establishment of the CBRC, CIRC and CSRC, the regulatory and 
supervisory regime of Yihang Sanhui (one central bank, and three commissions) 
officially formed, based upon the segmentation of financial markets, known as Fenye 
Jingying, Fenye Jianguan (separate operations, and separate regulations). By this 
division, the PBC took responsibility for monetary policy and systemic stability, 
with three commissions overseeing securities, insurance and banking respectively. 
However, such a model bears some structural weaknesses.  
 
By nature, three commissions have constrained independence. For example, the 
CBRC was legally described as the “banking supervision institution of the State 
Council”, making it an internal department of the State Council, affecting its conduct 
and legislative authority from the outset.
169
 Chairpersons were appointed by the State 
Council, and accountable to its Premier.
170
 According to Article 14, the CBRC was 
overseen by the National Audit Office and the Ministry of Supervision within the 
State Council. Moreover, legal provisions required other government departments to 
support the CBRC’s oversight. In addition, local governments have generally used 
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local SOCB branches to support the SOEs in their jurisdictions to achieve economic 
goals,
171
 challenging the CBRC’s regulation and supervision.172  
 
China’s domestic market was still dominated by state ownership with 
underdeveloped securities markets. Such imbalance has adversely affected capital 
allocation with easy Government intervention.
173
 The CBRC was granted broad 
authority of rulemaking, but only in accordance with policy directives from the 
central government. It controlled market-entry, the approval of products and services, 
on-site examination and off-site monitoring. So the CBRC was a prudential and 
conduct of business regulator.
174
 Furthermore, sector-based regulation was consistent 
with clear boundaries among financial activities and limited conglomeration. With 
further liberalisation and integration, this regime would not meet changing market 
conditions. Some evidence of this has already emerged, especially after China 
advanced its globalisation after WTO accession.
175
 Therefore, as China’s reform 
leads gradually to the business model of Huiye Jingying (financial conglomerate), 
this regime has come under intensified challenges.
176
 When assigning its objectives, 
“banking risks” was introduced and depositor interests were emphasised for the first 
time. The core value of the modern banking industry referred implicitly to “a safe 
and sound banking industry” and also to maintaining public confidence by ensuring 
fair competition.
177
 However, the legislation did not clarify its relationship with the 
PBC in the event of systemic banking crises. In extreme circumstances, the CBRC 
would inform the PBC if deemed necessary, but usually in coordination with the 
State Council.
178
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Overall, China’s financial regulation and supervision system has developed under 
the direct control of the State Council, whilst it was only chosen for China’s 
underdeveloped financial markets.  
 
 
7.5 How has the PBC Changed? 
 
The PBC was established without legal recording, and underwent statutory changes 
during China’s economic reform. Relevant changes around its two-tier relationship 
can be summarised in Table 7.3: 
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Table 7.3: Major Changes of the PBC around its Two-Tier Relationship 
 
Legislation 
 
 
Relationship with Government 
 
Relationship with Markets 
 
1978: economic 
reform started 
with delayed 
financial 
liberalization 
 
 
PBC was separated from MOF 
 
Financial institutions 
developed and diversified; 
PBC stopped insurance 
operations and reduced 
commercial banking 
businesses 
 
1983 Decision  
 
PBC was a state authority under 
State Council and still controlled 
quasi-fiscal issues 
 
 
PBC managed specialised 
banks directly, and employed 
the central credit plan to 
balance finance budget and 
lending channels 
 
 
Provisional 
Regulations 1986 
 
PBC was formalised as central 
bank under the direct leadership 
of State Council 
 
PBC managed the banking 
sector to support real economy 
and administered rates policies 
with a credit quota plan 
 
 
PBC Law 1995 
 
PBC was granted with state-
owned legal status under dual-
tracked subordination  
 
Central plan was still used; 
Money supply and interest 
rates were administered; 
PBC regulated financial 
institutions and their daily 
operations 
 
 
PBC Law 2003 
 
PBC had limited independence in 
budget, operation and policy-
making 
 
 
CBRC was established to 
regulate and supervise banking 
institutions and their 
businesses; 
PBC controlled monetary 
policy and overall financial 
stability 
 
 
As illustrated in Table 7.3, the PBC has gradually been separated from the MOF and 
from commercial banking business. As Government’s banker, after reducing quasi-
fiscal duties, it still operated under rigid dual subordination as an executive 
department of the State Council. As bankers’ bank, it has enhanced its role as 
monetary authority and, with the establishment of the CBRC, clarified its role as 
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systemic regulator. Two central bank laws, in 1995 and 2003, can be compared in 
Table 7.4: 
Table 7.4: Comparison between PBC Law 1995 and PBC Law 2003 
 
Legal Provision 
 
 
PBC Law 1995 
 
PBC Law 2003 
 
Ownership and 
Status 
 
State-owned government institution 
 
 
Objectives 
 
Maintaining currency value, and 
thereby promoting economic 
development 
 
Plus maintaining financial 
stability  
 
Independence 
 
Independence with unclear 
wording 
 
 
Operational independence 
 
Accountability 
 
Dual-subjection to NPC and State Council 
 
Organisational 
Structure 
 
Board of directors; 
Governor and Deputy Governors 
appointed by State Council 
 
31 branches based upon 
provincial division 
 
Governor-led system 
 
 
 
9 branches across administrative 
provinces 
 
MPC 
 
 
 
 
 
A consultative and advisory 
body  
 
 
Under the direct control of the 
Party and State Council; 
Monetary policy derives from 
political compromise 
 
Monetary Policy 
Instruments 
 
Issue of RMB, centralised 
controls of money supplies and 
interest rates 
 
Rates policies, monetary supply, 
ratios policies, and window 
guidance 
 
 
Regulation and 
Supervision 
 
Firm-level controls with direct 
political intervention 
 
Promoting the development of 
the financial market as a whole; 
Controlling certain examination 
over financial institutions 
(including their insolvency);  
Oversee inter-bank loans and 
bond markets 
 
CBRC was established as the 
main banking regulator 
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According to Table 7.4, the overall legal framework had improved with clearer 
wording, granting the PBC sophisticated policy instruments. Ownership, legal status 
and accountability to both the NPC and the State Council stayed unchanged. As 
argued, the Chinese legal system was still under strict political controls, and thus, 
central bank laws cannot exactly reflect the two-tier relationship governing the PBC. 
 
The PBC has gradually loaded off commercial banking business, but can still affect 
the financial sector directly. The central bank in a typical transition economy could 
generally adopt price-based, quantity-based and non-central bank policy 
instruments.
179
 Price-based instruments refer to those decided through pricing money 
in the financial system, including rates and ratios policies, and OMOs; they are 
indirect by nature. In China, the reserve requirement instrument was introduced in 
1984 to control liquidity, and has been used more actively since 1998.
180
 After being 
introduced in 1993, OMOs further developed in 1997, helping the PBC shift toward 
indirect market-based principles after the AFC.
181
 The PBC has several rates policies, 
but still shears the deposit rates for the money already at the disposal of commercial 
banks, ensuring them to access funds at rates below deposit rates for profitability.
182
  
 
By contrast, quantity-based and non-central bank instruments are direct, non-market 
tools. Quantity-based means are aimed at changing the amount of money without 
considering its price, including loan quotas and window guidance. The official credit 
plan was abolished in 1998, but preferential lending still prevailed from the SOCBs 
to SOEs. Window guidance,183 itself transplanted from Japan in the 1990s, enables 
the central bank to affect market participants by negotiation rather than strict rules.
184
 
It has been considered vital for the PBC to control liquidity in a quantitative manner, 
                                                          
179
 Michael Geiger, ‘Instruments of Monetary Policy in China and Their Effectiveness: 1994-2006’ 
UN Conference on Trade and Development, Discussion Papers No 187, 2008 
<http://unctad.org/en/Docs/osgdp20082_en.pdf>.  
180
 Guonan Ma, Xiandong Yan and Xi Liu, ‘China’s Evolving Reserve Requirements’ BIS Working 
Papers, No 360, 2011 <www.bis.org/publ/work360.pdf>. 
181
 Xie Duo, ‘The Conduct of the Open Market Operations and the Shift of Monetary Policy 
Instruments’ 5 Economic Research Journal 2005: 31-46. 
182
 Tarhan Feyzioglu, Nathan Porter and Elod Takats, ‘Interest Rate Liberalization in China’ IMF 
Working Paper, WP/09/171, 2009 
<http://211.253.40.86/mille/service/ers/20000/IMG/000000017525/wp09171.pdf>.   
183
 Official explanation of window guidance by the PBC: 
<www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/main/851/3004/30045/30045_.html> accessed on February 27, 2009. 
184
 Hugh T. Patrick and Yung Chul Park, The Financial Development of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan: 
Growth, Repression, and Liberalization (OUP 1994) 40-41. 
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whereby bank loans could be managed without modifying interest rates. 185  As 
established in a bureaucracy theory, a central bank might prefer to conduct covert 
methods to divert critical investigation and apparent failures, extending its authority 
without much explicit intervention. Similarly, moral suasion could enable it to 
administer the directions of lending.
186
 In China, the PBC’s governor was at a higher 
political rank than chairpersons from the SOCBs, facilitating the conduct of window 
guidance and then controlling the outcomes. It is also argued that by strengthening 
the oversight of network banks, the PBC could conduct window guidance more 
effectively.
187
 In the third classification, price and wage controls are typical non-
central bank tools. Due to incomplete marketization, centralized planning has widely 
co-existed with market principles, and hence, the PBC has continued to co-control 
various dual-track systems. As a result, it still replied upon quantity-based and non-
central bank tools to directly administer the financial sector, which has been 
facilitated by China’s economic transition and political hierarchy.  
 
What is more, the PBC’s independence was still seriously questioned. Central bank 
independence should be assessed from its institutional arrangement, operational and 
decision-making process, and credibility with financial institutions, central and local 
governments, as well as the public.
188
 By law, official influencing factors upon the 
PBC’s independence include:  
i) Personnel appointments were controlled by State Council;  
ii) It counted on the central budget;  
iii) MPC was a consultative and discussion body; 
iv) Dual-track subordination continued;  
v) Local government directly affected the implementation of monetary policy; 
vi) Financial crisis management was conducted under State Council.  
                                                          
185
 Junwen Fu and Hong Zhao, ‘Study on the Theory and Practice of China’s Window Guidance – 
One of the Monetary Policy Instruments’ Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics, 
September 2008 
<http://caod.oriprobe.com/articles/14911257/Study_on_the_Theory_and_Practice_of_China_s_Wind
ow.htm>.  
186
 John F. Chant and Keith Acheson, ‘The Choice of Monetary Instruments and the Theory of 
Bureaucracy’ 12 Public Choice 1972: 13-33. 
187
 Hong-yu Li, ‘On the Supervision of Network Bank’ 3 Journal of Shanxi Finance and Economics 
University 2001.  
188
 Connie We-Wee Chung and Jose L. Tongzon, ‘A Paradigm Shift for China’s Central Banking 
System’ (2004) Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 27(1): 87-103. 
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The PBC is part of an extensive political network, restricting its independence 
fundamentally, which could be better understood by scrutinising the MPC. To begin 
with, the State Council formally controlled the formulation of the MPC Provisional 
Rule. Its leading target was to properly formulate monetary policies, being a 
consultation and discussion body within the PBC. Moreover, the MPC was explicitly 
required by law to take into account the prevailing macroeconomic context and meet 
the pre-set Government strategies. In addition, under the direct leadership of the 
Party, the Central Finance Work Commission has the power to decide interest rates, 
close financial institutions, and approve the annual guiding plan to support SOEs.
189
  
As a result, the policy-making authority of the MPC has remained limited by the 
Party.
190
  
 
Functions of the MPC were further weakened by its organisational structure. It 
consisted of ex-officio members, including the PBC Governor, Director of the SAFE, 
and Chair of the CSRC, with other members being approved by the State Council 
after appointment by the PBC.
191
 The PBC used to be the cashier and accountant to 
the MOF, which remains important, particularly regarding its sizeable budget and 
revenues;
192
 in this context, its Vice Minister was a formal member of the MPC. 
Economic transition has also allowed other government departments to participate in 
monetary policy formulation. For example, the SAFE controlled exchange rates and 
the NDRC was responsible for overall reform, intruding upon the PBC in their 
respects. Therefore, the PBC was positioned in a shadow system as displayed in 
Figure 7.2: 
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 Victor Shih, ‘Partial Reform Equilibrium, Chinese Style, Political Incentives and Reform 
Stagnation in Chinese Financial Policies’ Comparative Political Studies, SAGE, August 21, 2007 
<http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~vsh853/papers/cps_final_proof.pdf>. 
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 MPC members with their profiles: 
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 Christine Wong, ‘Budget Reform in China’ (2007) OECD Journal on Budgeting 7(1): 
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Figure 7.2: The Shadow System of the PBC  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 7.2, the PBC was accountable to the NPC and State Council, 
which also controlled resource allocation to the MPC. Moreover, various 
government departments impinged upon the PBC through their resources in the MPC, 
and thus, monetary policy derived from negotiation and political compromise among 
different MPC participants. 
 
The PBC was still a political-dominated government-owned central bank with direct 
intervention into partially-liberalized financial markets. Its two-tier relationship was 
characterised by direct control from Government and direct administration into 
markets. It is argued that its independence cannot be raised until further reforms 
work effectively, including: i) the MPC should be granted full policy-making 
authority; ii) institutional structure should be professionalized yet reduced 
intervention via political hierarchy; iii) indirect monetary policy instruments should 
replace non-market mechanisms; and iv) information disclosure, accountability and 
enforcement mechanisms to be improved.
193
 However, it is elsewhere argued that a 
fundamental problem of government intervention is the exact relationship between 
government and the incumbent political party. Government departments are 
established to conduct the party policies as if all the ministerial bureaucrats are under 
the control of the Party. After decades, the PBC was just reformed to work more 
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effectively as a competent institution of the State Council, rather than with real 
operational independence. This has limited the PBC leverage from the outset, 
making interest rates liberalisation, RMB convertibility and prudential regulation 
relatively superficial solutions in regards to independent policy-making authority. 
Reform has been carried out under the Party’s absolute leadership, and thus, it is still 
ambiguous whether the Party or Government has really intended to grant the PBC 
with more independence.  
 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided support for the proposition that the PBC was still a 
government-controlled central bank with direct intervention into financial markets, 
though it did conduct some proactive policy responses to the AFC. During China’s 
market-oriented reform, a particular interaction of law, finance and economic growth 
has emerged, characterised by the Party’s absolute leadership and the state-led 
development. In terms of the PBC, it has gradually developed its role as a state 
central bank amid selected financial liberalization. Both the PBC and CBRC prefer 
to control markets through direct management over prudential regulation. Examining 
the PBC’s two-tier relationship beyond what legislation prescribed, it was actually 
identified as the executive of the State Council, and its independence granted by law 
has been fundamentally weakened by the shadow political system behind. To sum up, 
government control is the key to understanding its nature as Government’ banker, 
and incomplete financial liberalisation is the pre-condition to assessing its functions 
as bankers’ bank; this is the circumstance under which China got contagion from the 
GFC, affecting thus its selected policy responses and also the following outcomes.  
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Chapter Eight 
People’s Bank of China and the Global Financial Crisis: 
Policy Responses and Beyond1 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has defined the PBC as a government-owned central bank 
during China’s market-oriented reform. Political domination is its predominant 
characteristic, which affects its relationships with Government and with markets 
respectively. In this context, it has been challenged by the spillovers from the GFC 
since late 2008, but China regained significant GDP growth one year later.  
 
This chapter will focus upon how the GFC has affected the politically-dominated 
orientation of the PBC. It will provide support for the proposition that the PBC is a 
proactive financial regulator under direct Government control. It will start with 
planned monetary expansion, identifying major influencing factors that produced 
mixed outcomes: immediate effectiveness poses longer-term risks and challenges. 
Inter alia, the PBC has come under Government’s further intervention with monetary 
policy supporting the fiscal stimulus, and market-oriented financial liberalisation was 
suspended as one of its chosen crisis management solutions. After comparing the 
PBC before, during and after the GFC, this chapter will argue that, while this 
demonstrated proactive risk management, it remained constrained by political 
domination. Overall, as Government has intensified direct controls over both the 
PBC and wider financial markets, the GFC has actually exposed further its structural 
problems. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 This chapter is updated until October 2013, and an older version has been published with (2012) 
Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies 10(4): 361-390. 
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8.2 China and the GFC: Policy Responses, Outcomes and Key 
Influencing Factors 
 
In November 2008, China’s continued GDP growth was disturbed by losses in 
export-led manufacturing and reduced FDI from the international capital market. 
Since the second half of 2009, however, it attained previous GDP growth levels 
while most advanced countries were still struggling to recover. Consequently, the 
GFC only affected China for a limited period from late 2008 until late 2009. This 
section will now outline China’s experience during that period, assessing the 
effectiveness of its chosen crisis management strategies.  
 
 
8.2.1 China’s Resilience Explained 
 
To deal with the GFC, China similarly combined monetary expansion and fiscal 
stimulus, but different transmission channels had buffered the negative spillovers 
from the outset.  
 
8.2.1.1 Transmission Channels  
 
Prior to the GFC, China had further developed its external economic and financial 
ties after three decades of economic reform. Since 1978, exports and investment had 
driven its reform toward unprecedented economic growth. The scale and pace of 
economic development were thus closely linked to external demands and 
international capital flows. 2  As regards the financial sector, many financial 
institutions in China, including most SOCBs, acquired stakes from the US 
investment banks, while most major international investors also hold stakes in 
Chinese financial institutions.3 Particularly after 2007, China has overtaken the US 
to become the world’s second largest merchandise exporter after the EU, while still 
attracting $75 billion FDI, the 3rd largest gross recipient following the EU and US. 
                                                          
2
 Nicholas R. Lardy, ‘The Role of Foreign Trade and Investment in China’s Economic 
Transformation’ 144 The China Quarterly 1996: 1065-1082. 
3
 Yongnian Zheng and Minjia Chen, ‘How Effective will China’s Four Trillion Yuan Stimulus Plan 
Be?’ University of Nottingham, China Policy Institute, Briefing Series Issue 49, 2009 
<www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/briefings/briefing-49-how-efficient-4-tln-yuan.pdf>. 
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Fundamentally different from the developed world, as a result, China encountered 
contagion from external financial markets via trade and investment channels, rather 
than directly from a banking crisis per se.4  
 
Such transmission channels inform China’s losses in specific aspects. Since 
2007/2008, economic recession in the US and other major affected countries reduced 
consumption, as well as capabilities to invest, which would duly hinder China’s 
double digit GDP growth rates (as illustrated in Table 8.1).5 After November 2008, 
year-on-year export growth rate was negative for an entire year,6 and due to credit 
squeeze in the global capital market, international capital inflows declined sharply, 
resulting in reduced FDI between November 2008 and April 2009.7 Recession was 
not however restricted to exports and capital inflows. In some respects, China might 
have benefited from limiting the growing ties between its domestic financial sector 
and the global financial market,8  but certain losses still occurred. The Shanghai 
Stock Market Index lost nearly two thirds of its value from the end of 2007 to 2008.9 
The Chinese housing market experienced a severe downturn in late 2008, which 
placed further burden on banking operations and profitability.10 Another outstanding 
example emerged when the balance of payments experienced an unprecedented 
change: significant current account surpluses had been an important feature of 
China’s export-driven economic structure; however, due to growing imports and 
                                                          
4
 Mingchun Sun, ‘China: Unscratched Through the Global Financial Tsunami’ (2009) China & World 
Economy 17(6): 24-42. 
5
 For example, it is established that a 1 standard deviation shock to G-3 countries’(US, UK and Japan) 
output growth can lead to a 0.29 percentage point standard deviation in China’s output growth. Refer 
to Ligang Liu, ‘Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on China: Empirical Evidence and Policy 
Implications’ (2009) China & World Economy 17(6): 1-23. As the PBC estimated, if US GDP growth 
declined by 1%, China would suffer a 6% decline in exporting, cutting about 2% from GDP growth. 
Refer to Li Wang and Xin Fan, ‘The Influence of the US Subprime Crisis and Our Strategies to Cope 
with/Meiguo Cidai Weiji de Yingxiang he Zhongguo de Zhanlue’ 3 World Economy 2008: 54-58 [in 
Chinese]. 
6
 Data resources: Comprehensive Department Ministry of Commerce of the PRC 
<http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/tongji.shtml>. 
7
 Da-yong Zhang and Hong-wei Song, ‘Effects and Measures of American Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
on Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries’ <www.paper.edu.cn>. 
8
 Xianguo Yao and Xin Wu, ‘Transition of China’s Financial System after the Global Financial Crisis’ 
(2011) The World Economy 34(5): 792-804. 
9
 Data resources: Shanghai Stock Exchange; documents can be downloaded from 
<www.sse.com.cn/researchpublications/publication/yearly/c/tjnj_2008.pdf> and 
<www.sse.com.cn/researchpublications/publication/yearly/c/tjnj_2009.pdf>. 
10
 Shujie Yao, Dan Luo and Stephen Morgan, ‘Impact of the US Credit Crunch and Housing Market 
Crisis on China’ University of Nottingham, GEP Leverhulme Centre, China and the World Economy 
Research Paper 2008/32, 2008 <www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/briefings/briefing-43-us-
credit-crunch-housing-market-crisis-on-china.pdf>.  
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declining export values, the current account fell dramatically.11 Accordingly, due to 
its over-dependency upon exporting and investment, China was particularly 
vulnerable to external shocks, causing serious economic problems between 2008 and 
2009. 
Table 8.1: Changes in China’s Monthly Trade and FDI Inflows between July 
2008 and January 2010 
 
Data Source: Ministry of Commerce, PRC 
 
 
Why, then, was the financial sector not the first domino to fall in China? The reason 
was partly due to incomplete financial reform, including gradual liberalisation, 
constrained financial derivatives and innovations.12 Securitization, estimated as one 
major trigger to the GFC, was only tested in limited pilot programmes since March 
2005. 13  Because of various constraints, individuals and the private sector were 
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<www.mof.gov.cn/zhuantihuigu/zhongguocaizhengjibenqingkuang/zgczjbqkfl/201001/t20100119_26
1877.html> accessed on March 9, 2009. 
12
 Nicholas R. Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution (Brookings Institution Press 1988). 
Details were introduced in Chapter Seven. 
13
 In March 2005, after being approved by the State Council, the PBC, together with another nine 
government departments, the CBRC included, established the Coordination Group for the Pilot 
Program of Credit Asset Securitization. Pilot programme started in the inter-bank bond market, with 
China Credit Trust Co. Ltd (credit asset-backed securities) and CITIC Trust & Investment Co. Ltd 
(individual home mortgage loan-backed securities). Originators of those two securities are the State 
Development Bank and China Construction Bank. PBC, ‘Credit Asset-backed Securities were 
Approved for Issuance in the Inter-bank Bond Market by the PBC’ 
<www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/955/2006/20063/20063_.html> accessed on December 22, 2005.  
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legally prevented from freely investing abroad.14 In terms of financial institutions, 
they were only partially exposed to the US sub-prime crisis, even after doubling their 
investment in 2006/2007 (as illustrated in Table 8.2).15 They have become more 
commercialised with more explicit emphasis upon productivity and profitability to 
support the real economy since reform.16 For example, Chinese banking institutions 
were much lower leveraged with the NPLs ratio reported to be 1.8% on average in 
2009, 17  and the loan-to-deposit ratio was only 66% in 2008, whereas their US 
counterparts were generally reported 100% ratios. Although commercial banks seem 
to hold relatively significant US securities, the domestic financial market remained 
stable. In mid-2008, the Industry and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the largest 
commercial bank in terms of market capitalisation, claimed an exposure of $ 1.23 
billion, accounting for no more than 0.3% of its total securities investment; the Bank 
of China (BOC) reported the largest risk exposure to the US housing mortgage 
market, but still showed profitable growth even after adverse information exposure.18 
Banking lending significantly increased during the GFC, from 14.3% in August 2008 
to 34.4% in June 2009,19 so China was hardly threatened by a credit crunch. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 On January 5, 1997, the SAFE issued the Circular on Printing and Distributing the Detailed Rules 
on the Implementation of the Measures for the Administration of Individual Foreign Exchange, 
setting out rigorous controls of individuals’ trading foreign currency in amounts, manners, procedures, 
and so forth. 
15
 For data and statistics, see, News Report, Capital Weekly, available at <http://focus.jrj.com.cn> 
accessed on August 11, 2007. 
16
 BIS and PBC, ‘Strengthening the Banking System in China: Issues and Experiences’ BIS Policy 
Papers No 7, 1999 <www.bis.org/publ/plcy07.pdf>. For the relationship between the banking sector 
and the real economy in China, see, Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Daniel Santabarbara, ‘An Assessment 
of China’s Banking System Reform’ in Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Jean-Francois Di Meglio and Xavier 
Richet (eds.), China and the Global Financial Crisis: A Comparison with Europe (Routledge 2012) 
46-69. 
17
 CBRC, ‘Annual Report 2009’ 
<www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/20100615A314C942DEE7DD34FF395FFCEB671E00.ht
ml> accessed on April 19, 2010. 
18
 Peter Liu, ‘The Financial Crisis and China’s Banking Industry’ 
<www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/news/article.aspx?articleid=59112&categoryid=14&lang=en-
GB&validfrom=> accessed on November 25, 2008. 
19
 PBC, ‘Annual Report of Financial Stability 2009’ 
<www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/jinrongwendingju/370/2010/20100712145051297162094/2010071214505
1297162094_.html> accessed on June 26, 2009.   
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Table 8.2: Chinese Commercial Banks’ Exposure to the US Subprime Mortgage 
Securities (RMB Million) 
 
Bank 
 
US 
Securities 
Investment 
 
 
ABS 
 
SPL 
Lending 
 
Value of 
SPL 
 
Estimated 
Loss of 
SPL 
 
Compared 
with PBT of 
2007 
 
BOC 
CCB 
ICBC 
BCOM 
CMB 
CITIC 
 
590,766 
306,685 
199,870 
27,583 
34,272 
24,052 
 
37.4 
10.8 
3.5 
52.5 
17.3 
4.8 
 
0.51 
0.07 
0.010.01 
0.07 
0.02 
 
29,641 
4,433 
930 
1,941 
794 
154 
 
3,853 
576 
120 
252 
103 
19 
 
4.5 
0.7 
0.1 
1.2 
0.7 
0.2 
 
Notes 
ABS: Asset Backed Securities; SPL: Subprime Loans; PBT: Profit before Tax 
CCB: China Construction Bank; BCOM: Bank of Communication; CMB: China Merchant Bank; 
CITIC: China International Trust and Investment Corporation 
Source: Capital Weekly, August 11, 2007 <http://focus.jrj.com.cn>. 
 
 
Moreover, the PBC’s holding of US assets did not appear excessively risky. China’s 
foreign exchange reserves expanded during the decade before the GFC, from $216 
billion in 2001, 15.3% of GDP, to $1.946 trillion, equivalent to 45% of GDP in 
2008/9. To earn interest from foreign reserves, the PBC converted its foreign 
exchange holdings into financial securities in order to execute its exchange rate 
policy of pegged RMB against the US dollar.20 As of June 2008,21 China held US 
securities worth $1,205 billion, significantly up from $922 billion the year before. 
By category (as illustrated in Table 8.3),22 China was the largest holder of long-term 
US agency securities, its $527 billion accounting for 36% of the total. Most of 
China’s holding in US securities consisted of long-term government agency and 
long-term Treasury securities, 43.7% and 43.3% respectively. In particular, the PBC 
held considerable debts from the securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
                                                          
20
 Morris Goldstein and Nicholas R. Lardy (eds.), Debating China’s Exchange Rate Policy (Peterson 
Institute for International Economics 2008) 1-60. 
21
 The US Treasury Department conducts an annual survey about foreign portfolio holdings of US 
securities by countries, which reports data excluding foreign direct investment in the US for the year 
ending every June.  
22
 Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte, ‘China’s Holding of US Securities: Implications for the US 
Economy’ CRS Report for Congress, RL34314, 2009 <http://file.wikileaks.org/file/crs/RL34314.pdf>. 
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which have been in conservatorship of the Federal Government since September 
2008. The PBC involvement in the subprime mortgage market was thus a relatively 
small part of its total US securities holdings.23  
Table 8.3: Composition of China’s Holdings of US Securities in June 2008 
 
Notes  
LT=Long Term    ST=Short Term 
Data Resources: Department of Treasury, UK 
 
 
The strong trade relationship with the rest of the world, including exports and 
international capital flows, therefore, brought China into the province of the GFC 
without making it a particular victim of it. In terms of financial exposure, China had 
not yet completed liberalisation with continuing constraints upon financial 
derivatives, investment channels, and advanced securitization. Although both 
commercial banks and the state central bank had increased their engagement with US 
financial assets, their overall holding was not so critical as to escalate a credit crunch 
into large-scale financial upheaval. Its relatively closed financial market deflected 
and deterred more serious losses. A different crisis contagion channel has thus 
limited China’s eventual exposure and the attendant policy responses, as well as their 
                                                          
23
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later outcomes.24 
 
8.2.1.2 The PBC Policy Responses 
 
China recorded two-digit GDP growth rates between 2003 and 2007, resulting from 
excessive investment and net exports. In early 2008, fearing an overheated domestic 
economy, some measures were undertaken to rebalance growth, including slowing 
the pace of new investment. The PBC had executed a tight monetary policy prior to 
the GFC, but soon revised this.25  For example, both interest rates and required 
reserve ratios increased up to June 2008 but, as early as September 2008, the PBC 
reduced both: the former was continuously cut until December 2008 (as illustrated in 
Table 8.4), and the latter declined to 15.5%. The RMB had been pegged against a 
basket of currencies with a 0.3% daily fluctuation since 2005, but the PBC pegged it 
back to the USD as early as July 2008.26 By end-2008, the PBC voluntarily stopped 
issuing central bank bills, which used to be purchased mainly by SOCBs. Excess 
liquidity thus confounded the interbank market, and real interest rates declined. More 
remarkably, the loan quota mechanism, introduced to control economic overheating 
between late 2007 and early 2008, was removed, aiming to encourage further 
lending.27 Accordingly, in response to the GFC, the PBC loosened monetary policy 
by easing lending.  
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 Nir Kshetri, ‘Emerging Economies and the Global Financial Crisis: Evidence from China and India’ 
(2011) Thunderbird International Business Review 53(2): 247-262. 
25
 Barry Naughton, ‘China’s Emergence from Economic Crisis’ 29 China Leadership Monitor 2009: 
1-10. 
26
 Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte, ‘China’s Currency: An Analysis of the Economic Issues’ 
CRS Report for Congress, RS21625, 2011 <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/155620.pdf>. 
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 Lijun Mao and Bo Wang, ‘Lending Caps to Reduce Liquidity’ (China Daily, 21st January 2010). 
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Table 8.4: PBC Interest Rates between March 2007 and December 2008 
 Data source: PBC 
      <www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/zhengcehuobisi/628/index.html>. 
 
 
Between December 5 and 7, 2008, the Economic Work Conference, which stipulated 
guidelines for all monetary and fiscal policies for 2009, was finally held in Beijing 
after three weeks’ delay.28 The total increase in bank loans was targeted at RMB¥ 4 
trillion with an extra RMB¥ 100 billion allocated to policy banks. Following the 
announcement of the stimulus package in November 2008, bank loan growth 
exploded. For instance, the first week of 2009 saw a record RMB¥ 600 billion bank 
loans, and the figure increased up to RMB¥ 4.6 trillion by the end of March, more 
than the entire stimulus package envisaged. M2, the broad money supply,29 increased 
27.7%, constituting 178% of GDP.30  
 
Although the PBC began monetary expansion after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy,31 
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 ‘News of the Communist Party of China’ 
<http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49154/49155/8480932.html> accessed on December 8, 2008. 
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 Data resource: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
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little evidence is available to indicate contagion in China. 32  For example, both 
exports and FDI did not incur major losses until November 2008, three months after 
the first interest rates cut. 33  The PBC accordingly undertook some proactive 
measures. Its mechanisms of risk management were otherwise improved by 
diversified instruments. It succeeded in adding loanable funds by cutting benchmark 
interest rates and rates for mortgage loans, as well as varying chosen preferences and 
requirements. 34  It also affected monetary policies in a gradual and carefully 
negotiated manner. In addition to prioritising agriculture and exports, the PBC 
extended lower reserve ratios requirements to main SOCBs from other savings 
institutions. It has also given preference to the countryside and earthquake-struck 
areas. To some extent, China’s central bank still pursues selected quasi fiscal 
responsibilities and/or administrative guidance for the wider public welfare. 
 
8.2.1.3 Fiscal Stimulus Package 
 
After the PBC proactively reduced interest rates, China announced on November 9, 
2008 a two-year RMB¥ 4 trillion fiscal stimulus package, equivalent to $586 billion, 
accounting for nearly 14% of GDP in 2008. In terms of scale, this fiscal stimulus 
package was the second largest after the US.35 The NDRC was originally responsible 
for designing and implementing the package, but other changes have since taken 
place. The Economic Work Conference in December 2008 reviewed this proposal, 
and later modified in March 2009 with slightly more emphasis upon social 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Comparative Assessment of Economic Governance in 14 Economies (Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung 
2010). 
32
 Major economic indicators fell below expectations, but due to 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, it is 
difficult to explain its exact relationship with external financial shocks. Refer to, Jeffrey G. Owen, 
‘Estimating the Cost and Benefit of Hosting Olympic Games: What Can Beijing Expect from Its 2008 
Games?’ (2005) The Industrial Geographer 3(1): 1-18. 
33
 Laura Alfaro and Maggie Chen, ‘Surviving the Global Financial Crisis: Foreign Direct Investment 
and Establishment Performance’ Harvard Business School, Working Paper 10-110, 2010 
<www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/10-110.pdf>. 
34
 Nicholas R. Lardy, ‘The Sustainability of China’s Recovery from the Global Recession’ Peterson 
Institute for International Economics, No PB10-7, 2010 < http://ssrn.com/abstract=2126176>. 
35
 It is estimated that fiscal stimuli from the US, China and Japan accounted for around $424 billion in 
2009. China’s package constituted 2.1% of its GDP, and the US’s package 1.9% of its GDP. By 2010, 
the US accounted for 60% of the planned stimulus from G-20 countries and China for 15%. Eswar 
Prasad and Isaac Sorkin, ‘Assessing the G-20 Economic Stimulus Plans: A Deeper Look’ (Brookings, 
March 2009) 
<www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2009/3/g20%20stimulus%20prasad/03_g20_stim
ulus_prasad.pdf>. 
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spending.36 Further changes occurred in 2010 with additional importance attached to 
healthcare and education.37 In essence, this stimulus package has been liable to be 
amended according to government’s discretion throughout its implementation. By 
category, it consisted of public works, social welfare and tax reform (as illustrated in 
Table 8.5), with the largest portion devoted to transport and power infrastructure 
(37.5%). It reaffirmed that fixed asset investment (FAI) has long been the most 
important driving power because of its high growth rate and sizeable share of 
recorded GDP increases.38 
 
Table 8.5: Sector Breakdown of China’s Fiscal Stimulus Package 
 
Items 
 
Initial 
Plan 
November 
2008 
 
Revised 
Plan 
 
March 2009 
 
First 
Tranche 
December 
2008 
 
Second 
Tranche 
 
February 2009 
 
Transport & power 
infrastructure 
 
60% 
 
50% 
 
25% 
 
21% 
 
Rural village infrastructure 
 
12% 
 
12% 
 
34% 
 
24% 
 
Environmental investment; 
natural area 
 
12% 
 
7% 
 
12% 
 
8% 
 
Affordable housing 
 
9% 
 
13% 
 
10% 
 
22% 
 
Technological innovation; 
structural adjustment 
 
5% 
 
12% 
 
6% 
 
12% 
 
Health & education 
 
1% 
 
5% 
 
13% 
 
13% 
 
Source: News release, MOF, May 21, 2009  
<www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwtt/t20090521_280383.htm>. 
 
 
With regards to funding resources, central government directly committed 30%, 
amounting to 19% of China’s fiscal revenue. The remaining 70% was covered by 
local governments bearing the responsibility to collect funds. Implementation was 
                                                          
36
 <www.gov.cn/ldhd/2009-12/07/content_1481724.htm> accessed on December 7, 2009. 
37
 <www.mof.gov.cn/zhuantihuigu/2010qgcz/qgczhy2010/201001/t20100111_258396.html>. 
38
 Yanchun Zhang, Nina Thelen and Aparna Rao, ‘Social Protection in Fiscal Stimulus Packages: 
Some Evidence’ United Nations Development Programme, a UNDP/ODS Working Paper, March 
2010 <http://web.undp.org/developmentstudies/docs/socialprotection_fiscalstimulus_march2010.pdf>. 
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thereafter impacted by bargaining and negotiation between central and local 
governments.39 To gain approval, local governments submitted applications about 
potential projects to the NDRC, and funds were accordingly allocated either directly 
from central government or through commercial bank loans. However, according to 
the Law of the PRC on the Financial Budget, local governments are prohibited from 
issuing bonds. Under this arrangement, they were instead allowed to invest in bonds 
issued by the MOF up to the total value of RMB¥ 200 billion, with revenue and 
repayment obligations accounted into their own budgets. A special arrangement of 
bank loans with extra-long-term, concessionary interest rates were also authorised to 
provide paid-in capital for such projects. By this means, local governments could 
finance their preferred projects by employing bank loans from SOCBs to allocate 
funds to SOEs.40 Elsewhere, corporate debt was encouraged to take advantage of 
China’s underdeveloped capital market. In the first quarter of 2009, for example, 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) increased subsequently by 7 million, 17 million, and 
25 million shares.41  
 
 
8.2.2 Assessment of China’s Policy Responses 
 
Leading state actors, the PBC included, have introduced proactive solutions to cope 
with any potential economic recession associated with external financial stocks. For 
all its proactivity, it is still hard to conclude that the PBC has successively managed 
to overcome the GFC without adverse consequences; instead, various factors have 
explained China’s renewed growth. To assess the full outcomes, a three-tier strategy, 
incorporating varying-term goals, should be taken into consideration.42   
 
It is widely agreed that China’s package has enabled it to achieve stipulated GDP 
                                                          
39
 Supra 3. 
40
 News report, ‘Where Did that 7 Trillion Yuan Come From?’ (Caijing online) 
<http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-07-30/110218623.html> accessed on July 30, 2009. 
41
 Date resource: CSRC <www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/sjtj/zqscyb/index_1.htm>. 
42
 World Bank Office, ‘Quarterly Update’ China Quarterly Update, Beijing, March 2009 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCHINA/Resources/318862-1237238982080/5923417-
1257229995645/cqu_Oct_2009.pdf>. 
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growth targets both in 2008 and 2009.43 In January 2010, a GDP growth rate above 
10% exceeded previous years on average. The Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite 
Index rose by 45% and, on a year-on-year basis, in April 2010, retail sales soared by 
14.8%, industrial output by 7.3%, and investment in real estate by 6.4%.44 In this 
respect, Chinese policy responses to the GFC appear notably effective. The PBC’s 
contribution was not beyond the general toolbox for a central bank but, in the context 
of incomplete economic reform, it was nevertheless considerable. Monetary policies 
were employed prior to the selected fiscal stimulus package, but the latter is still 
claimed to have duly renewed GDP growth.45 Empirically, China’s stimulus package 
added approximately 2 – 3 percentages to the levels of GDP in both 2009 and 
2010.46 Since the end of 2008, fiscal and monetary stimuli have reinforced each 
other: on one hand, the PBC adopted various monetary instruments to make funds 
available, and the fiscal package channelled loanable credits; on the other hand, 
under due fiscal policies, credits have been targeted to deal with actual and 
prospective recession. Throughout 2009, a loose monetary policy in effect supported 
the expansionary fiscal policy. Therefore, fiscal support, on which China depended 
to survive external shocks, was more effective than monetary policies, and the PBC’s 
own responses took this into account for bottoming up economic recession.  
 
China’s financial regulation and supervision regime is argued to have been sufficient 
                                                          
43
 8% continued to be the strategic economic objective from 2008 to 2010, with official GDP rates at 
9.6%, 9.2% and 10.3% respectively. Data sources: NBSC, Annual Report of the Nation’s Social and 
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<www.bis.org/repofficepubl/arpresearch201003.14.pdf>. 
46
 Adam Mckissack and Jessica Y. Xu, ‘Chinese Macroeconomic Management Through the Crisis 
and Beyond’ (2011) Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 25(1): 43-55. 
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to meet immediate GFC problems.47 As the banking regulator, the CBRC conducted 
direct policy instruments to regulate banking risks, mainly by addressing liquidation 
risk management, information disclosure, interest rate risk management, methods of 
capital calculation, inspections of capital adequacy, and securitisation. 48  It 
particularly strengthened controls over trust companies with stricter criteria about 
conduits for banks to make off-sheet loans. More importantly, the working 
mechanism between the PBC and CBRC is judged successful. They cooperated to 
directly affect capital distributions. Since the end of 2008, bank loans followed fiscal 
expansion, and most were channelled to SOEs supported by their local governments. 
In this context, the CBRC called for more support for SMEs and rural finance49 and, 
in response, the PBC removed constraints upon the circulation of bonds issued by 
SMEs.50 The CBRC also acted with the PBC to release a series of regulations in 
relation to loan policies, financial innovations and services. 51  Even so, the 
competence of the yihang sanhui arrangement was certified by China’s overall 
limited risk exposure. In particular, no major financial institutions claimed illiquidity 
or insolvency between 2008 and 2009. This reduced the burden facing China’s 
financial regulators and supervisors, which have not yet been challenged by failing 
banks or market rescues on a large scale.  
 
From the perspective of its medium-term plan, China has sought to readjust 
economic growth, and since the 16th NPC Conference in 2002, certain structural 
reforms have occurred.52 In December 2004, a Central Economic Work Conference 
was held in Beijing, whereby the central government announced to change 
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fundamentally China’s economic growth pattern. 53  In principle, domestic 
consumption would replace the role played by investment and exporting to spur 
further economic growth.54 China was expected to focus upon deepening structural 
reform, including a shift toward domestic consumption, a shift to interior 
development, and more emphasis upon higher value-added manufacturing and 
supporting SMEs. 55  However, neither fiscal nor monetary policies above were 
particularly specific about these ends.56 For example, even during the GFC, SOE 
capital was implicitly guaranteed by governments and banks, though SMEs and the 
private sector had sought further exports and employment growth.57 Exports grew 
after the 3rd quarter of 2009 following policy preference from both local 
governments and the PBC. Rather than a credit crunch, banking credit increased 
faster, accelerating GDP growth. As has been argued about China’s transmission 
channels, over-dependency upon exports and international investment induced 
contagion from external financial shocks, but recovery still rested upon SOEs, 
exports, and more expansive lending; and domestic vulnerabilities have thus been 
aggravated by disparate global demands. From this point of view, there is an 
observable mismatch between official policy responses and the stated medium-term 
development target of advancing economic rebalancing.58  Therefore, in the post-
crisis era, China could become challenged by deteriorated vulnerabilities from 
lasting unbalanced growth and ineffective crisis management solutions as well.59 
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Now, it is still difficult to predict the full longer-term effect of China’s selected crisis 
management solutions, but expectations have since changed. Fiscal solvency, which 
had helped facilitate China’s economic expansion, has raised critical concerns. From 
2001, the central government had pursued a contraction fiscal policy; and in 2006, 
the PNC used a new approval system for the national budget, accelerating national 
debt reduction from that year on.60 Accordingly, China had claimed a sound fiscal 
base, carrying a deficit of only 0.4% of GDP in 2008 with average outstanding 
public debt accounting for less than 20% of GDP.61 Given that China’s GDP growth 
rate was 8% prior to the stimulus package, the outstanding amount of total debt 
reached 21.6% in 2008, 25.5% in 2009, and 27.9% in 2010. 62  However, fiscal 
soundness of local governments became more critical after they have committed a 
considerable part of the stimulus package.63 Moreover, local governments typically 
employed corporate vehicles to obtain capital with implicit or explicit guarantees, 
even though legal restrictions prohibit sub-national borrowing. From 2008 to 2009, 
those vehicles had largely increased funds, approximately equal to the total issuance 
over the previous four years. But there are risks in employing such vehicles, and 
undue information asymmetry64 makes it so difficult to access that additional NPLs 
in SOCBs became possible. The CBRC indicated that, until June 2010, around 23% 
of those bank loans supporting local governments’ invested projects were at the risk 
of default. 65  Since mid-2010, the MOF intervened in local governments’ fiscal 
policies by regulating their fiscal positions in terms of supervision, corporate 
governance, and the accounting system of corporate vehicles.66 In addition, credit 
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expansion exacerbated excess in industrial capacity, and exerted downward pressure 
on prices, as well as corporate profits. 67  As a result, SOCBs would be further 
challenged by deteriorating balance sheets, while SOEs faced significant competition 
disadvantages. Although corporate bond and commercial paper markets were 
encouraged to develop during the GFC, they failed to change the dominant position 
by indirect financing offered by bank loans.68 In consequence, rather than negative 
effects from external financial shocks, China’s financial market has become more 
susceptible to domestic vulnerabilities associated with deepening financial reform.  
 
Before the crisis, China was challenged by severe inflation, and inflationary 
pressures continue to constitute a major concern, especially after monetary 
aggregates have grown at a significant speed. Since January 2010, the PBC began to 
tighten monetary policies by increasing required reserve ratios; it maintained low 
interest rates for loans and deposits throughout 2009 and increases them after 
October 2010 (as illustrated in Table 8.6). 69  In spite of these changed policy 
instruments to control economic overheating, by October 2013, M2 reached 
RMB¥ 107.02 trillion, more than 200% of GDP, triggering an increasing concern 
about a credit bubble.70  In particular, the urban real estate sector and the stock 
market have continuously signalled the threat of a bubble economy.71 It is further 
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argued that China’s bubble up to 2010 was similar to Japan in the late 1980s, when 
the central bank conducted monetary easing in fear of deflationary effects with a 
stronger currency.72 However, after peaking at the two-digit GDP growth in 2010, 
China’s economic growth has slowed down. For 2012, it was 7.5%, the lowest for 
thirteen years. In the 12th Five-Year Plan, the target for economic growth was 
reduced to 7% for 2011-2015.73 As the challenge of rebalancing has become more 
evident, new reform measures are required with sacrificing sort of economic growth; 
this has been publicly addressed in top political leaders’ speeches.74 In brief, China is 
now challenged by the conflict between overheating market conditions, as regards its 
official stimulus packages amid the wider economic recession, and slowing 
economic development during the accelerating transition toward a more balanced 
and sustainable growth path.75  
Table 8.6: PBC Interest Rates between December 2008 and July 2012 
 
 
Source: Monetary Policy Department, PBC 
<www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/zhengcehuobisi/628/index.html>. 
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So, quick resilience can only show the success of crisis management solutions in 
meeting the short-term target, but still China encounters both instant and far-reaching 
negative effects from the GFC. Monetary and fiscal expansions have further 
enhanced overheating economic prospects with intense inflationary pressure. As the 
selected policy responses brought an observable mismatch in relation to its stated 
rebalancing reform goals, external instability has actually brought more unbalanced 
economic growth. 76  What is more, under loose monetary policy, easing lending 
follows the proactive fiscal policy, so that the monetary policy response remains 
subordinated to fiscal stimuli. Should global recovery falter, China would likely 
return to fiscal tools to offset any susceptibility to external shocks.77 For example, in 
mid-2013, it employed a mini-stimulus package to deal with domestic slowdown, 
including tax cuts, facilities for exporting firms, and extended investment into 
railway projects from private investors.78 It is thus argued that these factors, which 
underlined sustained growth even during the GFC, paradoxically pose other risks 
and challenges to China’s domestic economy over a long-term perspective.79 
 
 
8.2.3 Summary  
 
Confronting the recent GFC, limited market liberalisation has helped reduce direct 
negative effects from external shocks, placing China in a better position to deal with 
financial risk. Broadly, economic reform has brought major household savings and 
foreign reserves into play, buffering outside shocks. China was also fiscally 
judicious, allowing flexibility to design and implement well-directed policy changes. 
As regards monetary policies, the PBC formally controlled interest and exchange 
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rates policies,
80
 which enabled further measures to be put in place to control liquidity. 
Overall, China’s chosen fiscal stimulus package sought domestic stability, assisted 
by monetary policy with easy lending. In terms of outcomes, there has been an 
observable mismatch between official policy responses and the stated longer-term 
mission of economic rebalancing. More broadly, in the post-crisis era, China will be 
challenged by not only the pre-existing unbalanced growth, but also all costs paid for 
its quick resilience, renewing uncertainty about its further development.  
 
 
8.3 Overall PBC Policies during the GFC 
 
It is argued that one leading goal for central banks in developing countries is to 
support financial sector development. 81  During the GFC, China’s marketisation 
continued, with both domestic liberalisation and a new supranational financial 
strategy in place.  
 
 
8.3.1 Domestic Financial Liberalisation 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter Seven, China’s financial liberalization did not develop 
evenly in terms of institutions, instruments and market principles. During the GFC, 
further reform measures have been applied especially to financial institutions and 
instruments, while certain suspended marketization has been resumed in succession.  
Monetary Policy Department II was established within the PBC in November 2009, 
and its objective, besides cooperation with the MPC and Monetary Policy 
Department, concentrates upon RMB issues, including exchange rates, as well as 
cross-border currency trade and cooperation.82 The MPC was also reformed with 
expert members increased from one to three in March 2010. 83  To improve 
transparency through further information disclosure, the PBC began reporting 
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financial stability annually.84 It is thus argued that the PBC has improved its own 
structure and working mechanisms towards policy-making authority after continuous 
reforms and strengthening credibility of its policy records in financial crises.85 In 
terms of the banking sector, joint-stock reform was adopted for all major SOCBs,86 
after Central Huijin Investment Company Limited (Huijing) injected RMB¥ 1.3 
billion into the Agriculture Bank of China in November 2008. 87  Since 2011, 
commercialization-oriented reform extended to restructure rural financial 
institutions88 and Postal Savings Bank of China89.  
 
With regard to instruments, the PBC formally introduced a pilot programme of the 
Dynamic Adjustment of Deposit Reserve Ratio in early 2011,90 allowing the ratios to 
vary on a quarterly or monthly basis gradually.91 In January 2013, it launched the 
short-term liquidity operations (SLOs) complementing the OMOs, and also the 
Standing Lending Facility (SLF). Both were intended to offer financial aid in case of 
temporary liquidity shortage.92  While it shifted to repo operations to moderately 
withdraw liquidity,93 reserve repo operations were mainly used to inject liquidity in 
the second half of 2012.94 In market sectors, the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) 
was launched in May 2009 after a pilot programme in Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 
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2008.95 The bond market expanded, but still dominated by the MOF and policy 
banks. The interbank market has also grown, especially after the PBC released the 
2009 Notice,96 requiring improved pricing in the Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate 
(Shibor). 97  Additionally, interbank market participants have expanded to cover 
banks, other financial institutions, non-financial enterprises, and insurance 
companies. As of the bond market, the PBC and MOF announced to create a market-
making initiative for newly issued critical term bonds,98 with pilot programmes to 
trade treasury bonds.99 By 2011, the pilot programme of credit-asset securitization, 
suspended at end-2008, was resumed with the approval of the State Council; in May 
2012, the PBC, working with the CBRC and MOF, upgraded the programme.100 But 
securitization was still at the preliminary stage of development: there were no 
specific rules or regulations governing securitisation, only high quality credit assets 
were allowed for securitization, and re-securitization was still prohibited.101 Certain 
controls over cross-border investment have meanwhile been relaxed, 102  and the 
CSRC considered relaxing the conditions for qualified foreign institutional investors 
(QFII).103  
 
By comparison, progress in introducing market-oriented principles was delayed. As a 
proactive crisis management solution, the PBC first suspended the gradual reform 
regarding RMB convertibility. According to official data, the RMB against USD 
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appreciated by over 6% from November 2007 to March 2008, and the exchange 
RMB/USD rate arrived at 6.87 in December 2008.104 Not until July 2010 did it 
announce further reform of the exchange rate policy, moving forwards to 
marketization.105 It widened the floating range of the RMB/USD rate from 0.5% to 
1% in April 2012. 106  The PBC has thus displayed an evident uncertainty about 
currency liberalization,107 triggering concerns especially from the US.108 Moreover, 
interest rates liberalisation was initiated in 1996. However, as accumulated liquidity 
restricted the commercial banks’ ability to raise lending rates over the benchmark 
rate, liberalisation progress had slowed since as far back as 2004.109 Interest rates 
continued to be determined by non-market factors, mainly the PBC’s administration. 
The loan-deposit rate margin has likewise been ensured between the loan rate as the 
floor and the deposit rate as the ceiling.110 It was not changed until June 2012, when 
the PBC reformed the floating ranges of deposits and commercial loans: the upper 
limit of deposits was set at 1.1 times and the floor of loans at 0.8 times.111 After 
lowering the floor to 0.7 times in July 2012, the PBC announced to basically lift 
constraints upon loan rates after one year.112 Later, in October 2013, the mechanism 
for loan prime rates was officially announced, applying to selected banks, while the 
PBC continued to set basic interest rates for loans as a transition arrangement.113 
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Such rates have not yet effectively channelled due fund allocation, and the PBC has 
strengthened administrative tools to deal with financial volatilities.114  
 
Lately, China’s financial regulation and supervision regime has changed. Stress tests, 
initialled by the CBRC jointly with the PBC in 2007,115 were completed in 2011, but 
data were not accessible except for a brief summary.116 With regards to rule-making, 
both the PBC and CBRC have drafted and enacted rules and laws regarding financial 
liberalization. For example, after reforming its national payments system, the PBC 
introduced the High Value Payment System (HVPS) as a systemically important 
payment system (SIPS), and drafted the regulation through its administration.117 In 
China, “financial holding companies (FHCs)” have not yet been included in formal 
legal frameworks, though pilot programmes have developed since the 1980s. 118 
During the GFC, the PBC continued to formalize its regulation of FHCs.119 From the 
perspective of the sector-based regulator, the CBRC introduced monitoring 
indicators in its off-site system, including leverage ratio, liquidity coverage ratio and 
net stable funding ratio,120  and in January 2013, it released the new Regulation 
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Governing Capital of Commercial Banks (Provisional). 121  Meanwhile, the PBC 
clarified that while financial behaviour should come under comprehensive effective 
legal regulation, a more principle-based approach would facilitate the 
implementation of laws.122 However, legal reform occurred piecemeal by revising 
old rules and drafting new laws, reinforcing China’s rule-based regulatory 
framework.123 
 
Since financial sector reform began, institution building has been much emphasised 
with more diversified ownership and internal structure, followed by banking and 
capital markets development, but still market liberalisation raised further problems; 
this continued during the GFC. In principle, for a central bank in a transition 
economy, slow-speed liberalisation could themselves be employed as instruments 
against moderate external shocks. The resulting co-existence of direct and indirect 
tools helps guarantee effects as planned due to the PBC’s direct control over the 
financial sector.  
 
 
8.3.2 China’s New Supranational Financial Strategy 
 
China has long developed an export-led growth pattern driven by massive FDI. In 
particular, the RMB has continued to peg to the USD, and also China is the largest 
creditor of US securities. It is estimated that a depreciation of the dollar by 20% 
would generate a $300 billion loss in China’s reserve. 124  As early as in 2008, 
therefore, two rounds of Strategic Economic Dialogue between China and the US 
were held, where Chinese authorities promised to continue US treasury bonds 
holding but urged the US to stabilise its economy and protect Chinese investment, 
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given the potential risk from US dollar depreciation.125 During the GFC, in order to 
reduce its over-dependence upon US dollar in foreign trade, cross-border capital 
flows, and foreign reserve exchange management,126 China launched another 3-tier 
strategy combining RMB internationalisation, regional monetary cooperation and the 
reconstruction of the international monetary regime.127  
 
Internationalisation of a nation’s domestic currency intends to extend its usage 
beyond national borders involved in international transactions whether in 
merchandise trade or financial assets dealings. 128  The decisive principle is that 
national government does not prohibit certain activities and that the relevant foreign 
parties, be they private or public, permit or facilitate the activity described.129 To 
some extent, internationalisation and capital account liberalisation are considered 
asymmetric: currency internationalisation is exercised after full convertibility in both 
current and capital accounts, but as long as the above principle is met, 
internationalisation could be achieved by gradual regionalisation, especially in a 
country conducting gradualist economic reform, such as China. 130  As a result, 
although internationalisation is not considered an inevitable consequence of financial 
liberalisation, or a prerequisite for deepening financial reform, it is officially thought 
to help strengthen and diversify domestic financial markets, and as such presents a 
leading solution in China.131 Before the GFC, the PBC participated in two Asian 
bond funds in 2003 and 2004 by organising working taskforces so as to promote 
currency multilateralization. 132  These proceedings were not terminated with the 
                                                          
125
 The first one on June 18, 2008: <https://ustreas.gov/initiatives/us-china/meetings/jun2008.shtml>; 
the second on December 3–5, 2008: <https://ustreas.gov/initiatives/us-china/meetings/dec2008.shtml>. 
126
 Lixing Zou, ‘China’s Finance under the Global Financial Reform/Quanqiu Biange zhong de 
Zhongguo Jinrong’ 8 Economic Development 2010: 9-22 [in Chinese]. 
127
 Ming Zhang, ‘China’s New International Financial Strategy Amid the Global Financial Crisis’ 
(2009) China & World Economy 17(5): 22-35. 
128
 Hans Genberg, ‘Currency Internationalization: Analytical and Policy Issues’ Hong Kong Institute 
for Monetary Research, Working Papers No 31/2009, 2009 
<www.bis.org/repofficepubl/arpresearch200903.12.pdf>.  
129
 Peter B. Kenen, ‘Currency Internationalization: An Overview’ 
<www.bis.org/repofficepubl/arpresearch200903.01.pdf> accessed on March 1, 2009. 
130
 Jing Li, ‘Regionalization of the RMB and China’s Capital Account Liberalization’ (2004) China & 
World Economy 12(2): 86-100. 
131
 Yulu Chen, Fang Wang and Ming Wang, ‘Currency Internationalization as the Strategic Policy: 
The Empirical Experience of the US/Zuowei Guojia Jingzheng Zhanlve de Huobi Guojihua: Meiyuan 
de Jingyan Zhengju’ 2 Economic Study 2005: 35-44 [in Chinese]. 
132
 Study Group Report, ‘Asian Bond Markets Development and Regional Financial Cooperation’ The 
21
st
 Century Public Policy Institute, February 2011 
 273 
 
GFC. For example, it initiated bilateral local currency swap schemes worth 
RMB¥ 650 billion with Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Belorussia, Indonesia and 
Argentina following the G20 Summit in November 2008, when the President stated 
that China would “enhance its capacity to provide liquidity assistance, improve 
regional financial infrastructure and make the best use of regional liquidity 
assistance mechanisms”. 133  Recently, the PBC extended bilateral agreements to 
central banks in advanced economies, including the BOE in June 2013 and the ECB 
in October 2013.134 In addition, it has accelerated pilot programmes to use RMB in 
cross-border trade, 135  especially formalising relevant rules between 2012 and 
2013.136 With deepening reform of the exchange rate policy, the PBC intensified its 
two-way flexibility by trading on RMB directly with other currencies.137  
 
Meanwhile, during the GFC, progress continued towards further Asian 
regionalisation,138 including the establishment of a Credit Guarantee and Investment 
Fund (CGIF), and Asian Development Bank (ADB) trust fund and the Associations 
of Southeast Asian Nations “ASEAN+3” Macroeconomic Research Office 
(AMRO).139 Inter alia, responding to the effects of the GFC upon Asia,140 the Chiang 
Mai Initiative (CMI) has gradually changed.141 Signed in May 2000, the CMI is a 
bilateral US dollar-denominated exchange arrangement within the “ASEAN+3” 
framework, targeting at managing regional short-term liquidity and assisting with 
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other global financial facilities or institutions. 142  Since 2009, the “ASEAN+3” 
finance ministers’ meetings have been held more frequent. For example, on February 
22, 2009, the Action Plan to Restore Economic and Financial Stability of the Asian 
Region was released, mainly attributed to China, Japan and South Korea. 143  On 
March 24, 2010, the first instalment under the Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralisation (CMIM) of $ 120 billion came into effect, proposing to readdress 
balance of payments and short-term liquidity difficulties, and supplement existing 
international financial arrangements through currency swap transactions among 
CMIM participants in times of liquidity need.144 Until May 2012, its reserve was 
doubled.145 In principal, the CMI has changed from a bilateral arrangement to a 
multilateral facility across the crisis period.146 However, while China has a strong 
interest in preventing its neighbouring countries from economic flight due to its 
strong trade linkage within the ASEAN area, its rise has been taken as a challenge to 
the IMF and the US’s power in Asia.147  
 
Finally, developing and emerging countries have increasingly requested to reform the 
international financial architecture, albeit with mixed prospects. Despite that 
selective policy responses have focused upon such problems as countercyclical 
macroeconomic policy and international capital flows, certain countries have 
continued to rely upon international financial aid in case of liquidity shortage.148 
Prior to the G20 London summit in 2009, the PBC Governor, Zhou Xiaochuan, 
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made an open speech titled “Reflections on Reforming the International Monetary 
System”.149 This is viewed as a statement of China’s ambition to reconstruct the 
entire international monetary architecture.150 In reality, China had already begun to 
diversify its reserves, including commodities, especially strategic petroleum 
reserves, and IMF bonds. 151  Furthermore, the PBC has become more active in 
joining various multinational organisations and forums. For example, it is currently a 
member of the South East Asian Central Bank and the Eastern and Southern African 
Trade and Development Bank. 
 
 
8.3.3 Summary 
 
The PBC has attracted worldwide attention due to its quick responses during the 
GFC. According to this analysis, it is otherwise ambiguous about its commitment to 
further liberalization. During the GFC, financial reform was not totally terminated, 
but its future is by no means assured. Inter alia, the reform of exchange rate policies 
has been particularly difficult, and intensive window guidance may have further 
weakened the role of interest rates in modifying market liquidity. In spite of the 
market-oriented reform, the PBC resumed direct policy instruments for managing 
external financial shocks. In the context of partial financial reform, therefore, the 
specific link between the central bank and the market has enabled continued direct 
administration, working as part of its crisis management strategy. In contrast to slow-
speed domestic liberalisation, the PBC has been more progressive at cross-border 
financial cooperation. However, its RMB convertibility still triggered intense 
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debates, criticizing excessive Government intervention.152 At the very least, not only 
has its supranational financial strategy favoured China’s exports-led development 
with increasing capital inflows, but also balanced the pressures from delayed reforms 
in domestic markets.  
 
 
8.4 How has the GFC challenged the PBC? 
 
The following part will analyse and compare functions of the PBC in the event of 
external financial shocks before examining the central explanatory variable. 
 
 
8.4.1 The PBC in the AFC and the GFC Compared 
 
During the economic crises of the last decade or so, China suffered limited losses 
and the PBC has developed further, but different characteristics are noticeable,  as 
summarised in Table 8.7.  
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Table 8.7: China in the AFC and the GFC Compared  
Features AFC GFC 
Period 1997–1998 2008–2009 
 
Trigger 
 
Thai Baht appreciated disproportionally 
after Thai government abandoned 
pegged exchange rate policy regime 
 
US subprime mortgage crisis 
escalated into a worldwide 
financial crisis from September 
2008 
 
Scope 
 
Southeast and East Asia 
 
 
Most advanced economies and 
emerging markets 
 
China’s 
Position 
 
Nearly avoided with limited export 
losses. 
 
Losses concentrated in exports 
and FDIs with limited loss in 
financial markets; 
China recovered around the 
second half of 2009 
 
Transmission  
to China 
 
Export and International Capital Flows 
 
Plus further financial integrity 
 
Fiscal Policies 
 
Stimulus package of 2.5% GDP to 
support infrastructure and SOCBs; 
Tax reductions; 
Expenditure on social security, etc. 
 
A formal stimulus package of 
RMB¥ 4 trillion fiscal 
expansion over two year; 
VAT system restructure; 
Social security net rebuilding. 
 
Monetary 
Policies from 
the PBC 
 
Reducing interest rates, required 
reserves ratio and excess reserves ratio 
three times in 1998 and again in 1999. 
 
Reducing interest rates and 
required reserves ratios more 
often; 
Credit expansion and re-
distribution; 
Flexible monetary policy 
instruments 
 
Financial 
Regulation & 
Supervision 
 
PBC issued guidelines and suggestions 
to strengthen its direct management 
over financial markets 
 
CBRC directed the banking 
sector and cooperated with PBC 
 
Cross-Border 
Cooperation 
 
Inter-Asian cooperation 
 
 
Participating in Asian 
cooperation and beyond 
 
 
As illustrated in Table 8.7, China was not at the centre of either the AFC or the GFC, 
but suffered more losses and sought intense crisis management solutions during the 
latter. However, the similar mechanism of policy responses, combining fiscal 
stimulus with monetary expansion, can be problematic. 
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It is above all claimed that macroeconomic circumstances were distinctly different 
before the outbreak of these two external shocks. Since the 1997 AFC, the financial 
sector, especially commercial banks, has continued reform, with increasing loans, as 
well as diversification in income breakdowns and professional services. This brought 
more innovations and improved banks’ operating capabilities, which alleviated the 
relatively closed financial market.153 The way China obtained WTO membership in 
2001 required further financial liberalisation. Before the GFC, economic ties had 
been further strengthened between developing countries and sophisticated markets, 
but by which time, global imbalance became increasingly significant. 154  Also, 
China’s domestic reform and cross-border financial linkages have continued.155 In 
consequence, China has been under increasing pressure from both domestic 
economic liberalisation and global economic imbalance.156  
 
Nevertheless, policy responses worked in a similar way. When the PBC initiated 
some proactive measures, market sectors, especially financial markets, did not 
appear unstable. Consequently, it did not make responses just according to changed 
market conditions alone. In terms of monetary policy instruments, it had intended 
more direct market rescue; for example, Huijin increased shareholdings from the 
BOC, ICBC and CCB.157 With more diversified instruments, the PBC became more 
adaptable: in the second half of 2008, it shifted from tight to moderately easy 
monetary policy, including reduced reserve ratios, lending and deposit interest rates; 
but in 2010, from July to November, the PBC first tightened and then loosened 
monetary policy.158 Even so, reliance upon fiscal stimulus intensified from 2008 to 
2010; by category, infrastructure took the largest part. A decade after the AFC, 
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however, China’s infrastructure conditions had already improved, which then 
brought criticism about Government’s priorities. 159  Within limited welfare 
investment, expenditure on housing well exceeded that on education and healthcare, 
while FAI remained important. It is argued that expense on education and health care 
only have limited immediate functions, where efforts were not directly focused upon 
economic growth. However, inequality and underdeveloped social security had 
especially crippled the effort for continuing economic growth and declining poverty 
rates.160  Arguably, infrastructure investment had become a panacea to deal with 
China’s economic predicament.161  
 
From the AFC to the GFC, the basic pattern of crisis management solutions from 
China did not change in the event of external financial shocks. With regards to 
monetary policy responses, the PBC diversified risk management during the GFC 
when compared with the AFC, but failed to enhance its role in supporting economic 
recovery, since its policy instruments were kept subordinate to fiscal stimulus. 
 
 
8.4.2 The GFC Challenge for the PBC 
 
Unlike central banks in the US and UK, the PBC was not the centre of intensive 
criticism or massive legal reforms during the GFC. This is partially attributed to 
China’s limited losses in the context of incomplete liberalisation, which would affect 
the outcomes of the chosen crisis management solutions. China’s relevant experience 
before, during and after the GFC can be compared in Table 8.8. 
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Table 8.8: PBC’s Performances at Different Stages of the GFC 
  
Pre-GFC 
 
During-GFC 
 
 
Post-Crisis 
 
Macro- 
Economic 
Conditions 
 
Lasting GDP growth 
triggered concerns about 
economic overheating; 
Balancing reform measures 
brought preliminary 
improvements 
 
Losses concentrated 
on exports and FDIs 
with some instability 
in financial markets 
 
Renewed GDP 
growth  since 2010, 
triggering further 
concerns about 
inflation; 
Fiscal stimulus 
caused negative 
effects 
 
 
Financial 
Reforms 
 
Institutions developed 
faster than instruments and 
marketisation; 
External liberalisation 
benefited exports and FDI 
 
Uneven development 
intensified; 
External 
liberalisation was 
accelerated 
 
Domestic 
liberalisation boosted 
since 2012/2013; 
External financial 
cooperation has 
expanded beyond 
regionalisation 
 
 
PBC Policy 
Instruments 
 
PBC as a monetary 
authority and systemic 
regulator with limited 
independence behind a 
shadow political system; 
PBC administered interest 
and exchange rates policies; 
PBC continued tight 
monetary policy until mid-
2008 due to potential 
inflation prospects 
 
 
PBC reform 
continued with more 
diversified policy 
instruments; 
Monetary expansion 
subjected to fiscal 
stimulus; 
Direct tools revived 
as crisis management 
solutions 
 
MPC developed 
toward 
professionalisation; 
PBC claimed to 
reduce direct controls 
over RMB 
convertibility and 
interest rates 
 
Financial 
Regulation 
and 
Supervision 
 
Yihang Sanhui was set up 
with constrained 
independence and direct 
management over markets 
 
CBRC intensified its 
direct control at the 
firm level; 
Cooperation between 
CBRC and PBC 
worked effectively 
 
Prudential regulation 
was emphasised but 
without substantial 
changes; 
Collaboration began 
to be formalised 
under the political 
leadership of State 
Council 
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According to Table 8.8, China has experienced dynamic changes, and the PBC has 
pursued different policy instruments whilst continuing internal reforms. In terms of 
timing, given China’s resilience after 2009, measures for further financial 
liberalization, especially after 2012, were not directly linked with the GFC.  
 
Limited losses lessened the challenge for China’s financial regulator and supervisor 
from the outset; this helps explain why further reforms did not occur regarding 
effective oversight. Even so, both the PBC and CBRC have strengthened their use of 
more direct instruments, though they should develop prudential regulation as 
required by market-oriented liberalization. Especially, macro-prudential regulation 
was highlighted by the PBC
162
 and then by the 12th Five-Year Plan as a reform 
measure.163 But few detailed proposals subsequently followed.164 China’s financial 
market has developed with further uncertainty. Before the GFC, the domestic 
financial sector was reformed toward more universal banking models, which 
whereupon slowed down due to external upheavals. Meanwhile, China’s shadow 
banking system has expanded following the fiscal stimulus package, posing new 
problems for monitoring.
165
 Therefore, in spite of moderate market unrest, China’s 
financial regulators had enhanced direct controls over the markets, whilst being 
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challenged to develop prudential regulation with indirect policy instruments.
166
 
 
When focusing upon particular policies and reforms relating to the PBC, its overall 
performances are displayed in Figure 8.1: 
Figure 8.1: The GFC Challenge for the PBC 
 
 
 
As seen from Figure 8.1, prior to the GFC, the PBC was a central bank in a transition 
economy with incomplete financial liberalization, employing both direct and indirect 
tools. Due to the GFC, direct controls were reset as risk management solutions, and 
further market-oriented principles gave way to administered interest rates and 
exchange policy. After China’s resilience, the PBC’s policy instruments included: (i) 
conventional monetary policy instruments aiming at modifying market liquidity; (ii) 
re-introduction of certain suspended pilot programmes; and (iii) introduction of new 
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After-GFC 
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facilities. In brief, with direct controls from both the PBC and other regulators, the 
GFC constituted a breakpoint for China’s financial sector liberalization.  
 
As explained in Chapter Seven, the PBC was a government-controlled central bank. 
Due to the GFC, Government has reinforced its direct control over the PBC and 
other regulators more explicitly. 
 
The PBC was located in a shadow political system, which posed important 
limitations upon its selected policy responses regarding risk management. The 
NDRC was responsible for the fiscal stimulus package, and also had the final 
approval over projects proposed by local governments. The PBC could only operate 
within this decision-making authority, and the subsequent implementing of selected 
policy responses were subject to local governments. For example, by channelling 
treasury bonds and bank loans to SOEs, local governments have thereby increased 
their influence over financial markets during the GFC, as publicly warranted or 
encouraged by the PBC as the state central bank. In terms of domestic market-
oriented reform, besides the PBC, different government departments were still 
involved in promoting RMB swap and cross-border settlements. For example, due to 
exchange controls, the SAFE is responsible for drafting rules to regulate participants 
in RMB cross-border settlements regarding market-entry, reporting, accounting, and 
so on.  
 
On the surface, China’s financial regulators and supervisors could directly influence 
the markets through orders or directions, but this regime had to withstand potential 
challenges from other external political authorities. As soon as recovery was 
suggested in June 2009, the PBC and CBRC urged the banking sector to impose 
stricter lending criteria, and even tentatively sought an “exit” from expansionary 
monetary policy.
167
 But, in various top-level speeches, the dual course of a 
“proactive fiscal policy” and a “relatively loose monetary policy” was still strongly 
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supported.
168
 The market has seemingly followed the tone set by the PBC and CBRC. 
For example, in July 2009, the value of new bank loans dropped by more than 75% 
compared with the previous month.
169
 With regards to their cooperation, the informal 
mechanism under the State Council without any due legal framework could not be 
changed until August 2013, when the inter-ministry co-presence conference was 
approved to be set up.
170
 Overall, China’s financial monitoring regime continues 
under political intervention, especially from the State Council. 
 
Since 2012, the PBC had shifted between tight and loose monetary policies, 
implying that China’s domestic financial market has become more volatile, 
especially after the 12th Five-Year Plan sought to accelerate structural rebalancing. In 
particular, a short-term credit crunch did not occur during the GFC, but attacked the 
inter-bank market in June 2013.
171
 The PBC did not inject short-term liquidity until 
share prices plunged and the credit market momentarily froze.
172
 By July 2013, the 
State Council released the Guidelines on Financial Sector for Adjustment of 
Economic Structure, Transformation and Upgrading of the Economy, and the 
financial sector was thereby re-assured about rebalancing economic development 
while maintaining financial stability.173 However, China’s GDP growth slowed, and 
financial market prospects have become further unclear; as a result, both the PBC 
and other financial regulators are in a tough position to deal with fresh challenges 
associated.174 
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8.4.3 Policy Implications 
 
This part has further examined crisis management solutions of the PBC from 
different dimensions. From the AFC to the GFC, in spite of diversified monetary 
policy responses, the significance attributed to the fiscal stimulus package implies 
that the PBC had not yet fully realised its role of crisis management. During the GFC, 
Government explicitly enhanced direct controls over the PBC and financial markets 
as well.  
 
In theory, in case of financial crises, administrative power under the constitution law 
should enable the injection of short-term liquidity, stabilize monetary and pricing 
mechanisms and then control and release wider panic-based contagion.
175
 The GFC 
has exposed the limits of crisis management in the administrative state.
176
 In China, 
while policy responses from the PBC promised some immediate advantages for 
dealing with both actual and potential financial instabilities, they also bear other 
problematic longer-term implications for both macroeconomic conditions, and its 
own conduct of monetary policy. Inter alia, direct government intervention has 
evidently risen, which continues to limit the PBC and other regulators, whilst 
bringing further uncertainty into China’s market-oriented reform. However, amid the 
crisis, the limits of government intervention have also emerged. For example, 
following downward pressure between July 2007 and 2008, the Chinese property 
market quickly returned to previous growth rates, and attracted disproportional 
commercial loans within the fiscal stimulus package.
177
 Since 2010, Government has 
stepped in by combining interest rates, tax reforms, fiscal subsidies and so forth.
178
 It 
is whereas argued that, without considerable deposit interests and diversified 
investment products, major household savings have been continuously invested into 
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the property and stock markets;
179
 this has made government intervention rarely 
successful.
180
 Therefore, the role played by Government as financial disciplines 
cannot continue its old effects any longer as spur to economic growth.  
 
As for policy implications, given that the PBC should be reformed to be more legal-
dominated and market-driven, the state needs to determine further reform of the 
financial sector as a whole. Particularly, unsolved issues, such as independence, 
accountability and better implementation of monetary policies, continue to affect the 
PBC’s orientation. Deepening liberalisation of the financial sector, including rates 
policies, RMB convertibility and the role of the PBC, requires thus an improved 
balance between political power and market principles.
181
 As a result, the GFC, after 
suspending China’s financial liberalisation, has further exposed the structural 
problems revolving around the PBC and other regulators, in particular regarding 
continued political intervention and what else advanced market development 
requires.  
 
From the external perspective, China has strengthened its relationship with 
neighbouring countries, Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) and sophisticated 
markets as well. With its rise, it would be possibly accepted that China and its crisis 
management solutions will be used for future reference about managing financial 
shocks. Above all, others should carefully take into account not only short-term 
benefits, but also standing shortcomings of its chosen approaches. 
 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
Overall, this chapter has dealt with China’s experiences in the GFC, addressing how 
it achieved apparent quick resilience but suffered further domestic vulnerabilities. 
                                                          
179
 Shujie Yao and Dan Luo, ‘The Economic Psychology of Stock Market Bubbles in China’ (2009) 
The World Economy 32(5): 667-691. 
180
 Ashvin Ahuja, Lillian Cheung, Gaofeng Han, Nathan Porter and Wenlang Zhang, ‘Are House 
Prices Rising Too Fast in China?’ IMF Paper, WP/10/274, 2010 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1751386>. 
For an empirical analysis, see, Ya Ping Wang, Lei Shao, Alan Murie and Jianhua Cheng, ‘The 
Maturation of the Neo-Liberal Housing Market in Urban China’ (2012) Housing Studies 27(3): 343-
359. 
181
 Ray Barrell, Tatiana Fic and Lana Liadze, ‘Fiscal Policy Effectiveness in the Banking Crisis’ 
(2009) National Institute Economic Review 207(1): 43-50. 
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The GFC had adversely affected China for a limited period spanning 2008/2009, 
constituting a breakpoint in market-oriented financial reform. Inter alia, crisis 
management solutions selected by the PBC reflected its constrained role in 
maintaining financial stability under direct government intervention, with further 
market-oriented reform still determined by Government. This chapter has provided 
support for the proposition in this thesis that the PBC, being a proactive regulator, 
has continued under direct government controls, while the GFC has further raised 
government intervention into the PBC and also the wider economy. 
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Chapter Nine 
Central Bank Regulation toward Financial Stability: Convergence, 
Divergence, or Multiple Pathways? 
Evidence from the Comparative Study 
 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The key propositions of this thesis relating to the market or government orientation 
of central banks have been successively tested in Chapters Four to Eight. These have 
dealt respectively with four selected central banks, namely, the US Fed, the BOE, the 
BOJ and the PBC. The main themes of this thesis have been addressed by reference 
to these case studies. It has been noted that the GFC has challenged existing central 
bank regulatory ability to maintain financial stability. This chapter will now identify 
the leading signs of convergence, divergence or multiple pathways in the character 
and conduct of these central banks’ approaches to facilitating financial stability. 
 
This chapter will proceed as follows. First, all four central banks will be compared 
from the perspectives of their legal frameworks and changes that have occurred to 
them as a result of the GFC. Convergence had often co-existed with divergence 
throughout their history: in spite of similar legal frameworks, they had operated with 
different two-tier relationships, which has led to certain different outcomes in each 
central bank’s case regarding the GFC. Further comparison has found that the GFC 
enlarged existing divergences, as well as gaps between their respective legal 
frameworks and prevailing two-tier relationships.  
 
Comparisons are summarised under four main categories representing different 
levels of convergence bearing other important implications. Given that the actions of 
central banks are ultimately co-determined by their respective governments and 
market forces, this chapter will highlight where financial regulation explicitly, and 
central bank independence implicitly diverged. Moreover, the case studies reported 
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here have found that these central banks have each had their respective focuses and 
approaches when seeking to restore financial stability. In addition, comparisons have 
revealed how central banks have pursued legal changes at different levels, whilst 
historical evidence has already demonstrated the varying importance attached to laws 
and statues across countries. What is more, the GFC has not only changed the 
prevailing two-tier relationships governing central banks, but also changed the nexus 
between government and the market. Hence, their market or government orientation 
should be re-examined in the context of such new government-market balance. 
Overall, this chapter will argue that the GFC has challenged central banks so as to 
strike an improved balance between government and the market. 
 
The financial sector arguably might face the prospect of “Nipponization”, as well as 
added uncertainty regarding further integration and other globalization forces. The 
chapter will latterly re-examine the PBC’s response to such forces, while 
highlighting the main constraints imposed upon its functions as a state central bank.   
 
 
9.2 Comparing Four Central Banks: The Co-Existence of 
Convergence and Divergence in Their Governing Strategies 
 
This section will detail and compare the key findings from the four central banks 
studied in this thesis. Comparisons are made from the perspectives of their legal 
frameworks and crisis management responses regarding the GFC. This will be 
followed by further consideration of the argument suggesting the inevitable co-
existence of convergence and divergence in their respective character and conduct. 
 
 
9.2.1 Comparing Legal Frameworks before the GFC 
 
It has been established that central banks are defined by their respective two-tier 
relationships. Key legal elements accordingly include their objectives; organizational 
structures; monetary policy instruments; accountability, credibility and independence; 
and systems of financial regulation and supervision. Similarities and differences in 
each of these elements are now identified, arguing that, with increasingly convergent 
 291 
 
legal provisions, their respective two-tier relationships had significantly differed 
across countries. 
 
9.2.1.1 Comparing Central Bank Objectives 
 
As suggested in prevailing models, the requirements created by government and the 
banking sector have jointly led to the creation of the central bank with the primary 
goal of achieving price stability. After ceasing to directly finance governments, 
central banks pursued other objectives regarding the wider economy. Relevant laws 
and rules have generally prescribed what the central banks are required to achieve, 
and also enable them to be held accountable. Table 9.1 illustrates this by drawing 
upon previous discussions of earlier case studies. 
Table 9.1: Comparing Central Bank Objectives  
 
Central 
Bank 
 
 
Monetary Policy Objectives 
 
Other Objectives 
 
Numerical 
Targeting 
 
US Fed 
 
Maintaining stable prices and 
moderate long-term interest 
rates 
 
 
Maximizing employment and 
supporting economic 
development 
 
Nil 
 
BOE 
 
Maintaining price stability 
 
Supporting government’s 
economic policy, including its 
objective for growth and 
employment 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
BOJ 
 
Maintaining price stability 
 
Enhancing the sound 
development of the economy, 
and achieving the goal of an 
orderly payment and settlement 
system 
 
 
 
Nil 
 
PBC 
 
Maintaining the stability in 
the value of the currency 
 
 
Promoting economic growth 
 
Nil 
 
 
Table 9.1 separates legal provisions regarding monetary policy objectives from other 
objectives of these institutions; as numerical targeting rose, it is useful to consider 
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whether those four central banks adopted certain quantitative criteria when pursuing 
the goal of price stability. Under statutory requirements, central banks have a 
multitude of goals, often linking monetary policy targeting with other economic 
development strategies.
1
 As the sole national monetary authority, they were 
primarily responsible for maintaining stable prices, whilst leveraging and promoting 
economic growth.
2
 After delegating monetary policy to their respective central banks, 
governments have still been able to exercise control, such as by setting inflation 
targets, employment objectives, or by a combination of both of these.
3
  
 
The US Fed acted upon inflation and employment concerns by adjusting federal fund 
rates as the key strategy for its short-term targeting.
4
 But, as moderate long-term 
interest rates changed over the business cycle, market expectations about further 
policy actions varied.
5
 The US Fed therefore embraced such interest rates as its goal 
for monetary policy. Meanwhile, the 1978 US Full Employment and Balanced 
Growth Act required the federal government, including the US Fed, to achieve 
objectives regarding the whole economy.
6
 The US Fed was considered to have had 
an inflation bias from its inception due to its original bureaucratic structure,
7
 and 
concentrating upon full employment could help balance its pursuit of statutory 
objectives.
8
  
 
                                                          
1
 It is argued that a hierarchy of central bank objectives might exist, including lexicographic ordering 
and price stability as the primary goal, followed by the others shared with other government 
departments. Lars E. O. Svensson, ‘Optimal Inflation Targets, “Conservative” Central Banks, and 
Linear Inflation Contracts’ NBER Working Paper No 5251, 1995 <www.nber.org/papers/w5251.pdf>. 
2
 However, a central bank with explicit objective(s) alone can hardly support social welfare. Refer to, 
Philip Lawler, ‘Monetary Policy, Central Bank Objectives, and Social Welfare with Strategic Wage 
Setting’ 53 Oxford Economic Papers 2001: 94-113. 
3
 Berthold Herrendorf and Ben Lockwood, ‘Rogoff’s “Conservative” Central Banker Resorted’ (1997) 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 29(4): 476-495 (Part 1). 
4
 Richard Davis, ‘Intermediate Targets and Indicator for Monetary Policy: A Critical Survey’ FRB 
New York, Summer 1990 <www.ny.frb.org/research/quarterly_review/1990v15/v15n2article6.pdf>. 
5
 V. Vance Roley and Gordon H. Sellon, Jr., ‘Monetary Policy Actions and Long-Term Interest Rates’ 
Economic Review, 4
th
 Quarter, 1995 <www.kc.frb.org/publicat/econrev/pdf/4q95role.pdf>. 
6
 Leon H. Keyserling, ‘“Liberal” and “Conservative” National Economic Policies and their 
Consequences, 1919-1979: A Study to Help Implement Promptly the Humphrey-Hawkins Full 
Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978’ at Conference on Economic Progress, Washington, 
DC, 1979. 
7
 Mark Toma, ‘Inflation Bias of the Federal Reserve System: a Bureaucratic Perspective’ 10 Journal 
of Monetary Economics 1982: 163-190. 
8
 Glenn T. Potts and Dudley G. Luckett, ‘Policy Objectives of the Federal Reserve System’ (1978) 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 92(3): 525-534. 
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Among the four central banks considered here, only the BOE adopted a quantitative 
inflation rate target (numerical targeting).
9
 From a theoretical perspective, a central 
bank is given independence to fulfil delegated tasks, and in this way is held 
accountable. The explicitly clarified and announced inflation targeting could 
facilitate better central bank communication, and also accountability.
10
 Additionally, 
it is argued that numerical targeting encouraged more independent central bank 
instruments, moving thus towards the optimal conduct of monetary policy in 
practice.
11
 
 
Specific domestic conditions had imposed particular requirements upon central 
banks in Japan and China. For example, in the 1990s, Japan’s domestic banking 
crisis required the BOJ to seek a more stable payment and settlement system.
12
 In 
addition, Japan had been challenged by negative inflation or deflation after 
experiencing a bubble-burst cycle. The implications of maintaining price stability 
were thus different for the BOJ when compared to inflation control efforts by other 
central banks. As described in Chapter Six, the Diet, Cabinet and MOF have 
continued to control the BOJ in different degrees, so the BOJ was still under direct 
political control when pursuing economic development.
13
   
 
As explained, China’s market-oriented reforms were essential to understanding the 
statutory goals of the PBC. First, capital accounts have not been fully liberalized in 
China, and thus, the PBC, along with the SAFE, still controls exchange rates, 
requiring the balancing of domestic and foreign transactions. The PBC has thus been 
required to maintain domestic currency value.
14
 Secondly, China’s dual-track pricing 
                                                          
9
 In 1999, the Price Stability Act was proposed to mandate the US Fed to target an explicit numerical 
inflation rate. The reform failed, but triggered further discussions about the optimal target for a central 
bank to conduct monetary policy. Willem Thorbecke, ‘A Dual Mandate for the Federal Reserve’ 
Public Policy Brief Highlights, No 60A, 2003 <www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/hili60a.pdf>. 
10
 Supra 1. 
11
 Alexander Mihailov, ‘Instrument Independence with Goal Dependence: Lessons from the Bank of 
England’s Reaction Function’ (August 2007) 
<www.personal.reading.ac.uk/~les05am/InstrIndepGoalDepBoERnFnJAShAMS070831.pdf>. 
12
 Solid systems of payment and settlement system have been encouraged globally. BIS, ‘Core 
Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems: Report of the Task Force on Payment 
System Principles and Practices’ BIS Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Consultative 
Report, CPSS Publications No 43, 2001 <www.bis.org/publ/cpss43.pdf>. 
13
 Maurice Wright, ‘Who Governs Japan? Politicians and Bureaucrats in the Policy-making Processes’ 
(1999) Political Studies 47(5): 939-954. 
14
 Hassanali Mehran, Monetary and Exchange System Reforms in China: An Experiment in 
Gradualism (Washington DC: IMF 1996) 55-63. 
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system has allowed the NDRC to control overall price levels, whilst the PBC is only 
one of several government departments responsible for fostering price stability.
15
 
The NDRC is also in charge of setting the goals for long-term economic 
development and macroeconomic management, giving it a leading role within 
China’s political hierarchy, compelling the PBC to operate within such plans.16 As a 
result, statutory objectives for the PBC bear the features of economic transition and 
political direction. 
 
In summary, all four central banks discussed here do not have goal independence, 
and in the context of convergence, certain important differences remain. In addition 
to monetary policy objectives, central banks work together with other responsible 
agencies to pursue other particular government goals. These case studies suggest that 
the government’s authority is either relatively explicitly (as in the UK and China) or 
implicitly determined (as in the US and Japan). Both the BOJ and the PBC, being 
government-oriented central banks, were first required to deal with their respective 
domestic problems, whilst also serving their governments’ overarching development 
strategies.  
 
9.2.1.2 Comparing Organizational Structures of the Central Banks 
 
The institutional structures of central banks vary across countries. They are 
determined by a combination of factors, including geographic size, political systems, 
cultural traditions, and so forth. The previous chapters have identified different legal 
provisions, compared in Table 9.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 World Bank, ‘Price Reform in China’ World Bank, Report No 10414-CHA, May 28, 1992. 
16
 <http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfndrc/default.htm>. 
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Table 9.2:   Comparing Central Bank Organizational Structures 
Central 
Bank 
Constitution and 
Appointment 
Monetary Policy Making 
 
 
Constitution 
 
Function 
 
 
US Fed 
 
Board: 7 members, 
including Chairman and 
Vice Chairmen, 
nominated by the 
President and confirmed 
by the Senate  
 
 
Federal Open Market 
Committee: Board members, 
FRBNY’s President, and 4 out 
of the other 11 FRB presidents 
on a rotating basis  
 
 
Decision-
making body 
 
 
 
BOE 
 
Court of Directors 
appointed by the Crown, 
9 directors as non-
executive with one 
designated by the 
Chancellor of the 
Exchequer as Chairman  
 
 
Monetary Policy Committee: 
Governor, 2 Deputy Governors, 
Chief Economist and Executive 
Director as executive members; 
4 external members directly 
appointed by the Chancellor:  
HM Treasury representative 
without voting rights 
 
Decision-
making body 
 
 
 
BOJ 
 
Governor, 2 deputy 
governors, 6 deliberative 
members of the Policy 
Board, up to 3 auditors 
appointed by the 
Cabinet, up to 6 
executive directors and 
certain advisors 
appointed by the MOF 
on the BOJ’s 
recommendation 
 
Monetary Policy Board:  
Governor, deputy governors 
and 6 deliberative members 
selected by the Cabinet with the 
consent of both Houses of the 
Diet 
 
Decision-
making body  
 
PBC 
 
Governor appointed by 
the Premier of the State 
Council, and confirmed 
by the NPC/its Standing 
Committee; certain 
deputy governors 
appointed or removed by 
the Premier of the State 
Council. 
 
Monetary Policy Committee: 
Governor, SAFE Director, and 
CSRS Chairman as ex-officio 
members; other members 
nominated by the PBC and 
appointed by the State Council 
 
Consultative 
body 
 
 
How a central bank is organized, including its constitution and key personnel, is 
outlined through legislation, but the PBC Law 2003 did not specify how central 
bankers were appointed. Since all four central banks studied have established 
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divisions for conducting monetary policy, Table 9.2 also compares their respective 
arrangements. In theory, government can exercise leverage over the central bank 
through controlling the appointment of senior bank officers; decisions on their tenure 
indicate the varying degrees of government’s influence.17 The MOF maintained a 
strong presence by selecting some executive members for the BOJ, while in China, 
both the NPC (or its Standing Committee) and the State Council controlled resource 
allocation.   
 
It is argued that on average, group can make better decisions than individuals, 
without being slower in reaching decisions, so differently named specialized 
divisions have recently been established to control monetary policy making.
18
 The 
four case studies nevertheless identify differences in their respective organizational 
structures. In terms of legal status, only the PBC-MPC was a consultative body, the 
others actually formulating monetary policies. Both the BOE and the PBC had 
representatives from financial ministries, but representatives in the PBC had voting 
rights. With many other government departments’ representatives occupying key 
positions, the PBC-MPC could only pronounce once necessary political 
compromises had been reached. Furthermore, such divisions can be divided into 
individual or collegial committees, leading to different protocols of decision 
making.
19
 The BOE-MPC was a typical specialised committee, where all members 
could voice their own opinions, acted on them by voting, and decisions were made 
by majority vote. The FOMC was a collegial committee, where members agreed in 
advance that their individual opinions must be subordinated to the common good. In 
particular, under the Greenspan’s Chairmanship of the US Fed, the consensus was 
assumedly based on his own preference informed or influenced by views of other 
senior members.
20
 In regard to the BOJ’s Board, it began to operate on a more 
                                                          
17
 Robin Bade and Michael Parkin, ‘Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy’ (October 1988) 
<http://economics.uwo.ca/people/parkin_docs/CentralBankLaws.pdf>. 
18
 Alan S. Blinder and John Morgan, ‘Are Two Heads Better than One?: Monetary Policy by 
Committee’ (2005) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 37(5): 789-811. 
19
 Alessanro Riboni and Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, ‘Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, 
Chairman Dominance, or Single Majority’ (2010) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(1): 363-
416. 
20
 Another type of committee is the genuinely-collegial committee, allowing members to argue for 
difference behind “closed doors” before the group decision is achieved. The ECB has approached 
monetary policies similar to this way.  
 297 
 
individual basis after the 1996 Big-Bang reform.
21
 In China, a simple two thirds 
majority was required, while recommendations, or/and meeting notes had to be 
prepared when the PBC reported to the State Council regarding the monetary base, 
interest rates and other important decisions.
22
 Different types of committees affect 
how central banks communicate with their stakeholders.
23
 For example, the FOMC 
published terse statements after its meetings, but its subsequent minutes provided 
more detailed explanations. By contrast, existing legislation and other relevant rules 
do not clarify the requirements for communication, accountability and credibility for 
the PBC-MPC.
24
 The other issue here worth noting concerns how the BOE-MPC 
subscribed to the goal of quantitative numerical inflation targeting, elsewhere 
claimed to have improved central bank independence and transparency.
25
 
 
It has been argued that well-structured institutional arrangements can ensure that 
committee members remain adequately informed of both macro and micro economic 
information before making major decisions. Accordingly, an optimal model has been 
suggested, which incorporates clear objectives, as well as ensuring independence 
with measures to avoid free-riding.
26
 The above comparison makes it clear that an 
essential step required to improve the PBC’s independence would be to grant its 
MPC full policy-making authority. 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 Alan S. Blinder, The Quiet Revolution: Central Banking Goes Modern (New Haven: Yale 
University Press 2004). 
22
 
<www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/huobizhengceersi/3421/2010/20100915170700606910707/2010091517070
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23
 Alan S. Blinder, ‘Central Bank Talk: Committee Structure and Communication Policy’ for the 
ASSA Meetings, Philadelphia, January 9, 2005  
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 For an empirical survey, refer to, Anita Tuladhar, ‘Governance Structures and Decision-Making 
Roles in Inflation Targeting Central Banks’ IMF Working Paper, WP/05/183, 2005 
<http://211.253.40.86/mille/service/ERS/10000/IMG/000000004811/wp05183.pdf>.  
26
 Philipp Maier, ‘How Central Banks Take Decisions: An Analysis of Monetary Policy Meetings’ in 
Pierre L. Siklos, Martin T. Bohl, and Mark E. Wohar (eds.), Challenges in Central Banking: The 
Current Institutional Environment and Forces Affecting Monetary Policy (CUP 2010) 320-356. 
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9.2.1.3 Comparing Monetary Policy Instruments of Central Banks 
 
The way that central banks affect financial markets has gradually shifted from the 
use of direct tools towards indirect means. As illustrated in Table 9.3, all four central 
banks had employed similar indirect monetary policy instruments, but the PBC also 
continued to use various direct controls. 
Table 9.3: Comparing Monetary Policy Instruments under Legal Provisions 
 
Central 
Bank 
 
 
Monetary Policy Instruments 
 
US Fed 
 
OMOs, reserve requirements, discount rate, and window discount lending 
 
 
BOE 
 
OMOs, reserve requirements, Bank Rates 
 
 
BOJ 
 
OMOs, reserve requirements, Rates policy (window guidance, abolished in 
1994) 
 
 
PBC 
 
OMOs, reserve requirements, interest rates policy, and window guidance 
 
 
 
From Table 9.3, it is evident that central bank laws have specified limited monetary 
policy tools available to them, and these were similar, except for “window guidance” 
by the BOJ and the PBC. The limited choice of policy instruments is largely 
attributable to their specified objectives regarding monetary stability.
27
 Beyond 
legislation, however, the PBC could employ more direct tools; “window guidance” 
was only one explicit example of these. As previously observed, window guidance 
operated more effectively through China’s political hierarchy, while the PBC 
continued to rely upon quantity-based and non-central bank instruments to conduct 
monetary policy. Its direct controls could be summarised as: (i) guiding interest rates 
setting of commercial banks; (ii) controlling, with other government departments, 
exchange rates and capital accounts; (iii) controlling extensive dual-track systems in 
the context of the co-existing centralized planning and rigorously-controlled market 
                                                          
27
 Karl R. Bopp, ‘Central Banking Objectives, Guides and Measures’ (1954) The Journal of Finance 
19(1): 12-22. 
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principles; and (iv) legally supporting the SOCBs, providing selected subsidies, and 
supporting local governments and one policy bank, among continued bias toward the 
state-owned sectors.   
 
Therefore, apart from legal provisions, the PBC still controlled China’s partially-
liberalized financial markets through both explicit and implicit tools, which would 
arguably best be replaced by fully implemented indirect monetary policy instruments; 
this was a leading target for China’s market-oriented reformers.28 
 
9.2.1.4 Comparing Financial Regulation and Supervision by Central Banks  
 
The role played by central banks in overseeing financial markets has triggered 
continuous discussions. In certain countries, such duties have been transferred to 
outside responsible agencies, but central banks were still in charge of certain 
facilities linked with systemic stability. The patterns of legal responses observed here 
are demonstrated in Table 9.4: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
28
 Paul Hilbers, ‘Monetary Instruments and Their Use during the Transition from a Centrally Planned 
to a Market Economy’ IMF Working Paper, WP/93/ 87 C, 1993 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=883397> 
[in Chinese]. 
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Table 9.4: Comparing Financial Regulation and Supervision 
 
Central 
Bank 
Financial 
Stability as 
Legislative 
Objective 
 
 
Regulation and Supervision 
Approaches 
 
Internal 
Responsible 
Division 
 
External 
Responsible 
Agency 
 
US Fed 
 
Nil 
 
A dual federal-state system; 
US Fed conducted umbrella 
supervision as a consolidated 
supervisor, focusing on 
reporting requirements, 
examination, capital 
oversight, enforcement 
powers, and sharing 
information with other 
primary or functional 
regulators 
 
 
Nil 
 
Functional 
regulators at 
federal and 
state levels 
 
BOE 
 
Nil 
 
Tripartite: BOE, FSA and 
HM Treasury 
 
 
Financial 
Stability 
Division 
 
 
FSA 
 
BOJ 
 
 
Nil 
 
BOJ controlled on-site 
examination and off-site 
monitoring 
 
 
Nil 
 
FSA 
 
PBC 
 
Yes 
 
PBC controlled coordinated 
financial development, 
information disclosure, 
business conduct 
supervision, examination into 
troubled institutions, etc. 
 
 
Financial 
Stability 
Bureau 
 
CBRC, 
CIRC and 
CSRC 
 
 
The design of regulation and supervision suggests how governments affect financial 
markets. The legislation has often outlined such roles from the perspectives of 
institutional structures and approaches. Table 9.4 helps explain the relative 
importance of financial stability as a leading statutory requirement for the respective 
central banks considered here. Only the PBC had financial stability as an explicit 
statutory objective, others having more implicit roles tying financial stability into 
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broader economic development goals.
29
 Financial stability arguably requires ex ante 
prevention and ex post management of financial crises. Central banks can reduce 
financial instability through requisite monetary policy, especially in the event of 
liquidity crises. It is contended that maintaining financial stability has often been, 
and possibly always will be, a fundamental objective of central banks with or 
without the existence of legal provisions to this effect.
30
 The table above also makes 
it evident that the clarification of financial stability had few clear linkages with the 
establishment of a responsible division within the central bank.   
 
Furthermore, none central banks had sole authority for financial regulation and 
supervision. The UK led the trend of uniform financial oversight under a single 
agency. In this model, the character of the central bank affects cooperative 
arrangements with other sectors: a strong central bank reduces unification.
31
 Both in 
the US and the UK, risk-based prudential regulation had been further developed. 
However, financial regulators and supervisors in Japan and China still used direct 
approaches when managing their respective domestic problems. The Japanese 
regime emerged after a severe domestic banking crisis, dealing with NPLs and banks’ 
failures at the firm level. In China, there still existed clear boundaries between 
banking, insurance and securities sectors, leading to the rigorously enforced 
differences between sector-based responsible bodies;
32
 direct and political controls 
were maintained throughout partial and incomplete financial liberalization.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 Roger W. Ferguson, ‘Should Financial Stability Be An Explicit Central Bank Objective?’ for the 
Conference at the IMF “Challenges to Central Banking from Globalized Financial Systems”, 
Washington DC, September 16-17, 2002 
<www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Speeches/2002/20021016/default.htm>. 
30
 BIS, Issues in the Governance of Central Banks: A Report from the Central Bank Governance 
Group (Basel: BIS 2009) 5-55. 
31
 It is named “central bank fragmentation effect”. Refer to, Donato Masciandaro, ‘Divide et Impera: 
Financial Supervision Unification and Central Bank Fragment Effect’ (2007) European Journal of 
Political Economic 23(2): 285-315, and ‘Politicians and Financial Supervision Unification outside the 
Central Bank: Why do They do It?’ 5 Journal of Financial Stability 2009: 124-146. 
32
 Having both shortcomings and advantages, it was suggested that for emerging and transition 
economies, separate responsible bodies would be a favourable choice. C.A.E. Goodhart, ‘The 
Organizational Structure of Banking Supervision’ (2003) Economic Notes 31(1): 1-32. 
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9.2.1.5 Comparing Central Bank Independence 
 
As stated in Chapter Two, central bank independence is a most significant indictor of 
the relationship between a central bank and its government. While both transparency 
and credibility can be beneficial, it is never absolute. In the late 20
th
 century, most 
central banks obtained operational independence, further protected through written 
statues. Table 9.5 compares respective independence levels of those four central 
banks. 
Table 9.5: Comparing Central Bank Independence 
 
Central 
Bank 
 
Legal Provision 
 
 
Accountability 
 
Transparency 
 
 
US Fed 
 
Independence 
within  
Government 
 
Accountable to the 
Congress and the public 
 
A full range of detailed 
information concerning its 
policy actions, operations, 
and financial accounts 
 
 
BOE 
 
Operational 
Independence 
 
 
Via the House of 
Commons Treasury 
Committee 
 
Regular and ad hoc 
publications, educational 
materials, MPC publications 
 
 
 
BOJ 
 
Operational 
Independence 
 
Accountable to the Diet 
regularly and on request, 
with the MOF as the 
bridge 
 
Clarifying its decisions and 
opinions or votes; 
publications released in 
accordance with detailed 
requirements about timing 
and contents 
 
 
PBC 
 
Operational 
Independence 
 
 
Dual-subjection to the 
NPC and the State 
Council  
 
Part of the programme of 
“making government affairs 
open to the public”* 
 
  
Note:  
*‘Making government affairs open to the public/yangguang zhengwu’ was a programme 
launched by China’s government around mid-2000, aiming at promoting transparency and 
incorruptness.  For general information, refer to, 
<http://news.163.com/12/0416/09/7V711BQR0001124J.html>  
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Table 9.5 deals with the issue of central bank independence. In addition to clear 
stipulation, legislation has also clarified required accountability—which 
agency/agencies it is held accountable to—and transparency—how it communicates 
with the stakeholders. As this table shows, all four central banks claimed operational 
independence, but still faced different requirements concerning accountability and 
transparency as a consequence of varying political interventions. The MOF still 
intermediated between the BOJ and the Diet, while the PBC remained subject to both 
the NPC and the State Council. To summarise the relevant findings, other 
agency/agencies still influence central banks’ autonomy by: (i) setting monetary 
policy targets; (ii) setting other statutory objectives; (iii) appointing key members; 
and (iv) directly engaging in designing and implementing due monetary policy.  
 
Central bank independence was not uniformly constituted. Where market-oriented 
central banks were founded as private corporations, government-controlled central 
banks maintained close relationships with their respective governments, especially 
through their finance ministries. Extreme events could nevertheless invite radical 
changes. Due to World War II, the BOJ Act 1942 brought the BOJ further under the 
MOF control, the BOE was nationalized in 1946, whereas the US Fed gained more 
independence after the 1951 Accord. Therefore, the initial role played by 
governments, as well as any centralization and nationalization associated with 
extreme events, significantly influenced actual central bank independence.  
 
As argued in Chapter Two, central bank independence in a transitional economy is 
more likely to be affected by de facto circumstances, especially ongoing government 
intervention.
33
 Some time after its founding, the PBC operated as a mono-bank in a 
centralized planning economy, ending up as the cashier and accountant for the MOF. 
With market-oriented reform, it has been gradually re-oriented as a state central bank 
operating in the context of incomplete financial liberalization with an 
underdeveloped legal system. As detailed in the case studies earlier, insufficient 
                                                          
33
 Most existing studies about central banks in transition and emerging countries do not include the 
analysis of the PBC. For example, Helmut Wagner, ‘Central Banking in Transition Countries’ IMF 
Working Papers, WP/98/126, 1998 <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp98126.pdf>; Thorsten Beck, 
Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine, ‘A New Database on the Structure and Development of the 
Financial Sector’ World Bank Financial Sector Discussion Paper No 2, September 1999 
<www1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/fs02_web.pdf>.  
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transparency is continuously a serious challenge for the Chinese legal system.
34
 The 
real level of central bank independence needs to be examined beyond the authority 
of rules and laws. Relevant legal provisions explicitly prescribed dual subjection, 
while other government agencies were authorized to impinge upon monetary policy 
making via the MPC, and local political authorities could directly affect subsequent 
policy implementation. In a word, legal rules ensured that the PBC worked as one 
executive body of the State Council, and other direct intervention from both central 
and local governments affected the making and conduct of monetary policy. 
 
9.2.1.6 What Two-Tier Relationship Means for Prevailing Legal Frameworks 
 
The previously discussed comparisons have explored patterns of convergence and 
divergence emerging from the legal frameworks governing central banks. Within this 
co-existence, certain subtle differences are evident, whilst others are more 
pronounced. Inter alia, central bank independence cannot be understood without 
taking into account other influencing factors besides legal provisions. Overall, 
market-oriented central banks have performed their responsibilities with operational 
independence backed by specified accountability and transparency; rules and laws 
have explicitly set the limits of government influence. By contrast, government-
oriented central banks, such as the BOJ and the PBC, were under more direct 
political controls, even though operational independence was also written into their 
statutes. Especially, a number of other political agencies have been authorized by 
law to participate in and affect monetary policy making with the PBC. Apart from 
the tasks specified by economic transition, it is questionable whether statutes in 
China really intend to grant the PBC genuine independence, or even more likely to 
maintain political controls. 
 
In terms of central banks’ relationships with financial markets, indirect policy 
instruments appear particularly similar, while the PBC also still used direct controls. 
In addition to lawful window guidance, partial liberalization facilitated eligible direct 
                                                          
34
 There are some studies about government transparency and corruption in China. But China is 
absent from most surveys regarding transparency in the financial marker, including central bank 
independence. For example, there is no information about China in the IMF’s Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs), and also its 2012 survey of fiscal transparency and 
accountability. 
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monetary policy instruments, and also changed operational conduct. Moreover, it is 
obvious that great divergence arose from how financial regulation and supervision 
were arranged and approached in the four different countries. In pursuing risk-based 
prudential regulation, the US Fed and the BOE had different arrangements: the 
multi-agency pattern derived from the dual-chartering banking system in the US, 
whilst with the establishment of the FSA, the BOE was more a monetary authority 
than a financial regulator. Domestic circumstances directed the focuses of financial 
surveillance for the government-controlled BOJ and PBC. The PBC was explicitly 
required to pursue financial stability, but the lack of significant systemic risk made 
this statutory goal relatively superficial; and financial sector underdevelopment led 
towards sector-based regulation. 
 
As illustrated in the previous chapters, key propositions about the market or 
government orientation of these four central banks were tested by analysing their 
respective legal frameworks. Market-oriented US Fed and BOE came under indirect 
government oversight, and affected markets via indirect policy means and prudential 
regulation. Moreover, the distinction between the US Fed and the BOE lay mainly in 
their respective institutional structures: the FOMC was a collegial committee, but the 
BOE-MPC was more specialized, while financial regulatory and supervisory duties 
were separately distributed among different regulators. In comparison, government-
controlled central banks had limited operational independence and their interaction 
with financial sectors was more direct. To summarize, despite similar legal 
provisions, differences were created by the nature of their particular relationships 
with government and with the market. Under co-existing convergence and 
divergence, therefore, the four central banks actually operated with different levels 
of independence and different distances from financial markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 306 
 
9.2.2 Comparing Central Bank Regulation to Achieve Financial Stability 
 
The GFC has obliged central banks to review their preferred crisis management 
solutions, and their two-tier relationships have come under challenge. After 
comparing their responses during the last few years, this section will address the 
following issues:  
(i) similarities in the use of statutory policy tools for crisis management coexisted 
with differences in legal frameworks;  
(ii) during the GFC, selected monetary policies varied, bringing about different 
outcomes; and  
(iii) in seeking solutions to the GFC, legal reforms took different formats across 
these countries.  
 
9.2.2.1 Comparing Legal Approaches to Crisis Management  
 
It was demonstrated in Chapter Two that financial crises triggered certain policy 
responses from central banks and beyond; these were described as crisis 
management solutions. According to their respective legal frameworks, these 
different responses are compared in Table 9.6. 
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Table 9.6: Comparing Statutory Crisis Management Solutions  
 
Country 
 
 
LOLR 
 
Deposit Insurance 
 
Bankruptcy Proceeding 
 
US 
 
US Fed could conduct 
extended LOLR, 
especially under 
Sections 10(a) and (b), 
13(3) of Federal 
Reserve Act 
 
 
FDIC controlled explicit 
deposit insurance 
 
Within special 
arrangements for banks’ 
bankruptcy, the FDIC was 
often pointed as the 
receiver for failed banks 
 
UK 
 
BOE could provide 
temporary, short-term 
liquidity assistance 
under SMF 
 
 
FSCS controlled explicit 
deposit insurance 
 
Banks’ bankruptcy was 
dealt with under the same 
rules for other 
companies* 
 
 
Japan 
 
BOJ had limited LOLR 
after the Big-Bang 
reform 
 
 
DIC controlled explicit 
deposit insurance 
 
Prompt Corrective Action: 
special public control was 
exercised over insolvent 
banks by a government-
managed bridge bank 
 
China 
 
PBC was responsible 
for subsidiaries, 
lending to SOCBs, 
local governments and 
one policy bank 
 
 
No programmes or 
legislations existed 
about deposit insurance  
 
No official arrangements 
for banks’ bankruptcy 
 
Notes: 
*Bankruptcy in the UK does not have a singular law: one system for England and Wales, 
one for Northern Ireland, and one for Scotland; refer to <www.gov.uk/bankruptcy>. 
 
 
Table 9.6 displays the respective arrangements in the selected countries regarding ex 
post mechanisms for crisis management. Without exception, all four central banks 
were required to support market liquidity via the LOLR mechanisms, but other 
facilities varied. As illustrated in this table, statutes specified how they could each 
inject capital into the markets in the case of liquidity shortage. Chapter Four showed 
that the US Fed had gradually expanded its LOLR facilities in exigent and unusual 
circumstances, especially after the 1930s Great Depression had brought intense 
criticism about it being ill-prepared to provide necessary liquidity support. In 
contrast, before formalizing its regulation and supervision, the BOE approached the 
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private sector for funds whilst adopting a self-regulation approach. When demand for 
support went beyond its capacity, the BOE needed to be assisted with public funds 
under the charge of the finance ministry; this explains the role played by HM 
Treasury in the UK’s tripartite model. In Japan, central bank law enabled the Prime 
Minister and the MOF to request the BOJ to broaden its lending, while loans were 
legally constrained regarding NPLs and bank failures. In terms of China, neither 
deposit insurance nor bank bankruptcy arrangements were governed by formal rules 
or laws.
35
 The PBC loans were legally guaranteed to support the state sector, 
continuing direct control at the firm level.
36
 
 
9.2.2.2 Comparing Central Banks’ Crisis Management during the GFC 
 
Central banks could function towards financial stability via bank lending and 
deposits,
37
 as illustrated in the previous case studies. Their overall conduct during 
the GFC has been summarised in Table 9.7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35
 It is argued that China has continued an implicit deposit insurance programme, guaranteed by 
central government or the PBC. With further reform, it should be replaced by an explicit one. For 
details, refer to, Patrick Honohan, ‘Protecting Depositors in China’ in Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt, Edward 
James Kane and Luc Laeven (eds.), Deposit Insurance Around the World: Issues of Design and 
Implementation (MA: MIT Press 2008) 335-355. 
36
 <www.chinabaike.com/law/zhishi../cs/qt/1433474.html>. Also, existing programmes in advanced 
countries might not be applicable in China, due to its predominant state-ownership in the financial 
sector. See, Michael Faure and Jiye Hu, ‘Towards a Deposit Guarantee Insurance in China? A Law 
and Economics Perspective’ (2013) The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 1(2): 256-288. 
37
 Jeremy C. Stein, ‘Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation’ (2012) The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 127(1): 57-95. 
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Table 9.7: Comparing Central Bank Actions and Policies in US, UK, Japan and 
China during the GFC 
  
US 
 
UK 
 
Japan 
 
China 
 
Pre-conditions 
 
Great moderation: low interest 
and inflation rates, stable GDP 
growth; 
Banking sector developed to a 
“initiate-and-distribute” model; 
Subprime mortgage expanded 
with securitizations and structured 
products 
 
A short-lived 
recovery from 
the bubble-
bursting cycle; 
Banking sector 
had been 
recapitalized 
 
 
Economic reform 
developed with 
speedy GDP 
growth; 
Domestic 
financial 
liberalization 
was uncompleted 
 
Transmissions 
Channel 
 
Domestic 
subprime 
mortgage crisis 
quickly 
accelerate into a 
financial crisis. 
 
International 
financial links 
 
Exports and 
credit crunch in 
international 
capital markets 
 
Exports and FDIs 
reduction 
Fiscal Stimulus  
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
Conventional 
monetary 
policy 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
UMPs 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
X 
 
Statutory 
Objectives of 
Central Banks 
 
To maintain 
stable prices 
and moderate 
long-term 
interest rates; 
To maximize 
employment 
and support 
economic 
development 
 
To achieve the 
2% inflation 
rate target and 
support 
Government’s 
economic 
policy 
 
To maintain 
price stability, 
support 
economic 
development 
and a sound 
payment and 
settlement 
system 
 
To maintain 
currency value 
and support 
economic 
development 
 
Outcome* 
             
              X 
Unemployment 
rate over 7% 
until end-2013;  
Federal Funds 
Rates 
maintained at 
0.25% 
 
           
           X 
MPC failed to 
meet its target 
since March 
2008;  
Bank Rates 
maintained at 
0.5% 
             
              X 
Deflation and 
stagnant 
economy 
continue to be 
the most 
critical 
challenge; 
interest rate 
maintained at 
0%  
 
√ 
China achieved 
stipulated GDP 
growth targets 
both in 2008 and 
2009; a higher 
economic growth 
rate from January 
2010 
 
Note: 
*For the convenience of comparison, the outcomes are only examined in terms of whether the 
state central banks have met their statutory goals. 
 310 
 
Table 9.7 lists relevant important features regarding the respective experiences of 
these four countries before and during the GFC. By and large, variations can be 
identified in regard to how they were affected by this crisis, as well as the outcome 
following the use of their selected responses. Prior to the GFC, all four countries had 
different macroeconomic conditions, despite the increasing impact of integration and 
globalization. The US and the UK were both in the “great moderation” era, while 
Japan had already made effort to recover from a bubble-burst cycle. With more 
promising GDP growth, China pursued market-oriented reform. Both Japan and 
China had developed exporting-led growth, rendering them vulnerable to external 
financial shocks; this mainly explains the transmission channels through which they 
were subject to the GFC contagion. 
 
With different sizes and orientations, a combination of fiscal and monetary 
expansion is globally prevailing; in terms of monetary policy, central banks’ 
responses reveal both convergence and divergence in management styles. First, the 
PBC pursued proactive risk management, including interest rates cuts, reduced 
OMOs and greater employment of window guidance, well before exports and FDIs 
fell; proactive solutions from the BOJ concentrated upon cross-border cooperation. 
Secondly, the case evidence shows the extensive use of unconventional monetary 
policy (UMP) by the US Fed, BOE and BOJ, as illustrated in Table 9.8.  
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Table 9.8: Selected Financial Rescue Efforts in China, Japan, UK, and US from 
October to December 2008 
 
Packages 
 
 
China 
 
Japan 
 
UK 
 
US 
 
Increased Guarantee 
of Private Deposits 
 
   
£50,000 
billion 
 
FDIC 
$250,000 billion 
 
Guarantees for Bank 
Loans or Debt 
 
  
√ 
 
FSA 
√ 
 
SEC 
√ 
 
Fund to Purchase 
Commercial Papers 
 
    
√ 
 
Purchase Mortgage 
Bonds 
 
   
√ 
 
√ 
 
Ban or Restrict 
Short-selling 
 
  
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 
 
Capital  
Injections 
 
 
√* 
  
√ 
 
√ 
 
Options to Purchase 
Assets of  
Uncertain Value 
 
    
TARP 
√ 
 
Induced Mergers & 
Acquisitions 
 
 
√ 
  
√ 
 
√ 
 
IMF Emergency 
Lending 
 
    
 
Note: 
*The PBC is by law given the duty to lend directly to the SOCBs and beyond. 
 
 
According to Table 9.8,  in the US, UK and Japan, asset purchases expanded as the 
crisis deteriorated following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
and more untraditional instruments were considered once official interest rates 
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reached the near zero level after 2008.
38
 By contrast, the PBC largely replied upon 
conventional monetary policy, as well as upon its legal duty to support the banking 
sector, but fulfilled its statutory tasks of maintaining currency stability and furthering 
economic development. However, our case study of the PBC has suggested that it 
had revived the use of direct monetary tools and also suspended the process of 
domestic marketization as part of its crisis management solutions. The GFC actually 
constituted a breakpoint in China’s market-oriented reform efforts, and delayed 
further market liberalization, including exchange and interest rates. Table 9.8 
therefore exhibits two management styles conducted by these central banks: 
 (i) UMP tools, launched by the US Fed, BOE and BOJ, mainly refer to 
liquidity facilities supplied by central banks on extraordinary terms; in the 
context of near-zero interest rates, large-scale purchases of private sector 
credit assets and government bonds seek to ease capital flows;
39
 and 
(ii) PBC’s solutions include lawful direct and indirect monetary policy means, 
as well as other measures rooted in China’s economic transition. 
 
Both the UMP tools and the PBC’s solutions have further long-term implications. It 
is difficult to assess the effectiveness of individual UMP instruments because of 
varying financial conditions across economies, but certain policies are deemed more 
helpful than others.
40
 For example, central banks have succeeded in reducing the tail 
risks indicated by financial stress indicators, but the monetary complex has 
contracted, for they have engaged in major short-term transactions. Additionally, the 
UMP, similar to the safety net, would worsen the problem of moral hazard: central 
banks’ direct intervention, as in bailouts, might give banks and other financial 
institutions further incentives to make riskier investments.
41
 What is more, purchases 
of government bonds trigger particular arguments about their low rates of return but 
                                                          
38
 Turner Philip, ‘Central Banks, Liquidity, and the Banking Crisis’ in Griffith-Jones Stephany, 
Ocampo Jose Antonio and Stiglitz Joseph E. (eds.), Time for a Visible Hand: Lessons from the 2008 
World Financial Crisis (Oxford Scholarship Online, February 2010) 
<www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/economicsfinance/9780199578801/toc.html> 
Chapter 6. 
39
 Domanski Dietrich, ‘Exit from Unconventional Monetary Policy Measures and the Future of 
Central Bank Operational Frameworks’ BIS, 38th Economics Conference 2010. 
40
 Claudio Borio and Piti Disyatat, ‘Unconventional Monetary Policies: an Appraisal’ BIS Working 
Papers No 292, 2009 < www.bis.org/publ/work292.pdf>. 
41
 Emmanuel Farhi and Jean Tirole, ‘Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic 
Bailouts’ (2012) American Economic Review 102(1): 60-93. 
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higher risks from complicated portfolio compositions. Their effectiveness is more 
difficult to assess than the provisions of financial aid to the private sector, but 
governments could intervene more directly in the markets.
42
 The extensive 
employment of the UMP has raised concern about the balance sheets of central 
banks, questioning whether they could still offer emergency financial facilities once 
the next financial crisis arises, which would be more likely triggered by extensive 
asset purchases.
43
 Even so, it is argued that monetary responses are more potent in 
the event of financial distress than at other times: not only could they occur quickly, 
but have also successfully reduced the possibility of contraction effects in risk 
management.
44
 As a result of the UMP tools, the government, the central bank and 
the financial market have moved towards further interdependence in the US, UK and 
Japan. On the other hand, the problem of the PBC’s chosen solutions lies in its 
longer potential negative effects upon domestic market liberalization. In particular, 
the rise of direct government intervention has brought further uncertainty about 
China’s market-oriented reforms. 
 
The GFC was highly contagious, but each country had significantly different 
experiences. Initially, both Japan and China suffered contagion due to their own 
domestic vulnerabilities, while the US and UK were at the centre of wider financial 
upheavals. Monetary policy instruments were largely similar though still constrained 
by legislation, but the comparison has identified two particular strategies exercised 
by these central banks. After conducting their chosen measures, the US Fed, BOE 
and BOJ entered the unknown territory of central banking by exploring 
unprecedented monetary expansion. In terms of the PBC, with China’s limited losses, 
it was the only central bank here to have achieved its tasks as prescribed by law, but 
its “success” came under close scrutiny given that the government intensified direct 
intervention.  
 
 
                                                          
42
 Supra 40.  
43
 Thorvald Grung Moe, ‘Shadow Banking and the Limits of Central Bank Liquidity Support: How to 
Achieve a Better Balance between Global and Official Liquidity’ Levy Economics Institute of Bard 
College, Working Paper No 712, 2012 <www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_712.pdf>.  
44
 Mishkin Frederic S., ‘Is Monetary Policy Effective During Financial Crises?’ NBER Working 
Paper Series, No 14678, 2009 <www.nber.org/papers/w14678.pdf>. 
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9.2.2.3 Central Bank Reforms following the GFC 
 
The previous chapters argued that both the US and UK chose legal reforms to change 
their flawed financial systems once the GFC exposed various critical shortcomings 
and structural problems; however, in Japan and China, further rule making and law 
reforms have had different focuses. This part will argue that, in terms of statutory 
changes, divergence has become more apparent, as demonstrated in Table 9.9. 
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Table 9.9.: Comparing Legal Reforms of US Fed and BOE during the GFC 
 
Country 
 
 
Legal Reform 
 
Crisis Management 
Solutions 
 
Financial Stability 
 
US 
 
Economic Stimulus 
Act  2008 
 
Housing and 
Economic Recovery 
Act 2008  
 
 
Emergency 
Economic 
Stabilization Act 
2008 
 
American Recovery 
and Reinvestment 
Act 2009 
 
 
 
Dodd-Frank Act 
2010 
 
$152 billion expenditure at 
tax rebates and incentives 
 
Changing the rules 
regulating the GSEs, 
including Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac 
 
Troubled Asset Relief Plan: 
Treasury to purchase or 
insure “troubled assets”* 
 
 
$787 billion economic 
stimulus package 
 
 
 
 
US Fed clarified to link 
monetary policy with 
employment, and set a long-
term 2% inflation rate 
target; 
LOLR facilities were re-
regulated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maintaining and 
increasing employment 
immediately;  
Improving temporary 
relief programmes 
 
US Fed to control 
macro-prudential 
regulation of more 
financial institutions and 
focus upon systemic 
stability 
 
 
UK 
 
Banking Act 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial Services 
Act 2012 
 
Special Resolution Regime 
was introduced to deal with 
bank insolvency, and 
Special Resolution Unit was 
established within the BOE 
 
Dual mandate included 
flexible inflation targeting 
and government’s 
macroeconomic goals 
 
BOE was granted with a 
statutory objective for 
contributing to the 
maintenance of financial 
stability 
 
FSA was replaced by a  
“Twin-Peak” model 
controlling prudential 
policy and business 
conduct regulation; 
BOE to control macro-
and micro-prudential 
regulation under the 
leadership of HM 
Treasury 
 
 
 
 316 
 
Table 9.9: Comparing Legal Reforms of BOJ and PBC during the GFC 
 
Country 
 
 
Legal Reform 
 
Crisis Management 
Solutions 
 
Financial Stability 
 
Japan 
 
Japan Revitalization 
Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New Measures for 
Financial 
Facilitation; 
Act on Temporary 
Measures to 
Facilitate Financing 
for SMEs; 
Financial Function 
Strengthening Act 
(Amendment). 
 
 
BOJ introduced a numerical 
target for inflation rate, and 
reset monetary base as its 
target for money market 
operations;  
Council on Economic and 
Fiscal Policy monitored 
monetary policy 
 
FSA smoothed financial 
panics mainly through 
relaxed capital adequacy 
standards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BOJ controlled 
liquidity risk 
management 
surveillance; 
Macro-prudential 
regulation focuses 
upon financial 
imbalance 
 
Stress tests exercised 
by both BOJ and 
FSA 
 
China** 
 
Xingzheng Fagui;
45
 
Bumen Guizhang;
46
 
Guifanxing 
Wenjian
47
 
  
Collaboration 
mechanisms to be 
formalized between 
PBC and CBRC 
under State Council 
 
Notes: 
* The TARP has changed over time, and the Dodd-Frank Act reduced the amount of the 
authorized expenditures of ‘troubled assets’ from $700 billion to $475 billion.  
** China has a complex legal system, and Chapter Six has explained the legal authority and 
hierarchy therein.  
                                                          
45
 The State Council enacted a relevant legislation to regulate financial credit during the GFC, refer to, 
State Council, No 613 
<www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/tiaofasi/273/2013/20130305100536731178677/2013030510053673117867
7_.html>. 
46
 The PBC released three regulations between 2008 and 2014. PBC, Law Enforcement and 
Inspection Procedures of the PBC, No 1 [2010] 
www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/tiaofasi/274/2010/20100712150127980126616/20100712150127980126616
_.html>; PBC, Managing Payments and Settlements of Non-financial Firms, No 2 [2010] 
<www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/tiaofasi/274/2010/20100621164122767397231/2010062116412276739723
1_.html>; PBC, Financial Credit, No 1 [2013] 
<www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/tiaofasi/274/2013/20131203152618446381432/2013120315261844638143
2_.html>. 
47
 The PBC published more than one hundred Guifanxing Wenjian from mid-2008 to November 2013. 
More broadly, policies and regulations, from the PBC, CBRC, State Council and other responsible 
government departments, are numerous. Those with significant importance and relevance were cited 
in Chapters Seven and Eight, while most can be downloaded from the PBC’s website at 
<www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/tiaofasi/269/index.html>. 
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Based upon the pattern evident in Table 9.9, each country has released new rules and 
laws during the GFC; and some of these are directly linked with preferred crisis 
managements, whilst financial stability has been officially emphasized with different 
degrees of intensity. Legal reforms affecting central banks did occur in all four 
countries yet divergent approaches were clear. From the outset, varying losses 
caused by the GFC emphasised different requirements for legal changes, as well as 
diverse focuses. Severe banking failures and financial stress have questioned 
financial regulation and supervision systems in both the US and UK, leading to 
massive legal changes. Convergence became significant where systemic stability was 
emphasized in both countries, whilst macro-prudential regulation has been 
strengthened incrementally/step by step. However, the following divergences were 
evident: (i) the US Fed introduced a numerical target for the inflation rate while, 
after previous failures, the BOE was allowed to depart from its 2% inflation targeting; 
(ii) employment goals were reaffirmed for the US Fed’s operations, whilst the BOE 
has been required by HM Treasury to prioritize growth under its new remit since 
2013; and (iii) the US Fed is still a consolidated regulator and now has an extended 
scope over financial institutions, but more radical changes have occurred in the UK, 
characterised by re-locating the BOE as the oversight centre with overall 
responsibility for financial stability.   
 
As far as government-controlled central banks are concerned, legal changes, which 
were less bold, were intended to resolve domestic problems rather than focus upon 
the GFC itself. After a few years, Japan went back to the difficulty of dealing with 
deflation and a stagnant economy. Maintaining the division of tasks between the 
BOJ and FSA, the central bank continued to explore monetary expansion, and also 
introduced numerical inflation targeting goals, clarifying this so as to serve the 
government’s strategy aggressively. In China’s case, its limited losses reduced the 
need for legal reform, but new policies and regulations emerged. There is very clear 
evidence that the GFC has suspended China’s marketization, so, such as measures 
between 2010 and 2013 aimed at re-activating and continuing the reform but with 
limited progress.  
   
Overall, the GFC has created different requirements for legal reforms with varying 
focuses. Major statutory changes were directed to moving market-oriented central 
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banks towards a reinforced role in maintaining systemic stability, and thus, their 
legal reforms were directly linked to the GFC. By contrast, Japan and China enacted 
rules and laws to resolve their particular domestic problems, resulting in a more 
domestic-driven model pursuing changes. 
 
9.2.2.4 How the GFC Changed Central Banks’ Two-Tier Relationship 
 
In the previous case studies, we have shown that the two-tier relationships of all four 
central banks have been changed to varying degrees as a result of the GFC. 
Governments have explicitly increased their own powers to stabilize financial 
markets through sizeable fiscal stimulus packages, and implicitly acted to bring 
central banks under closer control. Without exception, joint rescues have been 
carried out by all central banks and their respective finance ministries. Moreover, 
new mandates explicitly required the BOE and BOJ to demonstrably support 
governmental economic goals; the US Fed and BOJ have purchased massive 
government bonds; monetary easing by the PBC actually supported the fiscal 
stimulus package. All these central banks have entwined their relationships with their 
financial markets, achieved either via the use of UMP tools or the PBC’s solution. 
Globally, macro-prudential regulation dealt with systemic risk, and was embraced 
particularly by both the US Fed and the BOE. In consequence, the GFC has 
enhanced the triangular relationship: the government and the central bank worked 
more closely towards controlling financial markets; and the changed two-tier 
relationship became characterised by reduced central bank independence and 
increased governmental intervention into markets.  
 
The GFC had at first enlarged the gaps between their legal frameworks and the two-
tier relationships governing those four central banks. Afterwards, these countries had 
different regards for legal orders: both the US and UK chose to acknowledge the 
amended two-tier relationships through statutory changes while, with more explicit 
government intervention, Japan and China focused more on their domestic problems. 
What is more, the market-oriented US Fed and BOE have continued to be under 
direct challenge from the GFC to restore financial stability. They pursued 
unprecedented asset purchases aimed at smoothing market liquidity, while legal 
reforms were directed to resolving previous shortcomings, making many reforms 
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crisis-driven. By contrast, government-controlled central banks had different 
priorities. External shocks brought Japan back to be critical of deflation and a 
stagnant economy, requiring further actions from the BOJ. To recover from the 
sluggish conditions in 2008/2009, the PBC reset direct tools, and reform measures 
gave way to crisis management solutions for restoring stability; these lacked 
consistency with China’s claimed market-oriented reform, and calls for deepening 
liberalisation so long as the effects of external shocks were reduced. From this point 
of view, reforms relating to the BOJ and PBC are more domestic-driven by 
comparison.  
 
All told, the GFC has brought different challenges to market-oriented and 
government-controlled central banks, leading to the above division of the post-crisis 
tasks. In response to the challenges created by the GFC, the commitment of the US 
Fed and BOE to market principles was secondary to restoring financial stability, 
while the government orientation of both the BOJ and PBC became even more 
evident. This is how the GFC amended their pre-existing (“old”) orientations 
respectively.  
 
 
9.2.3 Comparative Summary: Convergence, Divergence or Multiple 
Pathways? 
 
In principle, central banks are defined from their respective two-tier relationships. 
The two tiers are as follows: 
 the relationship between central bank and government, and 
 the relationship between central bank and market. 
 
The assumed propositions were tested with reference to their respective legal 
frameworks, which prescribe the character and conduct of central banks with regard 
to: 
 Objectives (monetary policy objectives and others); 
 Organizational structure; 
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 Direct and indirect monetary policy instruments;  
 Financial regulation and supervision (institutional structures and approaches);  
 Independence.  
 
Central banks seek and are required to make efforts to restore financial stability in 
the event of financial crises; the following facilities are available for this purpose: 
 Conventional and unconventional monetary policy employed as crisis 
management solutions;  
 Emergent financial support, such as the LOLR and bailouts.  
 
The different levels of convergence can be tabulated; Table 9.10 seeks to do this by 
covering all of the above items regarding central banks’ legal frameworks and their 
use of crisis management solutions during the GFC. 
Table 9.10: Comparing Legal Frameworks and Management Solutions in Four 
Central Banks 
  
Convergence in Legal Frameworks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Convergence 
 
in 
 
Crisis 
 
Management 
 
Solutions 
 
High 
 
 
Low 
 
 
 
High 
 
TYPE 1: 
 
Statutory design of multiple 
objectives with the primary 
goal for monetary stability; 
Legal provision for 
operational independence; 
Combination of fiscal and 
monetary stimulus during 
the GFC; 
Indirect monetary policy 
responses as crisis 
management 
 
TYPE 3: 
 
Other statutory objective(s) 
 
 
 
 
 
Low 
 
TYPE 2: 
 
LOLR facilities 
 
TYPE 4: 
 
Organizational structures; 
Direct and unconventional 
monetary policy instruments; 
Regulation and supervision 
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Table 9.10 provides an overall review of how the selected four central banks were 
similar to and different from each other. To present the patterns of convergence and 
divergence, the findings can be categorised into the following four types of 
responses evident at different times in their conduct: 
 Type 1-HH: high convergence in legal frameworks and high convergence in 
crisis management solutions. 
 
Under similar legal provisions, all four central banks conducted certain allied 
actions during the GFC. In principle, they have continued to take charge of 
monetary stability, and within the combined stimulus packages, limited 
lawful monetary policy means were first employed in response to market 
upheavals. 
 
 Type 2-HL: high convergence in legal frameworks but low convergence in 
crisis management solutions. 
 
All four central banks were similarly provided with the LOLR facilities, but 
their respective practices varied greatly during the GFC. For the US Fed, 
BOE and BOJ, the UMP originally derived from discretion granted under 
their statutory duties as a LOLR in the event of financial crises. For the PBC, 
it still directly controls the allocation of capital and manages income 
distribution, so that its solutions were only workable for a government-
controlled central bank in a semi-liberalized financial market.  
 
 Type 3-LH: low convergence in legal frameworks but high convergence in 
crisis management solutions. 
 
As detailed in Section 9.2.1.1, they had different objectives for the wider 
economy, but the GFC shifted all their attention towards dealing with market 
upheavals and restoring financial stability.  
 
 Type 4-LL: low convergence in legal frameworks and low convergence in 
crisis management solutions. 
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Their legal frameworks were not identical, with some aspects being 
prescribed differently by law, and their approaches to the GFC diverged. This 
type displays the most evident divergence that existed among the four central 
banks. Statutes defined their respective organizational arrangements and 
regulatory regimes. When dealing with financial instability, the PBC revived 
direct controls over the markets, and the other three employed widely UMP 
measures.  
 
From the above four types, obviously, convergence has co-existed with some 
divergence during the development of the four central banks. Before the GFC, with 
statutory operational independence, they all controlled monetary stability, a fixed 
toolbox of monetary policy instruments, and the LOLR facilities (as categorised in 
Type 1 and Type 2 above). In these selected countries, prior to the GFC, central 
banks were primarily in charge of monetary policy and also of financial regulation to 
some extent; the GFC has changed both sides of central bank regulation. After the 
BOJ pioneered the UMP tools, both the US Fed and BOE introduced and expanded 
innovative monetary policies; but differently, the PBC reapplied direct controls and 
suspended domestic liberalization in advance. The following evident differences 
include the distinction between the UMP tools and the PBC strategies, the focuses 
for legal reforms, the assignment of the post-crisis tasks, and especially the re-
arrangements of financial regulation and supervision; those are categorised in Type 4 
of Table 9.10 above.  
 
The most explicit difference emerged from their institutional structures and 
approaches toward financial regulation and supervision, as illustrated in Table 9.11 
below.  
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Table 9.11: National Arrangements for Financial Regulation and Supervision 
before the GFC 
 
Country 
 
 
Institutional Structure 
 
Regulation and Supervision 
Approach 
 
 
US 
 
At both Federal and State levels; 
US Fed was a consolidated regulator 
at the federal level 
 
 
Risk-based micro-prudential 
regulation 
 
UK 
 
FSA was the mega regulator, and 
BOE was in charge of LOLR 
facilities, as well as systemic 
stability 
 
 
Principle-based prudential 
regulation  
 
Japan 
 
FSA was the main regulator, and the 
BOJ controlled on-site examination, 
off-site monitoring and limited 
LOLR facilities 
 
 
Dealing with domestic changes of 
NPLs and bank failures; 
Oversight maintained at the firm 
level 
 
China 
 
Yihang Sanhui: PBC legally 
controlled monetary and financial 
stability, while CBRC, CIRC and 
CSRC controlled banking, insurance, 
and securities respectively 
 
 
Sector-based direct control mainly 
within political hierarchy 
 
 
As argued, there were historical reasons to explain the different focuses of the US 
Fed and the BOE as market-oriented central banks,
48
 while continued domestic 
challenges prompted the BOJ’s model, and partial liberalization, along with 
preliminary financial conglomerate, led to China’s choice of sector-based regulation. 
By the GFC, when conducting regulatory duties, their selected institutional 
structures and reforms were, and continue to be, different from one another, though 
macro-prudential policy has similarly been emphasized, as illustrated in Table 9.12.  
 
 
                                                          
48
 Dalvinder Singh, ‘The US Architecture of Bank Regulation and Supervision: Recent Reforms in 
Their Historical Context’ in John Raymond LaBrosse, Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal and Dalvinder 
Singh (eds.), Managing Risk in the Financial System (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 399-415. 
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Table 9.12: Reforming Financial Regulation and Supervision during the GFC 
 
Country 
 
Changed Institutional Structure 
 
Changed Approaches 
 
 
US 
 
FSOC was established to control systemic 
stability; 
OTS was abolished; 
US Fed extended its oversight scope 
 
 
Macro prudential regulation 
focused upon systemic 
stability 
 
UK 
 
FSA was abolished; 
PRA and FCA were established as a 
Twin-Peak model for prudential and 
conduct of business regulation; 
BOE embraced macro- and micro- 
prudential regulation, and banks’ failures 
 
Macro prudential regulation 
focused upon systemic 
stability; 
Banks’ failures began to be 
managed according to set rules 
under the SRU 
 
Japan 
 
Nil 
 
 
Macro prudential regulation 
claimed to control financial 
imbalance 
 
 
China 
 
Nil 
 
 
Political coordination 
mechanism 
 
 
Obviously, the more radical reforms in the UK sought to re-structure its entire 
oversight regime, while the US Fed was required by legislation to balance its duties 
as a LOLR and systemic regulator. By comparison, domestic economic situations 
had continuously specified priorities for the government-controlled central banks. 
The GFC has further renewed the debates about the optimal model for financial 
oversight; the bone of contention includes the division of responsible agencies, as 
well as their improved governance towards best practice of policy conduct,
49
 specific 
tools for macro-prudential regulation,
50
 and the criteria for effective monitoring,
51
 
among others. All such issues have continued from the pre-crisis period, but the GFC 
has challenged the respective significance. Inter alia, a systemic regulator was 
lacking before the GFC exposed the structural weaknesses of financial regulation 
                                                          
49
 Ross Levine, ‘The Governance of Financial Regulation: Reform Lessons from the Recent Crisis’ 
(2012) International Review of Finance 12(1): 39-56. 
50
 For a summary, refer to, Gabriele Galati and Richhild Moessner, ‘Macroprudential Policy—A 
Literature Review’ (2013) Journal of Economic Surveys 27(5): 846-878. 
51
 Steve Keen, ‘Hindsight on the Origins of the Global Financial Crisis’ inn Steven Keen (ed.), The 
Global Financial Crisis: What Have We Learnt? (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 111-125. 
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and supervision in the global arena, and thus, such a regulator should be introduced 
to focus upon the system-wider risk.
52
  
 
Implicitly, the relationship between the central bank and the government is more 
complicated than principal legal provision alone. Similar operational independence 
was granted by law, as illustrated in Type 1 of Table 9.10, but actual levels of 
autonomy distinguished market-oriented from government-controlled central banks. 
Less substantive differences existed between the US Fed and BOE, which has 
whereas been amplified by the GFC. For decades, without evident statutory changes, 
the US Fed maintained its independence within the government, but the BOE did not 
gain operational independence until the late 1990s with HM Treasury remaining 
influence upon both monetary policy and financial regulation. When it came to the 
GFC, the Dodd-Frank Act left central bank independence intact but with enhanced 
and extended transparency and oversight from both the Treasury and the GAO. In 
the UK, however, the power of HM Treasury was expanded by nationalizing private 
enterprises and leading the new regulation regime. In contrast, both the government-
controlled BOJ and the PBC came under further direct political control, but their 
statutes did not reflect their changed relationships with the governments. 
 
Overall, the GFC has enlarged certain divergences. Between the US Fed and BOE, 
more differences in independence and financial regulation regimes have become 
evident, while further gaps have emerged between market-oriented and government-
controlled central banks.  
 
Up until this point, this chapter has discussed the patterns of convergence and 
divergence, making horizontal comparisons above. Depending upon the time 
parameter, the two-tier relationship, essential to define a central bank, has changed 
due to the GFC:  
1. Before the GFC, the four central banks operated within similar legal 
frameworks, but actually with different levels of independence and at varying 
distances from financial markets. 
                                                          
52
 Roberta S. Karmel, ‘The Controversy over Systemic Risk Regulation’ Brooklyn Law School, Legal 
Studies Paper No 179, 2010 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1540691>. 
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2. During the GFC, crisis management solutions, including monetary policy 
adjustments and LOLR facilities, have simultaneously moved central banks 
towards government and financial markets. 
3. Following the GFC, reforms have intended to reconstitute their two-tier 
relationships. For market-oriented central banks, independence was still 
desirable with increasing focus upon systemic stability, but the BOJ and the 
PBC faced more domestic challenges than crisis-driven changes in the US 
and the UK.  
 
So far, as proved by the findings, it can be argued that the two-tier relationship is 
relatively dynamics. The GFC has presented that with convergent crisis management 
solutions, those four central banks had different focuses and approaches. In 
particular:  
1. With considerable independence, the US Fed has amended its authority to 
intervene directly into financial institutions and markets; regulatory reform 
promoted a macro-prudential approach toward systemic stability without 
changing the multiple-agency institutional structure. 
2. The BOE has continued to explore the feasibility of a central bank being 
financial regulator and supervisor. Radical legal reform has increased its 
power to maintain systemic stability but HM Treasury seeks to lead the 
central bank group. 
3. Facing domestic deflation and economic stagnation, the BOJ has continued to 
be guided by Government, and challenged to break the limits of monetary 
expansion for pursuing a sustainable recovery. 
4. China is primarily challenged to continue its market-oriented reform rather 
than deal with external shocks, while rising government intervention has 
questioned how far its liberalization can be. Inter alia, crisis management 
solutions from the PBC and beyond have brought further uncertainty apart 
from certain immediate benefits. 
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To summarise, within similar legal frameworks, those four central banks have 
operated, during the GFC, around different relationships with both the governments 
and the markets; they relied upon different approaches and focuses to restore 
financial stability; and accordingly, their two-tier relationships have been affected 
differently by the GFC.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
9.3 Implications to be drawn from this Comparative Analysis 
 
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated the detailed co-existence of convergence 
and divergence among all four central banks. This section will seek to explore some 
further effects that the GFC posed for central banks. 
 
 
9.3.1 Rule of Law or Rule of Central Bankers?  
 
This study has concentrated upon rule-based legal frameworks to assess central bank 
regulation towards financial stability. Individual propositions were established by 
comparing “old” legal frameworks with recent changes arising from the GFC. 
However, other historical evidence has already shown significant differences 
between the US Fed, BOE, BOJ and PBC in their pursuit of changes through rule 
makings and law reforms; this is further illustrated in Table 9.13.   
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Table 9.13: Comparing Major Legal Changes to the Four Central Banks before 
the GFC 
 
Country 
 
 
Laws and Rules 
 
Changes 
 
US 
 
Federal Reserve Act 1913 
 
Glass-Steagall Act 1932 
 
 
 
 
Glass-Steagall Act 1933 
 
 
 
Emergency Banking Act 
1933  
 
Gold Reserve Act 1934  
 
Banking Act 1935 
 
 
 
 
Employment Act 1946 
 
 
Treasury-Federal Reserve 
Accord 1951 
 
 
 
Banking Holding 
Company Act 1956 
 
Full Employment and 
Balanced Growth Act 1978 
 
Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act 1980 
 
 
Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement 
Act 1991 
 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
1999 
 
US Fed was established as a private agency 
 
Adding Section 13(3) as a provision of the 
Emergent Relief and Construction Act;  
Section 13(13) set eligible collateral for 
emergent loans from US Fed 
 
Separating commercial and investment banking; 
Regulation Q set limits upon interest rates; 
FOMC was set up 
 
Gold standard was suspended 
 
 
ESP controlled US Fed’s gold reserve 
 
Further changes to Sections 10(b) and 13(3);  
FDIC extended and became permanent;  
Secretary of the Treasury and the COC was 
removed from the Board 
 
Mandate between Government and US Fed for 
recovery 
 
An independent securities market was 
established; 
FOMC assumed decision-making authority; 
Central bank independence improved 
 
Registration requirements for companies 
controlling two or more banks under US Fed 
 
US Fed’s objectives embraced price stability 
and maximum employment 
 
Interest paid to transaction accounts; 
Interest rate ceilings were removed;  
US Fed set reserve requirements for more 
eligible institutions 
 
Explicit regulation of the LOLR with further 
extension 
 
 
Ending the separation between commercial and 
investment banks; 
US Fed was an “umbrella” consolidate regulator 
with broad discretion 
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Country 
 
 
Laws and Rules 
 
Changes 
 
UK 
 
BOE Act 1694  
 
 
BOE Charter 1694 
 
 
BOE Charter 1844 
 
 
 
BOE Act 1946 
 
 
 
Banking Act 1979 
 
 
 
 
Banking Act 1987 
 
 
 
 
BOE Charter 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BOE Act 1998 
 
 
 
FSMA 2000 
 
BOE was established as a private joint-stock 
corporation 
 
Capital stock and organizational structure were 
set 
 
BOE controlled monetary policy, financial 
stability and the settlement revenue;  
Issue and banking departments were separated 
 
BOE was nationalized with limited 
independence in monetary policy;  
Corporate governance further developed 
 
BOE conducted different regulations over the 
two-tier banking system, and began to issue 
directions for regulatory purposes;  
Deposit insurance scheme formed 
 
More supervisory instruments were granted;  
BOE Board of Banking Supervision was 
established;  
Legal accountability to Government increased 
 
Uniformed supervision over the whole banking 
sector;  
Corporate governance was improved by 
establishing the new Board of Banking 
Supervision Division; 
Further accountability was required 
 
Operational independence;  
MPC was established in 1997 to control 
monetary policy 
 
FSA emerged as a mega-regulator with 
prudential regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 330 
 
 
Country 
 
 
Laws and Rules 
 
Changes 
 
Japan 
 
BOJ Act 1882 
 
 
Convertible Bank Note Act 
1884 (with amendment in 
1888) 
 
Memorandum of 
Establishing a New 
Economic System 1940 
 
BOJ Act 1942 
 
 
 
Finance Law 1947 
 
 
 
 
BOJ Act 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
Legislation in Big-Bang: 
Financial Reconstruction 
Law; Financial Function 
Early Restoration Law; 
Prompt Corrective Action; 
and Deposit Insurance Law 
1998 
 
 
BOJ was established as a joint-stock company 
with the state as the major stakeholder 
 
BOJ promoted the unified stable monetary 
system through redemption of silver and national 
bank notes under the MOF and Treasury 
 
Centralization of policy and industry to support 
war, including loan rationings 
 
 
Under intensified authority of the MOF, the BOJ 
was administered to operate exclusively to 
accomplish the purpose of the state 
 
Supporting wartime loans 
 
Policy Board was reformed in 1949 
 
 
Operational independence but under the 
increasing authority of the Diet and Cabinet; 
Policy Board resumed its decision making power 
over monetary policy; 
On-site and off-site monitoring at the firm level 
 
New agencies were established to deal with 
NPLs and bank failures;  
FSA took over financial regulation and 
supervision from the MOF;  
DIC accounts were reformed;  
BOJ only offered limited LOLR  
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Country 
 
 
Laws and Rules 
 
Changes 
 
China 
 
 
 
 
 
State Council Decision 
1983 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Provisional Regulations 
1986 
 
 
 
 
 
PBC Law 1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MPC Regulations 1997 
 
 
PBC Law 2003 
 
 
 
 
CBRC Decision 2003 
 
 
 
PBC was established in 1948 as a government 
department 
 
PBC was a state authority under State Council 
with its branches supervised by local 
governments;  
PBC supervised specialized banks according to 
the administrative hierarchy; 
Centralized credit plan continued to balance 
finance budget and lending channels 
 
PBC was located as a bureau-level government 
institution within State Council with all monetary 
policies approved by the State Council before 
implementation; 
PBC controlled the markets mainly through direct 
and political tools 
 
PBC was stimulated to be a state-owned 
government institution under the dual-tracked 
authority of the NPC and the State Council;  
PBC was closely attached with, rather than 
independent of, financial markets with direct 
intervention into financial institutions 
 
MPC was established as a consultative body for 
compromising monetary policy decisions 
 
Dual subjection continued with various 
government departments allowed by law to 
determine monetary policy design and 
implementation 
 
Yihan Sanhui regime took up based upon division 
of financial markets with constrained 
independence 
 
 
Table 9.13 shows how these four central banks developed under their respective 
legal authority. As can be seen from this table, statute and rule changes were more 
frequently launched to modify the US Fed and the BOE. However, in Japan, central 
bank laws developed relatively passively, as exceptionally long-standing wartime 
legislation stood out. The short history of the PBC had initially limited the 
possibility of significant legal changes, but inherent shortcomings of the Chinese 
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legal system, including the Party’s absolute leadership and extensive administrative 
authority, weakened the utility of existing legislation. It is also argued that the 
performances of central banks in developing countries were more directly linked 
with legal enforcement rather than de jure central bank independence.
53
 
Consequently, the weak enforcement of laws in China has continued to impair the 
conduct of the PBC. At the very least, the value of rules and laws was conventionally 
discounted in both Japan and China, and thus, a clear line had been drawn between 
market-oriented and government-controlled central banks.  
 
As regards legal events trigged by the GFC, Section 9.2.2.3 has compared respective 
differences of the four countries. When compared, massive and frequent statutory 
changes have occurred to the US Fed, but the reference to the rule of law was rare in 
discussion when it launched unprecedented monetary expansion. In particular, the 
legitimacy of some of its innovative crisis management solutions has been 
questioned by repeatedly citing Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The US 
Fed used some fiscal policies to subsidize selected financial sectors, including both 
general programmes of liquidity support and direct bailouts of certain financial 
institutions. When offering support at the firm level, it discriminated some from the 
others: for example, it established ad hoc special facilities for Bear Stearns and AIG, 
but let Lehman Brothers fail.
54
 Overall, it has actually acted as a market maker 
during the GFC: 
 
 
 
                                                          
53
 Waranya Atchariyachanvanich, ‘The Legal Central Bank independence and Macroeconomic 
Performance: An Empirical Study on Eighteen Developing Countries in the 1990s’ Forum of 
International Development Studies, Issue 23, March 2003 <www.gsid.nagoya-
u.ac.jp/bpub/research/public/forum/23/09.pdf>.  However, this study did not include China’s central 
bank when charting the findings by employing a framework of legal enforcement variables and their 
scorings. 
54
 There are particular reasons explaining the different tunes set by the US Fed when dealing with the 
risks of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. Refer to, Chris Isidore, ‘Why They Let Lehman Die’ 
CNN Money Special Report, Issue 1 
<http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/15/news/companies/why_bear_not_lehman/index.htm?utm_source=f
eedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fmoney_news_companies+(Comp
anies+News)> accessed on September 15, 2008. 
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“To ameliorate the threat to financial and economic stability, the Federal Reserve 
and a number of other central banks in effect found they needed to provide a 
substitute for the arbitrage and trading no longer being undertaken in sufficient size 
by the private sectors.”55 
 
Seemingly, in order to restore financial stability, central banks have tried “every 
possible remedy but applying the rule of law”.56 It was thus argued that legal reforms 
should limit its illegal expansion and improper direct intervention into private sectors, 
though Section 13(3) had already granted it overly broad authority in “exigent and 
unusual circumstances”.57 This points to the role of legal orders in regulating central 
banks: are central bankers ruled by law or by their own rules? The rule of law can be 
defined from different dimensions. At the core, it is opposite to the discretionary 
exercise of the authority; government agencies should do nothing but faithfully 
enforce statutes without arbitrariness or undue discretion. By contrast, the rule of 
authority allows executive government authorities to release substantive new decrees 
and forgo enforcing the statutes.
58
 The principal difference between rule of law and 
rule of authority has been explained as follows: 
“Stripped of all technicalities, this means that government in all its actions is bound 
by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee 
with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given 
circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.”59  
 
As established here, central banks are generally bound to their legal mandate. In 
spite of essential legal elements, the mandate is purposely defined in comparatively 
loose terms.
60
 This has therefore permitted central bankers great discretion over 
monetary policy and regulatory rule-making under the legislation that created and 
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 Donald L. Kohn, ‘Money Markets and Financial Stability’ at FRB New York, India Infoline News 
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 Laurence H. White, ‘The Rule of Law or the Rule of Central Bankers?’ (2010) The Cato Journal 
30(3): 451-464. 
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Central Bank has Acted Outside the Law in Responding to the Current Financial Crisis’ (2010) 
William & Mary Business Law Review 1(1): 109-137. 
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 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Psychology Press 1944) 75. 
60
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empowered central banks.
61
 During the GFC, most central banks did not limit 
themselves into the orthodox policies for crisis management, but explored renewed 
UMPs. For example, there are special rules and procedures for bankruptcies of 
financial institutions in the US; if those known rules were complied with, the falling 
institutions should have been acquired or liquidated, rather than bailouts made at the 
firm level. 
 
In this context, the Dodd-Frank Act has sought to rectify the legal authority of the 
US Fed as the LOLR. As described in Chapter Four, the amendments to Section 13(3) 
include the requirements for lending through a program or facility with “broad-based 
eligible collateral”, the executive input by the Treasury into the decision-making of 
the US Fed and enhanced transparency through detailed reporting obligations under 
auditing. Amid the GFC, the US Fed had become the LOLR for systemic insolvency 
risks, while the above legal changes have restated the intended purpose of Section 
13(3):
62
 lending freely against eligible collateral, the US Fed should work as the 
LOLR for systemic liquidity risks.
63
  
 
A similar analysis can also be made about the BOE. In principle, the “light-touch” 
regulation of British banks, including the “soft law” corporate governance strategies, 
which was earlier believed to have spurred the development of the City of London as 
an international financial centre, failed to effectively monitor financial institutions 
and remedy their failures.
64
 As a result, the Financial Services Act 2012, along with 
the Banking Act 2009, intended to correct the FSA’s “principles-based” regulation 
and also brought an orderly manner to deal with the bankruptcy of financial 
institutions. 
 
                                                          
61
 Supra 56. 
62
 Alexander Mehra, ‘Legal Authority in Unusual and Exigent Circumstances: The Federal Reserve 
and the Financial Crisis’ (2010) University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 13(1): 221-273. 
63
 Kenneth N. Kuttner, ‘The Federal Reserve as Lender of Last Resort during the Panic of 2008’ 
(December 30, 2008) 
<www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/The_Federal_Reserve_as_Lender_of_Last_Resort_during_the_Panic_of_
2008.pdf>. 
64
 Roman Tomasic, ‘The Failure of Corporation Governance and the Limits of Law: British Banks 
and the Global Financial Crisis’ in William Sun, Jim Stewart and David Pollard (eds.), Corporate 
Governance and the Global Financial Crisis: International Perspective (CUP 2012) 50-74. 
 335 
 
Broadly, the GFC has challenged our prevailing legal orders in relation to central 
banking. Initially, market-oriented central banks did not strictly apply the rule of law, 
but large-scale law reforms ex post facto were intended to legitimize the adjusted 
two-tier relationships of the US Fed and the BOE respectively. Overall, their rule 
makings and law reforms were intended to reflect their two-tier relationships, aiming 
to ensure their legal commitment to market principles. By contrast, the BOJ Act 
1998 defined how it operated under its statutory objectives but, since end-2012, the 
Japanese government has intensified its direct controls over the BOJ to enhance 
interference in markets without touching its legal status. In China, most legal 
changes focused upon domestic reforms, while the PBC continued to perform its 
quasi-fiscal duties and maintain direct market controls under intensified orders from 
the government. Accordingly, government intervention in Japan and China emerged 
more visibly and directly, whereas few material statutory changes really affected the 
core two-tier relationships of their central banks. As a result, the gap between their 
respective legal frameworks and the real two-tier relationships increased, and their 
governments have enhanced their roles more easily. Therefore, due to the GFC, both 
the BOJ and PBC had moved away from their respective operational scopes 
prescribed by law, and hence, their legal frameworks have to a great extent been 
weakened to reflect their real two-tier relationships.  
 
Overall, both historical and contemporary evidence presents that the market-oriented 
and government-controlled central banks were differently disposed towards their 
respective legal orders, and the GFC has further increased such divergence. 
 
 
9.3.2 How the GFC Challenged the Government-Market Nexus 
 
Above all, in this thesis, central banks have been grouped into two categories: 
market-oriented or government-controlled. The GFC not only challenged central 
banks to focus upon restoring financial stability, but also changed the nexus between 
government and the market; the latter would bring potential far-reaching effects 
upon their orientations propositioned. 
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As explained at the very beginning of this thesis, the market-oriented reform sought 
to minimize the involvement of government in the markets, promoting more 
prudential regulation over the financial sector, and self-regulation was still espoused 
in the UK. It was argued that the markets could regulate themselves, and that 
financial institutions would judge it in their own interest to ensure financial 
stability.
65
 For decades, it was argued that financial markets had flourished with 
continued liberalism-oriented deregulation; but as a result of the GFC, neo-liberalist 
doctrine was finally called into question with critical challenges spreading through 
the financial sector.
66
 It is argued that excessive confidence upon rational market 
behaviours, along with de-regulation since the beginning of neo-liberalization reform, 
had triggered problems extensively existing in the financial sector and beyond. 
67
 
Consequently, many of these features have been, or needed to be, revised or even 
replaced.
68
 For example, the shadow banking boom, which was one trigger for this 
crisis, has gradually been placed under an official system-wide oversight framework, 
with central banks modifying their LOLR facilities to support an untraditional 
banking sector.
69
 The prevailing arrangement protecting systemically important 
financial institutions (known as the “too big to fail” policy) turned out to be rarely 
under scrutiny, and thus, various tools have been redesigned to regulate them.
70
 It 
might still be too early to judge whether the financial sector will end up under too 
much regulation or whether excessive government intervention could trigger the next 
                                                          
65
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<www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2013/speech685.pdf>.  
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financial crisis.
71
 However, obviously, governments have gradually been playing a 
more active role, introducing regulation regarding systemic stability,
72
 and financial 
markets have thereby shifted toward less self-regulation but more government 
intervention.
73
 Therefore, due to the GFC challenge, the “market” should be 
understood differently in the West: much of the financial sector has become different 
from what it used to be, but has developed with different “re-regulation” measures.74 
As emphasized by both the US Fed and BOE, macro-prudential regulation seeks to 
keep central banks committed to furthering systemic stability, even after they finally 
exit from directly supporting market players.
75
 
 
However, the market in the East was customarily viewed in a different manner. It 
was argued that Asian countries had state-led economic growth: they had progressed 
from underdeveloped financial markets, weak legal systems, dysfunctional 
governance and unbalanced industry policies, and the key to their rise lay largely 
with the active role played by their governments.
76
 Accordingly, these Asian 
governments led the way through “latecomer” industrialization and actively 
governed their domestic markets to develop,
77
 unlike the West, where classic neo-
                                                          
71
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in Asia? The Political Economy of the Asian Crisis’ University of Massachusetts, Political Economy 
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liberalism sought deregulation, privatization and depoliticization. As far as Japan is 
concerned, a tight nexus of political, economic and bureaucratic actors had 
effectively cooperated to guide economic development until a bubble-burst cycle 
brought Japan into recession.
78
 After the “Big-Bang” liberalization, Government 
continuously urged the BOJ to spur economic growth subsequently in domestic crisis 
and the GFC.
79
 In terms of China, Government has explicitly been defined as the 
maker of the market, leading the market-oriented reform throughout.
80
 The previous 
relevant chapters have established that the Chinese government, under the Party’s 
absolute leadership, has continued to control the markets comprehensively. At the 
macro level, central planning has not been entirely eliminated, and market principles 
still only operate under rigorous administrative authority. The Party controls 
macroeconomic policy-making and the PBC is employed to control the monetary 
market. At the micro level, Government pursues direct control through continued 
state ownership: the indirect-financing model is dominated by the SOCBs, while the 
SOEs control China’s pillar industries and sectors. Therefore, China’s government 
still directly controls the markets at both the policy-making and firm levels.
81
 This is 
the context in which the PBC achieved recovery from the GFC, while also making it 
increasingly unclear what the Party really intends about its market-oriented reform.  
 
During the GFC, governments have generally increased their intervention into 
financial markets from the West to the East, but the challenges for market-oriented 
and government-controlled central banks are different; this can be illustrated in 
Figure 9.1.  
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Figure 9.1: GFC Changes Government-Market Nexus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1 shows different directions of the government-market interaction in 
response to the GFC. In the West, with reduced feasibility attached to self-regulation, 
governments have resorted to macro-prudential policy to achieve systemic stability, 
and hence, how the US Fed and BOE have committed to their market principles 
should be re-examined in the context of a changed government-market nexus. For 
both China and Japan, their government-controlled central banks have been 
challenged to face further direct and explicit government intervention. These 
changes that have occurred in regard to their market or government orientation can 
be summarised in Figure 9.2. 
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Figure 9.2: How Central Banks’ Orientations have Evolved 
 
 
 
According to Figure 9.2, how the market or government orientation relating the 
selected central banks has evolved. With different orientations, they had all been 
challenged by the GFC by bringing them closer to the wider policies of their 
governments. But the post-crisis reforms have displayed evident divergences. Both 
the US Fed and BOE were required to seek systemic stability through macro-
prudential regulatory policy. When compared, both the BOJ and PBC have 
continuously been challenged by direct government intervention to explore the use 
of more effective crisis management techniques. 
 
 
9.3.3 Comparative Summary 
 
As demonstrated by the previous case studies, the new two-tier relationship 
governing central banks is generally characterised by reduced central bank 
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independence but increased direct governmental intervention. This change can be 
displayed in Figure 9.3. 
Figure 9.3: Comparison between Old and New Two-Tier Relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
T-T=Two-Tier Relationship 
G=Government; M=Market; CB=Central Bank 
 
 
Figure 9.3 helps explain how the two-tier relationship has generally changed 
throughout the GFC. Crisis management solutions moved central banks closer to 
their governments and also financial markets; meanwhile, governments have pursued 
increased powers in financial markets. Even so, the core value for a central bank – as 
Government’s banker and bankers’ bank – remained relatively unchanged. In 
addition to the changed two-tier relationship, the GFC has also changed the pre-
existing Government-Market nexus, requiring the central bank to reshape its role as 
government’s banker and as bankers’ bank. This can be summarised in Figure 9.4.  
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Figure 9.4: How GFC Challenged Central Banks 
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Figure 9.4 has represented the real effect of the GFC upon central banks. Inter alia, 
the core value of the central bank should be re-examined given that the GFC has 
changed the relationship between government and the market on the most 
fundamental. In this context, for market-oriented and government-controlled central 
banks, their triangular interactions were and continue to be different. With 
operational independence, both the US Fed and BOE should indirectly affect 
financial markets through prudential regulation with a focus upon systemic stability. 
By contrast, the BOJ and PBC were under direct governmental control and 
maintained their direct controls over financial markets at the firm level; this has 
become firmly proved since the crisis. From a legal perspective, the different ways in 
which statutes have dealt with the two-tier relationships has widened, though this 
thesis has found that there have been many similar legal elements across all four 
central banks. On a deeper level, the new government-market nexus has promoted 
macro-prudential policy, whilst requiring different changes in Japan and China, 
where direct government intervention should be replaced by resort to indirect 
regulatory means. This has reshaped the role of central banks, challenging how they 
continue to commit to their orientations. It is thus argued that the GFC has 
challenged central banks to manage changes so as to strike an improved balance 
between government and the market. 
 
 
9.4 The Effects of “Nipponization” and Globalization 
 
Until now, this chapter has explored some significant implications based upon the 
previous comparative studies. Further analysis can also be made from an 
international perspective before we re-visit China’s central bank. There is limited 
comparability between the BOJ and the PBC, but continuous UMP has thrown Japan 
into the spotlight. Meanwhile, besides providing challenges for central banks, the 
GFC has added uncertainty to further collaboration and globalization. 
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9.4.1 “Nipponization” and BOJ’s Performance 
 
During the GFC, especially after the US Fed had launched sizeable asset purchases, 
the BOJ attracted increasing attention due to its experience in dealing with earlier 
post-bubble negative effects. In particular, the term “nipponization” has been 
repeatedly used to refer to, and warn of the possible threat posed by such crisis 
management solutions.  
 
Among many studies into Japan, as well as comparative analysis with the US, a 
general consensus has not yet been reached in regard to the value of Japanese 
experience,
1
  but certain relevant issues can be highlighted, based upon the analysis 
earlier. Chapter Six has found that the BOJ changed its policy responses during 
Japan’s economic crisis, in sometimes quite misleading ways. It was argued that 
central banks should adjust their measures during different stages of a bubble 
economy and after its bursting.
2
 From 2001 to 2006, the BOJ introduced the UMP 
into its toolbox of strategies. It was judged to provide positive support to resolving 
the domestic banking crisis, but its real economic effect was not that convincing.
3
 On 
one hand, severe economic problems were dealt with by a combination of policy 
instruments, making it difficult to identify the exact role played by the BOJ.
4
 On the 
other hand, when dealing with NPLs and bank failures, both fiscal and monetary 
stimuli were criticised for having noticeable timing lags, and also for generating 
forbearance at the cost of government expenditure.
5
 Any alleviation of its domestic 
crisis was not therefore attributed to crisis management solutions coming from the 
BOJ alone.
6
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 The debates continue, doubting whether the bad loan problem has been resolved. Refer to, Richard 
Koo and Masaya Sasaki, ‘Japan’s Disposal of Bad Loans: Failure of Success? A Review of Japan’s 
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The BOJ has pioneered orthodox tools and strategies to add to its existing crisis 
management solutions, offering some valuable lessons. First, in contrast to delayed 
policy responses in the 1990s, the BOJ made more timely responses during the 
GFC,
7
 whilst innovative policy instruments have developed to restore market 
functions and confidence; this was in line with the statutory objectives of a central 
bank responsible for systemic financial stability.
8
 Secondly, the BOJ was the first 
central bank to deal with lasting low inflation rates after the 1930s Great Depression, 
and has continued the ZIRP for over a decade, constraining its capacity to make 
further changes to loosen money.
9
 Such a combination had altered the transmission 
of monetary policy,
10
 and also affected the functions of quantitative easing.
11
 Given 
that both the US Fed and BOE had already continued the zero-based approach to 
interest rates during the GFC, it is thus the case that relevant matters discussed above, 
including the changed transmission mechanism of monetary policy and deflation 
threat, should be taken into account.
12
  
 
However, Japanese experience did have obvious limitations. As demonstrated, the 
BOJ operated under such a situational two-tier relationship that the government 
continued direct control, and the central bank maintained certain direct intervention 
at the firm level. From the beginning, therefore, such a direct collaboration between 
the government, BOJ and financial markets is different from the triangular 
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Confidence’ at the Money and Banking Conference 2009, Central Bank of Argentina, Buenos Aries, 
September 1, 2009 <www.bis.org/review/r090907d.pdf>.  
9
 It was argued that due to the bubble-burst cycle, the links between monetary policy and the real 
output were broken. Ryuzo Miyao, ‘The Role of Monetary Policy in Japan: A Break in the 1990s?’ 
(2000) Journal of the Japanese and International Economics 14(4): 366-384. 
10
 Shigeru Iwata, ‘Monetary Policy and the Term Structure of Interest Rates When Short-Term Rates 
Are Close to Zero’ BOJ Monetary and Economic Studies, Vol. 28, November 2010 
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11
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th
 Economic Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston “Revisiting 
Monetary Policy in a Low Inflation Environment”, October 14-16, 2010 
<www.bostonfed.org/economic/conf/conf55/papers/Ueda.pdf>. 
12
 It is reported that such transmissions were broken: M.C.K., ‘The Broken Transmission Mechanism’ 
(The Economist) 
<www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchhttp://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/10/moneta
ry-policyange/2012/10/monetary-policy> assessed on October 3, 2012. For a comparative analysis, 
see, William C. Dudley, ‘Lessons at the Zero Bound: The Japanese and U.S. Experience’ at the Japan 
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relationship positioning the market-oriented central banks. Moreover, Japan’s direct-
financing model was fundamentally different from that operating in the US and UK 
which had better developed securities markets, where financial intermediaries played 
more important roles when UMPs were conducted to restore financial stability.
13
 
Furthermore, few references were made by the BOJ to the aftermath of the UMP. 
After 2006, its current account balance reduced by more than two thirds within six 
months when compared with its peak in 2005. However, it had not yet sold any of its 
purchased JGBs, but continued such outright purchases. Japan encountered 
contagion from the GFC in late 2008, just two years after the BOJ terminated 
monetary easing, making it too short a period in which to judge the outcome of its 
balance sheet repairs.
14
 Overall, there is lack of consolidated evidence to 
demonstrate the success of the BOJ’s strategies when introducing and expanding 
innovative monetary policy; even so, it has aggressively moved towards 
unprecedented monetary expansion by further inflating its own balance sheet, 
especially since 2012/2013. At the very least, the so-called BOJ experience from the 
late 1990s to the mid-2000s might have had little effect in assisting Japan’s 
economic recovery during the GFC, let alone providing a potential global solution.
15
   
 
 
9.4.2 Globalization during the GFC: Challenges from the Co-existence of 
Convergence and Divergence 
 
Given that as systemic risk has become cross-border through continued globalization, 
central banks must also collaborate to restore financial stability. However, the 
foregoing analysis has identified some challenges for globalization in the future. 
 
Broadly, the GFC has brought different implications across countries, drawing an 
                                                          
13
 In a market-based financial system, banking and capital market developments were inseparable and 
the driving power behind was the growth of mortgage backed securities. It is thus argued that 
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<www.nri.com/global/opinion/sdfmp/index.html> accessible on April 4, 2012. 
 347 
 
observable geographic division.
16
 As suggested by the PBC case study, East Asian 
regionalization has promoted inter-region trade and investment, as well as a 
mechanism for temporary liquidity shortage.
17
 As a key step towards globalization, 
regionalization depends upon creating necessary institutional and political 
frameworks for deeper integration of markets and the removal of trade barriers; this 
is generally directed by government.
18
 Inter alia, economic liberalization, being a 
force to help channel the resources of economies and labour into activities where 
they are most likely to excel, can reinforce regionalisation.
19
 Allowing market forces 
to operate supposes a political willingness to enable the market to provide 
information and incentives, reward and punish, advance efficiency among many 
unwilling and willing actors; during this course, government reacts to external and 
internal pressures for changes.
20
 However, during the GFC, liberalization was 
somewhat suspended in the biggest developing country China as part of its crisis 
management solution, presenting the significant obstacle from government.  
 
In this thesis, all the observed co-existence of convergence and divergence has 
displayed diversity worldwide, renewing the conflicts between horizontal integration 
and localization: in the global context, effective crisis management is subject to both 
individual measures and cross-border collaboration, and reforms also require efforts 
at not only national but also international levels.
21
 As found, the four selected central 
banks have jointly cut interest rates, set up currency swap lines, and taken other 
actions for ensuring systemic stability. But on the other hand, global imbalance, 
helping trigger this crisis, is argued to have been accelerated,
22
 with a protectionist 
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threat.
23
 Meanwhile, with the profound resetting of the government-market nexus, 
localization would “represent a radical break with neoliberal universalism”. 24 
Moreover, the limited role played by the rule of law allows scope for de facto 
circumstances to influence central banks and wider financial markets. This, in 
addition to evident divergence in financial oversight, has brought added uncertainty 
to improve cross-border crisis management,
25
 while the enforcement of laws and 
rules are argued to decrease with further requirements for new uniform rules.
26
  
 
 
9.5 Revisiting the PBC in a Comparative Context 
 
This thesis has endeavoured to make a systemic analysis of the PBC, covering its 
relevant experience during China’s market-oriented reform and amid the GFC as 
well. The following section will re-examine the PBC by summarising 1) findings 
from the previous analysis; 2) lessons suggested during the GFC; and 3) its role in 
the context of globalization.  
 
The PBC was assumed to be a government-controlled central bank; this proposition 
has been demonstrated by findings from its recent reforms and the overarching legal 
framework. Limited statutory reforms had occurred during its comparatively short 
history, and the reliability of the existing laws was seriously weakened by China’s 
underdeveloped legal system. In terms of its real two-tier relationship, the 
government has continued to politically control the PBC, extending further into the 
underdeveloped financial markets at both macro and micro levels. Those conditions, 
essential to explain the PBC’s “success” to deal with external shocks, were further 
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integration. Helmut Wagner, ‘Is Harmonization of Legal Rules an Appropriate Target? Lessons from 
the Global Financial Crisis’ (2012) European Journal of Law and Economics 33(3): 541-564.  
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consolidated due to the GFC. China’s reformers claim to effect market principles, 
which failed to withstand external shocks. It is therefore argued that domestic 
vulnerabilities, caused by both structural shortcomings and crisis management 
solutions, persist; this, rather than the GFC per se, is the top worrying concern for 
the PBC and beyond.  
 
The GFC has challenged the capacity of market-oriented central banks to restore 
financial stability, as well as the process of neo-liberalization in the West. In both the 
US and UK, financial sectors have come under added government intervention 
directly or indirectly, and the markets have already acknowledged “re-regulation”. It 
is still too early to assess the future of the market-oriented central banks, but certain 
issues have been commonly highlighted by the US Fed and BOE with implications 
for the PBC. To start, central bank independence is still considered desirable but, to 
improve credibility and legitimacy, further oversight and transparency are required. 
Furthermore, in spite of uneven financial developments, systemic stability is at the 
top of central banks’ agendas, and macro-prudential regulation is one key missing 
pillar exposed by the GFC. China’s financial monitoring system has never been 
severely tested, but with its further development towards conglomeration, it would 
be appropriate to explore how its next-step reform might change the existing rigidly 
sector-based regime, after taking into account both the shortcomings and lessons 
when leading central banks have continued to explore the options for improving 
financial oversight. More importantly, both the US and UK have amended rules and 
laws to confirm on changes which have occurred to the positions of their central 
banks as a result of the GFC. However, the changed two-tier relationship governing 
the PBC is characterised by explicitly reduced central bank independence and 
increased direct intervention, but few statutory reforms bring this into focus. 
Therefore, if law reforms continue, it would be an important target for the PBC to 
reduce the enlarged gap between the legal framework and its prevailing two-tier 
relationship. 
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During the GFC, benefiting from China’s apparent speedy recovery, the so-called 
Beijing Consensus gained further attention,
27
 and meantime, the PBC may enjoy 
higher international status. Becoming more participative in cross-border issues, as 
explained, it might have accelerated external liberalization. However, when 
compared with the delayed introduction of market principles to the domestic sector, 
the enlarged gap between internal and external reforms could bear negative effects 
and/or even risks. The PBC should not obscure the larger point: the GFC has, at least, 
pointed out that further financial sector development requires a different regulatory 
policy, and misplaced governmental intervention can inhibit more effective crisis 
management solutions. 
 
Taking into account recent economic issues, Chinese market-oriented reform with its 
own characteristics has seemingly reached a bottleneck.
28
 Further liberalization may 
require less direct government intervention, but this has become increasingly 
questionable after the GFC has disturbed market-oriented central banks and also 
globally raised government’s power in restabilising financial systems. After enduring 
the GFC, the major challenge for the PBC persists: it is still a government-controlled 
central bank under rigidly political control, which has increased rather than 
decreased during the GFC; as a result of explicit government intervention, its 
functions as a central bank have continued to weaken.   
 
 
                                                          
27
 “Beijing Consensus” was put forward in 2004, see, John Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus 
(Washington DC: Foreign Policy Centre 2004) < http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf>. In principle, it is 
argued that China has presented a new development model, where rapid economic growth is 
attributed to intense government guide and management. But debates and different opinions continue. 
See, Suisheng Zhao, ‘The China Model: Can it Replace the Western Model of Modernization?’ (2010) 
Journal of Contemporary China 19(65): 419-436. During the GFC, “Beijing Consensus” has attracted 
mixed comments. China’s quick resilience is argued to have proved the success of this model, but it 
may also face more domestic challenges. Refer to, Jun Li and Liming Wang (eds.), China’s Economic 
Dynamics: A Beijing Consensus in the Making? (Routledge 2013).  
28
 Prior to the GFC, there have already emerged discussions about the turning point of China’s reform. 
For details, see, Ross Garnaut and Ligang Song (eds.), The Turning Point in China’s Economic 
Development (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press 2006). Recently, it has increasingly argued that China is 
approaching its fundamental challenge. For example, in mid-2012, the importance to deepen the 
market-oriented reform has repeatedly been addressed by China’s political leaders; for a list, see, 
Shengjun Liu, ‘China have Reached Another Turning Point of Its Reform/Zhongguo Gaige Zaici 
Zoudao Zhuanzhedian’ (FT China) <www.ftchinese.com/story/001047319> accessed on November 6, 
2012 [in Chinese]. 
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9.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the main findings from the case studies set out in 
Chapters Four to Eight. It first made comparisons of the four central banks in 
relation to their legal frameworks and crisis management solutions, exploring the 
patterns of their co-existing convergence and divergence. In principle, these selected 
central banks have relied upon increasingly similar legal frameworks, but still 
operated under different levels of independence, while occupying varying distances 
from financial markets. The GFC has brought about important changes and reforms 
to central banks and beyond. Requiring reinforced central bank regulation towards 
the goal of system-wide stability, the GFC has changed their pre-existing two-tier 
relationships, and also modified how four leading central banks converged with and 
diverged to each other. In particular, differing attitudes toward legal ordering have 
become further evident between the market-oriented and government-controlled 
central banks. This chapter has also specified how the GFC changed the government-
market nexus in the West, while raising the level of direct government intervention 
in Japan and China; this requires a re-examination of the market or government 
orientation adopted by these central banks. Even so, the core value for a central bank 
– serving both as government’s banker and as bankers’ bank – has largely remained 
untouched. Therefore, this chapter has argued that these four central banks have been 
specifically challenged by the GFC so as to strike an improved balance between 
government and the market.  
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Chapter Ten 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
The GFC has been judged the worst financial crisis since the 1930s Great 
Depression, prompting profound reforms at both national and international levels. 
The foregoing analysis has detailed how it has challenged the capacity of leading 
central banks to deal with financial risk and necessitated further reforms. Drawing 
upon country-selected case studies, the following observations will conclude the 
arguments of this thesis. 
 
 
10.2 Research Question and Contribution 
 
The main research question of this thesis asked how the GFC challenged these 
leading central banks to maintain financial stability under considerable 
unprecedented duress. As illustrated by the changes and reforms made during the last 
few years, they have taken particular responsibility for dealing with financial 
stability issues. The central question in this thesis has been answered through a 
comparative analysis. Four major central banks have been compared here: (i) the US 
Fed; (ii) the BOE; (iii) the BOJ; and (iv) the PBC. The key propositions relating the 
market or government orientation of these four central banks have been examined. In 
particular, the PBC has been given special attention due to China’s apparent speedy 
resilience; as a consequence, the strengths and weaknesses of its regulation have 
been critically assessed. 
 
This thesis has focused upon the rule-based frameworks governing central banks and 
their reforms before, during and after the GFC. In Chapter Two, the thesis examined 
the core values of central banks serving, simultaneously, as both the government’s 
banker and the bankers’ bank. On this basis, theoretical and legal frameworks were 
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introduced. Historical evidence disclosed different government incentives to 
establish central banks but, in principle, rules and laws affect central banks in the 
context of their distinct two-tier relationships – with Government and with the 
Market. After reviewing statutes relating to central banks, it is evident that certain 
legal provisions are commonly prescribed in law, including legal status, ownership, 
objectives, organisational structure, monetary policy instruments, regulatory and 
supervisory duties, and mechanisms of accountability, credibility and independence. 
In the event of financial crises, central banks can evidently accommodate their policy 
responses together with other government bodies, limiting their own independence. 
At the same time, they directly intervene in financial markets and even the business 
operations of individual financial institutions. It is thus argued that the prevailing 
legal framework regulates a central bank by dealing with its two-tier relationship 
(Figure 2.4), which has been affected by changed central bank regulation in response 
to financial crises.  
 
In Part II, key propositions about the selected four central banks were tested. Their 
respective legal frameworks were shown to have been shaped by whether these 
institutions were either market-oriented or government-controlled. Table 10.1 lists 
the basic assumptions which have been examined when testing the key propositions 
of this thesis. 
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Table 10.1: Propositions about Four Selected Central Banks before GFC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All these propositions have been examined (in Chapters Four to Eight) by reference 
to the prevailing legal frameworks of the four central banks. In particular, their 
respective two-tier relationships have been assessed based upon key legal provisions; 
as a result, the differences between market-oriented and government-controlled 
central banks have been clarified. But such a stark distinction has itself been 
challenged in view of the different modes of central bank regulation that became 
evident during the GFC. Reduced central bank independence has weakened the 
market-oriented principles of both the US Fed and the BOE, and they have generally 
worked as more stringent regulators and supervisors, better able to deal with market 
upheavals. However, certain differences have become obvious. In the US, the Dodd–
Frank Act 2010 has granted the US Fed more macro-prudential regulatory power, but 
reduced its direct market interventions, while bringing it closer to the broader 
policies of the US Treasury. Being similarly a market-oriented central bank, the BOE 
was relocated to the centre of financial regulation and supervision; however, the 
 Proposition 1 
The US Fed was predominantly a market-oriented/laissez fair 
central bank with consolidated financial regulation and 
supervision. 
 
 Proposition 2 
The BOE was a market-oriented/laissez fair central bank with 
major financial regulation and supervision undertaken by the 
FSA. 
 
 Proposition 3 
The BOJ was a government-guided central bank with limited 
functions in dealing with NPLs and bank failures. 
 
 Proposition 4 
The PBC was a government-controlled central bank and a 
proactive regulator as part of China’s financial regulatory regime.  
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Financial Services Act 2012 has raised the power of Government, especially HM 
Treasury, to control the financial markets via the BOE group. In terms of 
government-controlled central banks, few substantial legal changes have directly 
amended their legal frameworks. As “a central bank in crisis”, the BOJ has remained 
under intensified government control to enhance its direct intervention in financial 
markets. During the GFC, the PBC failed to play a more important role in restoring 
financial stability as was expected after the Asian Financial Crisis, and its crisis 
management solutions also bore long-term negative consequences. China’s resilience 
in the face of this crisis has further revealed the extent of official control over 
economic activities, including a potentially manipulated central bank. Therefore, the 
PBC’s solution has been challenged by the GFC to such an extent that more rigorous 
political imperatives were subsequently imposed upon it.  
 
This thesis has examined the particular relationship between central bank regulation 
and financial stability by comparing the pre-existing legal frameworks of central 
banks with their changed two-tier relationships as a result of the GFC. Table 10.2 
displays how their prevailing propositions have been challenged during the GFC. 
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Table 10.2: Orientations of Four Central Banks following the GFC Challenge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The GFC has changed the “old” two-tier relationships of all the selected central 
banks, whilst demonstrating different focuses and approaches to crisis management 
and financial stability. 
 
The case studies in this thesis have suggested that convergence has occurred between 
these different central banks, yet with some continuing divergence, as illustrated in 
Chapter Nine. A fully detailed comparison has found that the legal frameworks of 
these four central banks were very similar before the GFC, but they actually operated 
with varying levels of independence and also at different distances from the markets. 
Adopting certain similar policy responses during the GFC, they each performed 
differently, and often faced different tasks. The pattern of convergence and 
divergence has been illustrated in Table 9.10: explicitly, more divergence has 
 Proposition 1:  
The US Fed has been placed under enhanced oversight from the 
Treasury and the GAO, and while in contrast to a reinforced role 
in macro-prudential regulation, its direct intervention in financial 
markets has been constrained. 
 
 Proposition 2 
The BOE has been placed at the centre of financial regulation, but 
HM Treasury has raised its power over monetary policy and led 
the regulatory regime. 
 
 Proposition 3 
The BOJ has been placed under intensifying government control, 
seeking to break the limits of monetary expansion to spur 
economic growth. 
 
 Proposition 4 
The PBC has reset direct tools and suspended marketisation as its 
crisis management solutions; government has further enhanced 
explicit and direct controls of the PBC and of the overall markets. 
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emerged from the arrangement of financial regulation and supervision; implicitly, 
their relationships with governments have continued to differ. Moreover, both the 
US Fed and the BOE faced direct pressures from the GFC to restore financial 
stability, triggering crisis-driven reforms. In contrast, the BOJ has had to deal with 
deflation and domestic economic stagnation, and China was challenged to continue 
its market-oriented reforms; these reforms were thus more domestic-driven in 
comparison to other central banks. In addition, the gap between the legal orders 
surrounding market-oriented and government-oriented central banks increased: both 
the US and the UK governments launched statutory reforms to legitimize the 
changed two-tier relationships governing their respective central banks, but Japanese 
and Chinese governments remained silent about their overly extensive political 
interventions. It is thus concluded that the GFC has affected the earlier differences 
and similarities between these four central banks.  
 
Significantly, this thesis has demonstrated that the triangular relationship, involving 
the government, the central bank and the financial market, has shaped how a central 
bank pursues its goals and achieves its statutory tasks. These four central banks have 
operated, even during the GFC, around different two-tier relationships, and the 
widespread co-existence of convergence and divergence needs to be understood 
accordingly. In addition to challenging central banks to improve their crisis 
management mechanisms, the GFC has changed the government–market nexus in a 
fundamental way (Figure 9.1). It has questioned the traditional ideology of neo-
liberalism in the West, requiring further government efforts towards system-wide 
stability; meanwhile, it did lead to further governmental intervention in Japan and 
China. As a result, the market or government orientation of central banks should be 
re-examined in the context of this changed nexus (see further Figure 9.2). In terms of 
the market-oriented US Fed and BOE, both have improved their accountability and 
transparency, whilst their influences upon the financial markets have been 
strengthened through macro-prudential regulation. When compared, the government-
controlled BOJ and PBC should explore effective crisis management without 
incurring more, especially over-extensive, political controls. Even so, the core of 
value for central banks, serving as the government’s banker and the bankers’ bank, 
has remained relatively untouched after all these reforms and changes brought about 
through this crisis. Therefore, this thesis has argued that the GFC has actually 
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changed the two-tier relationship of central banks so as to strike an improved balance 
between government and the market, although there is still room for improvement in 
this regard (Figure 9.4).  
  
China’s rise is the example of a case in which economic development has been 
achieved through active government involvement in the economy; this also explains 
its resilience during the GFC. After a systemic study, this thesis has argued that 
limited independence has seriously constrained the PBC’s functions, making other 
reform measures relatively superficial as solutions to various risk management 
problems. After comparing it with the other three central banks, this thesis has found 
that domestic vulnerabilities, rather than external shocks, continue to affect the 
PBC’s orientation. Reform measures should revolve around the central bank’s 
specific two-tier relationship, reducing government’s direct intervention into both the 
PBC and the markets. China’s top-down reforms are, however, ultimately in the 
hands of Government or the Party when any effort is made to introduce further 
market principles. As indicated during the GFC, it is at the very least questionable 
what the Government/Party in China really intends to achieve with its claimed 
market-oriented liberalisation, and that the prospects of granting the PBC further 
independence have become increasingly uncertain, mainly as a result of the extent to 
which the GFC has shaken the market-oriented US Fed and BOE.  
 
This thesis has endeavored to make a contribution to the existing literature. It has 
employed the two-tier relationship to examine the GFC challenge from the legal 
standpoint of central bank regulation. The main research question has been addressed 
by testing the propositions by reference to four selected central banks, with 
particular, as well as hitherto unusual, concern for China.  
 
 
10.3 Limitations and Further Research  
 
In conducting its rule-based analysis of the governance of leading central banks, this 
thesis has certain limitations. As initially stated, central banks – some of which have 
not long been public institutions – have long sought to operate amid considerable 
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secrecy, and only limited research has been conducted into their actual operations at 
the macro level. As the GFC has reaffirmed the importance of transparency with 
regard to financial markets, most central banks have been required to improve their 
communications and transparency. However, it is difficult to determine the optimal 
transparency level for central banks, and the discretion granted by law has added 
further ambiguity to central bankers’ own discussions about policy and conduct. 
Overall, there are limited data and other materials to help us to understand “central 
bank secrecy”. 
 
With regard to the case studies, the ECB is not included in this thesis. Its short 
existence makes it less suitable for comparison here, and its nature, comprising the 
central banks of member countries, is fundamentally different from the four selected 
central banks. Also, its legal governance as a supranational central bank for Europe’s 
single currency places it outside the same framework of the two-tier relationship. In 
addition, the continuing sovereign debt crisis has brought about further debates and 
challenges beyond the scope of this study, despite some reference to the ECB in 
Chapter Two. Moreover, the case study of the BOJ is based upon literature available 
in Chinese and English rather than in the Japanese language. Since certain materials 
are only available in Japanese, the incomplete referencing might affect the relevant 
analyses here. What is more, one goal of this thesis has been to critically probe 
China’s central bank, but this might be impeded by the quantity and quality of 
available data. China is a transition economy with insufficient transparency, 
uncompleted financial liberalisation, and an unsophisticated legal system. The PBC 
has thus been much affected by de facto circumstances, influencing how best to 
understand its real two-tier relationship behind its legal framework. In particular, 
China continues its strict censorship system which constrains freedom of speech, 
especially on politically sensitive issues. As a government-owned central bank, the 
PBC is situated within an intervening political hierarchy, and can only release 
information exactly in accordance with overriding political requirements. 
 
A number of further avenues for research relevant to the subject of this thesis can be 
envisaged. To begin with, the study approaches central bank regulation from a legal 
perspective, and one of the key legal provisions concerns the organisational structure 
where a central bank sits. However, due to its limited scope, this thesis did not 
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examine this in detail. The GFC has questioned the optimal model for central 
banking, addressing problems about the requisite institutional environment and 
prevailing forces. Recent changes could provide valuable lessons and reference 
points for China, since the PBC has pursued reform toward achieving greater 
professionalism. More broadly, this has renewed discussions of how best to design 
central bank law with good governance and institutional structures.  
 
A second avenue for further research is that the essential relationship between central 
bank regulation and financial stability requires more comprehensive interdisciplinary 
study beyond the rule-based framework employed here. However, there are still few 
studies exploring this topic from a legal perspective. The GFC has already exposed 
particular legal problems and triggered law reforms at different levels, representing 
the complexity of this issue whilst highlighting its significance. So it is necessary for 
there to be further in-depth legal analysis of central bank regulation with a focus 
upon maintaining financial stability. Economic views are important to better 
understand central banks. At the micro-economic level, the use of unconventional 
monetary policy has triggered intense concern about longer-term effectiveness, 
influences upon central banks’ balance sheets, and changed transmission channels 
for conducting monetary policy.  
 
Thirdly, this thesis has identified significant divergence in financial regulation; in 
particular, radical changes in the UK have displayed much uncertainty when central 
banks explore feasible solutions to systemic risk. One outcome of the post-crisis 
reforms is that central banks are needed to take on a reinforced macro-prudential 
regulation role. But this might exacerbate the worrying over conflicts of interests 
arising when central banks pursue both monetary and financial stability. In some 
cases, the adoption of a Twin-Peak model of market regulation has provided benefits 
in combining prudential regulation and conduct of business regulation relating to 
systemic stability. This can also be considered for the further reform of China’s 
sector-based monitoring. Overall, debates about financial oversight will continue in 
the aftermath of the GFC, whilst central banks will be challenged to explore macro-
prudential regulation with fresh uncertainty attributed to their enhanced focus upon 
systemic stability. 
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This thesis has acknowledged that financial crises now have cross-border features, 
requiring more effective institutional cooperation. During the GFC, the global 
financial architecture has been undergoing reforms towards stronger resilience, 
which remains incomplete. The co-existence of convergence and divergence 
illustrates diversification worldwide, creating potential difficulties for improving 
cross-border crisis management. Historical evidence indicates that the international 
financial system has developed in response to risk and crisis. Different proposals 
have therefore been made to strengthen regulation and supervision. Among these, the 
idea of establishing a global central bank has somewhat been welcomed, but seems 
almost impossible due to the lack of due legal authority and governance. Central 
banks have been criticised for their extensive, even illegal, authority of crisis 
management solutions, but there is also an increasing requirement for them to lead 
the rejuvenation of global economic growth.  
 
Many research topics triggered by the GFC are only just unfolding. All these offer 
fertile grounds for further research to identify the optimal model of central bank 
regulation when seeking to achieve enhanced financial stability. 
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Appendix 4-1 
US Financial Regulation and Supervision System 
 
The 1930s Great Depression brought a highly controlled financial system. At that 
moment, the US Fed and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) were 
regulators at the federal level, and other responsible agencies included the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), which regulated savings and loans until the 
savings and loan crisis in 1989, when it was replaced by the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS), and their deposit insurance shifted from the Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to the FDIC; the Bureau of Federal Credit 
Unions, which was restructured as the National Credit Union Administration in 1970, 
regulated credit unions, with insurance from the Federal Credit Union Share 
Insurance Fund; Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulated investment 
bank and brokers; insurance regulation remained at the state level under the 
McCarran-Fergusson Act 1945. 
 
When it came to the GFC, it has argued that, when reforming the US financial 
regulation and supervision regime, the Dodd-Frank Act has required to resetting 
institutional structures with different regulatory policy. How this has changed the 
previous regime can be displayed in the following Table. 
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Table: Comparison of Financial Regulation & Supervision System Before/After 
the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
Regulatory Agency 
 
 
Before GFC 
 
Under Dodd-Frank Act 
 
Federal Reserve 
 Institutions 
regulated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Systemic Risk 
Powers 
 
 
 
 Others 
 
 
Bank holding 
companies, financial 
holding companies, 
membership state 
banks, US branches of 
foreign banks, foreign 
branches of US Banks 
 
 
LOLR, emergent 
lending under Article 
13(3) of Federal 
Reserve Act 
 
Consumer protection 
regulations   
 
Plus certain subsidiaries of bank 
holding companies, securities holding 
companies, savings and loan holding 
companies, and any firms designated 
by the FSOC; payment, clearing and 
settlement systems designated by the 
FSOC LOLR, modified emergent 
lending under Article 13(3) 
Establishment of Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection (BCFP)* 
 
OCC 
 Institutions 
regulated 
 
 
National banks, US 
federal branches of 
foreign banks 
 
 
Plus federally chartered thrift 
institutions 
 
FDIC 
 Institutions 
regulated 
 
 
 
 Systemic Risk 
Powers 
 
 
Federally insured 
depository institutions, 
including non-
membership state banks 
 
Deposit insurance funds 
 
 
Plus state-chartered thrift institutions 
 
OTS 
 Institutions 
regulated 
 
 
 
 
Federally-chartered and 
insured thrift 
institutions, savings and 
loan holding companies 
 
 
Abolished 
 
NCUA 
 Institutions 
regulated 
 
 Systemic Risk 
Powers 
 
 Others 
 
 
 
Federally-chartered or 
insured credit unions 
 
Central Liquidity 
Facility 
 
National Credit Union 
Share Insurance Fund 
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SEC 
 Institutions 
regulated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Systemic Risk 
Powers 
 
 
 
 Others 
 
 
 
Firms selling securities 
to the public to register 
with SEC  
Securities exchange, 
brokers, dealers, mutual 
funds, investment 
advisers 
 
 
 
 
May unilaterally close 
markets or suspend 
trading strategies for 
limited periods 
 
Set financial accounting 
standards for all 
publicly traded firms 
 
Firms selling securities to the public 
to register with SEC, plus make 
financial disclosures 
Plus clearing houses and hedge funds 
with assets over $150 million 
Plus nationally-recognised statistical 
rating organisations 
Plus security-based swap (SBS) 
dealers, major SBS participants and 
SBS execution facilities 
 
CFTC 
 Institutions 
regulated 
 
 
 Systemic Risk 
Powers 
 
 
Future exchanges, 
brokers, pool operators, 
advisers 
 
May suspend trading 
order of liquidation of 
positions, or raise 
margins in emergencies 
 
 
Plus swap dealers, major swap 
participants, swap execution facilities 
 
FHFA 
 Institutions 
regulated 
 
 
 Systemic Risk 
Powers 
 
 
Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, Federal Home 
Loan Banks 
 
Conservator 
 
 
*
 BCFP is established within the US Fed under Consumer Financial Protection Act 2010, 
Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act. It is granted with a wide range of general and specific rule-
making, and would also work as a watchdog to protect financial consumers by applying non-
depository financial institutions with supervisory standards similar to depository institutions. 
In principle, this Bureau will concentrate upon consumer protection by taking over many 
powers from banking regulators and other federal regulators; this has consolidated consumer 
protection in financial markets, and required more balanced legislation and implementation. 
Its official website is at <www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/>. For some legal analysis, 
see, David H. Carpenter, ‘The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB): A Legal 
Analysis’ CRS Report for Congress, R42572, 2012. 
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Appendix 5-I   
Legal Framework of the FSA 
 
During London’s “Big Bang”, the securities market was reformed through a series of 
deregulation, and to policy these changes, the Financial Services Act 1986 
introduced the Securities Investment Board (SIB) as a leading regulatory mechanism 
but without an explicit definition of investment business. Ever since, the BOE’s 
regulation and supervision shifted from informal and flexible manners to regulatory 
surveillance.
1
 The relationship between the BOE and the SIB was arranged 
according to a series of Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs). In principle, the 
BOE primarily supervised financial position and capital adequacy of institutions 
under its control, as well as cooperated with them and exchanged information, while 
the SIB, without monitoring responsibilities, had the ultimate power to revoke a 
firm’s trading licence and impose a public reprimand.2 As the collapse of Barings in 
1995 triggered intense criticism over the BOE’s supervision, the RATE model (Risk 
Assessment, Tools and Evaluation)
3
 was introduced to strengthen risk-based 
supervision, especially through cooperation with overseas regulatory authorities.
4
 
Finally, the NEWRO was established to centralize oversight authority, named as the 
FSA on October 28, 1997. Its legal framework, placed by the FSMA 2000, can be 
summarised to incorporate the following important facets: 
 
Legal Status and Independence 
The FSA was an independent non-government body but accountable to Treasury 
ministers and Parliament.
5
 
 
                                                          
1
 Jan Peeters, ‘Re-regulation of the Financial Services Industry in the United Kingdom’ (1988) 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law 10(3): 371–407. 
2
 Simon Deakin and Jacqueline Cook, ‘Regulation and the Boundaries of the Law’ ESRC Centre of 
Business Research, University of Cambridge, August 1999 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/may2000/esrc9.pdf>. 
3
 Maximilian J.B. Hall, ‘The Collapse of Barings: The Lessons to be Learnt’ (1996) Journal of 
Financial Regulation and Compliance 4(3): 255–277. 
4
 Richard Dale, ‘Regulating the New Financial Markets’ 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.198.2379&rep=rep1&type=pdf>. 
5
 It was argued that compared with the BOE, the FSA had improved its accountability. See, Marianne 
Ojo, ‘The Financial Services Authority: A Model of Improved Accountability?’ Munich Personal 
RePEc Archive, MPRA Paper No 228, November 2005 
<http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/580/1/MPRA_paper_580.pdf>. 
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Objectives 
The objective of the FSA was to ensure “market confidence, public awareness, the 
protection of consumers, and the reduction of financial crime”.6  
 
Organisation  
The FSA Board consisted of a chairman, three executive directors and eleven non-
executive directors, all appointed by HM Treasury. 
 
Functions 
The FSA’s role was to undertake the BOE’s functions under the Banking Act 1987, 
Banking Coordination Regulations 1992, Financial Services Act 1986, Investment 
Services Regulation 1995, and Companies Act 1989.
7
 The BOE kept its 
responsibility for overall financial stability by maintaining the stability of the 
monetary system, financial system infrastructure, systemic effectiveness and 
efficiency, as well as the official financial operations in exceptional circumstance 
(LOLR facilities).
8
  
 
Regulation and Supervisory Responsibilities 
 Regulated Activities Order 2001 (RAO):9 RAO defined the range of financial 
activities. Broadly, the FSA should protect the competitiveness of the UK 
economy without undermining financial innovation.
10
 
 
 Principles-based theory: six tiers of regulation, including high level principles, 
generally applicable regulatory standards, supervisory rules, prudential rules, 
specific market regulations, complaints and compensatory mechanisms.
11
 These 
                                                          
6
 Alastair Hudson, The Law of Finance (1
st
 Edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 172–178. 
7
 FSA, Paying for Banking Supervision (Consultation Paper, No 3, October 1997). 
8
 BOE, ‘Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the 
Financial Services Authority’ <www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Documents/legislation/mou.pdf>. 
9
 <www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2001/544/contents/made>. 
10
 FSA, ‘Making Policy in the FSA: How to Take Account of Competition – A Guide to Competition 
Analysis in Financial Services’ Economics of Financial Regulation, Central Policy Division, July 
2000 <http://hb.betterregulation.com/external/Making%20policy%20in%20the%20FSA%20-
%20How%20to%20take%20account%20of%20competition.pdf>; and Competition Review of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000: Report Prepared for the OFT by Oxera (Office of Fair 
Trading, No OFT 757, November 2004). 
11
 Debates continue about the real functions of principles-based regulation. For example, see, Martyn 
Hopper and Jenny Stainsby, ‘Principle-Based Regulation – Better Regulation?’ 7 Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation 2006: 387-391. 
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high-level principles, aimed at displaying the big picture of the law relating 
financial activities as detailed regulation, were not susceptible to regular 
overhaul and re-writing.
12
 In 1998, the FSA set up the outline for the proposed 
principles when regulating business, in December 2005, the FSA reported its 
improvement in balancing different requirements for regulation across financial 
sectors. 
 
Risk-Based Regulatory Approaches  
 Supervision Manual (SUP)  
When supervising a firm’s exposure, the FSA would take into account the 
risks associated with each particular market sector. 
 
 General Prudential Rulebook (GENPRU)  
The FSA should identify the level of risks for any particular market sectors. 
In the banking industry, for example, all the regulated firms should maintain 
sound, effective and coherent strategies to manage risk, and to conduct stress 
tests and scenario analysis of the risks confronting banking activities.  
 
 Advanced Risk-Responsive Operating Frame Work (ARROFW)  
Initially, the FSA inherited the principal modes from its predecessors, 
including the BOE’s RATE system, the Securities and Futures Authority’s 
FIBSPAM, the Investment Management Regulatory Organization’s Relative 
Risk Assessment Model, the Building Societies Commission Model, and part 
of the Personal Investment Authority’s Evolution Project.13 Both inherent 
shortcomings and requirements for coherence have promoted the 
development of a new risk-based assessment framework incorporating 
vertical supervision of individual firms, assessment of cross-cutting risks, and 
internal risk management.
14
                                                          
12
 FSA, The FSA Principles for Business (Consultation Paper, No 13, September 1998); Better 
Regulation Action Plan: What We have Done and What We are Doing (December 2005). 
13
 Julia Black, ‘The Development of Risk Based Regulation in Financial Services: Canada, the UK 
and Australia: A Research Report’ (September 2004) 
<www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff%20publications%20full%20text/black/risk%20based%20regula
tion%20in%20financial%20services.pdf>. After proposals were made between 2000 and 2003, a 
report was published, and replaced by a new release in 2006. 
14
 FSA, ‘The FSA’s Risk-Assessment Framework’ (August 2006). 
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Appendix 7-1 
China’s Law in Transition 
 
In the late 1970s, the law reform started with the efforts to revive the old constitution 
and prepare new written rules.
1
 Since it is argued that a market economy should be 
based upon stable legal rules, a large number of statutes regarding trade, company, 
foreign investment and other commercial issues have first been adopted.
2
 After three 
decades, China’s legislative structure has preliminarily developed. In terms of 
legislative bodies, the NPC has full and highest authority, followed by its Standing 
Committees and the State Council. Below are the territorial divisions among regional 
and local governments, as well as the functional bureaucracies of central government 
administration. The third leg lies in the special law-making power granted to the 
autonomous minority areas. From the perspective of legal authority, there are three 
levels. Primary legislation is at the top but below Constitution; and it is often named 
falv in Chinese. At the second level are those issued by the State Council and the 
regional People’s Congresses; in varying forms, they are generally called fagui. Also, 
central government ministers, regional and local governments can issue at the 
tertiary level, most known as guizhang.
3
 The overall legislative hierarchy can be 
classified as follows:
 4 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 For example, a new Criminal Code was issued in 1980, and the collection of general civil principles 
(minfa tongze) in 1987.  
2
 It is difficult to name and identify all the rules and regulations in China. One major reason is that 
due to dynamic changes, the legal system is continuously updated and modified. For some recent 
reforms, refer to, Report on China Law Development: Database and Indicators 
<www.law.ruc.edu.cn/fazhan/> [in Chinese].  
3
 The autonomous minority areas, under the special legislature authority, can issue autonomous and 
special regulations (zizhi danxing tiaoli). Those regulations are defined between the primary and 
secondary legislature levels, varyingly depending on the political hierarchy of the administrative 
authorities.  
4
 For an introduction to the legislative structure, refer to, Perry Keller, ‘Legislation in the People’s 
Republic of China’ (1989) University of British Columbia Law Review 23(3): 653-688. 
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1. Xianfa:Constitution 
2. Falv: laws issued by the NPC and its Standing Committee 
3. Xingzheng Fagui: administrative regulations issued by the State Council 
4. Difangxing Fagui: Local People’s Congress Regulations issued by the 
people’s congresses and their standing committees of provinces, autonomous 
regions, cities directly under the central government and major cities and 
special economic zones 
Zhengfu Guizhang: rules issued by people’s governments of provinces, 
autonomous regions, cities directly under the central government and major 
cities 
5. Bumen Guizhang: rules issued by central ministers, commissions, agencies or 
entities directly under the State Council, including the PBC 
6. Guifanxing Wenjian: normative documents including all legislation issued by 
the legislature authorities other than those mentioned above. 
 
As argued in Chapter Seven, the Party’s absolute leadership has weakened the legal 
system from the fundamental. Its prioritized requirement for stabilization has further 
weakened the authority of law; this is primarily achieved by institutionally defined 
property rights without changing the state’s ownership. For example, joint ventures, 
equity joint ventures and cooperative joint ventures are legally permitted to utilise 
FDI, as long as their state ownership is untouched. Private property was not 
recognised in the Constitution until 2004, and equal protection given to de facto 
private property as to public property until 2007. Therefore, China’s legal rules 
should accommodate rather than interfere with the existing business practice.
5 
 
Another conflict has existed due to the complexity of Chinese legal system.
6
 China’s 
substantial legal system is incomplete, and many rules are still under consideration. 
For example, a codified civil law is argued to be vital, but drafts have been 
repeatedly modified without further substantial progress. What is more, mass 
normative documents do not automatically constitute a coherent and unified body of 
                                                          
5
 Jonathan R. Hay, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, ‘Privatisation in Transition Economies: 
Towards a Theory of Legal Reform’ (1996) European Economic Review 40(3-5): 559-567. 
6
 Yuanyuan Shen, ‘Conceptions and Receptions of Legality: Understanding the Complexity of Law 
Reform in Modern China’ in Karen G. Turner, James V. Feinerman and R. Kent Guy (eds.), The 
Limits of the Rule of Law in China (London: University of Washington Press 2000) 20–44. 
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law. As classified above, different resources of law between various central and local 
government bodies lead to the fragmented system of positive law. Meanwhile, 
informal law, including reputation, family relationship, and community judgement, 
has continued to affect written statutes.
7
 Furthermore, China has a considerable long 
history of receiving foreign laws.
8
 Since the late 1960s, however, it was implausible 
to transplant legal norms and institutions from developed to developing countries 
without taking into account local political, social and cultural contexts. And thus, the 
so-called ‘pre-tested’ best practice cannot be automatically suitable for the recipient.9 
In China’s case, international norms and standards have been weakened by 
transitional arrangements, and cannot work effectively in violation; instead, selective 
adaptation depends upon political regime, institutional capacity, and legal culture.
10
  
 
Moreover, difficulties have been caused by language and cultural traditions. For 
example, falv is usually translated as ‘regulations’ in English, while it is hard to find 
a proper English term for fagui or guizhang.
11
 In particular, there is a substantial 
difference between the mere existence of a legal system and establishing the rule of 
law, though they both are fazhi in Chinese.
12
 How to interpret rules and regulations 
is another challenge, for the fundamental principle of China’s legislature is to draft 
rules and regulations which exemplify stabilisation (wendingxing), flexibility 
(linghuoxing) and generalisation (yuanzexing). Accordingly, rules and regulations 
can be drafted to accommodate local conditions, but maintain internal coherence.
13
  
 
                                                          
7
 Bernard Chavance, ‘Formal and Informal Institutional Change: The Experience of Post-Socialist 
Transformation’ (2008) The European Journal of Comparative Economics 5(1): 57-71. 
8
 For a brief of historical development, see, Leigh K. Jenco, ‘“Rule by Man” and “Rule by Law” in 
Early Republican China: Contributions to a Theoretical Debate’ (2010) The Journal of Asian Studies 
69(1): 181–203. 
9
 For example, refer to, Herbert H.P. Ma, ‘The Chinese Concept of the Individual and the Reception 
of Foreign Law’ 9 Journal of Chinese Law 1995:207-218. 
10
 Pitman B. Potter, ‘Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and Selective Adaptation’ (2004) 
Law & Social Inquiry 29(2): 465–495. 
11
 In practice, more titles are used to represent different normative documents than those above, such 
as tiaoli, jueding, mingling, and jueyi. But even in Chinese, difference from the literature perspective 
is not as obvious. 
12
 There are plenty of studies into the application of “the rule of law” and “the rule by law” in China, 
as well as its relationship with democracy, e.g., Eric W. Orts, ‘The Rule of Law in China’ 34 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 2001: 43–115. 
13
 Daohui Guo, ‘Combination Between Stability and Flexibility in Legislation/Lun Lifa zhong 
Yuanzexing yu Linghuoxing Jiehe’ (1987) Law Review 21(1) [in Chinese]. 
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In addition, the full enforcement of law remains in doubt. Historically, lawsuits were 
regarded as undignified, placing down the basis for China’s society to promote 
shared values and norms; this was further consolidated under the Maoist ideology 
about a collectivism community.
14
 Lacking judicial independence affects the 
enforcement of law:
 15
 courts are under the direct leadership of the Party, and 
integrated into the state bureaucratic system. Courts are supervised by the Supreme 
People’s Court in Beijing and subject to the higher courts in the same region or area, 
and also depend upon the People’s Government for the allocation of buildings, 
personnel, and finances; this makes little institutional independence.
16
 Under this 
arrangement, courts are directly influenced by local governments, and also local 
protectionism has shaken the justice system.
17
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 For historical review, refer to, Xucheng Hu, Lawsuit: the Research on China’s Traditional 
Litigation/Su yu Song: Zhongguo Chunatong Susong Wenhua Yanjiu (Beijing: Renmin University 
Press 2012) [in Chinese]. 
15
 Guangzhong Chen, ‘Juridical Independence with Chinese Characteristics: from the Perspective of 
Comparative Law/Bijiaofa shiyexi de Zhongguo Tese Sifa Duli Yuanze’ 2 Comparative Studies 2013: 
1-12 [in Chinese]. 
16
 Xiao Wang, The Institutional Choice towards Justice/Zouxiang Sifa Gongzheng de Zhidu Xuanze 
(China Law Publishing 2005) 1–48, 106–144, 266–284 [in Chinese]. 
17
 Zuoxiang Liu, ‘Critical Analysis of Localisation of Juridical Power in China: Nationalisation of 
Judicial Power as the Guideline for Reform/Zhongguo Sifa Difang Baohu Zhuyi zhi Pipan: Jianlun 
Sifaquan Guojiahua de Sifa Gaige Silu’ 1 Law Studies 2003: 83-89 [in Chinese]. 
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